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Throughout the world, systems of life science governance carry historical, 
cultural, and political legacies, which now confront the revolutionary and 
pervasive advances of twenty-first century biotechnology. Nations' 
adaptability to the twin challenges of attempting to secure the benefits while 
reducing the risks and threats is a large and still burgeoning governance 
challenge. The legacy of the Soviet Union is particularly important in this 
regard, since its history of prolonged authoritarian rule and intense 
development of biological weapons in combination with the continuing 
scientific and technological prowess of Russia is a governance challenge, 
unprecedented in its nature and scale. The aim of the dissertation therefore 
is to examine to what extent and by what means it is possible for Russia to 
reconcile its on-going expansion in biotechnology with the institutional and 
normative inertia arising from its Soviet past. The first part of the dissertation 
(Chapters 1-4) seeks to uncover and analyse both the growth and 
consolidation of the governance of biotechnology and the multifaceted 
governance challenges brought about by the rapid advancement of the life 
sciences in the twenty-first century. The second part (Chapters 5-8) 
examines the extent to which the Soviet institutional and infrastructural 
legacies in the culture of life science research still persist in Russia and 
impact the governance of biotechnology in that country. The concluding 
chapter offers an assessment of the current state of the governance of 
biotechnology in Russia and outlines a scope for further research.  
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Introduction 
 
The present research seeks to examine the state of the culture of life science 
practice in post-Soviet Russia. As such, it constitutes an empirical 
investigation into the formal and intangible attributes and artefacts of 
biotechnology policy and practice in that country. The research advances two 
hypotheses: 
 (i) It is argued that throughout the world, systems of science 
governance carry historical, cultural, and political legacies, which now 
confront the revolutionary and pervasive advances of the twenty-first 
century biotechnology. Nations’ adaptability to the twin challenges of 
attempting to secure the benefits while reducing the risks and threats 
is a large and still burgeoning governance challenge.  
(ii) It is argued that the legacy of the Soviet Union is particularly 
important in this regard, since the history of a prolonged authoritarian 
rule and intense development of biological weapons in combination 
with the continuing scientific and technological prowess of Russia is a 
governance challenge, unprecedented in its nature and scale.  
 
The primary research question that the dissertation seeks to examine is: 
• To what extent and by what means is it possible for Russia to 
reconcile its on-going expansion in biotechnology with the 
institutional and normative inertia, arising from its Soviet past? 
The dissertation cuts across several sets of literature, bringing together 
elements of the anthropological study of culture; history of science and 
technology; management and international governance; and Soviet history 
and politics. A key concept utilised for the purposes of analysing change and 
continuities in the culture of life science research in present-day Russia is 
structural inertia. Originally developed in the field of organisational 
management, the concept of inertia is used in the context of the current 
research to elucidate the persistence of Soviet-style governance relations, 
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mentality, and power distribution among stakeholders involved in the 
biotechnology enterprise in Russia after 1990.  
In terms of structure, the dissertation takes the shape of an hourglass formed 
by two triangles. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of culture and examines 
the inter-connectedness between culture and governance. By demonstrating 
the ways in which culture impacts, and indeed underpins, governance, it 
underscores the limits of total and technocratic approaches to governance. 
Chapter 2 looks into the governance of science and technology until 1945. It 
focuses on the evolution of science as a professional sphere of activity and 
the ways in which it has been shaped by cultural, historical, political, and 
socio-economic contingencies. Chapter 3, then, delves into and examines 
the formation and governance of life science professional practice throughout 
the Cold War. It maps out some of the key developments, dynamics, and 
trends in the relations between the scientific community and the state that 
have had bearing on the consolidation of life science culture. Chapter 4 
narrows down the discussion the rapid advancement of biotechnology over 
the past few decades, outlining an array of factors that drive innovation and, 
at the same time, raise concerns of the extent to which the scope and pace 
of novel life science developments can be adequately governed.  
The first four chapters form Part 1 of the dissertation, and as such, seek to 
provide a rationale for looking into the case of post-Soviet Russia, in order to 
examine the impact and quality of inertia in the culture and governance of life 
science practice. Chapter 5 introduces the research hypotheses and main 
research question, as well as giving an overview of the methodological 
approach adopted for the study. Chapter 6 analyses the organisation, culture 
and governance of life science research from the late Imperial period in 
Russia throughout the years of Soviet rule. Chapter 7 then identifies and 
elucidates those attributes and artefacts that have persisted despite the 
disintegration of the USSR and the establishment of Russia as a pro-
democratic country with a market-oriented economy. In particular, it analyses 
the institutional and infrastructural legacies in power relations, practices, and 
socio-economic and political dynamics that shape life science policy and 
practice. Chapter 8 follows with an in-depth critical appraisal of life science 
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policy and practice in post-Soviet Russia. The concluding chapter offers an 
assessment of the current state of the governance of biotechnology in Russia 
and outlines a scope for further research. 
Parts of Chapters 1 and 4 have already been published. Full references are 
available in the Bibliography section of the dissertation. 
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Chapter 1: Culture and Governance 
 
Man’s Second Nature 
 
Arguably ‘culture’ is ‘one of the two or three most complicated words in the 
English language’1: a term shrouded in conceptual complexity and loaded 
with ‘considerable intellectual baggage,’2 which has ‘obstinately resisted final 
definition’.3 Much of the controversy surrounding the use of the concept 
stems from the fact that it has incessantly been employed in fundamentally 
differently ways4 and adapted in accordance with the dominant concerns of 
the day.5 Lamenting the mechanisation of human life under the pressures of 
the Industrial Revolution, nineteenth century authors, including Coleridge, 
Carlyle and Arnold, drew a Romantic picture of culture as ‘the pursuit of total 
perfection’,6 an ideal that must be ‘safeguarded, preserved, aspired towards 
and worked for’, which served as a counterforce in the face of the 
dehumanising influence of industrialisation.7 Hence the idea of the cultivated 
man, the intellectual, whose utter dedication to upholding the ideal of culture 
grants him a place within the social elite of the ‘clerisy’, or the intelligentsia. 
This usage of the word is closely linked with another, whereby culture is a 
collective category signifying the whole body of art and intellectual work 
within a society.8 In political terms, the concept of culture is often equated 
with the German idea of Kultur, which emphasises national differences and 
the particular identity of groups, and invoked in defence of indigenous styles 
of life and learning, distinct from those associated with the Western tradition.9 
 
By design, the concept of culture has a central standing10 in the discipline of 
anthropology but even there its meaning and use continue to be vigorously 
contested, as the work of Kroeber and Kluckhohn has illustrated. In an 
1 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Revised and Expanded Edition, (London: 
Fontana Press, 1988) p.87. 
2 Robert Borofsky et al. ‘When: A Conversation about Culture’, American Anthropologist, 103:2 (2001) p.434. 
3 Tim Ingold (ed). Companion Encyclopaedia of Anthropology: Humanity, Culture and Social Life, (London: 
Routledge, 1994) p.329. 
4 Elvin Hatch, Theories of Man and Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965). 
7 Chris Jenks, Culture, 2nd Ed. (London: Routledge, 2004), p.17;18. 
8 Ibid, p.11-12. 
9 Robert Borofsky, ‘When: A Conversation about Culture’, p.433 op cit. 
10 Richard Fox, ‘Culture – A Second Chance?’, Current Anthropology, vol.40:S1 (1999), pp.Si-Sii. 
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attempt to come up with an authoritative definition of the term, the authors 
conducted a detailed review of 150 definitions of culture, but their efforts 
have met with very little success.11 Despite the lack of consensus on how the 
term should be best defined, by and large anthropologists agree on the value 
of the concept of culture,12 not least because it provides them with a powerful 
tool with which to grasp the features of human existence.13 Language, belief 
systems, sacred rituals, routine activities, symbols, group ethos, spoken and 
unspoken rules guiding behaviour, styles of expression, art – virtually any 
aspect of the way of life of a given collective – are all elements of culture. Far 
from being an observable object or phenomenon, culture then is an 
abstraction, inferred from the observation of practices and artefacts 
perceived to be relatively common among the members of a certain group or 
population.14 As such, it is not merely a ‘complex whole’15 comprising single 
units but a system that is ‘highly patterned, cohesive, and coherent’16 and 
within which every sound, act, or object constitutes a sign bearing shared 
meaning.  
 
Culture is exclusively a human attribute. Unlike people, animals ‘have neither 
culture, nor history’, not only because they lack language and exchange 
information primarily via the lowest grade of social transmission, that is 
without conscious deliberation by either party, but also, and even more 
fundamentally, because they lack the categorical distinctions which provide 
the foundations on which cultural belief depends.17 Further differences stem 
from the fact that most animals, including higher mammals, inhabit an 
unchanging milieu to which their specialised organ structure is adapted and 
within which equally specific, innate, instinctive behaviour is carried out.18 
Man, by contrast, is characterised by morphological deficiency, insofar as he 
has practically no specialisations, his body is barely designed for attack and 
11 Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1952);  Robert Borofsky, p.432-433 op cit. 
12 For critique of the concept, see Edward Sapir, ‘Culture, Genuine and Spurious’, The American Journal of 
Sociology, vol.29:4 (1924), pp.401-429.  
13 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays, (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
14 Mark Schaller, Lucian Gideon Conway III and Christian Crandall, ‘The Psychological Foundations of Culture: An 
Introduction’ in Mark Schaller and Christian Crandall (ed.), The Psychological Foundations of Culture, (Mahwah, 
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), p.8. 
15 Edward B. Taylor, The Origins of Culture, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1958 [1873]). 
16 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture, op cit.  
17 Ibid, p.362; p.352; p.351 
18 Arnold Gehlen, Man, His Nature and Place in the World, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p.27.  
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protection and his senses are significantly underdeveloped compared to 
those of other animals.19 Given his ‘dangerous lack of true instincts’, man is 
not bound to a particular habitat to ensure his survival but is ‘world-open’,20 
which in turn allows him to move constrained only by his physical capacities, 
and makes him capable of adapting to even hostile natural conditions. Still, in 
order to survive, man somehow has to overcome, or at least to compensate 
for his biological deficiencies. His innate vulnerability thus becomes the 
primary stimulus to his creativity driving him to concentrate his efforts and 
energy on transforming the environment to meet his needs and satisfy his 
urges. By combining skill and ingenuity, man builds a shelter, devises 
weapons, creates tools, finds food and raises his offspring. In the process of 
accomplishing these and other tasks man learns the importance of co-
operating and communicating with others. The interplay between 
communication and cognition eventually gives rise to man’s ‘second nature’ – 
culture.21  
 
To man, culture is more than just a characteristic; rather, it is a necessity, for 
no human being can fully develop and fulfil his capacities outside the 
boundaries of culture. Since man is not associated with any particular natural 
habitat, he is required to create his own ‘unnatural’ environment22 in order to 
become truly human. The human world is thus the cultural world.23 The 
reason for this primarily stems from the fact that human biological 
development is not completed at the moment of birth but continues 
afterwards in an interrelationship with an environment and under the 
influence of significant others.24 An infant deprived of human presence would 
hardly resemble Kipling’s famous character, Mowgli. On the contrary, his 
development would be irreversibly impaired not only in terms of language 
and speech, but also as far as skills, reasoning, and morality are concerned. 
This in turn implies that man’s behaviour is neither just a sequence of 
responses to certain stimuli, nor a consequence of genetic programming. 
19 Ibid, p.26. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, p.29. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Peter Berger and Peter Ludwig, The Social Construction of Reality: A treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, 
(London: Allen Lane/Penguin Books, 1967), p.66. 
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Rather, it is moulded under the influence of continuous social interaction 
upon which the human brain is inevitably reliant for building its ‘own 
autonomous, ongoing pattern of activity’.25 Hence, the process of becoming 
man inevitably takes place in an established socio-cultural setting in the 
context of order, stability and direction, and never in isolation.26 Culture 
establishes the essential conditions for human existence, not least because 
without it man’s experience would be little more than a shapeless 
amalgamation of pointless actions and exploding emotions,27 and his ability 
to make sense of the outside world would be severely crippled. As such, it 
functions as a set of control mechanisms for the governing of human 
behaviour, effectively providing man with the templates, blueprints, moral 
codes and aesthetic judgements that he desperately requires in order to give 
form, point and direction to his life.28  
 
Culture grants man sanctuary from the tormenting pressures of chaos, which, 
if left untamed, threaten to engulf and eventually destroy him. By 
transforming human actions into habits and routines, it relieves man from the 
burden of constant decision-making and opens up a foreground for 
deliberation and innovation.29 It cushions man’s most severe anxieties thus 
offering him the comfort and tranquillity of living in a familiar setting. There is 
hardly a human fear more overwhelming than the terror of the ‘uncanny’, the 
unknown, the incomprehensible. Confronting what cannot be explained or 
interpreted horrifies man causing him mental paralysis and distress. 
Confusion, suffering and ‘a sense of intractable ethical paradox’ all mark a 
point beyond which the menace of chaos breaking in upon man appears 
vividly acute, not least because such states pose a radical challenge to the 
ability of man to grasp the intricacy of life.30 And this ability is vital to him, for 
man:  
must fulfil one condition of existence more than any 
other animal: man must from time to time believe 
he knows why he exists; his race cannot thrive 
25 Clifford Geerzt, The Interpretation of Culture, p.83, op cit.  
26 Ibid, p.69. 
27 Ibid p.46. 
28 Ibid, p. 44, p.52 
29 Peter Berger and Peter Ludwig, The Social Construction of Reality, p.71, op cit.  
30 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture, p.100, op cit.  
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without a periodic trust in life – without faith in the 
reason in life!31 
 
Satisfying man’s desperate need for answers would be impossible without a 
stable frame of reference, one that provides him with the tools required to 
construe and rationalise the objects and phenomena he encounters, and 
within which his actions acquire both purpose and meaning. Hence the 
indispensable role that culture plays in the life of human beings. Through its 
‘public symbolic structures’ culture suspends man in ‘webs of significance’ 
which simultaneously shape, guide and constrain his behaviour.32 With the 
aid of symbols and signs man succeeds in making sense of the surrounding 
world. Far from being mere mechanical expressions, his actions are goal-
oriented and motive-driven. By reading other people’s behaviour, he 
develops the ability to interact with his peers, giving verbal expression to his 
thoughts, intentions, and beliefs and wrapping his deeds in meaning. He 
reflects on and learns from his past experience, makes decisions about the 
present and envisions the future. This in turn allows him to utilise the power 
of his imagination and give shape to his dreams and desires by turning them 
into tangible reality; to plan his course of action according to external 
contingencies; and to creatively adapt the physical environment so as to 
satisfy his needs. The unfamiliar is conquered. Every phenomenon, object, 
gesture, sound has its place in the dominant cultural narrative reflected in 
myths, legends, sacred texts and folklore. Man can rest re-assured: he is no 
longer just a lone performer of random acts but finds himself in the midst of a 
cosmological drama, the beginning and the end of which remain forever 
shrouded in mystery but which nevertheless relates him to his predecessors 
and successors in a meaningful totality.33  
 
Culture constitutes man’s primary source of order and stability, insofar as it 
acts as a symbolic universe that demarcates the borders of social reality and 
defines the rules for social interaction.34  Any culture inevitably rests upon a 
31 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 29 (emphasis as 
original). 
32 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture, p.83 op cit.  
33 Peter Berger and Peter Ludwig, The Social Construction of Reality, p.120 op cit. 
34 Ibid. 
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set of ‘unquestioned and unverifiable beliefs’,35 which provide the basis for 
human action. Such beliefs are reinforced by the ‘frequent repetition of petty 
acts’36 and sustained by transmission across generations via ‘appropriate 
social mechanisms.’37 Through the process of transmission, they are 
permanently incorporated into the general stock of knowledge and accepted 
as fundamental truths. As a result, culture is no longer seen as a product of 
human activity but comes to resemble a ‘societal force’, one that is 
independent of ‘human purpose and wit’ and that exerts a strain on every 
person within its reach by dint of habit and custom.38 It is firm and opaque 
which makes it both resilient to challenges and resistant to change. Above 
all, it signifies both the institutionalised ‘way of how things are done’ within 
the respective group and the established model of behaviour with which 
every member has to demonstrate compliance. 
 
Man confronts culture as an objective reality: an external domain that is 
separate from his cognition and upon the elements of which he has little 
control. Under the influence of his peers, he is gradually ‘programmed’ to 
abide by cultural dogmas and behave in a way that is consistent with the 
prevalent normative order. Culture determines the standards on the basis of 
which man apprehends the world, relates to his milieu, acts and expresses 
himself.39 In other words, it reflects the accepted group ethos and as such, 
serves as the chief mechanism for regulation of human relatedness. Indeed 
 
[t]he most basic aspect of culture is its aptness for 
enabling a society to preserve reliable and 
acceptable relations, both internally between its 
members and externally with its milieu. If either 
fails, the society perishes.40 
 
It is worth noting that in performing its regulatory role culture is hardly 
dependent on enforcement tools. While such mechanisms do exist in the 
35 Geoffrey Vickers, Unpublished manuscript on culture p.8. 
36 William Sumner, Folkways: A study of the Sociological Importance of Usage, Manners, Customs, Mores, and 
Morals, (New York: Cosimo Inc. 2007 [1906]), p.3. 
37 David Premack and Ann James Premack, ‘Why Animals Have neither Culture nor History’, in Tim Ingold ed. 
Companion Encyclopaedia of Anthropology, p.352 op cit. 
38 William Sumner, Folkways, op cit. 
39 Geoffrey Vickers, Unpublished manuscript, op cit. 
40 Ibid, p.29. (emphasis as in original) 
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form of taboos, rules and laws, which envisage severe punishment for 
anyone daring to violate them, they are only occasionally invoked and 
enforced. This is not to say that individuals do not engage in practices such 
as murder, incest, or adultery solely on the grounds of fear of being 
reprimanded but because they view these activities as morally wicked and 
unacceptable, running counter to ‘normal’ human relations. Whereas 
compliance with cultural norms offers members of the collective certain 
benefits, including security and serenity, any attempt at defiance threatens to 
erode the status of the latter, effectively leading to their castigation. This 
subsequently raises the costs of nonconformity and facilitates the 
maintenance of the established order. Every aspect of this order is to a 
greater or lesser extent a manifestation of culture. Social roles, formal 
institutions, the distribution of power and regulatory architecture are all 
expressions of cultural forms. Even more importantly, they are reinforced and 
legitimated through culture. 
 
All forms of human association within a particular community are shaped by 
culture. This includes the fundamentals: the accrual and exercise of power; 
the determination of accountability and authority; and the articulation, 
organisation and pursuit of common interests. Hence, whether governing 
officials accede to power based on hereditary right or as a result of election, 
whether members of the polity can hold their governors accountable through 
formal procedures or find themselves at the whim of the ruling elite, or 
whether a society is devoid of hierarchy or organised around a rigid class 
system are matters that are deeply rooted in the historical and cultural 
development of a given community and as such, reflect its shared values, 
beliefs, convictions and morals. Very simple societies, for example, are rarely 
hierarchical, with power being vested in councils of elders, heads of 
households, or spiritual leaders such as priests and shamans, and 
collaboration arising spontaneously from a shared understanding of what 
needs to be done.41 By contrast, more complex forms of social organisation 
are characterised by a vertical distribution of power and intricate structures of 
41 Ibid, p.67. 
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interconnected positions. The differences notwithstanding, individuals within 
any collective are constantly engaged in role-playing, with the behaviour and 
actions of each role-holder being guided by tacit but more or less rigid shared 
standards of what is expected of them in any such position and of what they 
are in turn entitled to expect.42 What it means to be a husband, a wife, a 
ruler, or a servant is thus determined by the prevalent cultural values. Power 
relations at all levels from the social to private sphere are a function of 
culture. For instance, the status of and the attitude toward women in a 
society which asserts gender equality and promotes women’s freedom of 
choice and expression are in sharp contrast with the standing of women and 
the way they are treated in a social setting which tolerates male dominance 
and emphasises female modesty. Needless to say, the variance in the 
conception of gender across different cultures is reflected in virtually every 
aspect of life from the family realm through interaction in public to political 
activity. 
 
Yet it would be naïve to assume that the standards which shape social roles 
and serve as a precondition for social action are equally shared among all 
members of a given collective. On the contrary, cultures are never entirely 
uniform, even if their formal structures make them appear so.43 Indeed, every 
culture is bound to accommodate a range of subcultures formed around 
common criteria that can be as general as sex or age, or more specific like 
class, social rank, or economic status. While those subcultures inevitably 
bear some of the features of dominant cultures, they also differ from the latter 
in important ways, which in turn ensures richness and diversity within the 
community. Such heterogeneity is vital to cultures, not least because it 
makes them vibrant, plastic and adaptable, allowing them to maintain stability 
through change. But diversity can also be a source of tension and conflict, 
especially in times of rapid alternation under the influence of external factors 
when social values and established morals – the chief modulators of human 
relations – are challenged, or utterly eroded. Hence, it is of primary 
importance for any society to preserve enough shared culture in order to 
42 Ibid, p.66. 
43 See, for example, Valentina Lebedeva, ‘Totalitarian and Mass Elements in Soviet Culture of the 1930s’, Russian 
Studies in History, vol.42:2 (2003), pp.66-96. 
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sustain its internal relations and be able to act as a whole to the extent to 
which its survival requires.44 
  
Cultures within Culture: the ‘Matryoshka Principle’ 
 
It is possible to think of culture in terms of a multi-layered pattern. A useful 
analogy in this regard is the idea of a Matryoshka – a set of wooden dolls of 
decreasing size placed one inside the other. While all figures of a single 
Matryoshka are similar in form and designed around a shared concept, each 
of them differs from the rest as far as decoration is concerned. Despite the 
discrepancies in colour and style, the dolls belonging to a particular set still 
make up a coherent whole. Likewise, the subcultures found within a given 
society, by and large, resemble and/or are informed by the larger, dominant 
culture of the group.  
 
Subcultures based on biological sex are indicative. As discussed in the 
previous section, the roles of both men and women within a collective are 
culturally constructed, that is, gender differences stem not so much from 
physiological differences but from a shared understanding of what an 
appropriate male and female behaviour encompasses. In other words, they 
are expressed by dint of symbols, hero images, rituals and values45 with 
which individuals are expected to comply in every area of social activity. 
Thus, in communities where the position of women is accepted to be inferior 
vis-à-vis that of men, the principles asserted by the dominant culture are to a 
greater or lesser extent reflected in the various subcultures formed around 
gender. The same tendency is also valid for other types of subcultures, 
including those arising from differences in age and social class. What is 
generally perceived as a ‘gap between generations’ more often than not 
refers to values and practices that are attributes of age and, as such, repeat 
themselves for each successive pair of generations.46 A sharp divergence 
from the ethos and established routines of the dominant culture manifested, 
44 Geoffrey Vickers, Unpublished manuscript, p.23 op cit. 
45 Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind, Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance 
for Survival, 3rd ed. (London: Mc Graw-Hill, 2010) p.16. 
46 Ibid, p.17. 
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say in the willingness of the youth to radically alter their lifestyle by 
abandoning the village and moving permanently to the city, is an anomaly 
which poses an existential threat to the survival of the larger culture in 
question. In a similar fashion, individuals belonging to a class subculture, for 
example the working class, middle class or the intelligentsia, share certain 
beliefs, manners of behaviour, symbols and values that distinguish them from 
those with a higher or lower social rank. Such differences usually stem from 
the education and occupation opportunities open to class members, the 
economic power of the class and its relative standing vis-à-vis other class 
subcultures within the social hierarchy. Nevertheless, the prevalent norms 
and practices associated with a given subculture (e.g. the working class) are 
inevitably influenced by the larger, dominant culture (e.g. state’s national 
culture) within which the former is situated. 
 
But there is another type of subculture to which individuals, far from being 
‘assigned’ as a result of circumstances beyond their control, choose to 
belong in the course of their lives. Such elective subcultures are, by and 
large, present in every community and fulfil various purposes. Depending on 
their origins and function, their normative ethos, guiding principles and belief 
system can be loosely defined or formally codified in official documents and 
codes. In any event, members are expected to demonstrate conformity with 
the established rules, be they unspoken or formalised, and any departure 
from the norms is treated as a break with the group ethos. Informal 
subcultures often develop in opposition to aspects of the dominant culture 
and, as such, are viewed as odd or subversive, constituting a deviation from 
the prevalent social mores and enjoying a consciousness of ‘otherness’.47 
They may be formed around a shared interest (e.g. music, art), hobby (e.g. 
sport), or a cause. The punk movement, ‘Beatlemania’, football fan clubs, the 
hippie movement, and environmental and AIDS activists all bear similar 
features, insofar as their members carry certain symbols (clothes, slang, 
impolite behaviour) aspire to certain hero images (pop stars, bands, sport 
players, political figures, spiritual leaders), engage in certain rituals 
(demonstrations, graffiti, use of recreational drugs) and cherish certain values 
47 Ken Gelder and Sarah Thorton, (ed.), The Subcultures Reader, (London: Routledge 1997), p.5. 
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(freedom, equality, justice, peace, concern for nature, health) which 
unequivocally distinguish them from the rest of society. The crucial role that 
those elements play in the functioning and sustaining of subcultures 
contravenes the popular myth that the latter are little more than ‘lawless 
forms’.48 On the contrary: 
 
the internal structure of any particular subculture is 
characterised by an extreme orderliness: each part 
is organically related to other parts and it is through 
the fit between them that the subcultural member 
makes sense of the world.49 
 
But elective subcultures can also be institutionalised through formal practices 
and procedures. Such is the case with cultures of work and professional 
norms. Cultures of work derive from the diverse functional roles that 
individuals within a social grouping are expected to perform as a result of the 
division of labour. Whereas the choice of role is, by and large, in the hands of 
individuals, the question of a good performance is not. In other words, 
community members are invariably required to demonstrate sufficient 
proficiency in completing the tasks that particular roles encompass. To this 
end, individuals are expected to develop a certain set of skills and acquire 
knowledge as to how best to fulfil their work-related duties and thus 
contribute to the common good. The type and gamut of functional roles are 
bound to vary across different groups depending on the needs, traditions and 
lifestyle of their members. A pre-historic tribe with a relatively small size and 
simple structure, for instance, would require only a limited number of 
functional subgroups specialising in activities chiefly directed at providing 
food and shelter. By contrast, a mediaeval city-state or modern industrialised 
society characterised by the innate intricacy of its structures and dynamics 
would be capable of accommodating a considerably larger number of work 
subcultures formed around activities as diverse as curing, governing, 
teaching, ensuring territorial integrity and security, crafting, building, and 
engineering. What is important, however, is that irrespective of whether 
individuals choose to join the tribal hunting group, the guild of master 
craftsmen, or the Bar Association, they have to meet certain requirements, 
48 Dick Hebdige, ‘Subculture: The Meaning of a Style [1979]’, in ibid, p.137. 
49 Ibid. 
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learn certain strategies, obtain certain skills, become familiar with and abide 
by established group ethos, engage in certain practices and rituals, and be 
able to pass the acquired knowledge and abilities to younger generations. In 
short, they need to undergo a process of cultural socialisation which not only 
would facilitate their personal development but also would allow them to 
excel and rise through the ranks of the functional group. 
 
Yet to say that functional groups generally possess culture by no means 
implies that there are no significant differences in what their culture is like or 
how it is manifested. On the contrary, such discrepancies do exist and even 
play a crucial part in determining the status of a particular functional group 
within the social hierarchy. Accordingly, based on the ‘thickness’ of their 
culture, functional groups are classified as either ‘professions’, or 
‘occupations’. By design, this distinction is not a qualitative but a quantitative 
one, for nonprofessional occupations do possess most of the attributes of 
professions, including systematic body of theory, authority, community 
sanction and ethical code, but to a lesser degree.50 So, instead of 
constituting two opposing camps, professions and occupations seem to be 
distributed along a continuum with well-recognised and undisputed 
professions (e.g. physician, scientist, accountant, lawyer) situated at one 
end, the least skilled and least attractive occupations (e.g. cleaner, driver, 
truckloader) at the other, with the rest distributed in-between in accordance 
with their level of required skill and prestige.51 The category of professions is 
a curious one, for while occupations have to develop into professions, not all 
occupations are destined to professionalise; that is, some activities are more 
likely to enjoy the status of becoming and being regarded as professions than 
others. The reason behind this trend in part can be traced in the historical 
development of professions. 
 
Traditionally, professions were understood as those occupations that were 
‘suitable for a gentleman’ in the sense that they were supposed neither to 
50 Ernest Greenwood, ‘The Attributes of a Profession’, Social Work, vol.2:3 (1957), p.46.  
51 Ibid. 
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‘dull the brain, like manual labour’, nor to ‘corrupt the soul, like commerce’.52 
Since embarking on a professional career demanded utter dedication, 
extensive preparation and training, and substantial investment of time and 
resources, professions were the chief mark only of those members of society 
who could afford to live life as an end it itself relieved from the worry of 
securing their daily subsistence (e.g. the nobility). As a consequence, the 
practice of professions was virtually free of economic pressures53 guided 
purely by an individual’s interest in the subject matter of their choice and not 
subject to profit calculations. In conducting their activity, professionals were 
supposed, first and foremost, to be in service of society always working up to 
established standards and demonstrating expert proficiency without aiming or 
even expecting to earn a fortune. Being a professional was not a money-
making business; rather it was a vocation. And even when those engaged in 
a professional endeavour enjoyed rewards for their service, this was not in 
response to commercial cravings but only a gesture confirming the 
unequivocal value of professions as social institutions: 
 
We trust our health to the physician, our fortune 
and sometimes our life and reputation to the lawyer 
and attorney. Such confidence could not safely be 
reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. 
Their reward must be such, therefore, as may give 
them that rank in the society which so important a 
trust requires.54 
 
Along with their historical origins, there are additional nuance features that 
grant professions an air of superiority vis-à-vis occupations. One pertains to 
their raison d’étre. By design, the idea of professions rests on the two-fold 
premise that first, there are such human problems that cannot remain 
unaddressed, and, secondly, that such human ills can be alleviated through 
the provision of expert service. While the range of problems that inevitably 
needs to be tackled tends to vary among different communities, virtually all 
cultures seem to give special attention to certain concerns including 
sickness, salvation, and protection of life, property and reputation, by 
52 Thomas H. Marshall, ‘The Recent History of Professionalism in Relation to Social Structure and Social Policy’, 
The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol.5:3 (1939) p.325.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Adam Smith quoted in ibid, p.326. 
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assigning their solution to a designated group of individuals which alone is in 
a position to assess the situation correctly and articulate expert advice. 
Authority is vested in those groups by dint of their monopoly on the 
knowledge and skill required to make informed decisions when it comes to 
curing the sick, preaching the words of god, administering one’s money, 
defending one’s dignity, teaching the youth and discovering the truth in the 
world.  What makes the work of a professional utterly indispensable therefore 
is not merely its importance to public welfare but the fact that it can only be 
conducted by a representative of the respective professional guild. Given this 
‘asymmetry of expertise’,55 any relationship between professionals and those 
in need of their service is deemed to be an unequal one, with the latter being 
almost entirely dependent on the quality of advice offered by the former. 
Hence, in the professional realm, unlike in other occupations, trust between 
the parties involved is an essential requirement. The conduct of a lawyer is 
guided by an established code of ethics; the work of a market seller is not. 
Likewise, those requesting professional help are not customers but clients 
and, as such, they are not always right: they have to accept and comply with 
the conditions set by the experts, since it is the latter who know best what the 
former need.56 
 
Besides technical proficiency in their selected area of specialisation, 
professionals are also expected to demonstrate adherence to set of norms 
which shape their behaviour toward colleagues and professionals in other 
fields, as well as clients.57 Far from being divorced from a moral duty, 
professional practice is bound to be devoted to a service ideal, often 
enshrined in a formal code of ethics, according to which quality should not be 
sacrificed, standards should not be compromised and personal or 
commercial profit should not be advanced at the expense of the client’s 
interests.58 It is the responsibility of any professional to work toward the 
55 Andrew Abbott The System of Professions: An essay on the Division of Expert Labour (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1988), p.5. 
56 Thomas H. Marshall, ‘The Recent History of Professionalism in Relation to Social Structure and Social Policy’ 
p.330, op cit. 
57 Harold Wilensky, ‘The Professionalisation of Everyone?’, The American Journal of Sociology, vol.70:2 (1964), 
p.138. 
58 Ibid, p.140. 
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promotion and preservation of this ideal by exhibiting collegial respect, 
protecting clients, refraining from abusing their position of knowledge for 
personal gain, and exposing instances of incompetence and unscrupulous 
practice. Fostering dedication to professional ethos is thus a requisite 
element of the process of acquiring a professional role. The professional 
paradigm usually begins with a selection and passes through several stages 
including instruction, apprenticeship, sanctioning, certification and 
sponsorship.59 Advancing from one stage to another, the prospective 
professional aims to acquire the knowledge, skills and attributes that would 
eventually both grant them a full membership in the ‘quasi-sacred extra-
mundane sphere’ of professional communities and allow them to excel in 
their career.60 Yet the process of professional socialisation is never finished 
until the individuals have entirely immersed themselves in the culture of the 
respective profession, that is, until they have not become familiar with the 
argot (e.g. jargon, abbreviations, slogans), values (e.g. rationality, 
impartiality, commitment to objectivity regarding theory and technique), 
symbols (e.g. dress, emblems, insignias, heritage, folklore, stereotypes, 
heroes and villains) etiquette (e.g. formal and unspoken rules for being 
admitted to a profession, making a career, attracting clients, applying for 
funds, relating to peers, superiors, or subordinates) and marketplace 
information (e.g. matrix of activities and opportunities salient to practice).61 
As a result of the acculturation process, whereby the individual internalises 
the values, norms, and symbols of the occupational group, the acquired 
professional status becomes the dominant source of the individual’s identity 
with other sources being voluntarily and, sometimes, forcibly subordinated.62  
 
Since professions do not exist in a vacuum but find themselves in a constant 
interaction with other social groups and structures, cultures of work are 
hardly sheltered from the influences of the dominant culture within which they 
59 Basil Sherlock and Richard Morris, ‘The Evolution of the Professional: A Paradigm’, Sociological Inquiry, vol.37:1 
(1967) p.33, p.44. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid; See also Ernest Greenwood, ‘Attributes of a Profession’, p.52, op cit. 
62 See Basil Sherlock and Richard Morris, ‘The Evolution of the Professional: A Paradigm’, p.34, op cit; Ernest 
Greenwood, p.53 op cit; Robert MacIver, ‘The Social Significance of Professional Ethics’, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol.297 (1955), pp.118-124. 
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operate. That is, in their greatest part, professional norms reflect and are 
conditioned by the historical and cultural contingencies that have influenced 
social development. Almost any aspect of an individual’s career path from 
occupational training through job selection to professional practice and 
building a reputation is subject to the mores and morals prevalent in a given 
community.  Thus, whether a job is suitable for a male or female, whether it is 
prestigious or not, or whether it offers enough scope for career development 
inevitably depends on and is determined by society’s shared beliefs, needs 
and priorities. In a similar fashion, both formal and informal aspects of 
cultures of work are a function of the modes of behaviour sanctioned by the 
larger culture. For instance, in societies where discrimination and harassment 
on the grounds of sex, race and age are generally viewed as unacceptable, 
powerful norms against such actions are expected to develop in the 
professional realm, as well. Likewise, in conservative societies with explicit 
social hierarchy, professions also tend to be hierarchical, which in turn 
predisposes individuals to act in accordance with their professional rank by, 
say, always referring to their superiors by title and surname. Occasionally, 
the dominant culture may impact on, interfere or even clash with certain 
technical aspects of professional cultures. The pressure put on doctors who 
conduct abortion and/or euthanasia in communities where a strong taboo 
against such practices exists; the opposition toward providing legal service to 
members of minority groups; and the negative opinion voiced by the Church 
regarding certain scientific advances including stem cell research are all 
indicative of the how public opinion and social norms may affect the activity 
of professional groups.  
 
In modern industrialised states the penetrating influence that the dominant 
social culture exerts on the cultures of work is explicitly manifested in the way 
the former shapes and governs the latter. Virtually any culture of work is 
subject to some form of state regulation. Moreover, the type and extent of 
regulation that a professional culture requires is bound to vary from one 
occupation to another, as well as from a country to country. Depending on 
their standing within society and the value attached to the service they 
provide, certain occupations tend to be more strictly regulated compared to 
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others. For instance, the rules and guidelines with which medical doctors 
have to comply in their everyday practice are far more wide-ranging and 
sophisticated than the ones guiding the conduct of, say, cleaners. But there 
are other factors that are crucial for determining the degree of state control 
over a professional activity. Some pertain to the characteristics of the 
occupation in question. Those include its utility to the proper functioning of 
the state body; the level of expertise and skills, and the responsibilities it 
entails; and the conditions in which it has to be carried out. Hence, police 
officers enjoy the prerogative to carry a gun; prospective teachers are 
expected to hold formal qualifications and demonstrate competence in their 
area of specialisation; drivers are obliged not to exceed a set amount of 
working hours; and miners are required to use special work gear and 
equipment that ensures their safety. The kind and intensity of regulation is 
further dependent on country specificities.63 In capitalist societies which 
foster and promote private ownership and enterprise, state control is 
generally limited and attempts by governments to interfere with the affairs of 
professional guilds are perceived as intrusive, even threatening. By contrast, 
in communist societies professional practice in almost any sphere is not only 
heavily regulated by the ruling elite, but very often it is also funded and 
directed at ends and objectives that are explicitly set and defined by the 
government. 
 
The Social Homeostasis64 
 
Just as the human body has to maintain inner balance in order to perform its 
vital functions, virtually any social grouping requires a certain degree of 
internal stability to ensure that it can survive and flourish. As far as the body 
is concerned, balance is achieved via the process of homeostasis, which 
allows the body to keep its inner conditions, such as temperature and blood 
pressure, at constant rates, especially when reacting to changes. For social 
groups, order is established and maintained by dint of governance. The 
63 P. Sohl and H. A. Bassford, ‘Codes of Medical Ethics: Traditional Foundations and Contemporary Practice’, Social 
Science and Medicine, vol.22:11 (1986), p.1179. 
64 Parts of this section appear in Tatyana Novossiolova, ‘Biosecurity as a Normative Challenge’ in Jens Clausen and 
Neil Levy, (ed.), Handbook of Neuroethics, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), pp.1813-1825.  
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process of governance is a complex one happening on multiple levels, 
encompassing a multitude of actors and taking a variety of forms. Since one 
of the chief properties of social systems is communication, it is possible to 
view governance as a combination of steering and coordination,65 both of 
which are communicative processes aimed at influencing actions and 
behaviour, and attaining desired goals. Among the most common modes of 
governance are hierarchies, the ‘rationalised instrument of authority’,66 
networks, defined as ‘relatively institutionalised frameworks of negotiated 
interaction within which different actors struggle with each other, create 
opportunities for joint decisions and coordinate concrete actions’,67 and 
markets. What form of governance needs to be adopted within a particular 
community cannot be determined in abstract terms but has to be reconciled 
with historical and cultural contingencies. One of the main reasons behind 
this lies in the unique and highly specific nature of social order. 
 
Social order is not static but finds itself in a constant flux under the influence 
of various internal and external factors impacting on the community and on 
its relations with other systems. In contrast to the common perception of 
order as fixed and visual, among the chief attributes of social order are 
functionality and plasticity, which allow it to adjust to and accommodate 
changes in the social and ecological circumstances, and to respond to novel 
challenges. Among the most fascinating features of social order is its informal 
character, which mirrors the vibrant spirit and multi-faceted complexity of 
human-to-human interaction, vigorous communication and mutual 
understanding. Social order is therefore entrenched in the underlying logic of 
everyday social life: 
 
The sum of each casual, public contact at a local 
level (e.g. nodding hello, admiring a newborn baby, 
asking where someone’s nice pears come from) – 
most of it fortuitous, most of it associated with 
errands, all of it mattered by the person concerned 
and not thrust upon him by anyone – is a feeling for 
the public identity of people, a web of public respect 
65 Anders Esmark, ‘The Functional Differentiation of Governance: Public Governance beyond Hierarchy, Market and 
Networks’, Public Administration, vol.87:2 (2009), p.356. 
66 Robbie Waters Robichau, ‘The Mosaic of Governance: Creating a Picture with Definitions, Theories and Debates’, 
Policy Studies Journal, vol.39:s1 (2011), p.123. 
67 Ibid, p.122. 
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and trust, and a resource in time of personal or 
neighbourhood need. The absence of this trust is a 
disaster to a city street. Its cultivation cannot be 
institutionalised.68 
 
 
One aspect of social order that merits special attention is its normative 
foundation. Contrary to the assumption that order within social systems 
stems from formally established rules and procedures, such as laws and the 
institutions responsible for their enforcement, there are sufficient grounds to 
treat the former as a product of the predominant social norms and the 
expectations for acceptable behaviour that they create. It suffices to mention 
that people seldom refrain from committing illegal acts, including theft and 
murder, merely out of fear of facing sanctions afterwards. Were this the case, 
crime rates would be ubiquitously high and the prisons would be permanently 
full. Rather, individuals themselves choose to follow agreed rules of common 
decency, for they are convinced it is in their interest to do so. The underlying 
logic of such behaviour is not difficult to grasp: by accepting certain 
constraints on their freedom individuals signal their inclination to cooperate 
with other members of society and contribute to the common good, thus 
enjoying benefits which otherwise will be unattainable. Not only does free-
riding then become a costly option, but it also loses its attractiveness, as 
‘cheaters’ are hardly tolerated and likely to be ostracised.69 A powerful social 
stigma on certain actions will undoubtedly have direct implications for the 
establishment of social order. To be sure, the members of a society in which 
theft and murder are commonly viewed as unacceptable acts that merit 
denunciation are much more likely to enjoy a relative degree of safety than 
those living in a society utterly dependent on law enforcement for tackling 
such problems: 
 
Social order is not the result of the architectural 
order created by T squares and slide rules. Nor is 
social order brought about by such professionals as 
policemen, nightwatchmen, and public officials. 
Instead, ‘the public peace is – the sidewalk and 
street peace – of cities is …kept by an intricate, 
almost unconscious network of voluntary controls 
68 Jane Jacob quoted in James Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p.136. 
69 Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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and standards among the people themselves, and 
enforced by people themselves’.70 (Emphasis as 
original) 
 
 
Norms signify what a particular social group considers acceptable and 
unacceptable modes of behaviour. Unlike laws, they are not dependent on 
government for either promulgation or enforcement.71 Instead, norms arise 
from and crystallise in the emergence of gradual consensus72 as to what the 
members of a given group perceive as ‘normal’, and are sustained by a 
shared recognition of their importance. Norms carry significant regulatory 
weight, insofar as they reflect the ethos of the group, that is, the beliefs, 
values and morals shared by its members, and instances of non-compliance 
may have severe consequences. Thus, conformity with established norms 
both plays a paramount role in the maintenance of social order and 
constitutes an indispensable precondition for the functioning of law. As 
Tamanaha73 has pointed out, the ‘state legal system would not even exist, 
were it not for an already stable and effective baseline provided by the 
unarticulated substrate, shared norms, instrumental behaviour and consent’.  
 
Norms are inevitably subject to cultural and historical contingencies and tend 
to vary across communities. As such, they resemble ‘a living, negotiated 
tissue of practices which are continually being adapted to new ecological and 
social circumstances – including, of course, power relations.74 Far from being 
static, norms evolve and change in parallel with social processes and 
practices. For their part, laws by and large, follow the dynamics of social 
norms and adapt accordingly. Laws that guarantee women’s rights have only 
emerged as a result of the persistent efforts of the emancipation movements 
over the past century that challenged the prevalent norms of male superiority. 
Similarly, the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa would not have 
70 Jane Jacob in James Scott, Seeing like a State, p.135, op cit. 
71 Richard Posner and Eric Ramusen, ‘Creating and Enforcing Norms with Special Reference to Sanctions’, 
International Review of Law and Economics, vol.19 (1999), p.369. 
72 Ibid, p.370. 
73 Brian Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.224. 
74 James Scott, Seeing like a State, p.34, op cit.  
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occurred had not it been for the lack of popular support for the established 
order.75  
 
But while formal forms of regulation and control are largely informed and 
influenced by the changing social norms and practices, the reverse process, 
whereby governors adopt the former for promoting a particular desired 
behaviour among the members of a community is messy and arduous, 
exposing the limits of purely top-down governance mechanisms. The history 
of the human rights regime is a case in point. Brought about by the struggle 
of individuals everywhere to delegitimise the relations of absolute power, the 
human rights regime has played a major role in the abolition of colonialism, 
total war and slavery. At the same time, although most states have officially 
acceded to and codified at national level the provisions of the international 
treaties that seek to guarantee a set of universal rights for every human 
being, practices as gruesome as female genital mutilation (FGM), honour 
killing and even genocide still persist more than 60 years after the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was signed. The obstacles to effective norm 
entrepreneurship are further illustrated in the reluctance of democratic 
governments to impose legal rules which are inconsistent with the prevalent 
social norms. Hence, the decision of President Lyndon Johnson to sign the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 is often cited as an example of political courage, not 
least because of the public outrage that followed the new law, especially in 
the southern states. Needless to say, the Act required a substantial degree of 
enforcement in order to have an effect on lessening racial discrimination and 
segregation. 
 
The above discussion is indicative of the significant role that social norms 
play in the regulation of human relatedness, that is, in the governance of 
social systems. Contrary to the popular belief that regulatory activity could be 
reduced to rational problem solving, whereby quick and easy fixes could be 
identified and implemented by those in power, the process of regulation 
within the social realm is anything but clear and straightforward. Regulation is 
more often than not a slow and complex task, which, even if performed 
75 Jim Whitman, The Fundamentals of Global Governance, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009) p.80. 
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effectively, remains unlikely to result in direct and linear effects, control of all 
possible variation, or eradication of unintended consequences.76 It is not an 
exact science: there are hardly any clear-cut answers, nor are there hard and 
fast rules that the regulator must follow in order to ensure successful 
outcomes. This is so, for the task of regulation is one that ‘engages the whole 
person’.77 As such, it encompasses ‘not only the ability to analyse problems 
and work out rational responses but also, the ability to respond to situations 
on the basis of feelings and emotions’.78 Given the centrality of judgement in 
the process of regulation, virtually any form of governance that is based 
primarily or solely on rationality is likely not only to be largely ineffective but 
also deleterious. From the horrors of the concentration camps run by the 
Nazi regime79 through the destruction of the Aral Sea in the former Soviet 
Union to the failure of the ‘shock therapy’ designed to facilitate the economic 
recovery of post-communist Russia in the early 1990s, the pernicious effects 
of governance mechanisms that are based on sheer rationality in terms of 
goal-chasing, division of labour and rule-following and that demonstrate 
neglect of moral and human costs are vividly revealed. Optimisation in the 
management of machines could potentially increase efficiency and 
productivity; optimisation in the regulation of social systems inevitably leads 
to omission of important aspects pertaining to the range of potential complex 
interactions between man-made and natural systems, and erosion of the 
established moral principles. Unlike the technical operator who ‘has a single 
course given outside the system’, the human regulator, individual or 
collective, ‘controls a system which generates multiple and mutually 
inconsistent courses. The function of the regulator is to choose and realise 
one of the many possible mixes, not fully attainable’.80 In other words, far 
from striving to arrive at optimal solutions, the regulator has to come up with 
solutions that are good enough in the perceived circumstances.81 In doing so, 
he is not acting from the position of an impartial observer placed outside the 
76 Anders Esmark, ‘The Functional Differentiation of Governance’ op cit, p. 356. 
77 Peter Checkland, ‘Systems Theory and Management Thinking’, American Behavioural Scientist, vol.38:1 (1994), 
p.76. See also Charles Lindblom, ‘The Science of “Muddling Through”’, Public Administration Review, vol.19:2 
(1959), pp.79-88.  
78 Ibid. 
79 See Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
80 Geoffrey Vickers quoted in Peter Checkland, ‘Systems Theory and Management Thinking’, p.81, op cit. 
81 Peter Checkland, p.79, op cit. 
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system he is supposed to regulate but is an active member of the respective 
society, and as such, is guided in his deeds and decisions by the prevalent 
social norms, standards and values. The process of governance and all its 
forms are thus a manifestation of culture and the need for maintaining 
desired and eluding undesired relationships within and outside the social 
system.82 
   
Engineering Governance 
 
The idea that governance is a function of culture has direct and profound 
implications for the notion of total control. Given the informal logic of social 
order that emphasises the vitality of social norms and the indispensable role 
of moral judgement, it is hard to imagine how every aspect of human activity 
could be subject to formal regulation and constant supervision: 
 
Political systems […] are not to be modelled on 
computers, unless they are simplified either by 
ignoring their more important aspects, which only 
makes the result misleading, or by controlling their 
outcome with a completeness, which, if it were 
possible, would be highly threatening – as it already 
is in those regimes where it is attempted.83 
 
Despite the influential and quite convincing anti-utopian scenarios presented 
in George Orwell’s 1984 and Aldous Huxley’s A Brave New World, the utterly 
totalitarian society in which individuals’ behaviour is so closely monitored that 
instances of disobedience are pre-empted and any alternatives to the 
dominant power and the lifestyle it imposes are virtually non-existent so far 
remains a fiction. Even one of the most commonly cited historical examples 
of totalitarian government, the case of the Soviet Union, tends to reinforce 
rather than dispel the myth of total control. A careful analysis of the complex 
processes that took place within the Soviet society throughout the 1930s, a 
period associated with the ‘darkest’ days of Stalinist repression, vigorous use 
of propaganda and censorship, and blatant abuse of government power 
reveals that ‘beneath the “smooth coiffure” of totalitarian culture […] many 
82 Geoffrey Vickers quoted in ibid, p.81. 
83 Geoffrey Vickers, Human Systems Are Different, (London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1983), p.xxiii. 
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cultural worlds remained intact, and there existed a zone in which a mass 
aesthetic consciousness spontaneously took shape’.84 Official culture that 
sought to shape the ‘new man’ by praising the ideological superiority of Marx-
Leninist postulates and asserting communist values quickly proved incapable 
of filling the entire cultural space, leaving a niche within which popular culture 
could comfortably develop and flourish.85 Up until the collapse of the 
communist regime, the borders of the Soviet Union, otherwise largely sealed 
for human movement, remained permeable to foreign influence which quickly 
took root in a range of informal practices surreptitiously cherished by the 
masses. The persistent attempts of power structures to keep literature, 
theatre and cinemas in check notwithstanding, the ‘art of the masses’ and 
‘mass art’ obstinately made their way avoiding the dense net of state controls 
and oppressive sanctions and finding expression through the variety stage, 
vaudeville, circus, ‘under the counter’ sale of jazz and foxtrots, and ‘de-
westernisation’ of foreign movies.86 Against the background of 
institutionalised ideologically acceptable art forms, forbidden books, 
meticulous repertoire planning, and intellectual corruption and silencing, 
popular culture with its simplicity, light and cheerful spirit, and proximity to 
everyday life served as a social shield against the horrors conducted by the 
secret police and the pervasive chill of fear imbuing every level of society. 
Despite its sophisticated state apparatus, enormous resources, impeccably 
devised control mechanisms, and efficiently run network of prisons and 
labour camps, the Soviet Union never fully defeated the forces of mass 
culture which eventually contributed to its own disintegration, underscoring 
the limits of government structures and the futility of sheer power in winning 
the hearts and minds of individuals. 
 
While the tragic fate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
illustrates the negative outcomes of myopic leadership with regard to popular 
culture and its creative impulses, it still does not entirely exclude the 
possibility of comprehensive regulation of human affairs. After all, if the main 
84 Valentina Lebedeva, ‘Totalitarian and Mass Elements in Soviet Culture of the 1930s’, op cit, p.66. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid.  
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challenge to governance engineering is culture with its complexity and 
unpredictability, it seems logical to assume that the simplification of the latter 
would potentially facilitate the former. But could culture be really simplified to 
such an extent as to enable intensive coordination and exercise of holistic 
control? While the immediate answer seems to be ‘no’, it may be helpful to 
consider the structure of cultures of work in modern industrialised states. A 
closer look at the modern professional arena reveals a tightly 
compartmentalised landscape characterised by a clear division of labour and 
narrow specialisation. Since most areas of expertise are limited in terms of 
breadth focusing on the details of a particular subject matter, tailoring 
professional roles accordingly makes assigning individual responsibilities 
relatively easy and straightforward. The scope of employees’ duties is thus 
generally restricted to the tasks that have to be performed as part of their 
respective jobs. The allocation of power follows much the same principle. 
The lady behind the reception desk at a public institution may advise visitors 
on the type of forms that are required, the documents that have to be 
submitted alongside and the typical period for response but she can hardly 
assist with resolving non-information-related issues: she is neither qualified, 
nor authorised to do so. Likewise, an operator working within a giant 
chemical plant is expected to fulfil certain duties with regard to machine 
maintenance but in case of any major system failure that exceeds his level of 
competence, he is obliged to report to his superiors and wait for expert 
assistance before resuming work.  
 
To some extent, cultures of work have been consolidated because of the 
significant impact of technology. With the rapid advancement and 
proliferation of high technology over the past century many areas of 
professional specialisation have been tremendously transformed creating a 
working environment that emphasises efficiency, safety and effectiveness. 
From mining and factory processing to transportation and laboratory work the 
effects of technological optimisation as a substitute for human force are 
reflected in better quality, increased precision, lessened resource waste, and 
a reduced range of potential hazards. The air traffic control system is a case 
in point. Thanks to the improvements made in aircraft design, monitoring and 
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navigation, the number of plane crashes and collisions has been significantly 
reduced as a result of which commercial flights are generally perceived as a 
relatively safe way of travelling.87 
 
A direct consequence of the growing reliance upon machines, computers and 
other technical devices hailed as markers of civilisational progress is the 
significantly decreased role of the human factor in the performance of tasks 
and operations. Besides in air traffic control, this trend is also evident in other 
areas including chemical plant management, laboratory research, and space 
missions. In all of those fields technical competence is considered of 
paramount importance and the scope for improvisation is substantially 
restricted. There are also practical reasons why technology is deemed 
indispensable in the modern professional arena. The most obvious one is 
that it works, or at least, it seems to do so to the extent that it allows 
operations to be performed faster and more effectively. As already 
mentioned, engineering controls are particularly praised for their contribution 
to safety. High-containment laboratories equipped with advanced hardware 
and extra precautions provide life scientists with a favourable environment for 
conducting experiments on a host of highly dangerous pathogens such as 
the causative agents of Ebola, HIV/AIDS and smallpox without compromising 
public welfare. But what really makes technology so attractive is the way in 
which it appears to facilitate governance. Risk assessment software, 
manuals containing clear and detailed instructions pertaining to job 
technicalities, and extensive descriptions of safety procedures and practices 
are considered valuable tools in the modern management arsenal, not least 
because they provide employees and manages alike with blueprints of how 
work within a given institutions is to be organised so that efficiency is 
maximised and the likelihood for any potential hazards is kept to a minimum. 
As a result, there is a prima facie reason to suppose that the more technical 
the matter to be governed, say work in a laboratory or at production line, the 
easier it would be – easy to the degree of approaching the technocratic. 
 
87 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1999). See the chapter entitled ‘Aircraft and Airways’.  
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Chapter 2: Governance of Science before 1945 
 
Science as an ‘Aristocratic Endeavour’ 
 
The Scientific Revolution, a period that culminated in a drastic redefinition of 
the mediaeval world-view, itself a Christianised elaboration of the scientific 
and natural philosophical heritage of classical antiquity,88 unfolded across 
most of Europe roughly between 1500 and 1700. In many respects, the 
Revolution constituted a multi-faceted phenomenon characterised by a 
radical departure from the prevalent understandings of the features and 
properties of the natural world. Two key developments jointly marked a 
turning point in the conceptual evolution of modern science, one being the 
replacement of the Ptolemaic earth-centred system of astronomy with the 
Copernican one articulated in the early sixteenth century; and the other – the 
substitution of the mechanistic philosophy of nature championed by Rene 
Descartes for Aristotelian natural philosophy.89 Among the pinnacles of the 
Scientific Revolution were the extensive revision of the theories and aims of 
science; the refinement of methods of scientific enquiry; and the 
consolidation of a uniform body of knowledge in such areas as mechanics, 
astronomy and mathematics. But the Revolution also had far-reaching 
implications for the social organisation of science, transforming both the role 
of science practice within society and the structures vital for its cultivation, 
advancement and promotion. 
 
Science in early modern Europe differed tremendously from its nineteenth-
century counterpart, the latter being formally recognised as an established 
professional enterprise that played an indispensable part in the progress of 
industrialised societies. Back in its infancy, science constituted a broad 
domain encompassing various fields of inquiry with hardly any clear-cut 
branches of narrow specialisation. As such, it became differentiated from 
natural history and natural philosophy only gradually. Its champions were 
88 See John Schuster, ‘The Scientific Revolution’ in Robert Olby et al. (ed.) Companion to the History of Modern 
Science (London: Routledge, 1990), pp.217-242. 
89 Ibid, p.217. 
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gifted individuals intrigued to explore nature and gain an understanding of its 
workings. Driven by curiosity and a genuine urge to uncover as many of the 
secrets of the physical world as possible, they seldom concentrated their 
energies on one particular intellectual puzzle and eagerly examined concerns 
of diverse character. Central to their work was the search for the underlying 
causes of the dynamics and phenomena observed in the world. In their quest 
for answers, natural philosophers were largely guided by a shared belief that 
nature could be studied deductively by dint of reason and experience. Hence, 
their primary goal was the collection of empirical data on the basis of which 
knowledge could be acquired and accurate theories about the state and 
order of the natural world could be formulated. Emphasising the theoretical 
foundations of knowledge, natural philosophers demonstrated a propensity to 
distinguish themselves from artisans and craftsmen, for the latter were seen 
as mere practitioners unable to understand the principles that governed their 
activity.90 This attitude is partly grounded in the fact that even though natural 
philosophy was not utterly alien to contemporary surgeons, engineers, 
architects and even artists, very few of them actually contributed to its 
advancement at least until the eighteenth century.91 
 
Among the challenges that early modern thinkers had to grapple with was the 
justification of the claims they made about the world. In order to ensure that 
knowledge was generated, natural philosophers required a fixed frame of 
reference against which the validity of their propositions could be assessed. 
In the immediate post-mediaeval period the frame that served this purpose 
was Christianity. Several reasons account for this trend, including the fact 
that the authority of religion as the only source of truth at that time was 
uncontested and the Church continued to play an important role in the social 
and political affairs of the Western European states. The slow pace of 
affirming the credibility of Copernican theories and the tragic fate of 
prominent individuals, such as Galileo Galilei and Giordano Bruno, who 
openly questioned the Church doctrine, are further indicative of the 
determination of the Church to maintain its monopoly and final judgement 
90 See Roger Emerson, ‘The Organisation of Science and Its Pursuit in Early Modern Europe’ in Robert Olby et al. 
(ed.) Companion to the History of Modern Science, op cit, p.965. 
91 Ibid. 
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over what constituted valid knowledge. Yet being devout Christians 
themselves, most contemporary scientists did not perceive a conflict between 
their work and religious convictions, not least because their observations and 
discoveries highlighting the richness and diversity of nature only reinforced 
the inference that the latter was an intricate clock designed by a skilful 
clockmaker (God).92 This trend is evident from the large number of scientists 
recruited from the ranks of the clerics and the even larger number of 
individuals willing to promote science, due to its alleged support for religious 
beliefs. 93 Unsurprisingly, Catholics and Protestants alike saw these 
developments as a favourable opportunity to expand their influence by 
providing patronage for the individuals and institutions involved in the study 
and teaching of science. As a result, many ecclesiastical establishments 
dedicated space and resources for the pursuit of scientific activity within their 
institutions, in addition to which a significant number of schools, colleges and 
universities were brought under the control of the clergy by dint of staffing 
and funding.94 
 
An important feature of the early modern period was the development of a 
close and multifaceted relationship between science and the court. In fact, 
the origins of these connections can be traced back to the late Middle Ages 
and the Italian Renaissance, with city-state rulers and wealthy aristocratic 
families acting as patrons of individuals demonstrating skill and knowledge in 
areas such as arts, mathematics, and engineering. Typically resident in noble 
households and/or holding a court office, early men of science, including 
Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo and Johannes Kepler, diligently strived to 
promote the value of their expertise, thus enhancing the glory and prestige of 
their sovereigns. To be sure, aristocracy’s support for science was 
underpinned by considerable vested interests in the practical benefits that 
could be obtained from such patronage. Fields like gunnery, cartography, 
navigation and architecture received considerable attention, not least 
because of the immediate strategic, economic and commercial advantage 
that could be yielded. With the growing sophistication of technology, there 
92 Dominick Jenkins, The Final Frontier: America, Science, and Terror (London: Verso, 2002), p.234. 
93 Roger Emerson, ‘The Organisation of Science and Its Pursuit in Early Modern Europe’, op cit, p.962. 
94 Ibid. 
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was an increased appreciation for the value of science, particularly among 
the aristocracy. The advent of the cannon is a case in point. Having exposed 
the heightened vulnerability of the Italian city-states to foreign invasion, it 
effectively paved the way for the emergence of the cannon-proof system of 
fortification – the bastion.95 Given the importance of advanced mathematical 
knowledge for the design and building of reliable fortifications, it was 
essential that military engineers and warriors of noble birth become 
mathematically literate.96 According to The Book of the Courtier, mathematics 
also featured in the education of young aristocrats.97 One critical aspect that 
further facilitated the embedding of science in the court culture of European 
monarchies was the rise of prince-practitioners – royal figures who did not 
merely support the promotion of natural knowledge but were themselves 
actively engaged in technical and mathematical projects.98 By demonstrating 
their commitment to the procedural values of technical precision, objective 
observation, systematic collection of information and collaborative effort, 
such leaders played a crucial role in elevating the status of science, 
successfully transforming their courts into ‘institutional nodes of technical 
activity’.99 
 
The increasing dependence of modern European societies on science and 
technology crystallised into a gradual transition from agrarianism to 
industrialisation. New discoveries about the natural world began to find 
practical application in various spheres of activity, including transportation, 
mining, astronomy, medicine, surveying and engineering, leading to 
considerable improvements in the welfare of modern nations. Seeking to 
assert their legitimacy and demonstrate an appetite and capacity for power 
projection, cultural flourish and military conquest, modern states were keen to 
harness technical expertise and vigorously exploit it to its greatest potential.  
A direct consequence of this policy orientation was the surge in the number 
of natural philosophers, engineers and skilful artisans recruited to work at the 
95 Mario Biagioli, ‘The Social Status of Italian Mathematicians, 1450-1600’, History of Science, vol.27:1 (1989), p.45. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See Baldassarre Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier: Translated and with an Introduction by George Bull 
(London: Penguin, 2003).  
98 See Bruce Martin, ‘German Prince-Practitioners: Aspects in the Development of Courtly Science, Technology, 
and Procedures in the Renaissance’, Technology and Culture, vol.22:2 (1981), pp.253-274. 
99 Ibid. 
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service of the state.100 Because of the specialised knowledge and skills they 
possessed, those individuals enjoyed the status of experts, and as such, 
were deemed qualified to offer informed opinion and deploy theoretical and 
analytical thinking for overcoming practical hurdles and alleviating societal 
ills. Motivated by the ideal of truth about the natural world and a strong desire 
to maximise the common good, men of science constantly strived to enhance 
their understanding of nature and develop novel techniques for its 
manipulation toward productive ends. In their pursuit for greater effectiveness 
and efficiency, experts focused on the acquisition of operative knowledge 
that could be translated into practical outcomes and placed at the service of 
state, commercial and manufacturing interests.101 By adopting a mechanistic, 
practice-oriented approach to the study of nature and emphasising the 
importance of rationality for predicting natural phenomena, they set the scene 
for an era of ‘Technological Enlightenment’,102 which eventuated in the First 
and Second Industrial Revolutions. The work of experts thus made a 
valuable contribution to the consolidation of power of modern states, allowing 
them to expand the scope of their influence by conquering new territories, 
creating and sustaining global empires and fostering trade networks.103 
 
The emergence of science institutions during the Scientific Revolution and 
especially throughout the Age of Enlightenment had profound implications for 
the social organisation of scientific enquiry and the popularisation of natural 
knowledge. Chiefly tasked with the administration and advancement of 
research, these institutions enhanced the social standing of science and 
validated the authority of its agents as experts. Most importantly, they 
facilitated the secularisation of science, taking it outside the churches and 
universities and placing it within the remit of the state institutional 
apparatus.104 Among the early science institutions were observatories and 
academies. Learned societies were fluid in nature and diverse in terms of 
100 See Anna Maerker, ‘Political Order and the Ambivalence of Expertise: Count Rumford and Welfare Reform in 
Late Eighteenth-Century Munich’, Osiris, vol.25 (2010), pp.213-230. 
101 See Eric Ash, ‘Introduction: Expertise and the Early Modern State’, Osiris, vol.25 (2010), p.23. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid, p. 16. 
104 Roger Emerson, ‘The Organisation of Science and Its Pursuit in Early Modern Europe’, op cit, p.972.  
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expertise,105 devised to bring together individuals with an interest in the study 
of nature and provide them with an arena for deliberation and exchange of 
key findings. Many of them evolved from the late sixteenth-century clubs in 
which individuals would gather in an informal manner to discuss concerns of 
various kinds. Since their members were largely drawn from the high social 
strata and the ranks of aristocracy, early learned societies were imbued with 
an air of elitism. Some sixteenth-century Italian academies even existed for 
the sole purpose of giving expression to, and thus perpetuating, the social 
differentiations between low-class science virtuosi and those belonging to the 
nobility.106 A distinct feature and an important source of the legitimacy of 
learned societies was their proximity to the court. The British Royal Society 
(1660), the French Royal Academy of Sciences (1666) and the Russian 
Academy of Sciences (1724) all enjoyed formal recognition by the Crown and 
strived to combine the advancement of knowledge with loyalty and service to 
the state’s interests. Still, the different path of development these institutions 
followed indicates that the modes of operation of learned societies were a 
function of the socio-political and economic context within which they 
existed.107 This helps to explain some obvious discrepancies in the 
functioning, funding and management of learned societies across Europe, 
manifested in the private patronage of the Royal Society, the state subsidies 
allocated to the French Academy and the challenges that the Russian 
Academy faced after the death of Peter the Great. The institutional variations 
notwithstanding, by and large, learned societies demonstrated an explicit 
commitment to endorsing and maximising the merits of scientific enquiry. 
Through the publication of journals, memoirs and proceedings aimed to 
facilitate the dissemination and exchange of novel ideas and cutting-edge 
discoveries and through the promotion of joint and collaborative effort at 
national as well as, international level,108 academies played an indispensable 
105 See Simon Werrett, ‘The Schumacher Affair: Reconfiguring Academic Expertise across Dynasties in Eighteenth-
Century Russia’, Osiris, vol.25 (2010), p.104. 
106 See Mario Biagioli, ‘The Social Status of Italian Mathematicians, 1450-1600’, op cit, p.61-62. 
107 A case in point is the establishment of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1783, which arose ‘not of necessary 
organisational demands of science but of the particular position that scientific culture came to occupy in the local 
context.’ See Steven Shapin, ‘Property, Patronage, and the Politics of Science: The Founding of the Royal Society 
of Edinburgh’, The British Journal for the History of Science, vol.7 (1974), pp.1-41. 
108 See Roger Emerson, ‘The Organisation of Science and Its Pursuit in Early Modern Europe’, op cit, p.973; Derek 
de Solla Price, Little Science, Big Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p.4. 
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role in solidifying the position of science as a sphere worthy of professional 
recognition. 
 
Science as a Vocational Pursuit 
 
Two parallel dynamics had a direct bearing on the transformation of science 
from a gentlemanly leisure activity into an established professional enterprise 
with social standing and authority. One was the increasing significance of 
science practice in society, underpinned by the intensive industrialisation that 
West European states underwent during eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. The brilliant scientific breakthroughs and technological 
achievements from the time of the Enlightenment served to sustain the public 
interest in the work of scientists, highlighting both the practical utility of 
science and its potential for human betterment. The improvements in 
transport, infrastructure and communications, the expansion of civil and 
mechanical engineering, the developments in industrial chemistry, the 
advances in medicine and the rapid spread of the applications of electricity 
not only raised the social profile of men of science granting them prominence 
and respect but also strengthened an awareness of the links between state 
power, public welfare and technological progress.109 An illustration of this 
trend is the surge in career opportunities and paid positions available to 
individuals in possession of scientific and technical expertise, which made it 
possible for them to secure full-time contracts in non-academic domains, 
including industrial engineering, manufacturing and corporate and 
government consultancy.110 What is worth noting is that the establishment of 
science as a source of income brought about a shift in the opinion regarding 
the commercialisation of knowledge. Hence, although up until the second half 
of the nineteenth century the prospects for making a fortune out of science 
109 Rene Taton, ‘Emergence and Development of Some National Scientific Communities in the Nineteenth Century’, 
International Social Science Journal, vol.22:1 (1970), p. 95. See also Rainald von Gizycki, ‘Centre and Periphery in 
the International Scientific Community: Germany, France, and Great Britain in the 19th Century’, Minerva, vol.11:4 
(1973), pp.474-494. 
110 John Pickstone, Ways of Knowing: A History of Science, Technology, and Medicine (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), p.167. See also John Pickstone, ‘Sketching Together the Modern Histories of Science, 
Technology, and Medicine’, Isis, vol.102 (2011), pp.123-133. 
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remained rather scant,111 few scientists shared the attitude of their 
Enlightenment counterparts toward profit as a degrading pursuit and even 
fewer aligned themselves with Faraday’s reluctance to patent their inventions 
and discoveries.112 
 
The second dynamic in question pertained to the growing sophistication of 
science and the manner in which knowledge was pursued. The constant 
refinement of scientific methods helped overcome many experimental 
deficiencies and minimise errors, thus allowing for greater precision and 
efficiency in the conduct of research and a higher intensity of knowledge 
generation. The resultant growth in the volume and complexity of research 
output gradually turned science into a highly specialised body of knowledge 
placing it beyond the comprehension of the average individual and making it 
available only to those possessing specific skills and expertise.113 Given the 
ever-increasing demand for science practitioners and the shrinking pool of 
individuals capable of keeping the engines of technical progress running, by 
the start of nineteenth century the professionalisation of science could 
scarcely have been avoided, even if was not clearly foreseen. 
 
Several developments merit attention in mapping the process of the evolution 
and consolidation of the practice of science as a distinct professional culture. 
These include the establishment of a formal system for training and 
certification; the introduction of institutional and infrastructural reforms in the 
administration of science; and the emergence of mechanisms for granting 
credit and acknowledging excellence in science. Since early natural 
philosophers usually took up science as a pastime activity, seldom did they 
require any formal preparation. Hence, they were often self-taught. Under the 
pressures of industrialisation and the need for technological innovation, 
however, this tendency began to change most notably after 1800 when 
science virtuosi and amateurs were steadily supplanted with formally 
111 See W.H. Brock, ‘The Spectrum of Science Patronage’ in G. L’E. Turner ed. The Patronage of Science in the 
Nineteenth Century (Leyden: Noordhoff International Publishing, 1976), p.173. Thomas H. Huxley is famous for 
saying that, ‘science in England does anything but pay. You may earn praise but not pudding!’. 
112 See John Pickstone, Ways of Knowing, op cit, p.168; Sydney Ross, ‘Scientist: The Story of a Word’, Annals of 
Science, vol.18:2 (1962), p.66.  
113 George Daniels, ‘The Process of Professionalisation in American Science: The Emergent Period, 1820-1860’, 
Isis, vol.192 (1967), pp.151-167. 
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educated students of science. In Britain, mechanics colleges founded in most 
industrial towns made science education available to the working classes; the 
universities in Oxford and Cambridge began conferring Bachelor of Science 
degrees; and in Germany, higher technical colleges offered individuals 
theoretical grounding in engineering.114 In France, too, following the 
Revolution of 1789 science teaching was given a powerful fresh impetus. 
Elementary instruction in mathematics and physics was introduced in the 
new central schools to compensate for the utter neglect of the natural 
sciences exhibited by colleges of the ancien regime.115 Staffed with the most 
prominent contemporary scientists and equipped with advanced laboratory 
technologies, the French higher education institutions, including the Ecole 
Polytechnique, the Ecole des Mines and the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees 
provided science students with an extensive theoretical and practical training 
allowing them to keep pace with the latest developments in research. 
  
Besides the obvious practical benefits of incorporating science teaching in 
the instruction of prospective engineers, the introduction of formal 
qualifications served as a mechanism for public certification of competence. 
This was particularly true of the PhD degree in science awarded by German 
universities. Not only did the degree provide fresh graduates with an 
opportunity of pursing research but it was also indispensable in validating 
their status as expert practitioners with in-depth theoretical and analytical 
understanding of science-related disciplines, such as chemistry. Efforts were 
made in revising and devising teaching procedures and techniques in order 
to ensure that science students received adequate training. One such 
initiative was the emergence of instruction materials, including textbooks and 
manuals, targeting individuals at different levels of education (e.g. school, 
college and university).116 Yet another was the growing centrality of the 
university laboratory as a teaching space supplementary to the lecture room. 
Traditionally used by prospective academics in the process of gaining 
practical research experience, university laboratories came to be regarded as 
114 See John Pickstone, Ways of Knowing, op cit, p.166. 
115 Rene Taton, ‘Emergence and Development of Some National Scientific Communities in the Nineteenth Century’, 
op cit, p.98. See also Terry Shinn, ‘Science, Tocqueville, and the State: The Organisation of Knowledge in Modern 
France’, Social Research, vol.59:3 (1992), pp.533-566. 
116 W.H. Brock, ‘The Spectrum of Science Patronage’, op cit, p.192.  
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an essential training ground where science students could acquire tacit skills 
and master experimental techniques.117 
 
The institutional and structural reforms in the social organisation of science 
that took place during the nineteenth century reflected the realities of the time 
largely shaped under the influence of the ideals of the French Revolution and 
the drives for maximising the public gains to be reaped from industrialisation 
and technological progress. Despite the differences in their manifestations 
stemming from the political, economic and historical specificities of European 
states, the reforms generally sought to democratise the practice of science 
while ensuring research quality and integrity; to foster innovation and 
promote science principles; and to routinise greater commitment and support 
from the state. As such, they played an instrumental role in creating a sense 
of community consciousness among those dedicated to the study of nature, 
thus institutionalising science as a profession of its own and laying the 
foundations for the development of a national science policy. A case in point 
is Germany after its consolidation. Generously supported by the Imperial 
government and offering clear prospects for successful professional 
realisation, research in the natural sciences quickly became an attractive 
career path for students at universities and technical schools. With science 
teaching permanently embedded in the education curricula and the rapid rise 
in the number of newly-founded research institutes and laboratories, the 
stage was set for the emergence of an ambitious scientific community with a 
growing specialisation that mirrored the trends in industrial expansion. 
Thanks to its proven efficacy of employing the theoretical and practical skills 
acquired in the educational institutions for the purposes of boosting the 
economic and political influence of the state, the German model was 
vigorously praised and aspired to by scientists and policy-makers not only in 
Western Europe but across the ocean, in the US, as well. 
   
In an attempt to improve the state of a declining British science, individuals of 
a Liberal stripe and graduates of the Scottish universities led a struggle for 
117 J.B. Morrell, ‘Professionalisation’ in Robert Olby et al. (ed.) Companion to the History of Modern Science, op cit, 
p.983. 
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reforms against the ruling classes and the Anglican Church, both of which 
exercised preponderant influence over the academic curricula and the 
administration of research and jealously clung to their prerogatives.118 To this 
end, the establishment of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science in 1831 was of paramount importance, for it provided the dissenting 
groups with formal mechanisms for voicing their concerns and, thus, 
generating public support for their cause. The Association was pivotal to a 
number of reforms, including the founding of specialised teaching institutions, 
new laboratories and research institutes, and the increase in state subsidies 
available for science research.119 In a similar fashion, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) played a major part in 
affirming the professional status of those engaged in the pursuit of science. 
Set up in 1840, the AAAS embarked on the challenging task of upholding the 
ideals of truth, objectivity and impartiality that were deemed central to 
science, while, at the same time, monitoring compliance with professional 
standards. Given the importance of preserving the integrity of science 
practice, an explicit distinction between amateurs and professionals had to 
be drawn, reinforcing the vital role of the latter in fostering and sustaining 
economic progress and academic excellence. In this regard, the leadership 
of the Association is evident in its unequivocal commitment to the need for 
the advancement of scientific knowledge instead of its mere diffusion; the 
emergence of highly specialised journals barely accessible to those lacking 
extensive grounding in science; and the efforts to prescribe more rigid criteria 
for membership by admitting mainly individuals who had already made a 
contribution to science.120 
 
But institutional reforms sometimes proved insufficient in cultivating a healthy 
professional culture in which research could flourish. The epitome of this 
failure is the state of the scientific endeavour in France for most of the 
nineteenth century. Restructured and renamed as the First Class of the 
118 Rene Taton, ‘Emergence and Development of Some National Scientific Communities in the Nineteenth Century’, 
op cit, p.101.  
119 Ibid, p.102. 
120 George Daniels, ‘The Process of Professionalisation in American Science’, op cit, p.159-160. See also Roy 
Porter, ‘Gentlemen and Geology: The Emergence of a Scientific Career’, The Historical Journal, vol.21:4 (1978), 
pp.809-836. 
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Institut National in the aftermath of the Revolution, the French Academy of 
Sciences strived to promote the pursuit of knowledge by emphasising 
originality and creativity, as well as to serve in an advisory capacity on issues 
related to science and technology. The value of research was further 
heightened by the establishment of the Societe d’Arcueil, a private body set 
up by Berthollet and Laplace in 1805 for the advanced study of physics, 
chemistry and mathematics.121 Yet the government’s disregard for the 
material needs of scientists, the resurgence of saloon activity at the expense 
of work carried out at laboratories and the inflexibility of the French 
educational system paved the way for the creation of a professional culture 
that encouraged private politicking, patronage games and lip service to the 
ideals of science.122 With career prospects heavily determined by political 
considerations, rather than talent and demonstrated capacities, and the 
growing divide between the bureaucratic and intellectual concepts of the 
savant, by 1900 French professional science had yielded a blighted 
harvest.123 
 
Along with formal training and institutional structures, professions require 
some form of public recognition in order to achieve full legitimacy. In the case 
of science, the development of systems and practices for rewarding 
achievement and celebrating excellence in research, and the organisation of 
international meetings and symposia exclusively for the purpose of 
discussing recent developments in science-related disciplines served to 
solidify its position as an established professional domain. Formal awards 
were usually granted by the respective national academies and professional 
associations. While the value attached to them was symbolic rather than 
material, the honours, prestige and prominence that such prizes brought 
made them a desired goal for those dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge. 
Among the exceptions of the time was the fellowship awarded by the British 
Royal Society, as it did encompass some financial support for the work of the 
121 See Robert Fox, ‘Scientific Enterprise and the Patronage of Research in France, 1800-70’, Minerva, vol.11 
(1973), pp.442-473.  
122 Ibid, p. 457; see also Rene Taton, ‘Emergence and Development of Some National Scientific Communities in the 
Nineteenth Century’, op cit, p.99; J.B. Morrell, ‘Professionalisation’ in Robert Olby et al. (ed.) Companion to the 
History of Modern Science, op cit, p.986. 
123 See Robert Fox, ‘Science, the Universit, and the State in Nineteenth-Century France’ in G.L. Geison (ed.), 
Professions and the French State, 1700-1900 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), pp.66-145.  
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successful fellows.124 After 1901, the Nobel Prize became by far the highest 
and most prestigious award conferred for an outstanding performance in a 
scientific discipline at an international scale. But even prior to the introduction 
of the Prize, there were already signs of science overcoming chauvinistic 
inclinations and creating a sense of professional unity among its 
practitioners. An example of this trend is the emergence of international 
congress meetings and conferences that aimed to bring together scientists 
from different states to provide them with a platform for a discussion and 
debate on the latest developments, findings and discoveries. Narrowly 
focused on a specific scientific discipline, such forums not only facilitated the 
dissemination of research but also allowed scientists to meet in person, 
share expertise and even foster partnerships and collaborative effort. 
Examples include the international congresses in statistics held from 1853 
onwards; in chemistry from 1860; in botany from 1864; in medicine from 
1867.125 
 
With science literature becoming more and more sophisticated and barely 
accessible for individuals without sufficient theoretical grounding; with 
membership in science institutions (e.g. academies and associations) being 
restricted to active researchers and scholars; and with the growing sense of 
solidarity and collegiality among practitioners in different science disciplines, 
the scientific endeavour steadily drifted away from general culture. Far from 
being smooth and linear, this process was shaped by vigorous power 
struggles, radical political and social reforms and a strong desire to 
democratise the pursuit of knowledge without compromising its integrity. Its 
pinnacle was the eventual transition of science practice from the hands of the 
amateur to those of the professional,126 explicitly manifested in the 
establishment of the term ‘scientist’ as a professional title. Originally coined 
by William Whewell in 1834, the word served to nurture a sense of unity 
among individuals specialising in different science sub-fields by denoting 
124 See W.H. Brock, ‘The Spectrum of Science Patronage’, op cit, p.188-189. 
125 Rene Taton, ‘Emergence and Development of Some National Scientific Communities in the Nineteenth Century’, 
op cit, p.97. 
126 Sydney Ross, ‘Scientist: The Story of a Word’, op cit, p.65. 
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their shared commitment to the ideals of truth, originality and objectivity.127 
The established norms of practice (e.g. peer review, publication, mentorship) 
common across various scientific disciplines and the shared outlook on the 
role of science in society further served to create a particular group mentality 
which inevitably left a distinctive stamp on scientists.128 Thus, the 
consolidation of a professional culture featuring specialised language 
systems, advanced experimental techniques and accepted modes of 
behaviour, routines, symbols and rituals effectively gave rise to a scientific 
community with clearly defined frontiers and a relative degree of 
sovereignty.129 The degree to which this community was imagined can be 
regarded as compelling evidence of scientists’ own perceptions of the 
importance of articulating and reinforcing their nascent professional culture. 
 
Harnessing the Power of Science 
 
The development of science from about the second half of the nineteenth 
century onwards fully embodied Francis Bacon’s famous revelation scientia 
est potentia (‘knowledge is power’):  knowledge had long been equated with 
power but it was the political, economic and social arrangements of the late 
modernity that made its utilisation on a large scale possible and therefore 
irresistibly attractive. With the professionalisation of science, the scene was 
set for the mass production of knowledge that could be commercialised, 
patented, exploited for profit, deployed for military ends and used for boosting 
the state’s economic and political influence internationally. A manifestation of 
this was the growing recognition of the strategic leverage (industrial, 
commercial, economic, politico-military) of science that could be accrued 
through various forms of high-level facilitation, coordination, funding and 
policy planning. These forms of governance, both public and private, exerted 
(and continue to exert) a powerful influence on the cultures of science. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Robert MacIver, ‘The Social Significance of Professional Ethics’, Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, vol.297 (1955), pp.118-124. 
129 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Cambridge: 
Verso, 1991), p.6. 
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Education and Training Opportunities 
 
Up until the nineteenth century the majority of universities across Western 
Europe were preoccupied with teaching; research was marginal. To the 
extent that science was taught, courses were generally theoretical providing 
students with only limited opportunities for gaining practical experience. 
Inspired by the Humboldtian ideal of linking teaching and research, German 
universities were among the first to offer science a home where knowledge 
could be not merely disseminated but also advanced.130 As a consequence, 
they were well-positioned to respond to the technological imperative created 
by the pressures of industrialisation, managing successfully to combine the 
cultivation of knowledge with fostering long-lasting and multifaceted links with 
the consumers of science. The field of chemistry is a case in point. The 
discovery of synthetic dyes in 1856 gave a fresh impetus to the German 
economy which culminated in the development of a rapidly expanding coal 
tar dyestuff industry.131 Since the companies’ growing demand for trained 
personnel offered clear career prospects for virtually anyone with advanced 
understanding of chemistry, universities and their respective research 
institutes attracted a considerable number of students nationwide. The 
scheme served the interests of professors and students alike, not least 
because the former earned their income in proportion to the number of 
enrolments and the latter enjoyed affordable fees thanks to the academic 
subsidies granted by the Imperial Government.132 The close ties with 
commercial companies, however, often put an extra burden on universities. 
For instance, when in the 1890s the state transferred the onus of 
administrating the certifying examinations to academia, universities had to 
devise self-regulation mechanisms to ensure that their graduates were 
130 Roger Geiger, ‘Science and the University: Patterns from the US Experience in the Twentieth Century’ in John 
Krige and Dominique Pestre (ed.), Science in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 
1997), p.159.  
131 Diarmuid Jeffreys, Hell’s Cartel: IG Farben and the Making of Hitler’s War Machine (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 2008), p.18. See also Georg Mayer-Thurow, ‘The Industrialisation of Invention: A Case Study from the 
German Chemical Industry’, Isis, vol.73:3 (1982), pp.363-381; Robert Baptista and Anthony Travis, ‘I.G. Farben in 
America: The Technologies of General Aniline & Film’, History and Technology, vol.22:2 (2006), pp.187-224.   On 
the links between German university and industry in other fields, see Wolfgang Konig, ‘Science-Based Industry or 
Industry-Based Science: Electrical Engineering in Germany before World War I’, Technology and Culture, vol.37:1 
(1996), pp.70-101. 
132 See Jeffrey Johnson, ‘Academic Chemistry in Imperial Germany’, Isis, vol.76 (1985), p.500-524. On academic 
physics training during the same period, see Lewis Pyenson and Douglas Skopp, ‘Educating Physicists in Germany 
circa 1900’, Social Studies of Science, vol.7 (1977), pp.329-366.   
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properly qualified.133 In doing so, not only had universities to accommodate 
the requirements of industry by diversifying the curricula and increasing the 
amount of practical training that students underwent but they also had to 
heighten the value of the qualifications they offered in order to prevail in the 
fierce competition with technical colleges which after 1899 began awarding 
doctoral degrees.134 
  
Germany was not an isolated example as far as the symbiosis between 
academia and industry is concerned. In Britain, too, the advances in electrical 
engineering, and in particular, the invention of telegraphy helped create 
bridges between the academic realm and the commercial sector. When the 
expertise required for the development of a transatlantic cable telegraph out 
outstripped the knowledge of the industrial engineers tasked with the 
endeavour, the Glasgow university laboratory where Lord Kelvin conducted 
his studies provided both the research environment and the skills required for 
the completion of the project.135 Apart from being a financial and 
technological success, the outcome of this collaboration had at least two 
significant implications. First, it highlighted the value of academic research 
facilities offering favourable conditions for systematic testing and analysis, as 
well as, for training and capacity building. And second, it played a crucial role 
in making the laboratory an integral element of the engineering routine. In a 
similar fashion, the invention of electric lighting and the resultant demand for 
qualified technicians in industry vastly facilitated the introduction of formal 
technical instruction in American universities.136 
 
The emergence of the industrial research laboratory constituted a remarkable 
manifestation of the synergies between commercial firms, government 
agencies and academic institutions. In 1876 Imperial Germany enacted 
stringent patent legislation that prohibited the wide-spread copying practices 
of chemical companies, forcing them to invest in the development of novel 
133 See Jeffrey Johnson, ‘Academic Self-Regulation and the Chemical Profession in Imperial Germany’, Minerva, 
vol.23:2 (1985), pp.241-271. 
134 Ibid.  
135 John Pickstone, Ways of Knowing, op cit, p.169. 
136 Ibid. 
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processes and products.137 Making virtue of necessity, the dye and later, 
pharmaceutical firms began to set up their own research branches providing 
university chemists with alternative career paths. Fifteen years later, the 
General Electric Company (GEC) under the directorship of Thomas Edison 
adopted a similar strategy once the anti-trust laws hindered larger 
businesses from buying smaller ones in an attempt to acquire their 
patents.138 The GEC laboratory accommodated prominent scientists and 
engineers, such as Irving Langmuir whose discoveries in surface chemistry 
brought him the Nobel Prize in 1932. Yet despite its numerous benefits, 
industry’s disposition to ‘internalise’ research severely disadvantaged 
academic science by isolating it from the findings obtained in the commercial 
laboratories on the grounds of patents and corporate secrecy.139 
  
Needless to say, industry had a clear vested interest in primarily supporting 
research that was practically oriented and likely to produce commercially-
viable results and products. And to be sure, a few industrialists shared the 
conviction that since the chief goal of industrial laboratories was money-
making, it was impossible to give the staff of investigators a ‘perfectly free 
hand’.140 The underlying logic behind directed research for economic 
purposes notwithstanding, many leading companies, including GEC, Du 
Pont, standard Oil of Indiana and Westinghouse hired physicists and 
chemists allowing them to pursue lines of unguided science. On other 
occasions, businesses supported academic research by funding projects 
(e.g. GEC at Harvard, AT&T at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT)), donating money for new facilities and equipment, and subsidising 
fellowships. Just before the outbreak of the First World War, for instance, 
German academic chemists and industry leaders joined forces to establish 
three Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for research in general chemistry, physical 
chemistry and electrochemistry, and coal chemistry. The Institutes were 
137 John Beer, ‘Coal Tar Dye Manufacture and the Origins of the Modern Industrial Research Laboratory’, Illinois 
Studies in the Social Sciences, vol.44 (1959), p.127.  
138 John Pickstone, Ways of Knowing, op cit, p.171; 173. 
139 Jeffrey Johnson, ‘The Academic-Industrial Symbiosis in German Chemical Research, 1905-1939’ in John Lesch 
(ed.), The German Chemical Industry in the Twentieth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 
p.19. 
140 Daniel Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America, (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1979), p.100. See also Leo Baekeland, ‘Science and Industry’, Science, vol.31:805 (1910), pp.841-852; 
Willis Whitney, ‘Research as a Financial Asset’, Science, vol.33:853 (1911), pp.673-681. 
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tasked with the study of pure science, which while expected to produce 
substantial long-term payoffs, was unlikely to lead to immediate patentable 
results.141 
 
Science Patronage 
 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth century science patronage took a 
variety of forms, some of which persisted even after the state largely took up 
the role of a chief patron following the Second World War. Prior to 1940, 
lavish state financial support for science, as the one provided in Imperial and 
later, Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia, tended to be an exception rather 
than a rule. Yet while the policies implemented by the Wilhelminian 
government were generally praised as an example of best practice both in 
and outside Germany, those introduced by the Bolsheviks and the Nazis 
exposed the perils of linking science to ideology, highlighting the deleterious 
effects that such a linkage could have on the ideals and integrity of science. 
Adopted first by Prussia after the defeat by Napoleon and subsequently 
applied nationwide following the unification, the model of promoting science 
education and research by dint of state sponsorship proved to be a potent 
force that considerably boosted the political and economic might of the 
German Empire.142 Modernised and well-equipped with the cutting-edge 
technology of the day, the German laboratories and research institutes 
played an important role in providing the rapidly expanding chemical industry 
with highly-skilled science cadres, thus illustrating how the synergy between 
state patronage and academic excellence could lead to economic 
preponderance. Even though scientists across Western Europe envied the 
circumstances of their German colleagues and bitterly lamented what they 
perceived as the neglect of science demonstrated by their respective 
governments, state subsidies for teaching and research remained marginal, 
141 Jeffrey Johnson, ‘The Academic-Industrial Symbiosis in German Chemical Research, 1905-1939’, op cit, p.22. 
142 On the relations between science and the state in Imperial Germany, see David Cahan, ‘The “Imperial 
Chancellor of the Sciences”: Helmholtz between Science and Politics’, Social Research, vol.73:4 (2006), pp.1093-
1128; E.S. Althoff and Max Weber, ‘The Power of the State and the Dignity of the Academic Calling in Imperial 
Germany: The Writings of Max Weber on University Problems’, Minerva, vol.11:4 (1973), pp.571-632; Frank 
Pfetsch, ‘Scientific Organisation and Science Policy in Imperial Germany, 1871-1914: The Foundation of the 
Imperial Institute of Physics and Technology’, Minerva, vol.8:1-4 (1970), pp.557-580. 
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limited to projects from which direct practical military, commercial or national 
benefits could be immediately accrued.143 
 
In spite of, or rather because of the pervasive lack of financial commitment to 
science by the state, alternative forms of patronage evolved. One such 
example is the multifaceted involvement of industry in supporting the study of 
science. Many of the emergent British proprietors in civil and mechanical 
engineering acknowledged the value of combining apprenticeship with 
theoretical grounding by providing sponsorship for formal scientific education. 
Likewise, foreign companies dedicated funds to support academic 
institutions, as evidenced in the case of King’s College, London, which ran an 
engineering laboratory financed by the Siemens Company.144 At home too, 
German industry actively sought to promote higher education by subsiding 
the universities and their respective research institutes. Chemical companies 
in particular demonstrated a deep and long-standing commitment to this goal. 
Being scientists by training, prominent industrialists, such as Emanuel Merck, 
Carl Duisberg and Arthur Weinberg, wanted ‘to stay loyal to science’ and 
reinforce the dye industry’s ‘chemical foundation as a main point’.145 While 
the companies’ beneficence might indeed have been an expression of a 
genuine concern for the state of chemistry as an academic discipline, at least 
in part, it was undoubtedly accompanied by considerable vested interests. 
When the post-First World War recession hit Germany, for example, the 
government established an Emergency Community for German Science 
through which to direct its support for all fields of science. Even though the 
industry expected to contribute financially, it was to have very little control 
over how the funds were allocated. In order to counter what they perceived 
as an over-centralised system, the chemical companies established three 
funding bodies – the Emil Fischer Society for the Promotion of Chemical 
Research; the Adolf Bayer Society for the Promotion of Chemical Literature; 
and the Justus Liebig Society for the Promotion of Chemical Education – to 
143 W.H.Brock, ‘The Spectrum of Science Patronage’, op cit, p.177. See William Cavendish, ‘The Science 
Commission on the Advancement of Science’, Nature, vol.12:305 (1875), pp.361-364; 
144 John Pickstone, Ways of Knowing, op cit, p.170. 
145 Jeffrey Johnson, ‘The Academic-Industrial Symbiosis in German Chemical Research, 1905-1939’, op cit, p.20. 
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ensure that the industry would be able to channel its support for academic 
science based on its own judgement.146 
  
To scientists, academic-industrial partnerships promised considerable 
benefits, including patent royalties and consultancy contracts. Besides being 
a valuable source of income, such opportunities were instrumental in 
compensating for financial scarcities and lack of state support for pure 
science, as was the case in Britain. On some occasions, funds provided by 
industry aimed at counterbalancing unemployment at times of economic 
downturn. The I.G. Farben ‘Emergency Fellowships’ were to serve precisely 
this purpose by allowing gifted German students to remain at school as 
additional assistants until the job market improved; the cartel would be able 
to employ them at a later stage, and better trained.147 Its positive features 
notwithstanding, the symbiosis between universities and industry did not 
always run so smoothly. For example, many talented individuals were 
tempted to abandon their modestly salaried academic positions and pursue 
profitable careers as consultants in the corporate sector. Academia was also 
negatively affected by outflow of bright graduates drawn by the better 
facilities and well-paid positions in industry, as illustrated in the complaints of 
professors that the ‘best men [we]re in industry’.148 
  
Sometimes commercial pressures mounted serious challenges to the 
integrity of scientific research. The experience of the MIT Research 
Laboratory of Applied Chemistry in the 1920s in its dealings with industry is a 
case in point. On numerous occasions the Laboratory was prevented from 
publishing the results of the studies conducted there on the grounds that the 
companies that funded the research would be severely disadvantaged vis-à-
vis their commercial competitors if the information was to be widely 
shared.149 Moreover, due to the overemphasis on applied research, the 
146 Ibid, p.26. On the relationship between science and the state during the Weimar Republic, see Paul Forman, 
‘The Financial Support and Political Alignment of Physicists in Weimar Germany’, Minerva, vol.12:1 (1974), pp.39-
66; Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus, ‘The Argument for the Self-Government and Public Support of Science in Weimar 
Germany’, Minerva, vol.10:4 (1972), pp.537-570. 
147 Ibid, p.45. 
148 Ibid, p.26. See also W.H.Brock, ‘The Spectrum of Science Patronage’, op cit, p.186. 
149 See John Servos, ‘The Industrial Relations of Science: Chemical Engineering at MIT, 1900-1939’, ISIS, 
vol.71:259 (1980), p.541-542; Jeffrey Johnson, ‘The Academic-Industrial Symbiosis in German Chemical Research, 
1905-1939’, op cit, p.19. 
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Laboratory, far from a division of an educational institution, resembled a 
commercial consulting branch, which in turn not only forced many graduates 
and faculty members to seek employment elsewhere but also gave rise to an 
academic outcry over its practices deemed both inconsistent with and 
detrimental to the ethos of science.150 
 
Another type of science patronage that merits attention is individual 
philanthropy. As discussed earlier, up until the nineteenth century the 
material support for science came largely from royal and private patronage. 
With the rise of the bourgeoisie over the following decades this trend 
persisted and intensified. Patrons were typically men of means who 
expressed interest in the study of nature. Even though many of them had 
earned their fortune in fields unrelated to science, they were willing to support 
the advancement of knowledge. Nowhere is this philanthropic phenomenon 
observed more vividly than in the US. The funds dedicated by wealthy 
American businessmen, industrialists and proprietors facilitated the 
establishment of universities (e.g. Johns Hopkins University, Stanford 
University) and the building of research facilities (e.g. the Mount Wilson Solar 
Observatory). But the impact of philanthropy was by far the most substantial 
in the realm of scientific research where large private foundations offered 
generous support in the form of grants, fellowships and equipment. The 
Carnegie Endowment, founded in 1902 in Washington with an initial capital 
equal to that of the entire endowment of Harvard University, distributed both 
substantial gifts for big projects and some small grants for individual 
researchers.151 Established a year earlier in New York, the Rockefeller 
Foundation ran a prestigious postdoctoral research programme for promoting 
research physics and chemistry.152 
 
150 Unlike other leading universities, including Caltech, Princeton, Harvard and Chicago that enjoyed generous 
support from private philanthropies, MIT failed to obtain any gift. When the administration tried to seek financial 
support from the Rockefeller Foundation, the board of trustees justified their reluctance to approve the MIT 
application on the grounds that the engineering work conducted there was not fundamental science but applied 
research that was of interest mainly to industry. See ibid, p.542. On the ideal of pure science, see H.A. Rowland, ‘A 
Plea for Pure Science’, Science, vol.2:29 (1883), pp.242-250. 
151 Daniel Kevles, ‘Foundations, Universities, and Trends in Support for the Physical and Biological Sciences, 1900-
1992’, Daedalus, vol.121:4 (1992), pp.195-222. 
152 Ibid, p.202. 
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During the interwar period, private foundations constituted a major source for 
support of fundamental science. By the 1920s the amount of money available 
for research had massively increased, yet so had the number of universities 
and their demands. The resultant scarcity in resources quickly turned the 
competition for funds into an elitist game in which the largest and most 
prestigious universities were typically favoured at the expense of smaller and 
more obscure ones.153 But there was a further cause for concern which 
heightened in the long term, namely the steadily growing influence of the 
private foundations. Thanks to the substantial capital at their disposal and the 
relative absence of chief competitors regarding the funding of pure science, 
several philanthropic organisations could exert considerable influence on the 
research agenda and shape the objectives of a sizable fraction of American 
scholarship.154 
 
State-Mandated Science Programmes 
  
The interplay of science and political power from 1900 onwards was at least 
in some respects a continuation of an already existing trend. Nevertheless, 
given the institutional arrangements inspired by the late modernity that 
enabled the mass mobilisation of science by the state for the attainment of 
economic, socio-political and ideological, and military goals, it was a 
continuation on a very different scale and kind, unprecedented to that 
moment in history. 
 
The twentieth century witnessed the consolidation of mechanised warfare: no 
longer was technology just one of the elements of war-fighting, but it was a 
crucial factor both for the course of hostilities and for their ultimate outcome. 
Machine guns, submarines, tanks, radio systems, poison gas, radar 
detection, atomic bombs and guided missiles, all of which embodied the 
practical application of scientific principles, alerted the military and politicians 
alike to the value of research, solidifying their conviction that laboratories 
153 David Hart, Forged Consensus: Science, Technology and Economic Policy in the United States, 1921-1953 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p.37. 
154 Daniel Kevles, ‘Foundations, Universities, and Trends in Support for the Physical and Biological Sciences, 1900-
1992’, op cit, p.205. 
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should constitute the state’s first line of defence. Having secured the 
cooperation of the chemist Fritz Haber, the German army was the first to 
mount a chlorine gas assault in 1915 killing some five thousand Allied troops 
and causing severe impairment to at least ten thousand more. Caught utterly 
by surprise and seriously unprepared, the British and French military 
command quickly moved to foster close ties with academia and launch their 
own chemical warfare programmes. Besides at the newly established 
complex at Porton Down, British work on chemical weapons was also carried 
out in the laboratories at Cambridge, St Andrews, Oxford, London’s 
University College and the Royal Army Medical College. In France, the effort 
was concentrated in Paris, with College de France and the Sorbonne as the 
two main centres.155 Its belated entrance into the hostilities in 1917 
notwithstanding, the US army vigorously joined the chemical arms race by 
setting up the Chemical Warfare Service, the largest research group yet 
organised by the federal government.156 As a result of the vigorous 
employment of scientific expertise, by the end of the war more than twenty 
chemical agents were developed, including mustard gas, phosgene and 
arsenicals; Haber’s work even allowed Germany to manufacture a form of 
phosgene that could penetrate gas masks.157 Despite the international 
prohibition on the use of asphyxiating and deleterious gases in hostilities that 
was already in place long before 1914, many chemists willingly put their 
talents in service to the state and few had doubts about crossing a moral 
Rubicon.158 
 
155 On the British and French effort in chemical warfare, see L.F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in 
the First World War (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1986); Danielle M. E. Fauque, ‘French Chemists and the International 
Reorganisation of Chemistry after World War I’, Ambix, vol.58:2 (2011), pp.116-135. On the Japanese chemical 
weapons programme in the First World War see, Yoshiyuki Kikuchi, ‘World War I, International Participation, and 
Reorganisation of the Japanese Chemical Community’, Ambix, vol.58:2 (2011), pp.136-149.  
156 Hugh Slotten, ‘Humane Chemistry or Scientific Barbarism: American Responses to World War I Poison Gas, 
1915-1930’, The Journal of American History, vol.77:2 (1990), p.485. It is worth noting that following the First World 
War the chemical scientific establishment in the US launched a massive campaign to prevent the ratification of the 
1925 Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of chemical warfare. See Daniel Jones, ‘American Chemists and the 
Geneva Protocol’, Isis, vol.71:3 (1980), pp.426-440.  
157 Diarmuid Jeffreys, Hell’s Cartel, op cit, p.73. 
158 Fritz Haber, the ‘father of modern chemical warfare’ would counter any accusations of his active involvement in 
the German use of chlorine during the First World War arguing that to be maimed or killed by gas was no worse 
than being injured or mutilated by high explosives or shot and killed by a machine gun. In late 1918 he was awarded 
the Nobel Prize in chemistry for his work on synthetic ammonia. See ibid. For further information on the life and 
political and professional activity of Fritz Haber see Morris Goran, The Story of Fritz Haber (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1967); Dietriech Stoltzenberg, Fritz Haber: Chemist, Nobel Laureate, German, Jew (Philadelphia: 
Chemical Heritage Foundation, 2004). On the involvement of chemists in the First World War, see L.F. Haber The 
Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1986). 
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Within thirty years, the mushroom cloud replaced the poisonous gas as the 
hallmark of scientific ingenuity in the service of the state. But if scientists’ 
involvement in the First World War was born out of expediency and ended 
with the armistice, the ties forged between science and the state during the 
Second World War proved too tight to be broken after 1945. In light of the 
prospect of being drawn into yet another major war and the resultant urgent 
need to enhance its military capability, the US embarked on reforming its 
science policy. Under the chairmanship of the then-president of the Carnegie 
Institution, Vaneevar Bush, a National Defence Research Committee (NDRC) 
was set up in 1940 to support ‘scientific research and development of new 
instrumentalities or materials of war, or of new methods and materials to be 
used primarily in the manufacture of instruments of war’.159 One project the 
Committee was specifically assigned to by President Roosevelt was the 
examination of a ‘possible relationship to national defence of recent 
discoveries…of the fission of uranium’.160 The NDRC undertook a range of 
steps to overcome the hurdles of getting civilian scientists involved in military 
research projects. Strict restrictions on access to data and materials, extreme 
conditions of secrecy and security clearance substituted for the free and 
open dissemination of information and broad collaboration among scientists, 
typical for the production and advancement of knowledge. Under Bush’s 
orders, information was subject to compartmentalisation, which precluded 
anyone associated with the NDRC from accessing classified data non-related 
to their particular task.161 Later, with the Manhattan Project steadily 
underway, Bush would craftily make use of patent censorship to ensure that 
the ownership of both the technology and ideas that made the atomic bomb 
possible remained with the state, at least until the government decided how 
to handle the governance of nuclear knowledge.162 Despite its merits, the 
NDRC was mainly tasked with the coordination of research activities and had 
159 Irvin Stewart, Organising Scientific Research for War: The Administrative History of the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co: 1948), p.16. Available at 
http://archive.org/details/organizingscient00stew (accessed 30/11/12). See also National Resources Committee, 
Research – A National Resource: Relation of the Federal Government to Research (Washington DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1939). 
160 Ibid, p.18. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Alex Wallerstein, ‘Inside the Atomic Patent Office’, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.64:2 (2008), pp.26-31. 
For a detailed account on the development of the US atomic bomb project, see Henry DeWolf Smyth, Atomic 
Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the 
United States Government, 1940-1945 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1945).  
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no authority over the approval of the development of technology. To correct 
this deficiency, in 1941 President Roosevelt authorised the establishment of 
an Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) and appointed 
Bush as its director. The NDRC remained active under the new institution 
and served as a model for the creation a similar body in the realm of military 
medicine. Generously financed the government, the OSRD coordinated the 
construction of the atomic bomb, as well as the development of radar and 
microwave technology, the proximity fuse and solid fuel rockets. Deeply 
convinced that the state had to turn defence research into a ‘peace-time 
thing’, Bush filed a proposal for the post-war organisation of American 
science. While many of the ideas outlined in his Science, The Endless 
Frontier, were altered or not fully implemented, its key message, namely the 
need for extensive state support for science, was permanently embedded in 
the US policies, as evidenced throughout the Cold War period.163 
 
State-mandated science programmes in the early twentieth century were 
hardly limited to the military domain. Science and technology promised 
economic might, social prosperity and human health betterment and, as 
such, constituted potent powers which, if effectively subordinated to the 
interests of the state, could bring in considerable benefits. In short, for 
virtually any sphere in which the industrial state might face a challenge, 
science and technology seemed to offer a solution. However naïve it may 
sound, this conviction was far from uncommon among scientists and 
politicians alike, giving rise to the ideal of technocracy: a form of government 
which assigns the supreme decision making powers to science and 
engineering experts. Coined by William Smyth in 1919,164 the term was 
vigorously promoted by Howard Scott as the panacea to the deleterious 
effects of the 1929 Wall Street Crash and the resultant depression.165 But by 
far the most notorious example of employing technocratic means to state 
governance is the tragic fate of the Soviet Union. Stressing the nexus 
163 See Vannevar Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier: A Report to the President on a Programme for Postwar 
Science Research (Washington DC: National Science Foundation, 1945).  
164 See William Smyth, ‘Technocracy – Ways and Means to Gain Industrial Democracy’, Industrial Management, 
vol.57 (1919), p.385. 
165 See James Olson (ed.) Historical Dictionary of the Great Depression, 1929-1940, (Westport CT: Greenwood 
Press, 2001).  
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between science and economic recovery, the Bolshevik leaders embarked on 
an extensive social engineering project featuring mass terror, economic 
scarcities and environmental degradation. The regime had a detrimental 
impact on science, depriving the scientific community of its autonomy and 
politicising scientific authority.166 
  
The Nazi rule in Germany exerted a similar effect on science, reflected in its 
support for ‘Aryan’ versus ‘Jewish’ physics, mathematics, and medicine.167 
Yet even against the backdrop of assaults that the Third Reich mounted on 
science, its policies toward racial hygiene vividly stand out. That said, 
negative eugenics was not a Nazi invention. Long before Hitler’s coming to 
power, the Carnegie Institution and the Rockefeller and the Harriman 
Foundations supported research in human heredity and by the 1920s several 
American States had already enacted human sterilisation laws.168 Drawing 
upon the US expertise, the Nazi launched Aktion T4 that paved the way for 
the mass sterilisation and, later ‘euthanasia’ and murder, of those ‘unworthy 
of life’ including social outcasts, physically and/or mentally disabled adults 
and children, Jews and Gypsies. A Euthanasia Office was established to 
coordinate the implementation of the project, as well as, academic research 
in eugenics carried out at German institutes with funds from the Rockefeller 
Foundation.169 With the scene thus set, in 1942 the Reich began the 
implementation of the Final Solution, the plan designed to rid Germany once 
and for all from the ‘Jewish problem’. Some 350 medical doctors, including 
university professors and lecturers, took part in ‘healing the nation’ working 
diligently at Dachau, Auschwitz and Ravensbruck and Buchenwald. But the 
166 David Holloway, ‘Scientific Truth and Political Authority in the Soviet Union’, Government and Opposition, vol.5:3 
(1970), pp.345-367. See also James Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (Yale University Press, 1998); Charles Maier, ‘Between Taylorism and Technocracy: 
European Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial Productivity in the 1920s’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol.5:2 
(1970), pp.27-61.  
167 On the relations between science and the state during the Nazi regime, see Sandra Harding, ‘After the Neutrality 
Ideal: Science, Politics, and “Strong Objectivity”’, Social Research, vol.59:3 (1992), pp.567-587; Bernd Gausemeier, 
‘Genetics as a Modernisation Programme: Biological Research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes and the Political 
Economy of the Nazi State’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, vol.40:4 (2010), pp.429-456; Alan 
Beyerchen, ‘What We Now Know about Nazism and Science’, Social Research, vol.59:3 (1992), pp.615-641; Dieter 
Hoffmann, ‘Between Autonomy and Accommodation: The German Physical Society during the Third Reich’, Physics 
in Perspective, vol.7 (2005), pp.293-329. On the German nuclear bomb project, see Ruth Lewin Sime, ‘The Politics 
of Forgetting: Otto Hahn and the German Nuclear-Fission Project in World War II’, Physics in Perspective, vol.14 
(2012), pp.59-94; Mark Walker, ‘Heisenberg, Goudsmit and the German Atomic Bomb’, Physics Today, January 
1990, pp.52-60; David Cassidy, ‘Heisenberg, German Science, and the Third Reich’, Social Research, vol.59:3 
(1992), pp. 643-661. 
168 Edwin Black, War against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Campaign to Create a Master Race, (New York: 
Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003). 
169 John Cornwell, Hitler’s Scientists: Science, War and the Devil’s Pact, (London: Penguin, 2004), p.350. 
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implications of the Final Solution were far more profound, not least because it 
exposed the multifaceted ways in which technical ingenuity, meticulous 
organisation and careful planning – all legacies of late modernity – could 
effectively be combined to turn an utterly sinister act into a routine, even 
‘normal’ activity.170 
    
The Rise of the Military-Industrial-Academic Complex (MIAC) 
 
The ‘golden triangle’ of military agencies, high technology industry and 
research universities171 that developed in the early twentieth century and 
reached its apogee during the Cold War era, played a key role in determining 
and shaping the evolution of modern science culture. As we shall see, the 
close ties forged between academia and commercial companies from the late 
nineteenth century onwards proved vital both for meeting the wartime 
demands of governments and for ensuring their peacetime defences, as the 
latter grew more and more dependent on the acquisition of sophisticated 
military technology. Born out of the war expediency and nurtured by the 
states’ vested interest in being able to translate the latest scientific 
breakthroughs into cutting-edge weaponry, the military-industrial-academic 
complex gradually acquired a life of its own, accumulating vast amounts of 
power and resources. The resultant giant, while deemed necessary for the 
preservation of peace, proved to be a potent force whose ‘unwarranted 
influence’ brought a ‘revolution in the conduct of research’, effectively 
substituting government contracts for intellectual curiosity172 and eroding the 
science ethos. 
  
The German dye industry was heavily involved in both world wars, presenting 
the military with a host of powerful techniques and later, exposing the darkest 
side of the synergies between intellectual corruption, money interests and 
radical political ideology. During the First World War the dye firms’ 
contribution was multifaceted, ranging from medicines and paints to 
170 Ibid. See also Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, op cit.  
171 Stuart Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: the Military-Industrial-Academic Complex, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), p.2. 
172 Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell Address, (Washington DC: The White House, 1961), available at 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=90&page=transcript (accessed 3/12/12).  
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explosives and poison gas. In addition, the industry channelled substantial 
funds for military-oriented academic research via the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Foundation for Military and Technical Science directed by the mastermind 
behind the German chemical weapons programme, Fritz Haber.173 A direct 
consequence of the symbiosis between the scientific community, business 
and the army was a reciprocal relationship that paved the way for the 
militarisation of science and industry, as well as, the rise of science-based 
industry and military.174 The effects of this relationship became vividly clear 
during the Nazi regime, when educational and medical institutions joined 
forces with the military and the industrial conglomerate, IG Farben, on a 
series of projects demonstrating unquestioned conformity with Hitler’s 
extreme racial discrimination policies, as reflected in the pervasive 
experimentation on humans, mass murder and vigorous use of slave labour 
and unquestioned conformity.175 As evident in the research on chemical 
weapons, German scientists not only took a full advantage of the funds 
available for the study of nerve agents but were even eager to use organs 
from victims of Nazi persecution for testing their military potential.176 
 
Germany was hardly the only country where academia, industry and the 
army turned out to be ‘mutually supportive resources’.177 Having witnessed 
the destructive power of the German U-boats early in First World War, the 
US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) set up a National Research Council 
(NRC) to promote both pure and applied research for the ultimate end of 
‘national security and welfare’.178 Seeking to establish grounds for broad 
collaboration among leading scientists, engineers, industrialists, government 
officials and military experts, the Council played a crucial role in coordinating 
the development and production of optical glass, nitrates, poison gas, 
submarine detection technology and flash- and sound-ranging systems. 
Despite its invaluable contribution to the war effort, the Council still raised 
173 Jeffrey Johnson, The Academic-Industrial Symbiosis in German Chemical Research, 1905-1939’, op cit, p.24. 
174 Florian Schmaltz, ‘Neurosciences and Research on Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction in Nazi Germany’, 
Journal of the History of the Neurosciences, vol.15 (2006), p.186.  
175 See John Cornwell, Hitler’s Scientists, op cit; Diarmuid Jeffreys, Hell’s Cartel, op cit. 
176 Florian Schmaltz, ‘Neurosciences and Research on Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction in Nazi Germany’, 
op cit, p.205. 
177 Ibid, p.204. 
178 Daniel Kevles, The Physicists, op cit, p.112. 
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suspicions among the military, as the latter were convinced that the civilian-
controlled laboratories could neither meet the secrecy requirements, nor 
produce practical battlefield devices without close military oversight.179 As 
indicated in the previous section, the comprehensive institutional 
infrastructure erected to monitor and supervise the process of weaponry 
development during World War II went to extraordinary lengths to overcome 
such challenges and secure the long-term cooperation between universities, 
business and the defence establishment. The wartime work carried out at the 
MIT’s Rad Lab, Caltech and Johns Hopkins highlighted the value of the 
military-industrial-academic alliance and encouraged other education 
institutions to join the race for defence contracts. Harvard, Princeton, 
Michigan, Berkeley and Stanford were just few of the universities that 
enthusiastically accepted money both from the Pentagon, readily acceding to 
the establishment of closed campus facilities where classified projects could 
be conducted. The development of nuclear weapons, air defences, 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), electronic communications and 
countermeasures thus became the daily routine of a large fraction of the 
American scientific establishment, permanently blurring the lines between 
pure and applied research and making secrecy an indispensable working 
condition at universities and laboratories. In many respects, academic 
science turned into a function of military needs and priorities, whereby not 
only did research agendas focus on questions critical to weapon-oriented 
technologies but the very idea of what it meant to be a scientist or an 
engineer underwent a fundamental redefinition, effectively creating a 
professional elite of arms designers.180 
 
Toward a Permanent Mobilisation 
  
The Second World War marked a turning point in the evolution of science. 
Having exposed the tremendous battlefield benefits that the high-level 
179 Ibid, p.132. 
180 Stuart Leslie, The Cold War and American Science, p.9. See also Paul Forman, ‘Behind Quantum Electronics: 
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Perspective, vol.7 (2005), pp.138-149. 
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coordination, organisation and funding of scientific research could yield, the 
war largely laid the foundations of the post-1945 science policies, featuring 
skyrocketing R&D (research and development) budgets and mass academic 
mobilisation. It permanently redefined the relationship between science and 
the state, cementing the academic-military alliance and bringing scientists 
under the direct control of government leaders. All those developments had 
an enormous bearing on the culture of science, effectively substituting top-
down management and weapon procurement for the ideals of intellectual 
curiosity and disinterested pursuit of knowledge and forcing scientists to 
focus exclusively on the technical aspects of research. Their significant 
impact notwithstanding, it would be naïve to assert that state-led initiatives 
were the only factor shaping the governance of science as the Cold War 
unfolded. True, scientific and technological advancement was central to the 
extensive planetary competition, in which the Soviet Union and the United 
States found themselves caught from 1949 onwards, both as a function and 
a manifestation of the superpowers’ insatiable appetite for socio-political and 
economic expansion, and global domination. While professional science 
cultures demonstrated a remarkable degree of adaptation to this changed 
setting, they were hardly static but shaped and influenced the formulation 
and execution of government policies in turn. The role of business both as a 
patron and consumer of scientific research was also substantial, especially in 
the USA, where patents, joint ventures and start-ups mushroomed as a result 
of the close ties between academic institutions and industry. Even though 
none of these dynamics was inherently new to science, their pace and 
intensity were vastly enhanced by the social, political and economic changes 
that occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War and, as such, 
required the development of governance relations that were concomitant with 
the intensification and multiplication of the scientific and technological 
endeavour. 
 
By and large, post-1945 science policies epitomised the conviction that 
science and technology were too important to be left free from a wary high-
level oversight, planning, funding and facilitation. The underlying rationale 
behind this type of thinking was that even if science could progress without 
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material support from the state, any government refusing to invest in the 
development of science ran the risk of jeopardising its own national security. 
Against the background of fierce nuclear arms race and diplomacy pervaded 
by realist fears and zero-sum political calculations, the doctrine of national 
security provided states with a powerful incentive to assume a posture of 
military preparedness and remain on permanent alert.181 Highlighting the 
primacy of state survival, it encouraged governments to adopt a proactive 
approach to boosting their defences by enhancing their military capabilities 
and expanding their weapon arsenals. Given the crucial role of science in the 
acquisition of novel armaments, it was essential that academic and industrial 
talent and ingenuity were harnessed for the goals of national security. 
 
In the US, first the navy and shortly after that the army, zealously strived to 
preserve and extend the wartime ties with academia and industry.182 
Following the Korean War, the Department of Defence (DoD) emerged as 
one of the dominant sources of revenue for science and technology with a 
R&D budget of 1.8 billion dollars which was three times its pre-war value.183 
Thanks to its funds MIT, Stanford and Johns Hopkins expanded their pre-
1945 military research complexes and other leading universities set up ones 
of their own; the number of federal weapon-development laboratories 
multiplied; and the volume of research and development conducted by 
industrial contractors massively increased, leading some civilian companies, 
such as GEC, to establish specialised departments to work exclusively on 
defence-related projects.184 But the Pentagon money offered scientists and 
their respective institutions more than financial security; it enhanced their 
professional status, validating their prominence and prestige. More 
importantly, it fostered an attitude to which a significant proportion of the 
American scientific community subscribed, namely that military support for 
science was to be welcomed and that there was ‘no reason for refusing 
[such] help – granted it is forthcoming – in doing the scientific work that one 
181 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1978), p.196. 
182 See Daniel Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).  
183 David Hart, Forged Consensus, op cit, p.195.  
184 Ibid. 
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would have tried to accomplish even without such help.’185 Since the majority 
of scientists were committed to the ideal of basic research, they 
demonstrated little moral disquiet regarding the sources of funding, as long 
as it was provided on a regular basis and with limited restrictions attached. 
To ensure that their projects would eventually be financed, they tended to 
emphasise the practical utility of their research even when there was hardly 
any.186 Besides scientists, businessmen, economists and industrialists were 
also in favour of the vast DoD expenditure on science and technology, not 
least because of the ‘spinoff effect’ of military-oriented research which 
sparked new civilian industries (e.g. Boeing’s passenger jets, IBM’s business 
computers) and facilitated the rise of high-technology start-ups and venture 
capitalists, leading to productivity growth and economic prosperity.187 In a 
similar fashion, the Soviet Union laid an enormous emphasis on the linkage 
between science and national security. Having successfully tested their first 
nuclear device in 1949, the Soviets embarked on an immense military build-
up featuring an H-bomb project, development of ICBMs and nuclear 
submarines. In addition, substantial funds were poured into space research 
which culminated in the launch of Sputnik in 1957. France and Britain, too, 
set up institutional infrastructure that allowed the smooth integration of 
scientific milieus into technological and military research. 
 
Given the scale of military expenditure on science, the immediate question 
that arises is whether and how scientific communities managed to preserve 
at least some degree of freedom in their practice. After all, science rests 
upon the ideal of truth and disinterested discovery, which at first sight seem 
difficult to reconcile with the heavy involvement of governments. To be sure, 
in totalitarian societies like the Soviet Union, the state did interfere vigorously 
with the everyday work of scientists not only by dint of funding and 
coordination but also by directing research and censoring scientific data. Yet 
even under those severe conditions, scientists still enjoyed some flexibility, if 
only to avoid the mistakes made by the Nazi regime which seriously hindered 
185 Louis Ridenour, ’Military Support of American Science, a Danger?’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.3:8 (1947), 
p.223. 
186 Ibid. 
187 David Hart, Forged Consensus, op cit, p.199.  
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the German weapon-development programmes prior to and during the 
Second World War. Indeed, the fact that the Soviets succeeded in obtaining 
the atomic bomb so quickly did not show that the totalitarian governance of 
science was effective but rather reinforced the belief that even totalitarian 
states had to allow their scientists some freedom of action in order to reap 
the benefits of research.188 Far more explicit were the ways in which scientific 
communities in democratic societies influenced and shaped the development 
and implementation of government-led initiatives pertaining to the conduct of 
research. In the US, for instance, the scientific community jealously clung to 
its independence striving to keep state inference at an absolute minimum. 
Thus, although the National Science Foundation (NSF), the government 
agency established to promote basic research, was eventually put under the 
direct control of the President, the scientific community largely retained the 
final word regarding the distribution of funds. This was possible, for the 
Foundation adopted a referee system, which required that any grant 
application was screened by a panel of academic experts in the respective 
field of study, whose decision was almost always undisputed and final.189 
Other governmental agencies, including the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), the Atomic Energy Agency (AEA) and the DoD, allocated their 
financial support on the same principle. While the system played a crucial 
role in insulating the scientific community from executive scrutiny, it served 
the interests of distinguished research institutions, creating huge disparities 
between the nation’s leading universities and the smaller and less known 
ones. Since grants were awarded chiefly on the grounds of merit, the US 
most prestigious schools and faculties tended to be disproportionately 
privileged, with those based in California, New York and Massachusetts 
receiving as much as half of the total support available.190 The resultant 
reconfiguration of power effectively gave rise to a ‘scientific oligarchy’191 
which not only controlled the flow and direction of federal science funding, 
188 Daniel Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science, op cit. 
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but also maintained close relations with both industry and the military, 
provided consultancy services and advice to the government and produced a 
significant part of the American research output, including products and 
publications. 
 
With the fall of the iron curtain, the close connections forged between science 
and the state during the Second World War gradually evolved into a marriage 
of convenience. National security considerations and demands for rapid 
economic growth translated into lavish financial support and mass academic 
mobilisation. The display of scientific and technological advancement in the 
form of sophisticated weapon systems, space programmes and burgeoning 
industries was just as much an expression of intellectual ingenuity as it was 
of political and ideological superiority and socio-economic prosperity. For 
their part, scientific communities took full advantage of the generous support 
available, as evidenced in the rise of ‘big science’ and the proliferation of high 
technology. Large facilities and expensive laboratory equipment made 
governmental assistance an essential condition for the development of 
science, fundamentally redefining in the process the ethos and values of 
science practice. Secrecy, whether for corporate or military purposes, 
permeated the culture of research, erecting walls within and between 
universities and eroding collegiality. The governance relations thus fostered 
paved the way for the mass exploitation of a vigorously expanding scientific 
and technological endeavour allowing for the attainment of strategic, 
commercial, industrial and politico-military goals without disturbing the 
‘cloistered calm of the laboratory’.192  
 
 
 
 
192 Don Price, The Scientific Estate (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), p.97. 
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Chapter 3: Governance and Cultures of Life Science 
Research during the Cold War 
 
The Life Sciences as a Professional Domain 
 
Life Science Research prior to the Biotechnology Revolution 
 
The origins of modern biology date back to the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, a period characterised by a confluence of 
developments in thought and practice that facilitated the establishment of a 
unified study of life, one that was distinct from medicine and natural history. 
Among those developments were the reformation of the taxonomy system 
and the subsequent realisation of the extinction of life forms; the emergence 
of comparative anatomy and palaeontology as distinct disciplines; and the 
refinement of experimental methods that enhanced the understanding of 
fundamental physiological processes. Carl Linnaeus introduced the term 
biologi in his Bibliotheca Botanica in 1776 and Karl Friedrich Burdach used it 
in his works when referring to the study of human morphology, physiology 
and psychology. It also appeared in the writings of the French botanist Jean-
Baptiste de Lamarck but it was through the efforts of the social philosopher 
August Comte that the term gained its widespread currency.193 From the 
1800s onward the field of biology underwent a rapid expansion vividly 
expressed in increasing specialisation and the rise of novel sub-disciplines. 
The significant improvements in optics and microscopy around the 1830s 
proved crucial to the development of cytology (cell biology) and histology (the 
study of tissues), allowing scientists to conceptualise the structure of the cell 
and acquire advanced knowledge of the origins of disease. Microbiology, too, 
witnessed its first pioneers. Building upon Pasteur’s germ theory, Robert 
Koch conducted ground-breaking work in bacteriology, successfully isolating 
the bacilli responsible for anthrax, tuberculosis and cholera.194 The discovery 
193 On the origins of modern biology, see Robert Olby et al. Companion to the History of Modern Science, op cit. In 
particular, see chapters 23, 31, 32 and 33.  
194 Arguably Robert Koch is best known for his contribution to general bacteriology and pathology. He devised new 
research methods to isolate pathogenic bacteria and defined a set of guidelines to prove that disease is caused by a 
specific microorganism. These guidelines became known as Koch’s postulates. They include: 1) A specific 
microorganism is always associated with a given disease; 2) The microorganism can be isolated from the diseased 
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of the tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) at the end of nineteenth century by the 
Dutch biologist Martinus Beijerinck effectively laid the foundations of modern 
virology even though the structure of viruses remained unknown for another 
forty years.195 
 
Two more disciplines that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century merit 
specific attention, as their evolution is closely linked to the advent of the 
biotechnology revolution that unfolded in the 1950s. One is the study of 
heredity, which provides the basis for modern genetics. Following the 
publication of Darwin’s theories on natural selection, the issue of the 
evolution of species attracted considerable interest, spurring vigorous 
debates between Darwinists and those subscribing to alternative intellectual 
traditions, including neo-Lamarckism and mutation theory. We will return to 
one particular aspect of this controversy, namely the rise of Lysenkoism in 
the 1940s, later on. The founder of modern genetics is commonly accepted 
to be Gregor Mendel who coined the principles of heredity after observing the 
inheritance of certain traits in pea plants. While the results of his experiments 
were published as early as the 1860s, it was not until 1900 that his findings 
were ‘rediscovered’ and eventually appreciated. Based on the Mendelian 
laws of inheritance, Walter Sutton and Theodor Boveri advanced the 
chromosome theory of heredity, according to which chromosomes were the 
material carriers of heredity. Hardly substantiated with any hard evidence, the 
Sutton-Boveri proposition remained deeply controversial for about a decade. 
Then in 1915, the American geneticist Thomas Hunt Morgan managed to 
provide experimental data in support of the chromosome theory of heredity 
using the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster, as a model. 
  
animal and grown in pure culture in the laboratory; 3) The cultured microbe will cause disease when transferred to a 
healthy animal; and 4) The cultured microbe will cause disease when transferred to a healthy animal. See 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/320834/Robert-Koch (accessed 30/01/2014). Koch's studies inspired a 
generation of scientists. In the span of just 30 years – from 1876 to 1906 – the principal bacterial pathogens of 
human disease were isolated. Hence, the period following Koch’s elucidation of the anthrax bacteria is largely 
regarded as the ‘golden age of bacteriology’. See Steve Blevins and Michael Bronze, ‘Robert Koch and the “Golden 
Age” of Bacteriology’, International Journal of Infectious Diseases, vol.14:9 (2010), p.e750; Thomas Brock, Robert 
Koch: A Life in Medicine and Bacteriology (Berlin: Springer, 1988). 
195 Wendell Stanley, an American biochemist, crystallised tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) in 1935 showing that it is a 
rod-shaped aggregate of protein and nucleic acid molecules. His work laid the foundations for the application of X-
ray diffraction as a method for determining the structure and modes of propagation of viruses. See 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/563251/Wendell-Meredith-Stanley (accessed 30/01/2014).  
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The second discipline worthy of note is biochemistry, which, according to 
Robert Kohler, began to acquire conceptual and social organisation around 
1890.196 In some respects, biochemistry can be seen as an extension of 
physiological chemistry, which emerged around 1840 in Germany and 
vigorously strived to preserve its autonomy over the following decades vis-à-
vis the rapidly expanding field of organic chemistry. The majority of research 
conducted throughout that period was centred on the concept of ‘the living 
protein’ (protoplasm). Starting in the early twentieth century, novel 
discoveries on the structure and properties of enzymes, coenzymes, vitamins 
and hormones helped solidify the position of biochemistry as a separate 
discipline with an enormous practical utility, thus legitimising the professional 
status of its practitioners. 
 
For the purposes of the present chapter, there are two chief reasons – one 
scientific and the other philosophical – why the developments in biochemistry 
are deemed pertinent to the advent of the biotechnology revolution. As far as 
the scientific dimension is concerned, the discoveries made in the field of 
biochemistry, particularly those related to proteins and nucleic acids, served 
as an important precursor of molecular biology, an area of study actively 
promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation from the 1930s onwards which 
largely provided the context for the elucidation of the deoxyribose nucleic 
acid (DNA) structure and the resultant emergence of genetic engineering. In 
philosophical terms, by dint of incorporating the study of chemicals as 
integral to the study of life, biochemistry rests upon the premise that life 
obeys mechanistic principles and as such, can be understood through the 
behaviour and properties of particles, elements and compounds. The late 
nineteenth and especially the early twentieth century witnessed the 
consolidation and growth of many of the newly-emerged biology-related sub-
fields. Yet what needs to be underscored is that, by and large, the 
establishment of those sub-disciplines was just as much a politically-inspired 
move aimed at gaining public recognition, professional status and material 
196 Robert Kohler, ‘The History of Biochemistry: A Survey’, Journal of the History of Biology, vol.8:2 (1975), p.276. 
63 
 
                                                          
support as it was an expression of the trajectory of scientific development as 
it was.197 This is hardly surprising, for: 
  
disciplines are political institutions that demarcate 
areas of academic territory, allocate the privileges 
and responsibilities of expertise, and structure 
claims on resources. They are the infrastructure of 
science, embodied in university departments, 
professional societies, and informal market 
relationships between the producers and 
consumers of knowledge. They are creatures of 
history and reflect human habits and preferences, 
not a fixed order of nature.198 
 
The trend toward the professionalisation of the life sciences was also evident 
in at least three major developments, namely the diversification of academic 
curricula; the establishment of professional societies and specialised 
journals; and the multiplication of career opportunities for experts in narrowly-
defined areas of biology.  
 
A survey conducted by the American Medical Association (AMA) in 1909 
demonstrated that 60 out of the 97 medical schools under scrutiny had 
established departments in biochemistry and offered courses accordingly.199 
Likewise, by 1913 departments of genetics offering postgraduate training 
were in place at Cornell, Berkeley, and Wisconsin, and by 1916 the number 
of American colleges and universities that had taught programmes in 
genetics was fifty-one.200 In Britain, University College of London introduced 
an advanced course in physiological chemistry as early as 1884 and it was 
not long before other leading higher education institutions, including 
Edinburgh, Oxford, King’s College and Cambridge adjusted their curricula 
197 The heated debate between traditional biochemists and the new breed of scientists who called themselves 
molecular biologists is indicative in this regard. Erwin Chargaff, a renowned biochemist who had demonstrated that 
the ratios between A:T and G:C in the DNA molecule are constant described molecular biology as the practice of 
biochemistry without a license. See Robert Kohler, From Medical Chemistry to Biochemistry: The Making of a 
Biomedical Discipline, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.332. On the same issue, see also Richard 
Burian, ‘”The Tools of the Discipline: Biochemists and Molecular Biologists”:  A Comment’, Journal of the History of 
Biology, vol.29 (1996), pp.451-462; Lily Kay, ‘Biochemists and Molecular Biologists: Laboratories, Networks, 
Disciplines: Comments’, Journal of the History of Biology, vol.29 (1996), pp.447-450; Jean-Paul Gaudilliere, 
‘Molecular Biologists, Biochemists, and Messenger RNA: the Birth of a Scientific Network’, Journal of the History of 
Biology, vol.29 (1996), pp.417-445; Pnina Abir-Am, ‘The Politics of Macromolecules: Molecular Biologists, 
Biochemists, and Rhetoric’, Osiris, vol.7 (1992), pp.164-191. 
198 Robert Kohler, From Medical Chemistry to Biochemistry: The Making of a Biomedical Discipline, op cit, p.1. 
199 Ibid, p.192. 
200 Jonathan Harwood, ‘National Styles in Science: Genetics in Germany and the United States between the World 
Wars’, ISIS, vol.78 (1987), p.396. 
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accordingly.201 During the first decade of the twentieth century formal 
instruction in genetics began to feature in German academia, with half of the 
universities and agricultural colleges offering taught courses in the field. 
 
The proliferation of discipline-specific professional societies was another key 
development that facilitated the institutionalisation of the life sciences. 
Founded in 1899, the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) was the first 
single life science membership organisation in the world set up exclusively 
for the purposes of promoting research on bacteria, viruses, fungi and other 
microorganisms. Both the American Society of Biological Chemists organised 
in 1906-7 and its British counterpart, the Biochemical Society established in 
1911, shared the goals of expanding and protecting the interests of their 
constituencies, particularly with respect to strengthening the occupational 
position of biochemists in botany, agriculture, the brewing industry, medicine, 
pathology, and public health.202 In a similar fashion, learned societies in the 
field of genetics, such as the British Genetics Society of 1919, the German 
Genetics Society of 1921 and the Genetics Society of America of 1931, 
sought to elevate the social and professional status of the discipline, advance 
research and facilitate data-exchange and knowledge-sharing on the basic 
mechanisms of inheritance. 
 
Besides being an important channel for the communication of findings and an 
indispensable forum for scientific discussion, discipline-specific journals also 
constituted an ideal vehicle for enhancing the legitimacy of the newly-
emerged fields by delimiting their intellectual boundaries and fostering a 
shared identity and sense of cohesion among narrow specialists. On some 
occasions, the establishment of journals preceded the formation of a learned 
society, as in the case of the American-based Journal of Biological Chemistry 
founded in 1905203 and Genetics founded in 1916. By contrast, the British 
Genetics Society only began publishing its first journal, Heredity, in 1947, or 
almost twenty years after it had been set up. 
201 Robert Kohler, From Medical Chemistry to Biochemistry, op cit, p.44-45. 
202 Ibid, 198. 
203 Another journal in the field of biochemistry, Biochemical Journal, was founded in 1906, almost in parallel with the 
establishment of the American Society of Biological Chemists. See ibid, p.197. 
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Growing occupational pluralism further enhanced the social standing of the 
life sciences, as it allowed practitioners to transfer their expertise from 
academia to the public sphere, confirming in the process the enormous 
practical utility of their work. While universities remained the chief employer 
of life scientists attracting them with decent conditions for research, 
considerable freedom and light, if any, teaching duties, alternative career 
options were also gradually made available. Private research institutes, such 
as those established by the Carnegie Endowment and the Rockefeller 
Foundation in the USA, and the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in 
Germany, vigorously recruited staff for their programmes in genetics, 
biochemistry and neuroscience. Given the numerous benefits likely to result 
from the progress of the life sciences, including new and improved diagnostic 
tests and therapies, food products and animal feeds, research activities 
began to feature in industrial laboratories, medical research institutes and 
hospitals. Research in agriculture drew heavily on the discoveries in the life 
sciences, particularly those in the fields of genetics and biochemistry. Across 
the USA, agricultural experimental stations employed biologists offering them 
both a degree of autonomy in the choice of research topics and the 
opportunity of gaining extensive experience in applied and experimental 
science.204 Government bureaus, too, hired life science experts in an attempt 
to improve food and drug regulation, water analysis and testing, hygiene 
standards, and public health policies. All those developments substantially 
contributed to the consolidation and establishment of the life sciences as a 
highly-specialised professional sphere, the steady expansion of which went 
virtually unchallenged due to the bright prospects for human betterment and 
social transformation that advanced biological knowledge offered. 
 
While some areas of science, most notably physics and engineering, came 
under vociferous criticism during the 1930s Depression, due to the 
overproduction crisis and rising unemployment, public trust in the utility and 
204 Jonathan Harwood, ‘National Styles in Science: Genetics in Germany and the United States between the World 
Wars’, op cit, p.399. 
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value of biology and its related sub-disciplines remained largely unshaken. 
By that time, the life sciences had already begun delivering on their extensive 
promise to maximise societal welfare. Research on hormones and vitamins 
enabled the development of new medicines and nutrition products; advanced 
knowledge of botany and genetics facilitated plant hybrid breeding and 
enhanced crop yields; and improved understanding of disease causes and 
transmission informed policies on public health and hygiene. For example, 
the successful commercial cultivation of hybrid corn in the early 1930s was 
hailed as a major achievement in agriculture, subsequently allowing the US 
to triple its corn production during the second half of the twentieth century. 
Laboratory-manufactured hormones, including adrenalin, insulin, thyroxine, 
and vitamins B and C were made widely available, vividly demonstrating that 
the progress of life sciences could help alleviate a range of serious chronic 
conditions. But by far the most remarkable breakthrough in the area of drug 
development during the first half of twentieth century was the advent of 
antibiotics, as reflected in the miraculous properties of penicillin. Even though 
it was discovered in 1928 by Alexander Fleming, it took scientists around 
fourteen years to successfully utilise penicillin for medical treatment. The 
large-scale production and distribution of the antibiotic during the Second 
World War played a crucial role in reducing the number of victims among the 
Allied troops by preventing deaths and amputations caused by infected 
wounds.  
 
The wide application of biological knowledge for generating public goods 
notwithstanding, it would be naïve to assume that the history of the evolution 
of the life sciences is deprived of ‘dark pages’ and pernicious legacies. On 
the contrary, such legacies are indeed vividly present giving rise to wide-
ranging debates about the potential for malicious misuse of biotechnology. 
Two highly controversial areas with which the life sciences have been directly 
or indirectly involved are eugenics and biowarfare. Despite not being new, 
the concept of eugenics only won popularity following the publication of 
Francis Galton’s works in the 1860s. Drawing upon Darwin’s ideas, Galton 
advanced the argument that the laws of inheritance applied to humans just 
as much as they did to other animals, stressing that mental, temperamental 
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and physical traits were inherited from both parents, which allowed for 
improving human character and mentality by dint of institutionalised good 
breeding.205 Based upon this logic, two broad categories of eugenics 
practices emerged, namely positive and negative. Positive eugenics 
generally entailed strategies that sought to generate more life (e.g. 
pronatalist policies and treatment of infertility) and foster healthy lifestyles 
and living environments (e.g. environmental reforms, public health, policies 
on youth upbringing and training). By contrast, negative eugenics focused on 
measures aimed at reducing birth rates (e.g. sterilisation, contraception, 
segregation, abortion) and even destroying life (e.g. euthanasia, genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, non-treatment of terminally ill and neonates). Research 
involving negative eugenics was vigorously pursued in the US206 during the 
first few decades of the twentieth century thanks to the sterilisation laws 
enacted in a number of states and the generous grants made available by 
the Carnegie Endowment, the Rockefeller philanthropies and the Harriman 
Foundation. The worst excesses of negative eugenics, including gassing, 
mass murder and racial extermination reached their peak in Nazi Germany 
during the 1930s and 1940s, allowing life scientists and medical personnel to 
abandon ethical norms and pursue a whole range of gruesome practices 
including human experimentation.207 Despite being explicitly condemned in 
the aftermath of the Second World War and resultant Nuremberg Code, the 
strategy of using human beings as guinea pigs for the purposes of life 
science research did not disappear straight away, as evident from the work 
conducted by American scientists in the late 1940s in Guatemala for the 
purposes of testing the efficacy of penicillin against sexually-transmitted 
diseases.208 
205 See Diane Paul and James Moore, ‘The Darwinian Context: Evolution and Inheritance’ and Nils Roll-Hansen, 
‘Eugenics and the Science of Genetics’ in Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on the 
History of Eugenics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). See also Chloe Burke and Christopher Castaneda, 
‘The Public and Private History of Eugenics: An Introduction’, The Public Historian, vol.29:3 (2007), pp.5-17; Mark 
Adams et al, ‘Human Heredity and Politics: A Comparative Institutional Study of the Eugenics Record Office at Cold 
Spring Harbour (United States), the Keiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics 
(Germany), and the Maxim Gorky Medical Genetics Institute (USSR)’, Osiris, vol.20 (2005), pp.232-262. 
206 See Edwin Black, War against the Weak, op cit. See also Wendy Kline, ‘Eugenics in the United States’ in Alison 
Bashford and Philippa Levine ed., The Oxford Handbook on the History of Eugenics, op cit. 
207 See Gerhard Baader et al. ‘Pathways to Human Experimentation, 1933-1945: Germany, Japan, and the United 
States’, Osiris, vol.20 (2005), pp.205-231. 
208  Records have shown that between 1946 and 1948 the US government supported a highly unethical study 
whereby vulnerable populations in Guatemala were intentionally infected with sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). 
The purpose of the study was to test whether penicillin could not only cure but prevent early syphilis infection. See 
Chris McGreal, ‘US Says Sorry for “Outrageous and Abhorrent” Guatemalan Syphilis Tests’, Guardian, 1 October 
2010, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/01/us-apology-guatemala-syphilis-tests (accessed 
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Attempts to use disease as a weapon of war have deep historical roots 
dating back to antiquity, as illustrated in the resolve of the Carthaginian army 
to hurl clay pots full of ‘serpents of every kind’ during a naval battle against 
King Eumenes of Pergamum in 184 BC.209 During the Middle Ages offensive 
activities became slightly more ‘sophisticated’, due to the growing awareness 
of the pestilential properties of rotten bodies. Two well-documented cases 
exhibit this tendency. One is the siege of Thun-l’Eveque of 1340, as part of 
which attackers catapulted dead horses and other animals to force the 
defenders out of the castle; the other is the 1346 siege of Caffa in which the 
invading Tatars sent plague-infected human dead bodies over the city walls 
and subsequently facilitated the second major outbreak of ‘Black Death’ in 
Europe.210 Cunning tactics to spread disease were also adopted by the 
British forces during the American War for Independence in the eighteenth 
century, whereby blankets and handkerchiefs of smallpox victims were 
distributed among the Native Americans. The Golden Age of Bacteriology 
largely redefined biological warfare, for, by shedding light both on the 
mechanisms of disease transmission and the microorganisms responsible for 
various illnesses, it paved the way for the development of novel and 
significantly more potent weapons. Biological sabotage against livestock thus 
featured notably in the First World War, with anthrax and glanders 
constituting an indispensable element of the German army’s arsenal.211 
30/01/2014); Fact Sheet on the 1946-1948 U.S. Public Health Service Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STD) 
Inoculation Study, available at http://www.hhs.gov/1946inoculationstudy/factsheet.html (accessed 3/08/2015). 
Another notorious example is the Tuskegee Study of untreated syphilis conducted by the US Public Health Service 
and the Tuskegee Institute between 1930s and 1970s. No informed consent was obtained from the participants in 
the project. Still worse, the experiment involved a considerable number of males infected with syphilis who were not 
provided with the required treatment even though they were told they were. The study went on for about 40 years 
before it was exposed by the media in the US causing a massive public outcry. See ‘US Public Health Service 
Syphilis Study at Tuskegee’ section on the US Centres for Disease Control (CDC) webpage at 
http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm# (accessed 30/01/2014). See analysis of the study and its ethical 
implications, see Susan Reverby, ‘More than Fact and Fiction: Cultural Memory and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study’, 
The Hastings Centre Report, vol.31:5 (2001), pp.22-28; Susan Reverby, ‘Tuskegee: Could It happen Again?’, 
Postgraduate Medical Journal, vol.77 (2001), pp.553-555; Susan Reverby, ‘”Special Treatment”: BiDil, Tuskegee 
and the Logic of Race’, Journal of law, Medicine and Ethics, vol.36 (2008), pp.478-484; Allan Brandt, ‘Racism and 
Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study’, The Hastings Centre Report, vol.8:6 (1978), pp.21-29.  
209 Edward Eitzen and Ernest Takafuji, ‘Historical Overview of Biological Warfare’ in Frederick Sidell, Ernest Takafuji 
and David Franz (ed.), Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Surgeon General, Borden Institute, Walter Reed Army Medical Centre, 1997), p.416. 
210 Mark Wheelis, ‘Biological Warfare at the 1346 Siege of Caffa’, Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol.8:9 (2002), 
available at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/8/9/01-0536_article.htm#suggestedcitation (accessed 2/02/2014).  
211 See Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon (ed.), Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, 
Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies No.18 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Gregory Koblenz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International 
Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); James Martin et al. ‘History of Biological Weapons: From 
Poisoned Darts to International Epidemics’ in Frederick Sidell, Ernest Takafuji and David Franz (ed.), Medical 
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Following the defeat of the Triple Powers, international efforts to restrict the 
deployment of biological weaponry in hostilities manifested in the successful 
negotiation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Despite being an important step 
in the area of arms control, the Protocol proved insufficient to deprive 
biological weapons of their strategic and symbolic value, something 
evidenced in the determination of most major powers to pursue offensive 
programmes in the interwar years and the reluctance of the Allied Forces to 
impose sanctions against, or otherwise punish the Axis members that 
launched biological attacks during World War Two.212 
 
Having evolved into a sphere of professional activity during the early decades 
of the twentieth century, the life sciences were hardly insulated from the 
complex dynamics triggered by the multiplication of diverse agendas pursued 
by interested stakeholders, such as funding bodies, industry, state agencies, 
and the general public. The synergies between those dynamics and their 
cumulative effects played a crucial role in facilitating the extension and 
consolidation of the governance of biotechnology, effectively redefining 
research objectives, reconfiguring power relations and altering established 
norms. At least four trends are indicative in this regard. First, the policies of 
funding bodies affected and sometimes even shaped life science research 
priorities. Prior to the Second World War philanthropic organisations, 
including private foundations and charities, provided the bulk of material 
support for science and, as such, were in a position to define, at least to an 
extent, the lines of scientific enquiry to be pursued. Arguably the relationship 
between the policies of the Rockefeller philanthropies and the rise of 
molecular biology213 as a distinct discipline is an illustration of this trend. 
Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, op cit, pp.1-20; Simon Whitby, Biological Warfare against Crops, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).  
212 See John Krige, ‘Building the Arsenal of Knowledge’, Centaurus, vol. 52 (2010), pp.280-296; Nazi War Crimes 
and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, Researching Japanese War Crimes 
Records (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2006), available at http://www.archives.gov/iwg/japanese-war-
crimes/introductory-essays.pdf (accessed 3/02/2014); Jeanne Guillemin, ‘Imperial Japan’s Germ Warfare: The 
Suppression of Evidence at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 1946-1948’ in Ann Clunan et al. Terrorism, War, Disease?: 
Unravelling the Use of Biological Weapons, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp.165-186; John Gimbel, 
‘The American Exploitation of German Know-How after World War Two’, Political Science Quarterly, vol.105:2 
(1990), pp.295-309; Asif Siddiqi, ‘Germans in Russia: Cold War, Technology Transfer, and National Identity’, Osiris, 
vol.24 (2009), pp.120-143. 
213 See Lily Kay, Molecular Vision of Life: Caltech, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of the New Biology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Warren Weaver, ‘Molecular Biology: Origins of the Term’, Science, 
vol.170:3958 (1970), pp.581-582. On the impact of the Rockefeller Foundation’s policies on Soviet research, see 
Susan Gross Solomon and Nikolai Krementsov, ‘Giving and Taking across Borders: The Rockefeller Foundation 
and Russia’, Minerva, vol.39 (2001), pp.265-298; Susan Gross Solomon, ‘”Being there”: Fact-Finding and 
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While this relationship has been extensively questioned, the prevalent view in 
literature still holds that the policies implemented by Warren Weaver, the 
then director of the natural sciences division of the Foundation, effectively 
facilitated the ‘colonisation’ of biology by physical techniques not only in 
technical but also in philosophical and conceptual terms.214 In any event, the 
explicitly reductionist vision adopted by Weaver manifested in his strong 
support for the application of new physical and chemical techniques to 
biology, including the use of isotopes, ultracentrifuges and X-ray 
crystallography had far-reaching implications for several disciplines, 
especially biochemistry215 and largely provided the context for the major 
discoveries that triggered the biotechnology revolution. 
   
A second factor impacting on professional life science cultures was the 
emergence of partnerships between pharmaceutical companies and 
academia, a process dating back to the early years of the twentieth century. 
Following the defeat of Germany in the First World War, a significant 
proportion of the assets and patents held by local pharmaceutical companies 
were confiscated, as a result of which the centre of drug-manufacturing 
industry shifted to the most economically-stable country at the time – the US, 
allowing a greater number of American firms relatively easy and lucrative 
entry to the drug market.216 Heightened competition, coupled with already 
Policymaking: The Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Medical Education and the “Russian Matter”, 1925-1927’, 
The Journal of Policy History, vol.14:4 (2002), pp.384-409; Chris Shepherd, ‘Imperial Science: The Rockefeller 
Foundation and Agricultural Science in Peru, 1940-1960’, Science as Culture, vol.14:2 (2005), pp.113-137. 
214 On the impact of the Rockefeller Foundation’s policy on the consolidation of molecular biology as a separate 
discipline, see John Fuerst, ‘The Definition of Molecular Biology and the Definition of Policy: The Role of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s Policy for Molecular Biology’, Social Studies of Science, vol.14:2 (1984), p.225; Robert 
Olby, ‘The Sheriff and the Cowboys: Or Weaver’s Support of Astbury and Pauling’, Social Studies of Science, 
vol.14:2 (1984), pp.244-247; Ditta Bartels, ‘The Rockefeller Foundation’s Funding Policy of Molecular Biology: 
Success or Failure’, Social Studies of Science, vol.14:2 (1984), pp.238-243; Edward Yoxen, ‘Scepticism about the 
Centrality of Technology Transfer in the Rockefeller Foundation Programme in Molecular Biology’, Social Studies of 
Science, vol.14:2 (1984), pp. 248-252; John Fuerst, ‘Role of Reductionism in the Development of Molecular Biology: 
Peripheral or Central’, Social Studies of Science, vol.12:2 (1982), pp.241-278. On the arguments that contest this 
position, see Pnina Abir-Am, ‘The Discourse of Physical Power and Biological Knowledge in the 1930s: A 
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existing initiatives to ensure drug quality, such as the 1906 federal legislation 
on ingredient labelling and the establishment of the AMA Council on 
Chemistry and Pharmacy in 1905, in turn generated strong incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to forge close links with universities both for 
research and clinical trials.217 Academic-industrial partnerships took various 
forms, the most common of which were fellowships for junior scientists and 
consultancy.218 Commercial firms generally benefited from such 
collaborations in three ways, namely by getting exclusive access to the 
techniques and tacit knowledge of academic researchers; by obtaining 
exclusive rights to use the name of a compound made famous by its 
discoverer as a trademark; and by receiving exclusive license to manufacture 
a drug or compound that a researcher had patented.219 For their part, 
academic scientists enjoyed material and technical support, royalties and 
public renown.220 Even though the linkages between industry and academia 
fostered during the interwar period did encounter some serious opprobrium 
among the scientific community, by the late 1930s there were already signs 
that professional norms were changing, as reflected in the resolve of the 
American Society for Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics (ASPET) 
to allow its members to consult with industry (1937) and to amend its 
constitution to admit industry-employed scientists (1941).221 More 
importantly, university-industry cooperation gave birth to a new breed of life 
scientists – ‘the life scientist-entrepreneur’ – characterised by a remarkable 
ability to manage both pure and applied research projects using a ‘two-tiered’ 
funding strategy with support flowing from industry as well as philanthropic 
institutions.222  
 
Yet another consequential development was the extension of patent law so 
as to cover discoveries in the field of biotechnology. As early as 1900, the 
Japanese biochemist Jokichi Takamine managed to isolate the adrenal 
201-227; Martin Kenney, Biotechnology: The University- Industrial Complex, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986).  
217 Nicolas Rasmussen, ‘The Moral Economy of the Drug Company’, op cit, p.165.  
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222 Nicolas Rasmussen, ‘Of “Small Men”, “Big Science” and Bigger Business: The Second World War and 
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hormone, subsequently patenting his process for adrenaline purification and 
granting a license for commercial production to Parke-Davis.223 Even more 
revealing is the case of Edward Kendall who in 1916 patented his thyroid 
hormone preparation method, assigning the intellectual property to the 
University of Minnesota, which, for its part, granted exclusive license to the 
Squibb pharmaceutical company in exchange for half of the profits from the 
marketed product.224 Kendall’s work served as an important precedent, 
encouraging other life scientists and academic institutions to benefit from 
intellectual property management, as a result of which by the 1930s there 
were already concerns that the widespread management of biomedical 
knowledge for profit was eroding professional science ethos and traditional 
patterns of data and materials sharing between and even within 
universities.225 Yet in stark contrast with the anxieties expressed by those in 
favour of pure science and disinterested pursuit of knowledge, professional 
bodies, most notably the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS), demonstrated unequivocal support for medical patents, 
asserting their vital role both in ensuring public interest and advancing the 
scientific endeavour, and legitimising the administrative and institutional 
arrangements through which intellectual property was handled.226 In a similar 
fashion, seed companies and the American Seed Table Association lobbied 
vigorously for effective intellectual property restrictions on plant breeding 
innovations, something evident in the passage of the Plant Patent Act of 
1930 which provided protection for varieties of plants that could be 
reproduced asexually by mechanisms other than seeds.227 
 
Last but not least, along with chemistry and physics, biology also found itself 
within the compass of the state. The large-scale Nazi programme on racial 
hygiene which was discussed in some detail in the preceding chapter is but 
223 Nicolas Rasmussen, ‘Biotechnology Before the “Biotechnology Revolution”: Life Scientists, Chemists, and 
Product Development in 1930s-1940s America’, op cit, p. 204. 
224 Ibid, p.205. In 1915 T. Brailsford Robertson patented tethelin, a substance extracted from a gland in the brain 
which, he believed, promoted growth and as such, could have significant medical applications. Unlike Kendall’s 
work, his discovery proved neither medical, nor financial success and nor revenue was generated. See Charles 
Weiner, ‘Patenting and Academic Research: Historical Case Studies’, Science, Technology and Human Values, vol. 
12 (1987), pp.50-62. 
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one example of the efforts to organise life science expertise in pursuit of 
political objectives. The Nazis were hardly the first to do so, either. As early 
as the time of the First World War, life scientists in Germany and France 
were tasked with studying biological agents and pathogens in order to 
facilitate the development of offensive capability. The Soviet Union launched 
its biowarfare programme in the late 1920s, followed by the Japanese and 
the British in the mid- and late 1930s, respectively.228 Run by Army Surgeon 
Ishii under strict conditions of secrecy, Japan’s Unit 731 was arguably 
hosting the most advanced biological weapons programme at the time: ‘a 
mighty research empire’ in which hundreds of talented scientists laboured 
day and night investigating the warfare potential of a wide variety of 
diseases, such as plague, anthrax, dysentery, typhoid, paratyphoid, cholera 
and pneumonia.229 American life scientists, too, were mobilised during the 
Second World War. Besides the Committee on Medical Research (CMR) 
which operated within the remit of OSRD directed by Vannevar Bush, the 
War Production Board (WPB), the War Department, and the Army’s 
Manhattan District funded and coordinated large-scale programmes in plant 
biology, bacteriological warfare, and radiation biology.230 The CMR alone 
was in charge of managing around 600 research contracts231 covering a 
broad spectre of fields and encompassing a significant number of academic 
scientists. In doing so, the Committee heavily relied upon the already 
established framework of project-oriented university-industry collaborations, 
which enabled the rapid development of a range of pharmaceuticals and 
products, including penicillin, steroids and manufactured collagen.232 
 
Thus, by a variety of means, a scientific, technological, institutional and 
regulatory foundation for what would later be recognised as the ‘revolution in 
biology’ was already in place in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
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And this is why the discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953 and subsequent 
work on recombinant DNA were not only scientific sensations but also the 
triggers for the advances, possibilities and challenges of 21st century 
biotechnology. 
 
‘The Eighth Day of Creation’: From a Double Helix to Gene Splicing 
 
By the early 1950s efforts to decipher the secrets of life had already yielded 
some results. The field of molecular biology was steadily expanding with 
cutting-edge research giving insights into the structure and function of the 
macromolecules found in living cells, most notably, proteins. There are two 
main reasons why proteins attracted such considerable attention during that 
period. First, unlike the rest of the large biological molecules – 
carbohydrates, lipids and nucleic acids – which were dismissed as chemically 
and conceptually boring substances composed of monotonous repetitions of 
one or a few subunits in entirely predictable order, proteins were deemed 
interesting not only because of the amino acid chains which made them up 
but also because of the crucial part they played in the biochemistry of living 
organisms.233 Among the chief characteristics of proteins is their property to 
serve as enzymes or biological catalysts and thus facilitate the cell metabolic 
activity. Given the supposed (and later confirmed) link between cell 
metabolism and gene expression, the process that determines what kind of 
traits an organism would exhibit, proteins were considered essential to 
unravelling the mechanisms of how life manifested itself. Second, throughout 
the first several decades of the twentieth century there was a general 
consensus that genes had a protein-based structure and it was not until the 
late 1940s that this assumption was seriously questioned. Then, in 1949, 
Frederick Sanger managed to demonstrate by dint of chromatography that, 
far from being governed by a natural law, protein sequencing required 
233 Up until the late 1940s the majority of scientists worked on the assumption that nucleic acids, in particular DNA, 
were similar in structure and composition to carbohydrates and lipids: long but simple and hardly performing any 
important role in cell processes. It suffices to mention that according to Max Delbruck, one of the pioneers of 
molecular biology, nucleic acids were ‘stupid molecules’ that could not specify anything. See Horace Freeland 
Judson, ‘A History of the Science and Technology behind Gene Mapping and Sequencing’ in Daniel Kevles and 
Leroy Hood (ed.), The Code of Codes: Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), pp.37-80. For further discussion on the precursors to the biotechnology revolution, 
see Horace Freeland Judson, The Eight Day of Creation: Makers of the Revolution in Biology, (London: Penguin 
Books, 1979); Eric Vettel, ‘The Protean Nature of Stanford University’s Biological Sciences, 1946-1972’, Historical 
Studies in the Physical and Biological sciences, vol.35:1, (2004), pp.95-113. 
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specific instructions from the gene. Even more importantly, the following year 
Erwin Chargaff using the same method disproved that DNA was also a 
‘boring’ molecule, showing that it was indeed at least as specific in its 
composition as proteins.234 Taken together, the studies constituted an 
important indicator of the looming paradigm shift in molecular biology, which 
asserted the primacy of nucleic acids in the study of life. But the culmination 
of this rapid turn of events took the form of a letter, which Nature published in 
1953. There, the authors James Watson and Francis Crick sought ‘to 
suggest a structure for the salt of deoxyribose nucleic acid (D.N.A.)’ which, 
they believed, possessed ‘novel features…of considerable biological 
interest.’235 According to proposed model, the DNA molecule consisted of 
‘two helical chains each coiled round the same axis’ and their ‘specific 
pairing’ suggested ‘a possible copying mechanism of genetic material.’236  
 
The conceptual metamorphosis of DNA occurred overnight. Far from being a 
‘stupid molecule’ that fulfilled no interesting function, it seemed to be a holder 
of the code of life. The sensational discovery galvanised the scientific 
community worldwide. Its profound implications quickly became evident, as 
life scientists struggled to comprehend the novel paradigm and adjust their 
research programmes accordingly. Failure to adapt to the altered conceptual 
landscape jeopardised individual careers and threatened to erode the 
prestige of renowned research facilities, something vividly illustrated in the 
case of Wendell Stanley and the Biochemistry and Virus Laboratory (BVL) 
which he directed at Berkeley.237 In scientific terms, the elucidation of the 
DNA structure proved to be a truly catalytic event, not least because it led to 
a substantive redefinition of the gene, which made it possible to map its 
sequence: 
 
the moment molecular biologists understood the 
gene as a specific sequence of bases of DNA, then 
they could begin to think of analysing the growth 
234 See Horace Freeland Judson, ‘A History of the Science and Technology behind Gene Mapping and Sequencing’, 
op cit, p. 53. 
235 James Watson and Francis Crick, ‘Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic 
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and functioning of organisms from the inside out – 
as it were in parallel with the natural processes of 
the organism – by identifying functional base 
sequences and finding out what they determine in 
the living creature.238 
 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the double helix model enabled molecular 
biologists to substantially expand the amount of theoretical knowledge 
available about genetic activity and the processes taking place within the cell. 
Within a relatively short time-frame the genetic code was cracked; the cellular 
machinery responsible for DNA replication and protein synthesis was 
explained in detail; the metabolic pathways involved in replication, expression 
and natural recombination were defined and the enzymes that facilitated 
those processes were identified; and the regulation of protein synthesis in 
bacteria was successfully modelled.239 On the practical side, the 
manipulation of DNA was vigorously pursued, as reflected in the test-tube 
replication of viral DNA and the completion of the first chemical synthesis of a 
gene in 1972.240 Even though by 1970 the knowledge generated in molecular 
biology had little practical application, there was a shared conviction among 
researchers in the field that increased understanding of the role of genes in 
development and differentiation might potentially create a possibility for the 
efficient regulation and control of these processes, thus allowing the 
production of better organisms.241 Indeed, efforts to deliberately modify the 
genetic makeup of organisms were well underway in the late 1960s. In many 
respects, the announcement of the first successful gene-splicing experiment 
conducted by Paul Berg at the University of Stanford in 1971 had a snowball 
effect on genetic engineering and by 1973 researchers had already 
demonstrated that genes from completely unrelated bacterial species 
238 Horace Freeland Judson, ‘A History of the Science and Technology behind Gene Mapping and Sequencing’ in 
Daniel Kevles and Leroy Hood (ed.), The Code of Codes: Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome 
Project, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p.40. 
239 Susan Wright, ‘Recombinant DNA Technology and Its Social Transformation, 1972-1982’, Osiris, vol.2 (1986), 
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functioned in their new bacterial host.242 This was a fascinating breakthrough 
of unprecedented gravity: 
  
For the first time, there is now available a method 
which allows us to cross very large evolutionary 
barriers and to move genes between organisms 
which have never had genetic contact...These 
species barriers have so long been accepted as 
logical and almost absolute that it is only within the 
past months that scientists have seriously 
contemplated the ramifications of breaking these 
species barriers.243 
 
 
In crude terms, recombinant DNA techniques, generally referred to as 
‘genetic engineering’, presented scientists with the opportunity to alter and 
control life at will on a scale unimaginable before. Due to its far-reaching 
implications, from the outset the technique was deemed highly controversial. 
The wide-ranging debate that it spurred will be discussed later on in this 
chapter. At this stage, it suffices to note that from the outset an explicit 
emphasis was laid on the benefits that could be derived from this 
development. In particular, the prospects for potential commercial 
exploitation of the technique occupied a central place in the debate. By 
contrast, while various concerns of social, environmental, ethical and political 
character were raised, those remained largely marginal in the overall 
discussion on whether and under what conditions work involving recombinant 
DNA should proceed.244  
 
Given the highly wide-ranging adaptable applications of genetic engineering 
that were readily apparent as early as the late 1970s, it is hardly surprising 
that the technique was largely hailed as beneficial and hence, worthy of 
support. In medicine, for example, gene technology was vigorously applied to 
studying the mechanisms of disease and exploring possibilities for early 
diagnostics and treatment. As a result of these efforts, by the turn of the 
242 Ibid, p.314. 
243 Sydney Brenner quoted in ibid, p.315.  
244 See Susan Wright. Molecular Politics: Developing American and British Regulatory Policy for Genetic 
Engineering, 1972-1982, (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Susan Wright, ‘The Social Warp of 
Science: Writing the History of Genetic Engineering’, Science, Technology, and Human Values, vol.18:1 (1993), 
pp.79-101; Judith Swazey et al. ‘Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A History of the Recombinant DNA 
Research Controversy’, Southern California Law Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1019-1078.  
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century the transformation of biology from a descriptive to predictive science 
was steadily becoming a reality. The successful mapping of the human 
genome in 2003 arguably constituted the pinnacle of this transformation. In 
addition, genetic engineering facilitated the development of an array of new 
drugs, including hormones (e.g. somatostatin, human insulin and human 
growth hormone), vaccines, antibiotics and anti-viral agents (e.g. interferon). 
Agriculture and food production were also expected to benefit substantially 
from the application of recombinant DNA techniques in the form of novel 
plant breeds, increased yields, nutritious products, and synthesis of vital 
substances, such as amino acids and vitamins. Finally, genetic engineering 
was likely to contribute to pollution control, manufacturing, mineral refining 
and food processing.  
 
Throughout the final decades of the twentieth century gene technology, that 
is, the tools required for large-scale recombinant DNA experimentation, 
developed exponentially. Whereas the early methods for manipulating 
genetic material were limited to gene-splicing and gene-cloning, by the early 
1990s scientists were already employing techniques as sophisticated as DNA 
synthesis, automated DNA fluorescence sequencing, and polymerase chain 
reaction.245 Taken together, those innovative technologies considerably 
shortened the time necessary for conducting experimental work, while at the 
same time, enhancing accuracy and quality. But the impact of genetic 
engineering was hardly limited to the development of novel devices and 
research methods. In broader terms, it reinforced the notion of the cell as an 
information-processing machine that could be effectively reprogrammed to 
perform functions outside its inherent capacity.246 Based on this computer 
analogy, DNA came to be regarded as little more than a piece of software, 
the scope for modification and tuning of which was limited only to the 
boundaries of scientists’ imagination. And those scientists did not even need 
to be specialists in biology per se. Along with individuals who had their 
academic grounding in chemistry and physics, from the mid-1960s onwards, 
245 See Horace Freeland Judson, ‘A History of the Science and Technology behind Gene Mapping and Sequencing’ 
op cit, p. 74.  
246 See Martin Kenney, Biotechnology: The University-Industrial Complex (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986), p.21. 
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molecular biology attracted scientists with backgrounds in inherently practical 
disciplines, such as engineering and medicine.247 The growing 
interdisciplinarity of the field was further reflected in the consolidation of novel 
sub-disciplines, including bioinformatics, ‘the study of informatic processes in 
biotic systems’ which relied heavily upon computational methods for analysis 
of genomic data.248 DNA manipulation was steadily turning into a domain of 
practice open to a wide range of constituencies with varying levels of 
expertise in biology. We will return to this point when looking into the 
governance challenges arising from the advances in the 21st century 
biotechnology in Chapter 4.  
 
Even as rapid advances were altering the professional and institutional 
cultures of an emerging life sciences arena, none of these was free standing 
of the encompassing national cultures, particularly the prevailing political 
ethos and government, which in any event retained a close direct interest in 
these developments, not least through funding and regulatory arrangements. 
  
Life Science Research in the East and West 
 
Cold War Inertia 
 
The Cold War deepened and extended the organisational and governance 
tools for the procurement of cutting-edge, highly sophisticated weapon 
systems developed during the Second World War and solidified the wartime 
marriage of convenience between science and the state, whereby the former 
was finally lifted out of the scarcity of funds that pervaded its earlier history; 
and the latter rapidly and efficiently availed itself of the enormous scientific 
expertise found in academia and industry. More importantly, it considerably 
enhanced the value attached to scientific and technological prowess turning it 
into a critical asset of state power and national security. Hence, it can be 
argued that the Cold War was a technological race for military, strategic and 
247 Eric Vettel, Biotech: The Countercultural Origins of an Industry’, op cit, p.173. 
248 Paulien Hogeweg, ‘The Roots of Bioinformatics in Theoretical Biology’, PLOS Computational Biology, vol.7:3 
(2011), pp. 1-5. 
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economic advantage, just as much as it was a political and ideological 
confrontation for global domination. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, 
physics enjoyed explicit preferential treatment in terms of government and 
military investment. The Soviet acquisition of the bomb and the launch of 
Sputnik in 1957 both illustrated this trend and served as catalysts for its 
steady perpetuation. Among its tangible expressions were nuclear weapons, 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and space exploration to name a few – 
emblematic artefacts of the vigorous arms race between the superpowers 
and vivid symbols of scientific supremacy and technological might. High-
technology in the form of electronics, data-processing tools and computer 
devices flourished, too, as epitomised by the rapid growth and economic 
success of the Silicon Valley – a Cold War creation whose infrastructure and 
paths of opportunity were fundamentally shaped by the era’s political 
institutions and imperatives.249 Yet the physical sciences were not the only 
area that was explicitly brought under the compass of the state. On the 
contrary, the life sciences attracted no lesser degree of interest from 
government agencies and the military, something evidenced in the massive 
resources and efforts dedicated to their expansion on both sides of the iron 
curtain. This trend was largely a result of the rapid growth of the biological 
disciplines and the fascinating discoveries made during the first half of the 
twentieth century, including the advent of antibiotics. Unlike the investments 
in physics whose payback had implications chiefly for the armament sector 
and industry, funding biology-related research promised enormous benefits in 
terms of social welfare, food security and economic prosperity. The 
‘tremendous optimism’ that enveloped the study of disease during the 1950s 
and 1960s is indicative in this regard: 
                       
Nearly every week the medical establishment 
declared another ‘miracle breakthrough’ in 
humanity’s war with infectious diseases. Antibiotics, 
first discovered in the early 1940s, were now 
growing in number and potency…Medicine was 
249 Margaret Pugh O’Mara, ‘Cold War Politics and Scientific Communities: The Case of the Silicon Valley’, 
Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, vol.31:2 (2006), p.122.  
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viewed as a huge chart depicting disease incidence 
over time: by the twentieth-first century every 
infectious disease on the chart would have hit zero. 
Few scientists or physicians of the day doubted that 
humanity would continue on its linear course of 
triumphs over microbes.250 
  
 
Even prior to the biotechnology revolution and the emergence of genetic 
engineering there were clear indications that well-organised and generously 
supported life science research could make a significant contribution to 
combating threats to public health. At the same time, advances in plant 
breeding and hybridisation offered novel ways of boosting crop yields and 
producing food of better quality and higher nutritional value.  Besides its vast 
array of civilian applications, biomedical knowledge also possessed proven 
military potential which, if utilised efficiently, could facilitate the development 
of a sophisticated biowarfare arsenal. Given the multifaceted leverage likely 
to be accrued through the high-level coordination and governance of the life 
sciences, neither of the superpowers spared energy or resources to ensure 
that ground-breaking discoveries in the field were fully utilised for the 
purposes of the Cold War.  
 
Despite the obvious differences between the US and the USSR at systemic 
and social levels, the similarities in terms of the dynamics that shaped and 
impacted on the professional life science cultures in both countries were 
profound. This is hardly surprising, since both superpowers were scientific 
states251 preoccupied with national security, economic preponderance and 
political power; both employed radical rhetoric and constructed ideological 
narratives to justify their grand strategies and bolster their international 
standing; and both underscored the benefits of social transformation 
achieved by dint of scientific and technological advancement. Three sets of 
dynamics are indicative in this regard. One was the post-war linkage between 
scientific research and national security that largely dictated the ‘Big Science’ 
expenditure and helped fuel and sustain the growth of the military-industrial 
250 Laurie Garrett, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World out of Balance. (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1994), p.30. 
251 On the concept of ‘scientific state’, see Jurgen Schmandt and James Everett Katz, ‘The Scientific State: A 
Theory with Hypotheses’, Science, Technology, and Human Values, vol.11:1 (1986), pp.40-52. 
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complex. But zero-sum calculations and realist fears did much more than 
bring scientists, policy-makers and the military together. They motivated 
states on either side of the conflict to exercise an unprecedented degree of 
control over the practice of science, sanctioning deeply controversial 
methods for ensuring conformity and obedience which erected barriers to 
science internationalism and academic freedom, and eroded scientific 
openness. With scientific knowledge treated as an asset of strategic 
significance that had to be protected at all costs, secrecy and mutual distrust 
came to permeate the professional science ethos.252  
 
Second, the growing bureaucratisation of science, coupled with the 
significant increase in the influence of science administrators constituted 
another set of consequential dynamics that had bearing on its governance 
and cultures during the Cold War. Given the unique nature of science as a 
professional endeavour dedicated to the pursuit of truth and knowledge, 
there was a shared conviction among scientists that their work was entitled to 
a special status when it came to regulation and policy-making. In particular, 
most scientists were deeply sceptical of the ability of lay people, be they 
politicians or the general public to make informed decisions regarding the 
course of development of scientific research. In their view, those who were 
directly engaged in science were ideally suited to determine and assess the 
needs of the sphere so that it could flourish, for they solely possessed 
sufficient expertise and knowledge of its internal workings. Being the 
intermediate between researchers and the government, science 
administrators strived tirelessly to reconcile various political pressures with 
252 Writing in the 1960s, Norbert Wiener described the growing secrecy in government laboratories in the US during 
the Cold War as follows:  
 
There is no doubt that the present age, particularly in America, is one in which more men 
and women are devoting themselves to a formally scientific career than ever before in 
history. This does not mean that the intellectual environment of science received a 
proportionate increment. Many of today’s American scientists are working in government 
laboratories, where secrecy is the order of the day, and they are protected by the deliberate 
subdivision of problems to the extent that no man can be fully aware of the bearing of his 
own work. These laboratories, as well as the great industrial laboratories are so aware of 
the importance of the scientist that he is forced to punch the time clock and to give an 
accounting of the last minute of his research. Vacations are cut down to a dead minimum, 
but consultations and reports and visits to other plants are encouraged without limit, so that 
the scientist, and the young scientist in particular, has not the leisure to ripen his own ideas. 
 
See Norbert Wiener, I am a Mathematician, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1964), p. 361.  
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the demands of their constituencies for preserving research autonomy. 
Coping with this task was far from straightforward and attempts to strike a 
balance often generated friction and/or encompassed serious trade-offs 
between maintaining science professional ethos and complying with political 
imperatives.  
 
The third set of dynamics pertained to the shift in attitude toward the role of 
science and technology in society. Novel discoveries in fundamental 
research offered a variety of applications with potential for enhancing public 
health, alleviating environmental damage, and maximising social welfare. 
Science and technology thus came to be regarded as important sources of 
solutions not only to problems of purely technical character but also to issues 
that were inherently social and political. Having embraced technological 
optimism as a dominant paradigm in the realm of public policy, politicians on 
both sides of the iron curtain demonstrated unequivocal trust in the expert 
judgement of scientists, further bolstering their social image. As a 
consequence, scientific objectivity and preference for quick technological 
fixes largely supplanted public deliberation not only in tackling pressing 
socio-economic concerns but also in assessing the desirability and utility of 
scientific breakthroughs.  
 
The complex synergies between the three sets of dynamics described above 
and their cumulative effects facilitated the development of forms and modes 
of science governance that were, by and large, consistent with the prevalent 
Cold War mentality of the day. In other words, virtually any aspect of science 
practice from everyday routines through professional norms to top-down 
government regulation reflected and was influenced by the socio-political and 
economic contingencies of the period.253 But if state-led initiatives and 
253 On the impact of the Cold War on science, see Naomi Oreskes and John Krige, (ed.), Science and Technology in 
the Global Cold War, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014); Walter McDougall, ‘The Cold War Excursion of Science’, 
Diplomatic History, vol.24:1 (2000), pp.117-127; Hunter Heyck and David Kaiser, ‘Focus: New Perspectives on 
Science and the Cold War: Introduction’, Isis, vol.101 (2010), pp.362-366; Gregg Herken, ‘In the Service of the 
State: Science and the Cold War', Diplomatic History, vol.24:1 (2000), pp.107-115; Walter McDougall, ‘Technocracy 
and Statecraft in the Space Age: Toward a History of Saltation’, The American Historical Review, vol.87:4 (1982), 
pp.1010-1040; David van Kruen, ‘US Intelligence Gathering and Its Scientific Cover at the Naval Research 
Laboratory, 1948-1962’, Social Studies of Science, vol.vol.31:2 (2001), pp.207-229; David Hart, Forged Consensus: 
Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the United States, 1921-1953 (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1998), see Chapter 8 ‘The Past in the Present: The “Hybrid” in the Cold War and Beyond’, pp.206-233; 
Joseph Manzione, ‘”Amusing and Amazing and Practical and Military”: The Legacy of Scientific Internationalism in 
84 
 
                                                          
measures sought to codify and institutionalise the Cold War scientific and 
technological objectives, it was the informal, tacit elements of science 
conduct, such as shared values, beliefs, standards and collective memory 
that reinforced official rules and ensured their endurance and validity. Given 
the constant interplay between professional science cultures and the larger 
encompassing cultures within which they operated, the relations of 
governance fostered during the period achieved stability and acquired inertia. 
Within the organisational theory literature, the concept of inertia refers to the 
property of structural, normative and institutional arrangements to guarantee 
order and predictability by providing a stable and reliable context that 
supports performance. Since it is key to the maintenance of the status quo, 
inertia is deemed a hindrance to change and/or to ‘strategic renewal outside 
the current frame of strategy’.254 Sources of inertia include organisational 
attributes, such as capabilities, controls, culture and conduct.255 While inertia 
plays a salient part in increasing the momentum that drives organisations 
forward, over time, organisational inertia and momentum become mutually 
reinforcing.256 There are sufficient grounds to argue therefore that the inertia 
of the governance arrangements in the area of the life sciences put in place 
during the Cold War would accrue resistance to change and make their 
adaptation to a different political or organisational ecology difficult. To 
substantiate this point, the remaining sections of this chapter will look into the 
Cold War modes of the governance of biotechnology, focusing on three 
dimensions, namely procedural, structural and normative. The next chapter 
will then elucidate the nature and range of governance challenges posed by 
the rapid advances in the life sciences in the twenty-first century.  
 
 
 
 
American Foreign Policy, 1945-1963’, Diplomatic History, vol.24:1 (2000), see pp.53-55; John Sutton, 
‘Organisational Autonomy and Professional Norms in Science: A Case Study of the Lawrence Livermore 
Laboratory’, Social Studies of Science, vol.14 (1984), pp.197-224; Slava Gerovitch, ‘Stalin’s Rocket Designers’ Leap 
into Space: The Technical Intelligentsia Faces the Thaw’, Osiris, vol.23 (2008), pp.189-209; Sonja Schmid, 
‘Organisational Culture and Professional Identities in the Soviet Nuclear Power Industry’, Osiris, vol.23 (2008), 
pp.82-111.  
254 C Kinnear and G Roodt, ‘The Development of an Instrument for Measuring Organisational Inertia’, Journal of 
Industrial Psychology, vol. 24:2 (1998), p.44 [emphasis as original].  
255 C Fombrun, Leading Corporate Change (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992).  
256 C Kinnear and G Roodt, ‘The Development of an Instrument for Measuring Organisational Inertia’, op cit. 
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Procedural Dimension 
 
The purpose of this section is to look into the regulatory and policy 
mechanisms adopted for the governance of biotechnology during the Cold 
War. As such, it provides an overview of some of the key international and 
national legally-binding measures and standard-setting documents, 
recommendations, and guidelines. The section also sketches the main trends 
in national life science policies in terms of funding, strategic planning and 
definition of priorities during the Cold War.  
 
a. International Regulatory Framework 
 
Given its wide scope of applications, biotechnology was gradually brought 
within the compass of multiple international regimes, with the breadth and 
depth of the regulations in place varying depending on their nature and 
goals.257 To be sure, not all regulations were directly pertinent to the conduct 
of life science research as such. Standards on food safety,258 animal,259 
plant260 and environmental protection,261 for example, while long-standing 
and extensive, had limited direct bearing on everyday practices within 
laboratories. It is indicative to note that even though the International Sanitary 
Regulations adopted by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 1951262 
explicitly required State Parties to provide ‘facilities for bacteriological 
investigation [and] for the collection and examination of rodents for plague 
257 For an overview of the international regulation of biotechnology, see Catherine Rhodes, International 
Governance of Biotechnology: Needs, Problems, and Potential, (London: Bloomsbury, 2010).  
258 The Codex Alimentarius Commission established in 1963 by the UN FAO and WHO is the principal international 
authority that develops and oversees the implementation of harmonised international food standards, guidelines and 
codes of practices in food trade. See http://www.codexalimentarius.org/ (accessed 5/02/2014).  
259 The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) founded in 1924 is the international authority that develops and 
oversees the implementation of the international regulations related to animal health and welfare. Among the 
principal international legal documents in the area is the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (1968) which includes a 
chapter on the use of animals in research and education. For further information see http://www.oie.int/international-
standard-setting/terrestrial-code/ (accessed 5/02/2014).  
260 The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is an international plant health agreement. Signed in 1951, 
the Convention seeks to protect cultivated and wild plant species by preventing the introduction and spread of pests. 
See https://www.ippc.int/about (accessed 5/02/2014).  
261 The UN Conference on Human Environment held in 1972 in Stockholm was the first ever international summit 
that focused explicitly on the interactions between human activities and the environment. It concluded with the 
acceptance of the Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment. See 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dunche/dunche.html (accessed 5/02/2014).  
262 The 1951 ISR are listed as Second edition, taking into account that the treaty drafted in 1851 at the international 
sanitary conference addressed cholera, plague and yellow fever. Full text of the ISR is available at 
http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/fullnames/pdf/1962/TS0022%20(1962)%20CMND-
1704%20INTERNATIONAL%20SANITARY%20REGULATIONS%20ADOPTED%20BY%20THE%20WORLD%20H
EALTH%20ASSEMBLY%20ON%20MAY%2025.PDF (accessed 21/09/2015). 
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infection’, as well as to ensure that every sanitary airport had at its disposal ‘a 
bacteriological laboratory, or facilities for dispatching suspected material to 
such a laboratory’, the Regulations made no specific provisions regarding 
biological safety in research facilities and/or the conduct of work on 
pathogenic microorganisms. Indeed, it was not until 1983 that the WHO 
issued its Laboratory Biosafety Manual – a guidance document seeking to 
promote the development of codes and standards for the safe handling of 
pathogens in laboratories. Prior to the publication of the Manual, countries 
were assigned two broad sets of obligations as part of the international 
efforts to control the spread of infectious diseases, namely to notify the WHO 
about outbreaks of specified infectious diseases in their territories; and to 
limit disease-prevention measures that interfered with trade and travel to 
those based on scientific evidence and public health principles.263  
 
Yet this is not to say that international rules did not impact on the cultures of 
life science research before the 1980s. On the contrary, in addition to the 
evolution of biosafety guidelines (discussed below), there are at least four 
areas of international law that merit attention as far as work in biology-related 
disciplines is concerned. Those include the transfer of dangerous goods and 
substances; the protection of intellectual property; biological non-proliferation 
and arms control; and research ethics. 
 
In 1956 the Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods of 
the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) published its 
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, which largely 
informed subsequent legal developments in the field.264 The regime is 
coherent insofar as it comprises legally-binding provisions for any mode of 
transport - that is, air, road, rail, sea, and post, based on a common system 
of classification divided into nine categories. Class six is subdivided into two 
parts, covering poisonous (toxic) substances and infectious substances, 
respectively. The regime thus covers the transport of pathogens and toxins 
263 David Fidler, ‘From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The International Health 
Regulations’, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol.4:2 (2005), p.328. 
264 Full text of the subsequently revised Recommendations is available at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/danger/publi/unrec/rev13/English/00E_Intro.pdf (accessed 21/09/2015).  
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alike. Biological specimens and cultures would also fall into this category. 
Collectively, the regulations define the standards and requirements for 
packaging, labelling, handling and transportation of dangerous goods. Given 
the importance of data sharing and exchange of samples and materials 
among life scientists, sufficient awareness of and familiarity with the 
provisions of and changes in the regulations was an important aspect of 
research practice in order to ensure the safe handling of pathogenic 
microorganisms.  
 
The regulations pertaining to the carriage of dangerous substances by air 
were introduced in the mid-1950s. Two international agencies were tasked 
with their administration, the International Air Transport Association (IATA)265 
and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).266 Prior to the entry 
into force of the regulations, there was a complete ban on the carriage of 
toxic, flammable or corrosive materials on board planes. In the mid-1960s, an 
additional set of legal rules was introduced, the Live Animal Regulations, 
which laid down the standards for the in-flight welfare of animals.267 The 
transport of dangerous substances by road is regulated by the European 
Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by 
Road (ADR) which was signed in 1957 in Geneva under the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe. Similar agreements were later adopted by countries 
in other regions, including South America and South-East Asia.268 The 
Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) was signed in 
1980 and entered into force five years later.269 The event was marked by the 
establishment of the Intergovernmental Organisation for International 
Carriage by Rail (OTIF) which was tasked with the administration of the 
treaty. The Regulation concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous 
265 Founded in 1945, the International Air Transport Association seeks ‘to promote safe, regular and economical air 
transport for the benefit of the peoples of the world, to foster air commerce, and to study the problems connected 
therewith’ and ‘to provide means for collaboration among the air  transport enterprises engaged directly or indirectly 
in international  air transport service’. See  
http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/history_2.aspx (accessed 5/02/2014).  
266 Founded 1944, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is a UN specialised agency that seeks to 
promote the safe development of international civil aviation around the world. Annex 18 of the Chicago Convention 
(1944) that set out the standards for international civil aviation addressed the safe transport of dangerous goods on 
board of passenger aircraft. See 
http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/Pages/annex-18.aspx (accessed 5/02/2014).  
267 See http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/history_3.aspx (accessed 5/02/2014).  
268 For full text of the ADR Agreement, see  
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/danger/publi/adr/ADRagree_e.pdf (accessed 21/09/2015). 
269 For full text of COTIF, see http://www.otif.org/pdf_external/e/cotif-1980-e.PDF (acceesed 2109/2015). 
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Goods (RID) is contained in Annex C of the Convention. The criteria for 
transporting dangerous goods by sea were established by the 1974 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).270 Its 
provisions are mandatory for each State Party. Based on the text of the 
Convention, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) developed and 
adopted in 1965 the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, which 
covered matters such as packing, container traffic and stowage, specifically 
emphasising the need for segregation of incompatible substances.271 Lastly, 
Article 16 of the Universal Postal Convention adopted by the Universal Postal 
Union (UPU) in 1964 sets out the regulations regarding the shipment of 
dangerous goods via mail services.272  
 
The origins of the international legal framework for the protection of 
intellectual property date back to the late nineteenth century. A landmark 
treaty of that period was the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property adopted in 1883 and last revised in 1979. The Convention is broad 
in scope applying to industrial property ‘in the widest sense, including 
patents, marks, industrial designs, utility models, trade names, geographical 
indications, and the repression of unfair competition.’273 Initially the 
Convention was administered by the United International Bureaux for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI), an international body set up in 
1893 which later, in 1970, evolved into the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation. The provisions of the Paris Convention regarding patents were 
subsequently incorporated into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
a treaty that has proved to be very consequential for biotechnology, 
270 The 1974 SOLAS replaced its earlier counterpart negotiated in 1960. Full text of the Convention is available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201184/volume-1184-I-18961-English.pdf (accessed 
21/09/2015). 
271 On the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, see  
http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=158 (accessed 5/02/2014).  
272 For information on the Universal Postal Union, see http://www.upu.int/en/the-upu/the-upu.html (accessed 
17/09/2016). The full text of the Universal Postal Convention is available at https://lettersblogatory.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/universal-postal-convention.pdf (accessed 17/09/2015).  
273 For a summary of the 1883 Paris Convention, see  
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html (accessed 5/02/2014);  for the evolution of the 
international regime on intellectual property protection, see http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ (accessed 
5/02/2014).  
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especially in the area of drug innovation and distribution.274 Two more 
international legal instruments developed as part of the efforts to synchronise 
the standards on the protection of intellectual property across various 
countries were the International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV) of 1961 and the Budapest Treaty on the 
International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes 
of Patent Procedure of 1977. Under the UPOV Convention, a variety is 
defined as ‘any cultivar, clone, line, stock or hybrid which is capable of 
cultivation’ and this criterion is applicable to ‘all botanical genera and 
species’. According to Article 5 of the Convention concerning breeders’ 
rights, prior authorisation from individual breeders is required ‘for the 
production, for purposes of commercial marketing, of the reproductive or 
vegetative propagating material, as such, of the new variety, and for the 
offering for sale or marketing of such material.’ The Budapest Treaty aims to 
facilitate the patent application procedures involving microorganisms. One of 
the chief requirements for granting a patent on an invention is disclosure, 
which usually takes the form of a written description. Where an invention 
involves a microorganism or the use thereof, a deposit of a sample is used as 
a substitute for a description in writing. The value of the Treaty thus lies in the 
fact that it allows applicants to deposit biological material with an 
‘international depositary authority’, rather than asking them to submit 
samples in every country in which they are pursuing patent protection.275 By 
establishing a uniform system of deposit, the Budapest Treaty makes the 
patent system of contracting States more attractive and provides patent 
applicants with a cost-effective mode of securing intellectual property rights.  
 
The third set of regulations under scrutiny includes those prohibiting the 
development and spread of biological weapons. The proscription of ‘poison 
or poisoned arms’ in war has a long-standing tradition in customary 
274 See, for example, Sherry Marcellin, The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents: US Sectional Interests 
and the African Group at the WTO, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010);  Ellen t‘Hoen, ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and 
Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha’, Chicago Journal of International Law, vol.3:1 
(2002), pp.27-46; Michael Westerhaus and Arachu Castro, ‘How Do Intellectual Property Law and International 
Trade Agreements Affect Access to Antiretroviral Therapy’, PLOS Medicine, vol.3:8 (2006), pp.1230-1236; Robert 
Ostergard (ed.), HIV/AIDS and the Threat to National and International Security, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006). 
275 For a summary of the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the 
Purposes of Patent Procedure (1977), see  
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/budapest/summary_budapest.html (accessed 5/02/2014).  
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international law. From at least the late nineteenth century the ban has also 
been explicitly codified in several agreements, including The International 
Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War (1874) and The Hague 
Conventions with Respect to the to the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
(1899; 1907).276 Following the First World War, in which belligerents on both 
sides procured and deployed chemical and biological weapons, in 1925 the 
League of Nations adopted a Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare (Geneva Protocol).277 Whilst legally binding, those agreements 
applied only in times of war and, as such, hardly contained any provisions 
regarding peacetime research and development of biological (and chemical) 
weapons. This trend began to change in the late 1960s, partially as a result 
of the public outcry triggered by the Vietnam War and the vivid reports 
demonstrating the deleterious effects of the widespread use of Agent 
Orange, a dioxin-rich defoliant.278 In 1969, the US unilaterally renounced ‘the 
use of any form of deadly biological weapons that either kill or 
incapacitate.’279 Three years later, in 1972, the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) was opened for signature. The Convention 
outlaws the development, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of ‘microbial 
or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes’.280 Thus defined, the general purpose 
criterion contained in Article 1 extends the international legal prohibition on 
biological weapons to encompass all future scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention. In other words, the use of virtually 
any biological agent and/toxin is legal, as long as such use is directed toward 
peaceful and preventive purposes. No official organisation was specifically 
276 For full text of the 1874 Brussels Declaration, see https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/135 (accessed 21/09/2015). 
Full text of the Hague Conventions (II and IV) is available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/150?OpenDocument 
(accessed 21/09/2015) and https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/0/1d1726425f6955aec125641e0038bfd6 (accessed 
21/09/2015), respectively. 
277 For the full text of the Geneva Protocol, see https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/280?OpenDocument (accessed 
21/09/2015). 
278 See Tom Fawthrop, ‘Vietnam’s War against Agent Orange’, BBC News, 14 June 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3798581.stm (accessed 5/02/2014).  
279 Richard Nixon, Remarks Announcing Decisions on Chemical and Biological Defence Policies and Programmes, 
25 November 1969, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2344 (accessed 5/02/2014).  
280 Full text of the BTWC is available at 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/77CF2516DDC5DCF5C1257E520032EF67?OpenDocument 
(accessed 21/09/2015). 
91 
 
                                                          
established or otherwise nominated to administer the implementation of the 
Convention. This was in part due to the fact that the treaty itself lacked 
provisions for verifying State Parties’ compliance. Since the formal entry into 
force of the Convention in 1975, State Parties have been holding a Review 
Conference every five years to evaluate the state of the treaty, clarify 
common understandings and adopt any measures deemed relevant to 
ensure the regime integrity. At the Second Review Conference of the BTWC 
in 1986, State Parties agreed to the voluntary exchange of Confidence-
Building Measures (CBMs) ‘in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of 
ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and in order to improve international 
cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities.’281 Over the years the 
CBMs have undergone several revisions and at present remain the only 
mechanism for ensuring State Parties’ compliance with the Convention.  
 
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques adopted in 1976 introduced further 
restrictions on the application of biotechnology for the purposes of warfare.  
While the Convention defines the term ‘environmental modification technique’ 
broadly as ‘any technique for changing […] the dynamics, composition or 
structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and 
atmosphere, or of outer space’, its scope is nevertheless severely 
constrained by the narrowly worded common understandings enshrined in 
Article 1.282 This may also explain why the Convention has remained 
unpopular, with only 76 states acceding to it.  
 
A final point relates to the role of ethics in scientific research. The issue came 
to the fore in the aftermath of the Second World War when the full scale of 
the horrors conducted by medical workers in the Nazi concentration camps 
was revealed. In an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of Hippocratic 
281 For information on Confidence Building Measures, see http://www.unog.ch/bwc/cbms (accessed 5/02/2014).   
282 The common understandings related to Article 1 define the terms ‘widespread’, ‘long-lasting’, and ‘severe’ as 
follows: 
a) "widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometres;  
b) "long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season; 
c) "severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic   resources 
or other assets.  
For further information see  
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=A951B510E9491F56C12563C
D0051FC40 (accessed 5/02/2014).  
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ethics to guarantee that the rights of those taking part in medical and 
scientific experiments were fully observed, the Nuremberg Code was 
adopted in 1947.283 The Code outlined ten basic principles by which life 
science and medical practitioners had to abide in their work. In particular, it 
made informed consent an essential condition for any study involving human 
subjects. While the Nuremberg Code was not legally binding, some its 
provisions have been enshrined in national and international legislation. For 
instance, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) agreed in 1966 explicitly reads that ‘no one shall be subjected 
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.’284 Likewise, 
the Declaration of Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects that was issued by the World Medical Association 
(WMA) in 1964 echoed the basic tenets of the Code.285 In order to facilitate 
the implementation of the principles contained in the declaration worldwide, 
the Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in 
conjunction with the WHO published in 1982 Proposed International Ethical 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects.286  
 
Another international actor that actively sought to promote the centrality of 
ethics in the practice of scientific research was The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). In 1974, 
UNESCO adopted a Recommendation on the Status of Scientific 
Researchers. Despite being non-binding in character, the document 
articulated a set of norms intended to inform individual Member States’ 
science policies. The Recommendation emphasised the indispensable role of 
science and technology in ‘the preservation of international peace and the 
elimination of want’, as well as in tackling problems on a global scale, 
283 On the limitations of the Hippocratic Oath and the role of physicians in the development of the Nuremberg Code, 
see Evelyne Shuster, ‘Fifty Years Later: The Significance of the Nuremberg Code’, The New England Journal of 
Medicine, vol.337:20 (1997), pp.1436-1440. Full text of the Nuremberg Code is available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nurcode.html (accessed 21/09/2015). 
284 For full text of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights see  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx (accessed 5/02/2014).  
285 For full text of the WMA Declaration of Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human 
Subjects, see http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/ (accessed 5/02/2014).  
286 For more information on the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects 
and its revised version published in 2002, see http://www.cioms.ch/publications/layout_guide2002.pdf (accessed 
5/02/2014). In 2009, the Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) and WHO published 
International Guidelines for Ethical Review of Epidemiological Studies. The provisional text of the Guidelines is 
available at http://www.ufrgs.br/bioetica/cioms2008.pdf (accessed 5/02/2014).  
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including ‘pollution monitoring and control, weather forecasting and 
earthquake prediction.’ It also drew attention to the ‘civic and ethical aspects 
of scientific research’ urging the adoption of methods that were ‘humanely, 
socially and ecologically responsible’ and highlighting the need for ‘vigilance 
as to the probable and possible social and ecological consequences of 
scientific research and experimental development activities’. Perhaps the 
most notable manifestation of this point was the emergence and 
consolidation of a separate academic discipline that sought to examine the 
ethical implications of the life sciences – bioethics. That said, the friction 
between the increasing reliance upon science and technology in addressing 
socio-economic and political ills and the need for accommodating the various 
social, ethical and legal implications of advancing biotechnology, far from 
going away, would acutely come to the fore from the late 1990s onwards. 
Some of its manifold expressions will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. Lastly, the Recommendation called upon Member States to ensure 
that adequate health and safety conditions were in place within research 
establishments and that those in employ were properly trained in safety 
procedures.287   
 
b. Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines 
 
The evolution of internationally agreed guidelines on laboratory biosafety 
merits being addressed in a separate section for two reasons. First, the story 
tracing the codification of laboratory biosafety procedures in international and 
national legislation288 is a deeply fascinating one, not least because it depicts 
the transformation of a professional norm developed explicitly for the 
purposes of exploiting the military potential of the life sciences into an 
essential requirement for professional competence in scientific research. And 
second, unlike the regulations discussed above, the international legal 
framework pertaining to laboratory biosafety did not have its roots in the Cold 
287 For full text of the UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Status of Scientific Researchers, see 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13131&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 
5/02/2014).  
288 It is worth highlighting that national regulations on laboratory biosafety only emerged in the early 1990s. 
International regulations were not developed until 2005.  
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War period and largely remained in its infancy up until the early twenty-first 
century.  
 
The history of biological containment, whereby microorganisms can be safely 
manipulated within a laboratory setting with a minimal risk of infection and 
contamination, dates back at least to the 1940s when the US vigorously 
embarked on developing its offensive biowarfare capability.289 A note of 
caution is required here. While to the US the field of biological warfare was 
‘an undiscovered country’ prior to the Second World War, this was hardly the 
case with other states, including Germany, Japan and the USSR.290 It is 
plausible therefore to assume that some techniques and tools for the safe 
handling of highly pathogenic agents might have already existed in those 
countries before the 1940s. Such an assumption is hardly unfounded, since 
both American scientists and the military heavily drew upon the Japanese 
expertise with research, development and testing of biological weapons. 
Indeed, Fort Detrick, the backbone of the US offensive biological endeavour 
which became the first training ground in laboratory biosafety for American 
researchers, conducted several investigations in Japan after the war which 
allowed its personnel to gain an in-depth understanding of the work carried 
out in the top secret Unit 731. From the outset, a variety of protection 
measures were examined, so as to minimise the risks of scientists’ exposure 
to virulent microorganisms. Those included studying vaccines, toxoids, 
disinfectants, antibiotics, and antiseptics; devising strategies and techniques 
for detecting, sampling, and identifying pathogens and their toxic products; 
and implementing procedures for sterilisation and decontamination. Among 
the pioneers of laboratory biosafety were Arnold Wedum, the Industrial 
Health and Safety Director at Fort Detrick; Newell Johnson, an Army officer 
responsible for the modifications and design of safety equipment at Fort 
Detrick; and Hubert Kaempf, then a soldier who produced the first prototype 
289 See Norman Covert, Cutting Edge: The History of Fort Detrick, 3rd ed. 1997 [online], see 
http://www.detrick.army.mil/cutting_edge/chapter04.cfm (accessed 5/02/2014). For an evaluation of the US 
bioweapons programme, see Alastair Hay, ‘A Magic Sword or a Big Itch: A Historical Look at the United States 
Biological Weapons Programme’, Medicine, Conflict, and Survival, vol.15:3 (1999), pp.215-234.  
290 See Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon (ed.), Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, 
Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, op cit.  
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of a Class III biosafety cabinet.291 The Laminar Flow Hood was yet another 
item fashioned by the staff for the purposes of ensuring the health and safety 
of investigators during work with pathogenic microorganisms. The device is 
still in use in our time and its present-day design differs little from its original 
conception.  
 
Even though the American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) only came 
into existence in 1984, formal deliberations within the scientific community on 
the value of improving health and safety procedures within research facilities 
began as early as the mid-1950s. The idea of organising a conference arose 
from the need for better coordination of safety policy adopted by the three 
principal biological warfare laboratories of the US Army, namely Camp 
Detrick (Maryland), Pine Bluff Arsenal (Arkansas) and Dugway Proving 
Grounds (Utah). As a result, the first cycle of Biological Safety Conferences, 
which spanned the period between 1955 and 1965, featured closed sessions 
solely accessible to life scientists involved in the procurement of biological 
weapons.292 Given the sensitive nature of the work in question, the papers 
presented at the meetings had to be cleared by security officers and virtually 
none of the proceedings were shared with researchers outside the military 
establishment. The scope of topics discussed was broad ranging from 
incident analyses through ways for reducing the number of laboratory-
acquired infections to export and import controls applicable to the shipment 
of infectious and toxic materials. From 1964 the number of participants at the 
conferences increased substantially, as no classified material was discussed 
any longer and civilian federal agencies, including the NIH and the 
Communicable Disease Centre (Centre for Disease Control and Prevention – 
CDC), employed extensive effort to make information regarding laboratory 
biosafety available to the general scientific community. This trend further 
intensified during the second cycle of biosafety conferences between 1966 
and 1977. Civilian participation grew, as more government agencies, 
universities, colleges, laboratories and industries were involved. From 1977 
291 On the classes and types of biosafety cabinets, see http://www.biologicalsafetycabinet.co.uk/ (accessed 
5/02/2014).  
292 For an overview of the development of the American Biosafety Association, see  
http://www.absa.org/abohistory.html (accessed 5 February 2014).   
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onwards the conference attendance acquired an international dimension as 
well.  
 
In the mid-1970s issues related to laboratory biosafety entered the 
international policy arena. In 1976 the WHO launched four special 
programmes focusing on laboratory safety elements; emergency services; 
shipment of infectious substances; and maximum containment laboratories. 
As part of its campaign in support of laboratory biosafety, the Organisation 
published a brochure entitled Public Health Aspects and Safety Regulations 
in General Experimentation and actively encouraged member-states to 
implement respective programmes at local level and report cases of 
occupationally-acquired infections. In 1983 the WHO Special Programme on 
Safety Measures in Microbiology produced a Laboratory Biosafety Manual, a 
non-binding document providing internationally applicable guidance on 
biological safety.293 The Manual laid a considerable emphasis on the 
importance of safe practice and training in preventing laboratory accidents 
and minimising the risk of infection and contamination. It further classified 
biological agents according to their degree of pathogenicity and outlined the 
corresponding basic criteria of laboratory design that had to be met to ensure 
safe conduct of research. Additional WHO-led activities designed to promote 
biosafety expertise globally included the organisation of ‘train-the-trainer’ 
workshops and the establishment of biosafety collaborating centres.  
 
c. Trends in National Science Policy-Making 
 
The formulation of national and international life science policies and 
regulatory initiatives on both sides of the Berlin Wall generally reflected five 
main trends: governmental expenditure; linkage between biotechnology 
progress and economic growth; military exploitation of the life sciences; 
technocratic approaches to the governance of research; and limited options 
for public participation in devising governance mechanisms.  
 
293 See US CDC, ‘Biologic Safety’, MMWR, vol.32:47 (2 December 1983), pp.622-3, available at   
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000183.htm (accessed 5/02/2014).  
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Whereas prior to the Second World War the idea of state support for science 
invoked negative connotations, for it was largely considered an attribute of 
dictatorial regimes (USSR, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany), after 1945 it 
came to be regarded as an essential prerequisite for national security and 
economic prosperity, something evident in the resolve of long-established 
democracies such as the USA and UK to fully embrace the ‘Big Science’ 
mentality.294 The biomedical sciences were hardly an exception in this 
regard. On the contrary, the US government investment in the life sciences 
grew at enormous pace, as illustrated in the substantial increase in the 
number of grants for biology-related research allocated by the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) and the AEA.295 Similarly, the NIH, the principal agency 
tasked with channelling federal funding into the life sciences, experienced a 
remarkable budget expansion, especially after the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 
1957, with funding levels rising from 25 just before the event to 135 million 
dollars just after.296 Thus, by the early 1960s the US ‘Manhattan Project for 
biology’ was ‘almost as much of an obsession to Congress as it was for 
scientists at the NIH.’297  
 
The UK, too, demonstrated a deep commitment to the goal of financing 
biomedical research, with overall state expenditure on science and 
technology increasing dramatically by 44 per cent between the fiscal years 
1956 and 1965.298 In contrast to the American system, in which funds were 
distributed in accordance with state priorities, in Britain grants were awarded 
by government-supported research councils which vigorously strived to 
preserve their autonomy.299 By the 1960s, all of the four existing research 
councils – the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Medical 
Research Council (MRC), the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) and the 
Natural Conservancy (NC) – to a greater or lesser extent provided funds for 
research in biology-related disciplines.   
294 See George Brown, ‘The Role of the Federal Government in Supporting Research and Development’, Science, 
Technology, and Human Values, vol.7:39 (1982), pp.35-36. 
295 Eric Vettel, ‘The Protean Nature of Stanford University’s Biological Sciences, 1946-1972’, Historical Studies in 
the Physical and Biological sciences, vol.35:1, (2004), p.100. 
296 Ibid, p.102. The funding policy of the National Science Foundation followed a similar trend.  
297 Eric Vettel, ‘The Protean Nature of Stanford University’s Biological Sciences, 1946-1972’, Historical Studies in 
the Physical and Biological sciences, vol.35:1, (2004), p.100.  
298 Susan Wright, Molecular Policy, op cit, p.31.  
299 Ibid.  
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 From the mid-1960s and throughout the 1970s state funding for science in 
the West largely fluctuated due to a combination of factors. Economic 
stagnation coupled with growing social awareness of environmental 
degradation and health hazards, and public outrage at the Vietnam War 
forced Western governments to re-evaluate their priorities and direct financial 
support to initiatives with immediate socio-economic impact. Following the 
advent of genetic engineering, public investment in biotechnology surged 
once more, with France, Britain and Japan spending (respectively) 0.0215, 
0.015 and 0.05 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP), respectively. 
In the USA, the annual GDP share allocated for life science research was by 
far the highest, 0.058 per cent, which amounted roughly to 3 billion dollars.300  
 
The idea that there was a direct cause-and-effect link between scientific 
prowess and economic prosperity constituted another cornerstone of the 
Cold War science policies. For the Soviet Union and the members of the 
Warsaw Pact, such a linkage, at least in principle, was beyond question, for it 
was deeply embedded in the socialist ideology of dialectical materialism. Yet 
as later chapters will reveal, the cult of science was a prominent 
phenomenon in Imperial Russia long before the Bolshevik Revolution and 
Russian liberals, no less than their communist counterparts, were deeply 
convinced that science was synonymous with social and economic 
progress.301 That said, during Soviet times this conviction was taken to 
extremes, with research practice in virtually all fields strictly guided by 
economic and political imperatives dictated by the Communist Party. In 
Western capitalist countries, by contrast, the linkage between scientific and 
technological innovation and economic growth took the form of regulatory 
initiatives and policies designed to foster favourable conditions for business 
development and capital investment. In the area of the life sciences, this 
trend is particularly vivid from the 1970s onwards. Following the entry into 
force of the UPOV Convention in 1968, the American Seed Trade 
Association (ASTA) vigorously lobbied for changes in the US intellectual 
300 Ibid, p.439. 
301 Alexei Kojevnikov, ‘The Phenomenon of Soviet Science’, Osiris, vol.23 (2008), p. 116. 
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property legislation to ensure that its constituencies were well placed vis-à-
vis their European competitors.302 As a result, in 1970 the US passed the 
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), which granted breeders the right to 
exclusive control over novel plant varieties, whether sexually reproduced or 
tuber propagated, for seventeen years, provided that they met the criteria of 
being distinct, uniform and stable.  
 
Given the enormous commercial viability of recombinant DNA (rDNA) 
techniques, further measures were adopted to promote the surge of the 
biotechnology industry. In the USA, aggressive policies toward economic 
liberalisation and cuts in corporate tax rates, coupled with developments in 
patent law provided strong incentives for business investments and capital 
flow. The passage of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act was hugely important in this 
regard, not least because it enabled federal grantees, including individual 
scientists, universities, not-for-profit organisations and commercial 
companies, to patent and license discoveries arising from publicly funded 
research.303 Nevertheless, the implications of the law in the area of the life 
sciences would not have been so far-reaching had it not been for a decision 
of the US Supreme Court issued several months earlier. On 16 June 1980, 
Ananda Chakrabarty, a biochemist working for General Electric, won an 
eight-year long legal battle for obtaining a patent for his ‘invention’, a 
genetically altered bacterium capable of digesting both crude oil and 
commercially valuable petroleum.304 Prior to the Supreme Court momentous 
ruling, patents were granted only for the process devised to extract natural 
products but not for the products themselves, as the latter were not 
considered results of human ingenuity. By proclaiming that genetically altered 
microorganisms constituted inventions, the Court took a strictly technical view 
on the matter, effectively paving the way for the extension of patent law to 
302 Frederick Buttel and Jill Belsky, ‘Biotechnology, Plant Breeding, and Intellectual Property’, op cit, p.35. For a 
detailed account on the evolution of plant patents and intellectual property law, see Glenn Bugos and Daniel Kevles, 
‘Plants as intellectual Property: American Practice, Law, and Policy in World Context, Osiris, vol.7 (1992), pp.74-
104. 
303 See Steven Vallas et al. ‘Political Structures and the Making of US Biotechnology’ in Fred Block and Matthew 
Keller, State of Innovation: The US Government’s Role in Technology Development (Boulder, CO: Paradigm 
Publishers, 2011), p.63. The Act is available at:  https://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/PL96-517.pdf (accessed 
16/09/2015). 
304 See Daniel Kevles, ‘Ananda Chakrabarty Wins a Patent: Biotechnology, Law and Society’, Historical Studies in 
the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol.25:1 (1994), pp.111-135. See also Donna Smith and Jonathan King, ‘The 
Legal and Legislative Background’, Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, vol.24:6 (1982), 
pp.24-37. 
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cover multicellular living organisms.305 Besides the Bayh-Dole Act, three 
more laws played a role in establishing the infrastructure that facilitated the 
expansion of biotechnology industry, namely the Stevenson-Wydler 
Technology Innovation Act (1980), the Small Business Innovation 
Development Act (1982) and the Orphan Drug Act (1983).306  
 
Yet another set of measures vigorously pursued by governments in East and 
the West alike was designed to enable the large-scale utilisation of the 
military potential of the life sciences. To some countries, the respective 
policies implemented after 1945 were hardly new but rather constituted a 
continuation of an already established trend. Such is the case with Great 
Britain, for instance. The British military establishment began exploring the 
utility of biological weapons in the 1930s chiefly as a result of a perceived 
threat of biological attacks from Germany. In 1940 the Biology Department of 
Porton, a unit specifically designated to carry out activities related to the 
British biological warfare programme, was established at Porton Down.307 
While the initial intention was to conduct research primarily for purposes of 
biodefence, options for offensive capability were also examined, including 
attempts to design a biological bomb (Project Red Admiral).308 By the late 
1960s when the British government was zealously advocating for an 
international ban on research and development of biological weapons, 
offensive activities at Porton Down had largely come to a halt. The French 
biological warfare programme followed a similar course of development, 
305 In 1985 the patent Office Appeals Board awarded a patent on a type of corn genetically engineered to contain 
certain quantity of free tryptophan. In 1987, the Board held in ex Parte Allen that patents could be granted, at least 
in principle, on non-human animals. As a result, in 1988, Harvard University managed to obtain a patent for any 
non-human mammal genetically engineered to incorporate in its genome an oncogene tied to a specific promoter. 
Ibid, p.133.  
306 For full text of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Public Law 96-480, see 
http://www.csrees.usda.gov/about/offices/legis/techtran.html (accessed 5/02/2014). For full text of the Small 
Business Innovation Development Act of 1984, Public Law 97-219, see  
http://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/PL97-219.pdf (accessed 5/02/2014). For full text of the Orphan Drug Act 
of 1983, Public Law 97-414, see  
http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?c=ecfr&SID=51cf70689d51f0ea4147c0a8ac649321&rgn=div5&view=text&node=21:5.0.1.1.6&idno=21 
(accessed 5/02/2014).  
307 For a detailed overview of the work carried out at Porton Down, see Peter Hammond and Gradon Carter, From 
Biological Warfare to Healthcare: Porton Down, 1940-2000 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). 
308 Brian Balmer, ‘The UK Biological Weapons Programme’ in Mark Wheelis et al. (ed.), Deadly Cultures: Biological 
Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p.54; Brian Balmer, ‘Killing “Without the 
Distressing Preliminaries”: Scientists’ Defence of the British Biological Warfare Programme’, Minerva, vol.40 (2002), 
pp.57-75; see also Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon (ed.), Biological and Toxin Weapons: 
Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, op cit. For a detailed overview of the British 
biowarfare programme from its inception, see Brian Balmer, Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and 
Science Policy, 1930-1965 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). 
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running from the early 1920s until 1972 when the government signed the 
BTWC and all offensive activities were terminated.  
 
As already mentioned, the US joined the biowarfare race later than its 
European counterparts and it was not until the end of the Second World War 
that significant progress in developing offensive biological capability was 
made. From the outset, the US military attached a considerable strategic 
value to the advances taking place in the life sciences, comparing them to 
the developments in the field of nuclear physics that enabled the construction 
of the atomic bomb.309 Over the next two decades, the American leadership 
translated this conviction into a well-organised system for the procurement of 
biological weaponry. Concerns over public health and environmental safety, 
coupled with vigorous public opposition toward the use of defoliants in 
Vietnam forced the government to re-evaluate its biowarfare policies and 
effectively paved the way for President Nixon’s resolve of 1969 to convert the 
American biological weapons programme into a biological research 
programme solely directed toward civilian and defensive purposes.310 Two 
points merit scrutiny regarding the conversion process. The first pertains to 
National Security Decision Memorandum 35 of 25 November 1969, a 
document which delimited the scope of legitimate activities in the area of 
biological research. According to its text, the US ‘bacteriological/biological 
programmes will be confined to research and development for defensive 
purposes…[which] does not preclude research into those offensive aspects 
of bacteriological/biological agents necessary to determine what defensive 
measures are required.’311 Since the permissibility of studies was to be 
assessed not on the basis of the expected results but on the rationale that 
motivated them in the first place, some commentators have argued that the 
criterion outlined in Memorandum 35 effectively ‘allowed for research in a 
grey area where defensive and offensive activities could not be easily 
309 Susan Wright (ed.) Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), p.30.  
310 For a detailed account of the US renunciation of biological weapons, see Jonathan Tucker and Erin Mahan, 
President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the US Offensive Biological Weapons Programme, Centre for the Study of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Case Study Series (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2009). 
Available at http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/CSWMD-CaseStudy/CSWMD_CaseStudy-1.pdf (accessed 
19/06/2013).  
311 National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 35, (25 November 1969, Washington DC). 
Available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e2/83596.htm (accessed 19/06/2013).  
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distinguished.’312 The second point is related to the policies adopted by the 
Nixon administration that enabled the military to retain considerable influence 
in spurring research and development in the area of biotechnology without 
attracting the animosity of academic scientists.313 In particular, it has been 
suggested that the primary objective of the New Technology Opportunities 
(NTO) Programme launched in 1971 was to replace the military-academic 
partnership with industry-academic partnership while providing the White 
House with substantial leverage over federal science policy.314  
 
Some countries went to great lengths to ensure that their respective military 
establishments enjoyed carte blanche to take full advantage of cutting-edge 
life science advances, even after the entry into force of the BTWC. Following 
the First Gulf War in the early 1990s, it was revealed that the Iraqi 
government possessed an extensive offensive biological capability 
developed and kept in conditions of utmost secrecy. Despite the lack of 
sufficient reliable information regarding the strategy and/or the objectives of 
the programme, its scope and key facilities were well documented by the 
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq and its successor, 
the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC) that sought to ensure the complete disarmament of Baghdad.315 
The fact that Iraq had formally signed the BTWC in 1972 hardly precluded 
the country’s leadership from expanding and intensifying the efforts to 
procure biological weaponry two years later. In a similar fashion, the 
apartheid government of South Africa, having ratified the BTWC in 1975, 
authorised the launch of Project Coast, which sought to ‘establish a research, 
production and development capacity with regard to biological warfare.’316 In 
order to conceal the involvement of the military, the programme was run 
through front commercial companies, Roderplaat Research Laboratories 
(RRL) and Delta G Scientific, which enabled the import of dual-use 
312 Susan Wright (ed.) Preventing a Biological Arms Race, op cit, p.41; see also Susan Wright and Robert 
Sinsheimer, ‘Recombinant DNA and Biological Warfare’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.39:9 (1983), pp.20-26. 
313 See Shelley Hurt, ‘The Military’s Hidden Hand: Examining the Dual-Use Origins of Biotechnology in the American 
Context, 1969-1972’ in Fred Block and Matthew Keller, State of Innovation, op cit, pp.31-56. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Graham Pearson, ‘The Iraqi Biological Weapons Programme’ in Mark Wheelis et al. (ed.) Deadly Cultures, op cit, 
pp.167-190. 
316 See Chandre Gould and Alastair Hay, ‘The South African Biological Weapons Programme’ in Mark Wheelis et al. 
(ed.) Deadly Cultures, op cit, p.191-212. 
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equipment and materials without raising international suspicion. Political 
backing coming from the West, especially the US under the Reagan 
administration, further provided favourable conditions in which the South 
African biowarfare programme could flourish virtually unconstrained.  
 
By far the most long-standing and sophisticated offensive biological weapon 
programme was allegedly initiated and developed by the Soviet Union. It 
reportedly originated back in the late 1920s under the Bolsheviks and ran 
largely uninterruptedly throughout the Cold War years. Perhaps the most 
egregious aspect of the Soviet effort to acquire biowarfare capability was the 
blatant disregard for the international legal prohibition on biological weapons 
demonstrated in the Politburo’s unequivocal resolve to provide the legal and 
institutional infrastructure required for the perpetuation of the programme.317 
As a result, one of the depositary states of the BTWC was among the first to 
violate it, craftily ensuring that its clandestine network of research facilities 
under the auspices of the military could function undisturbed in civilian guise 
up until the early 1990s.  
 
A fourth trend underpinning national life science policies during the Cold War 
was the propensity of governments to favour narrowly-focused technocratic 
approaches to the governance of research whereby biotechnology was 
stripped of its broader socio-political and ethical implications and any issue 
likely to hinder its advancement was side-lined and/or framed in purely 
hypothetical terms. The regulation of genetic engineering is a case in point. 
Given the revolutionary nature of the technology, its vast array of possible 
applications and far-reaching implications, policy-makers found themselves 
compelled to take action and ensure that any potential hazards likely to arise 
therefrom were reduced to a minimum. This turned out to be a challenging 
endeavour due to at least three reasons. One was the limited data available 
regarding the type and extent of perils posed by recombinant DNA 
experiments. Very little was yet known about the behaviour of genetically 
modified organisms, as a result of which many of the possible scenarios 
entertained appeared far-fetched and imaginary. Second, in order to ensure 
317 See Milton Leitenberg and Raymond Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Programme, op cit.  
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that the safety measures were enforceable, the demands of the scientific 
community had to be taken into account.318 Lastly, the pressures of 
international competition dictated that any government-driven initiatives had 
to be devised in ways that did not stifle innovation.319  
 
A pivotal event in the evolution of recombinant DNA policy was the Asilomar 
Conference, an international meeting convened in California to bring together 
multiple stakeholders allowing them to discuss and determine what an 
adequate mechanism for the governance of the new technology should 
comprise. To achieve this goal, the conference chose to approach the issue 
of genetic engineering in terms of costs and benefits, whereby 
experimentation could continue unfettered provided that adequate 
precautions against potential hazards were adopted. Since ‘complicated 
questions of what is right and what is wrong’ and the possible utilisation of 
recombinant DNA for biowarfare were considered only ‘peripheral to the 
meeting’, they were barely addressed to avoid confusion.320 The subsequent 
policies implemented in the US and UK, the NIH Guidelines (1976) and the 
recommendations of the Williams Committee (1976), reflected the Asilomar 
legacy at three levels.321 First, both documents gave explicit priority on 
laboratory biosafety, stressing that the hazards that certain experiments 
entailed could be matched with a series of containment controls of two types, 
biological and physical. Still, this was hardly surprising given that the two 
advisory bodies tasked with policy development, the Recombinant DNA 
318 See Sheldon Krimsky, Genetic Alchemy: The Social History of the Recombinant DNA Controversy, (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1982), p.332. 
319 See Susan Wright, Molecular Politics, op cit, in particular Chapter 7, section 7.1. 
320 Ibid, p.149.On the same point, see Roger Dworkin, ‘Science, Society and the Expert Town Meeting: Some 
Comments on Asilomar’, Southern California Law Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1471-1482; Valerie Fogleman, 
‘Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the Regulation of Biotechnology Research’, Environmental Law, vol.17 (1986-
1987), pp.183-273. For detailed analysis of the multifaceted issued that rDNA raised, see Harlyn Halvorsen, ‘DNA 
and the Law’, Southern California Law Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1167-1180; John Robertson, ‘The Scientists’ 
Right To Research: Constitutional Analysis’, Southern California Law Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1203-1279; 
Joseph Fletcher, ‘Ethics and Recombinant DNA Research’, Southern California Law Review, vol.51 (1977-78), 
pp.1131-1140; Peter Barton Hutt, ‘Research on Recombinant DNA Molecules: The Regulatory Issues’, Southern 
California Law Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1435-1450; Jane Friedman, ‘Health Hazards Associated with 
Recombinant DNA Technology: Should Congress Impose Liability without Fault?’, Southern California Law Review, 
vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1355-1379; Raymond Zilinskas, ‘Recombinant DNA Research and the International System’, 
Southern California Law Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1483-1501; Robert Neville, ‘Philosophic perspectives on 
Freedom of Enquiry’, Southern California Law Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1115-1129; Carl Cohen, ‘Restriction of 
Research with recombinant DNA: The Dangers of Enquiry and the Burden of Proof’, Southern California Law 
Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1081-1113; Liebe Cavalieri, ‘Science as Technology’, Southern California Law 
Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1153-1165.  
321 See Susan Wright, Molecular Politics, op cit, p.168, p.213. 
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Advisory Committee (RAC)322 in the US and the Health and Safety Executive 
appointed to the Williams Committee, had very limited representation in 
areas such as law, ethics, environmental protection and industrial safety. 
Second, neither of the advisory bodies grappled with the possible 
deployment of genetic engineering techniques by private companies and/or 
the military but focused exclusively with experiments conducted as part of 
government-funded projects. Third, both countries took steps to expand 
research involving recombinant DNA before proper risk assessment 
mechanisms were developed. The underlying assumption upon which this 
resolve rested held that more experimental data needed to be collected in 
order to evaluate the scope of potential risks. Apart from their narrow focus, 
the policies have been criticised for their overemphasis on physical controls 
as a means of preventing the release of genetically altered pathogens, not 
least because while higher laboratory containment level proved to reduce the 
instances of laboratory-acquired infections, it did not eliminate the risks 
altogether.323 Moreover, the policies did not address the possibility of 
sabotage or long-range hazards such as those posed by the unwise use of 
recombinant DNA.324 Lastly, as the guidelines applied only to research 
supported with public funds, concerns were raised that life scientists were 
likely to be disadvantaged vis-à-vis their colleagues in industry.  
 
The final trend to be examined pertains to the limited options for public 
participation in the decision-making process on biotechnology.325 Two main 
reasons, one intrinsic and one extrinsic to the life sciences account for this 
development. The extrinsic reason was the linkage between science and 
national security which granted policy-makers a crucial say in setting 
priorities and defining research objectives. As to the intrinsic one, there was a 
322 On the creation of the rDNA Advisory Committee, see Michael Yesley, ‘The Use of an Advisory Commission’, 
Southern California Law Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1451-1469. 
323 Smallpox is a case in point. In 1973, a laboratory technician at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine unknowingly acquired the infection and managed to pass it to two more people before being properly 
diagnosed and isolated. In 1978, a woman at the University of Birmingham got infected with smallpox. Her office 
was located a floor above a laboratory where research on live smallpox was carried out. See S.L. Kotar and J.E. 
Gessler, Smallpox: A History (Jefferson: McFarland & Co, 2013), p.375.  
324 Francine Robinson Simring, ‘The Double Helix of Self-Interest’, The Sciences (New York), 17:3 (1977), p.11. 
325 On the importance of public participation in science policy making, see Halsted Holman and Diana Dutton, ‘A 
Case for Public Participation in Science Policy Formation and Practice’, Southern California Law Review, vol.51 
(1977-78), pp.1505-1534; Marc Lappe and Patricia Martin, ‘The Place of the Public in the Conduct of Science’, 
Southern California Law Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1535-1554; Clifford Grobstein, ‘Regulation and Basic 
Research: Implications of Recombinant DNA’, Southern California Law Review, vol.51 (1977-78), pp.1181-1200;  
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considerable resistance from within the scientific community to allowing lay 
people to determine the course of science evolution. Among the source of 
this opposition was a widely-held conviction among scientists that their 
profession occupied a unique niche in society and as such, hardly lends itself 
to regulation by people without sufficient understanding of its intricacies. In 
short, scientists viewed self-regulation as the sole viable and most adequate 
mechanism for the governance of research. The combination of these two 
dynamics reinforced the marriage of convenience sealed between science 
and the state after the Second World War effectively insulating the conduct of 
research from public scrutiny.  
 
To be sure, this trend manifested with far greater severity in the countries of 
the Soviet bloc where the supremacy of the Communist Party and the rigidity 
of political structures and hierarchies virtually precluded any direct public 
involvement in policy development. By contrast, in democratic states like the 
US, public protests not only were considered a legitimate form of opinion 
expression but did have some impact on government-led initiatives. For 
instance, following the public outcry at the devastating effects of scientific 
progress on society and the environment, Congress passed extensive 
legislation to address issues of health, safety and environmental protection. 
While some commentators have shown scepticism about the effectiveness of 
the new laws in facilitating public participation in the decision-making 
process,326 civil society was still an important factor in the US political life. 
Similarly, despite the fact that the development of regulations involving 
recombinant DNA largely took place away from the public domain, the 
publication of the NIH Guidelines spurred controversies in several states 
extending the debate on genetic engineering outside the university campuses 
to encompass local communities. At one of the forums held in Massachusetts 
to discuss the potential perils of the novel technology, the public was in 
control of the event to the extent that it openly and symbolically challenged 
the self-governance of science ideal.327 Besides Massachusetts, public-
driven initiatives regarding the safety of recombinant DNA technology swept 
326 Susan Wright, Molecular Politics, op cit,p.43. 
327 Sheldon Krimsky, Genetic Alchemy, op cit, p.301. 
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across various parts of the country, including, New Jersey, New York, 
Maryland, California and Illinois.328 
 
Structural Dimension 
 
This section aims to uncover and analyse the interactions between life 
scientists and the consumers of research, including the state, the military, 
industry, and the general public during the Cold War. To this end, it will 
enquire into the prevalent power dynamics, elucidating the multiple ways in 
which the larger socio-political and economic structures moulded and 
impacted on professional cultures and were in turn influenced by the 
scientific establishment.  
 
a. State Control over Science 
 
Following the Second World War, science was accorded a special status, 
whereby it was deemed a state asset of paramount importance that merited 
special support and protection. Some level of governmental control was 
therefore deemed not only essential but also morally justified to ensure that 
scientists were brought in line with national priorities and aspirations. While 
the type and extent of such control varied substantially across different 
countries, it is worth noting that the politicisation of science and the use of 
strong-arm tactics including state-led surveillance and infringement of civil 
liberties were foreign to neither side of the Cold War.329  
 
Having assumed the responsibility for providing science with financial 
security, governments were able to determine at least in part the terms and 
conditions under which research was to be carried out. This development 
stood in stark contrast with the original proposal for the post-war organisation 
of science outlined in Vannevar Bush’s emblematic work, Science: The 
328 Ibid, p.307. 
329 State-imposed restrictions on science were already in place in non-democratic countries, including the Soviet 
Union and Nazi Germany prior to 1945. For a comparative analysis of those policies and the measures introduced 
by the US after the Second World War, see Ronald Doel et al, ‘National States and International Science: A 
Comparative History of International Science Congresses in Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Russia, and Cold War United 
States’, Osiris, vol.20 (2005), pp.49-76. 
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Endless Frontier, where the author made a compelling case in favour of 
science autonomy vis-a-vis increased political scrutiny. The fact that the 
debate over the governance of the US NSF – the principal body tasked with 
funding basic research – was ultimately won by Bush’s opponents was a 
clear sign that even in democratic societies the state was eager to keep the 
scientific community in check – and/or developing in directions which most 
concerned it. This trend persisted during the 1950s fuelled by the intensive 
efforts to contain the spread of communism that culminated in McCarthy’s 
witch-hunt. As early as 1949 Congress passed legislation (the O’Mahoney 
Amendment) under which all recipients of the Atomic Energy Commission 
fellowship were subject to mandatory background checks by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).330 The following year, another controversial bill 
– the McCarran Act – was signed into law despite President Truman’s veto. 
The Act sanctioned the establishment of the Subversive Activities Control 
Board which, along with the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
(HUAC) and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS), launched a 
series of policies with far-reaching implications for scientists. Loyalty 
investigations, state-orchestrated surveillance of individuals and institutions, 
constriction of political discourse, visa and passport denials, and infringement 
of civil liberties vigorously employed to curb any seditious activities 
encroached the established norms of science practice, fostering an 
atmosphere of suspicion and mutual distrust on campuses and hindering 
knowledge sharing and international exchange.331  
 
But if democratic mechanisms still guaranteed science some degree of 
freedom from state intervention even in an ‘age of anxiety’, the absence of 
clearly articulated checks and balances in totalitarian societies largely left it at 
330 See Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism and the Cold War, 
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
331 See Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety, op cit; Sigmund Diamond, Compromised Campus: 
The Collaboration of Universities with the Intelligence Community, 1945-1955, (New York: Oxford University Press 
USA, 1992); Lawrence Badash, ‘Science and McCarthyism’, Minerva, vol.38 (2000), pp.53-80; Jessica Wang, 
‘Science and the Problem of the Public in Cold War America, 145-1960’, Osiris, vol.17 (2002), pp.323-347; John 
Shattuck, ‘Harvard University Basic Science, Secrecy, and National Security: Federal Restrictions on the Free Flow 
of Academic Information and Ideas’, Minerva, vol.22:3-4 (1984), pp.424-436. Lawrence Badash, ‘From Security 
Blanket to Security Risk: Scientists in the Decade after Hiroshima’, History and Technology, vol.19:3 (2003), pp.241-
256. 
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the disposal of government officials.332 For a decade before the Cold War, 
the repressive security apparatus in the Soviet Union utilised a wide range of 
coercive measures as part of Stalin’s Great Purges, which while not 
specifically directed against the scientific community, did deprive it of a 
significant proportion of leading researchers. And even when the repressions 
eased toward the late 1940s, the Communist Party barely loosened its grip 
on science, as travel restrictions, control over knowledge sharing and 
animosity toward ‘bourgeois’ scientists persisted throughout the subsequent 
decades up until the fall of the Berlin Wall. Unpatriotic activities including 
perceived servility toward the West were condemned as incompatible with 
Soviet morale and punishable in honour courts through which the Politburo 
sought to re-educate the Soviet intelligentsia in the spirit of Soviet patriotism 
and devotion to the Soviet state’s interests.333 The rapid rise of Trofim 
Lysenko was yet another manifestation of the egregious assault launched by 
Soviet propaganda on the life sciences. Born out of the confluence of Marxist 
ideology, Stalinist agricultural practices, and institutional centralisation, the 
pseudoscience of Lysenkoism grounded its principal claims about the 
inheritability of acquired characteristics in Darwinian notions of the origins of 
species, thus rejecting the principles of Mendelian genetics. Flawed as they 
might have been, Lysenko’s theories quickly became dogma for the entire 
Soviet community of biologists, allowing the Communist Party to promote its 
devoted members within the scientific community regardless of their 
academic credentials and to discredit and even punish those who dared to 
question their credibility.334 Besides in academia, the deleterious influence of 
Lysenkoism was acutely felt in agriculture where the new, purportedly 
scientific system for plant breeding that the state introduced in the 
countryside proved instrumental for extending and consolidating party control 
and organising peasants into attentive labour but miserably failed to bring the 
promised increase in yields.335  
332 This is not to say that the scientific enterprise in totalitarian countries was a passive entity; rather, the point here 
is to emphasise the virtually unconstrained power that the state possessed there. The point is elucidated later in this 
section (subsection c).  
333 Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.137. 
334 Paul Josephson, Totalitarian Science and Technology, 2nd ed. (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2005), see p.37-
42.  
335 Ibid, p.42.  
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b. The Social Context of Life Science Research 
 
Political power structures were not alone in shaping the professional life 
science cultures. On the contrary, other actors, including the military, industry 
and the general public played an important role as well. Given the centrality 
of the arms race in the East-West confrontation, the military managed to 
retain considerable influence on the direction of life science research and 
mobilised significant capacity for the purposes of weapons procurement. 
Perhaps the most vivid manifestation of this trend was the growth and 
consolidation of the massive MIACs that developed in the USA and the 
USSR. Their similarities in terms of organisation and role notwithstanding, 
the structures differed tremendously in their interactions with the state. In 
contrast to the American MIAC which had a significant say in governmental 
policies, its Soviet counterpart was strictly restrained in its activities by the 
political system in which the concentration of power in the central party 
organs and the ubiquitous role of the party-state apparatus left military and 
defense-industry interests little or no freedom of independent action.336 
Moreover, the Politburo’s preoccupation with military-oriented projects and its 
monopoly on research funding meant that a significant proportion of the 
Soviet scientific community was likely to be in one way or another involved in 
the expansion of the MIAC. The leading position of scientists in the direction 
of MIAC need not be taken for granted though, as even the role of scientific 
and technical elite in the Soviet system was restricted to the level of technical 
expertise, with its impact on policy decisions being only marginal.337  
 
Unlike their Soviet colleagues, American scientists enjoyed both a wider 
career choice and greater influence on policy matters. While substantial, 
federal funding constituted just one of several sources of financial support for 
336 On this point, see Mark Harrison ed. Guns and Rubles: The Defense Industry in the Stalinist State, (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2008). On the MIC in the US, see Binoy Kampmark, ‘Science and War: Remembering 
the Military Industrial Complex’, New Zealand International Review, vol.36:4 (2011), pp.11-14; Christoph Bluth, ‘The 
Soviet Union and the Cold War: Assessing the Technological Dimension’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol.23 
(2010), pp.282-305. 
337 Irina Bystrova, ‘Russian Military-Industrial Complex’, Aleksanteri Papers, vol.2 (2011), p.12. Available at 
http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/julkaisut/tiedostot/ap_2-2011.pdf (accessed 9/07/13). For a detailed overview of the 
Soviet military-industrial complex, see [in Russian] Irina Bystrova, Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v gody 
kholodnoi voiny: vtoraya polovina 40-kh – nachalo 60-kh godov, (Moscow: Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii RAN, 2000). On 
the Soviet military budget, see Timothy Sasnovy, ‘The Soviet Military Budget’, Foreign Affairs, vol.42:3 (1964), 
available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1964-04-01/soviet-military-budget (accessed 
16/09/2015).  
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the life sciences, with private philanthropies and the industry allowing the 
pursuit of research outside the compass of the state. This was particularly 
true in the case of genetic engineering, since the 1976 NIH Guidelines 
applied only to work conducted with governmental funds, which in turn 
automatically exempted scientists working in the industry from formal 
regulation.338 The state-led initiatives to promote the commercial exploitation 
of biotechnology further empowered the private sector, allowing it to play a 
significant part in the articulation and implementation of national policies. A 
direct consequence of this development was the move toward the relaxation 
of various regulatory measures, most notably those pertaining to health and 
safety, so as to enable the uninhibited advancement of the life sciences.339  
 
Yet another external factor that affected biotechnology not only in the USA 
but in the West generally was public opinion. For instance, it was the 
increasing social discontent over the limited practical utility of the life 
sciences in the 1960s that mainly drove Congress to revise the government 
expenditure on pure research and demand for the redirection of funds to 
practically-oriented projects. Exacerbated by the thalidomide scandal,340 the 
calls for a fight against extreme poverty and the worrying reports of the US 
involvement in Vietnam, the vociferous public criticism levelled at life 
scientists put a lot of pressure on them to accept social responsibility and 
concentrate their efforts on generating public goods. According to Vettel, the 
dynamic events of the period characterised by growing public awareness of 
the implications, both positive and negative, of the life sciences largely 
provided the context that inspired the architects of the biotechnology 
revolution.341 Public attitudes also featured vividly in the debates on how 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) should be regulated. Heightened 
338 See Susan Wright, ‘Recombinant DNA Policy: From Prevention to Crisis Intervention’, Environment: Science and 
Policy for Sustainable Development, vol.21:9 (1979), pp.34-42. On the growth of academic-industrial partnerships in 
the US, see Dorothy Nelkin et al. ‘Commentary: University-Industry Alliances’, Science, Technology, and Human 
Values, vol.12 (1987), pp.65-74; Martin Kenney, Biotechnology, op cit. 
339 See Susan Wright, ‘Down on the Animal Pharm: Splicing Away Regulations’, The Nation, vol.262:10 (1996), 
pp.16-20; Susan Wright, ‘The Status of Hazards and Controls’, Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable 
Development, vol.24:6 (1982), pp.12-17. 
340 Thalidomide was marketed as an over-the-counter drug during the late 1950s and 1960s deemed to alleviate the 
symptoms of morning sickness during pregnancy. It attracted wide-spread criticism when it was revelaed that its use 
caused severe birth defects. For an overview of the thalidomide scandal, see Michael Magazanik, Silent Schock: 
The Men behind the Thalidomide Scandal and an Australian Family’s Long Road to Justice, (Melbourne: Text 
Publishing, 2015).   
341 Eric Vettel, Biotech: The Countercultural Origins of an Industry, op cit. 
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concerns about the potential health and safety of GMOs among European 
citizens crucially accounted for the development and implementation of far 
more stringent regulations than those adopted in the US.342 
  
c. Role of Life Science Communities 
 
Far from being static, professional life science cultures constantly strived to 
adapt and respond to the extrinsic pressures exerted by the prevalent 
political and socio-economic dynamics in different countries, vigorously 
reconfiguring the established relations of governance in the process. As 
such, they were not merely passive victims of external power but sought to 
maintain, even under turbulent political circumstances, as well as they could, 
traditional patterns of professional authority and to collaborate with external 
authority.343 This tendency is evident in the activity of learned societies and 
professional bodies, significantly empowered as a result of the 
institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of the life sciences. As the principal 
bodies responsible for the administration and promotion of science in their 
respective states, the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the US NAS skilfully 
utilised any room for manoeuvre available to secure a mutually-beneficial 
relationship with the government and thus further enhance their social 
standing. Needless to say, such an ambitious objective entailed making 
certain concessions. For instance, according to some commentators, the 
reluctance of NAS leadership to overtly oppose the anti-communist measures 
adopted by the political and security structures in the early days of the Cold 
War constituted an integral part of its strategy to forge a post-war partnership 
with the national security state.344 The Soviet Academy went to even greater 
lengths to solidify its positions by demonstrating political conformity, 
extending its membership to politically-reliable cadres and individuals from a 
lower-class background with dubious scientific credentials and endorsing the 
342 Diahanna Lynch and David Vogel, The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the United States: A Case-Study of 
Contemporary European Regulatory Politics (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001). Available at 
http://www.cfr.org/agricultural-policy/regulation-gmos-europe-united-states-case-study-contemporary-european-
regulatory-politics/p8688 (last accessed 10/07/13).  
343 Richard Bayler, Alexei Kojevnikov, and Jessica Wang, ‘Purges in Comparative Perspective: Rules for Exclusion 
and Inclusion in the Scientific Community under Political Pressure’, Osiris, vol.20 (2005), p.24. 
344 Three cases are indicative in this regard, namely the 1948 Condon Affair, the battle over the AEC fellowship 
programme, and the formation of the Committee on Loyalty in Relation to Government Support of Unclassified 
Research. For details see Ibid, p.39 and Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety, op cit. 
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prevalent ideological vocabulary and political culture rules and rituals of the 
day.345  
 
National academies were not the only actors that favoured the tactic of 
avoiding a direct confrontation with political power structures in their dealings 
with the state. Wary of the rising animosity toward the spread of communism 
in the US, the Rockefeller Foundation resolved to withhold grants to 
scientists of a communist stripe, both at home and in Europe. To achieve this 
goal, the Foundation leadership mapped a clear science/nonscience 
demarcation onto the democracy/totalitarianism distinction, which allowed it 
to counter any accusations of discrimination on political grounds by justifying 
its decision based on the assumption that communist scientists were a priori 
unfit for academic merit.346 Much more subtle but just as much effective was 
the approach preferred by the Genetics Society of America (GSA) to handling 
the Lysenko affair. Rather than openly condemning the Communist Party’s 
encroachment on science, the Society staged a grand four-day celebration to 
mark the golden jubilee of the re-discovery of Gregor Mendel’s work, which 
sought, above all, to offer the Mendelian project as an alternative to 
Lysenkoism.347 Framed in a manner that unfailingly underscored the practical 
value of modern genetics, particularly in the area of agriculture and medicine, 
the event was intended as an indirect rebuttal of the Communist criticisms of 
Western genetics and, as such, constituted yet another vivid manifestation of 
the unavoidable presence of the Cold War in the culture of post-war 
science.348 
 
Having negotiated a relationship of mutual benefit with the state, life science 
administrators on both sides of the iron curtain hardly hesitated to utilise their 
increased influence for advancing the interests of their constituencies and 
thus preserve a degree of autonomy in matters of governance. The 
345 Richard Bayler et al, ‘Purges in Comparative Perspective’, op cit, p.34, 36.  
346 John Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe, (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2006), p.118. 
347 Audra Wolfe, ‘The Cold War Context of the Golden Jubilee, or, Why We Think of Mendel as the Father of 
Genetics’, Journal of the History of Biology, vol.45 (2012), pp.389-414; see also Rena Selya, ‘Defending Scientific 
Freedom and Democracy: The Genetics Society of America’s Response to Lysenko’, Journal of the History of 
Biology, vol. 45 (2012), pp.415-442; Audra Wolfe, ‘What Does It Mean to Go Public? The American Response to 
Lysenkoism, Reconsidered’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, vol.40:1 (2010), pp. 48-78.  
348 Ibid, p. 403-404. 
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distribution of funds for research was a case in point. In the US, peer-review 
of grant applications guaranteed that scientists and not state officials were in 
charge of allocating financial support which was largely hailed as a 
mechanism that both respected the values of science and acknowledged 
academic excellence.349 While considerably more stringent and centralised, 
the funding system put in place in the Soviet Union still assigned the 
Academy of Science a leading role in administering a substantial proportion 
of research monies. It is worth noting that the move toward protecting life 
science autonomy was an expression of the widely shared perception among 
researchers that the governance of life sciences had to be dealt with by 
scientists themselves, as they were by far the best suited to evaluate and 
determine the conditions required for science progress. Hence, allowing non-
scientists to impose their value system on what should be chiefly scientific 
decisions was deemed undesirable and even dangerous.350 To be sure, this 
conviction manifested itself much more explicitly in the USA where the 
democratic practices and modes of decision-making stood in stark contrast 
with the rise of what appeared to be a totalitarian scientific clique.351 The 
1975 Asilomar Conference convened to discuss the prospects and perils of 
genetic engineering largely constituted the pinnacle of the efforts of life 
scientists to ensure the self-regulation of biotechnology. From the outset, the 
meeting was intended as a closed event limited to by-invitation-only 
participants, the majority of whom were life scientists with a vested interest in 
taking full advantage of the novel gene-splicing techniques. Press coverage 
was carefully monitored to keep the deliberations as far from the public 
domain as possible. Most importantly, the organising committee gave special 
attention to the choice of speakers and topics to be addressed, fencing off 
issues related to the ethical implications of genetic engineering and its 
potential military applications that were likely to cause controversy. As a 
result, the conference agenda was so set as to produce its final outcome: a 
349 For a critical appraisal of the peer-review mechanism, see Daryl Chubin and Sheila Jasanoff (ed.), Special Issue 
on ‘Peer Review and Public Policy’,  Science, Technology, and Human Values, vol.10:3 (1985), pp.3-100. 
350 David Dickson, The New Politics of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p.233. 
351 For the idea of science and technology as totalitarianism in Cold War America, see Jessica Wang, ‘Scientists 
and the Problem of the Public in Cold War America, 1945-1960’, Osiris, vol.17 (2002), pp.323-347. 
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list of guidelines which once implemented would allow rDNA experiments to 
carry on uninhibited.352 
 
Normative Dimension 
 
The final section focuses on the tacit aspects of governance, such as norms 
and other cultural intangibles (e.g. beliefs, attitudes, and routines) that 
underpinned professional life science practice during the Cold War. 
  
a. Secrecy 
 
An oft made observation about the changes that occurred in professional life 
science cultures during the Cold War is the substitution of the norm of 
openness with a norm of secrecy.353 At least two factors played a key role in 
fostering favourable context for this trend. One is the politics of mutual 
distrust that pervaded the superpowers’ relations and fuelled the antagonism 
toward the ‘rival other’ at various levels of interaction by no means limited to 
the top echelon of the government and military. Geltzer, for instance, argues 
that the Cold War heavily influenced the analytical framework which 
scientists on both sides of the iron curtain used for understanding not only 
each other but also their own place in the world.354 Her analysis shows that 
the notions produced within this framework too often were distorted, even 
irrational, and imbued with suspicion rather than based on sound judgement, 
as a result of which US and Soviet researchers not only failed to see eye to 
eye politically but also misunderstood each other’s scientific enterprise and 
exhibited reluctance to participate in collaborative projects unless there were 
powerful political grounds for such a collaboration.355 The other factor that 
merits attention is the significant emphasis laid on the value of science and 
technology for achieving military preponderance and economic superiority. 
Since surprise was deemed an indispensable weapon in the multifaceted 
352 See Susan Wright, Molecular Politics, op cit.  
353 Here ‘openness’ is used to refer to the norm of communism in science, as defined by Robert Merton. For further 
discussion, see Robert Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1973).  
354 Anna Geltzer, ‘In a Distorted Mirror: The Cold War and US-Soviet Biomedical Cooperation and 
(Mis)understanding, 1956-1977’, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol.14:3 (2012), pp.39-63. 
355 Ibid, p.63-63. 
116 
 
                                                          
planetary competition between the two superpowers, substantial effort was 
dedicated to ensuring that any activities related to research and innovation 
were meticulously coated in layers of secrecy. In the Soviet Union this trend 
was taken to extremes as early as 1947 when the Supreme Soviet issued a 
decree entitled ‘On Responsibility for Disclosure of State Secrets’.356 Besides 
information related to projects of military and economic significance, the 
document contained a separate section on scientific research, which listed as 
state secrets any ‘discoveries, inventions, technical improvements, research 
and experimental work in all spheres of science, technology and national 
economy until they are finally completed and permission has been obtained 
for publication’. Disclosing state secrets of any kind constituted a serious 
legal offence liable to confinement to a labour camp for up to twenty years.  
 
Yet the notion of secrecy requires some conceptual unpacking if we are to 
develop an appreciation of the far-reaching implications of its various 
manifestations. At a very basic level, the act of keeping secrets entails the 
concealment of information and/or activity so as to limit the number of 
individuals with knowledge of it. Following this logic, secret science could be 
viewed as open science conducted behind closed doors, with secrecy 
serving as an opaque envelope that leaves the activity it is meant to hide 
intact. Accounts about classified research communities which, despite being 
limited in terms of membership, had their own professional organisations, 
published journals and held conventions and seminars are indicative in this 
regard. Attractive as it may appear, this definition conceptualises secrecy as 
a static phenomenon characterised by a clearly drawn distinction between 
those granted access to knowledge and the rest, thus obscuring the complex 
interactions and multifaceted power relations through which secrets are born, 
perpetuated and sustained. An alternative way of construing secrecy is to 
treat it as a dynamic process that facilitates, and in turn proliferates through, 
various forms of knowledge production.357 Within this context, secrecy is a 
356 Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, op cit, p.141. 
357 Brian Balmer, ‘How Does an Accident Become an Experiment? Secret Science and the Exposure of the Public to 
Biological Warfare Agents’, Science as Culture, vol.13:2 (2004), p.223. 
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social order that entails commitment to many auxiliary complexes and modes 
of behaviour:358 
 
Secrets do not develop in a social vacuum. Rather, 
the construction of a web of secrecy is a social 
process that defines relationships between those 
inside and outside the web, the conditions under 
which secrets are wholly or partially revealed, and 
the conditions of access and denial.359 
 
 
Military-related research is a case in point. According to Dennis, the phrases 
‘Secret’, ‘Top Secret’ and ‘Restricted’ intended to keep unwarranted readers 
away from documents and institutions are crucial to understanding how 
visible, public aspects of intellectual life were inseparable from a web of 
institutions and ideas to which access was barred.360 His argument 
effectively defies the binary logic of civil-military relations replacing it with the 
concept of an archipelago comprising discrete islands of civilian life 
connected by a larger, generally invisible, military framework.361 Sustaining 
such a complex system required both commitment and discipline. Task 
fragmentation, compartmentalisation of knowledge, and strict control over the 
exchange of data even in informal settings aimed to limit the amount of 
information available to individual scientists and thus minimise the damage 
caused in case of defection. For their part, civilian researchers took the act of 
keeping secrets seriously, not least because they regarded it as an essential 
condition for gaining credibility. Accepting the military’s rules about 
information distribution seemed attractive, for it allowed one the possibility of 
actually having at least some effect upon their actions.362 At a more 
fundamental level, some commentators make the claim that the knowledge 
produced under the conditions of secrecy is inherently different than what 
might be produced in a more open space, which in turn makes it virtually 
inaccessible to outsiders.363 
358 Ibid, p.199. 
359 Susan Wright and David Wallace, ‘Varieties of Secrets and Secret Varieties: The Case of Biotechnology’, Politics 
and the Life Sciences, vol.19:1 (2000), p.45. 
360 Michael A. Dennis, ‘“Our First Line of Defense”: Two University Laboratories in the Postwar American State’, Isis, 
vol.85:3 (1994), p.454. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Michael A. Dennis, ‘Secrecy and Science Revisited: From Politics to Historical Practice and Back’ in Judith 
Reppy, (ed.), Secrecy and Knowledge Production, Occasional Paper No.23 (1999), Ithaca, New York, Cornell 
University Press. 
363 Ibid, p.13-14. 
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 Far from limited to the domain of weapon procurement, research secrecy 
was a fairly common phenomenon among academic scientists, too, 
especially those with close ties with industry.  This trend became particularly 
acute in the late 1970s when the commercial prospects of genetic 
engineering lured the private sector to invest heavily in the emerging 
technology. The changes in the US patent law outlined in the earlier sections 
further accelerated the growth of academic-industrial cooperation. While the 
partnership between universities and commercial firms per se hardly 
constituted a novel development its pace and pervasiveness were 
unprecedented, triggering profound changes in the professional culture of life 
science research and redefining established patterns of behaviour.364 With 
research for profit no longer deemed inconsistent with science values, the 
scientist-entrepreneur became a popular character on university campuses. 
The race for patents quickly gained momentum rendering secrecy an integral 
part of science ethos. Results were often published with a significant delay 
only after a patent was obtained and some findings never got widely 
disseminated; papers and conference remarks had to be cleared by the legal 
representatives of partner companies before they could be presented in 
public; and more and more scientists demonstrated reluctance to discuss 
their work even in informal settings out of fear of having their ideas stolen.365 
Growing secrecy not only eroded the relations of collegiality among research 
workers but also affected the ways in which prospective scientists were 
trained, allowing industrial espionage to flourish under the guise of 
pedagogy.366 
  
b. ‘Scientifying’ Risk and Regulation  
 
The increased reliance of states upon science and technology fundamentally 
redefined the role of experts in society, elevating their status and granting 
them considerable influence over the resolution of a vast array of issues by 
364 See Mark Peter Jones, ‘Entrepreneurial Science: The Rules of the Game’, Social Studies of Science, vol.39:6 
(2009), pp.821-851; Martin Kenney, Biotechnology: The University-Industrial Complex, op cit. 
365 See David Dickson, The New Politics of Science, op cit, p.77-78. 
366 Michael A. Dennis, ‘Secrecy and Science Revisited: From Politics to Historical Practice and Back’, op cit, p.15. 
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no means limited to technical subtleties. Scientific rationality, rigorous data 
and hard evidence came to be regarded as essential prerequisites for making 
informed decisions not only about the feasibility and design of novel 
technology but also about its desirability, social utility and safety. The 
underlying logic of this trend was that if the risks of new technologies, their 
nature and causes could be identified and assessed with precision, then 
regulation could easily be reduced to a technocratic exercise, something 
evident in the emergence of cost-benefit analysis as a reliable tool for 
evaluating cutting-edge devices and products.367 There were, of course, 
practical considerations that favoured such simplified and efficient 
approaches to technology governance. In a highly competitive global 
environment where national security was almost deemed a function of 
scientific prowess, it was essential that the regulatory mechanisms put in 
place were compatible with, and not a restriction on, continued technological 
change and economic growth.368 Within the policy and science circles alike, 
public deliberation on the social, ethical and environmental implications of 
scientific work that could effectively pave the way for extensive regulation 
and even re-consideration of the safety and value of certain research 
programmes was largely perceived as a threat that had to be kept in check. 
The Communist Party in the USSR took this conviction to extremes in its 
attempt to engineer virtually every aspect of social life based on scientific 
ideology while, at the same time, effectively discouraging any form of social 
discussion that was inconsistent with the official Party line.  
  
 
 
 
367 David Dickson, The New Politics of Science, op cit, p.263. 
368 Ibid, p.268. 
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Chapter 4: 21st Century Governance Challenges in the Life 
Sciences 
 
Biotechnology Advancement in the 21st Century 
 
Depending on its application, biotechnology falls into three broad categories: 
‘red’ biotechnology encompassing R&D in medical and healthcare sectors 
(e.g. drug development, disease diagnostics, prevention and treatment); 
‘green’ biotechnology related to agriculture (e.g. increasing plant resilience to 
drought, herbicides and pesticides); and ‘white’ biotechnology covering 
innovation for industrial purposes (e.g. environment-friendly products).369 The 
expansion of all three types of biotechnology over the past several decades 
has been truly breathtaking, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Forty 
years ago scientists were fascinated to manipulate the manifestations of life 
by dint of gene-splicing, while the tools and technologies available in the 
beginning of twenty-first century have enabled them to create life forms from 
scratch.370 Similarly, when initially conceived the Human Genome Project 
(HGP) seemed a daunting undertaking, but within less than ten years of its 
completion the areas of genome-based diagnostics and therapeutics are now 
growing at a remarkable pace; and if once cutting-edge life science research 
used to be confined to prestigious universities and state-of-the-art 
laboratories found in the highly industrialised countries in the global North, 
nowadays studies involving highly dangerous microbes are conducted in 
research facilities scattered around the globe from Indonesia and Vietnam 
through Kenya and Morocco to Moldova and Pakistan. One authoritative 
high-level review has even gone so far as to suggest that the ‘life sciences 
knowledge, materials and technologies are advancing worldwide with 
369 Henrik Noes Piester et al. Trends and Drivers of Change in the Biomedical Healthcare Sector in Europe: 
Mapping Report (Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007), p.2. 
See also Eric Grace, Biotechnology Unzipped: Promises and Realities, (Washington DC: Joseph Henry Press, 
1997). 
370 See, for example, J Cello et al. ‘Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the 
Absence of Natural Template’, Science, vol.297:5583 (2002), pp.1016-1018; Eckard Wimmer, ‘The Test-Tube 
Synthesis of a Chemical Called Poliovirus: The Simple Synthesis of a Virus Has Far-Reaching Societal Implications, 
EMBO Reports, vol.7 (2006), S3-S9; Ian Sample, ‘Craig Venter Creates Synthetic Life Form’, The Guardian, 20 May 
2010, available at http://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/may/20/craig-venter-synthetic-life-form (last accessed 
9/10/2013). 
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Moore’s Law-like speed.’371 And whilst some commentators have questioned 
the extent to which the on-going progress of biotechnology has translated 
into practical applications and novel products,372 there is some consensus 
that the biotechnology landscape has been fundamentally transformed over 
the recent decades with the possibilities now unlocked holding revolutionary 
potential. Indeed, rapid advances in the field have produced a knowledge 
base and set of tools and techniques that enable biological processes to be 
understood, manipulated and controlled to an extent never possible 
before;373 they have found various applications in numerous spheres of life, 
generating enormous benefits and offering bright prospects for human 
betterment; and they have come to be regarded as a key driver of economic 
development with potential to close the gap between resource-rich and 
resource-poor countries.374 
 
The progress of biotechnology has been largely driven by three sets of 
forces, namely social, political and economic.375 The social dynamics at work 
in this context are understood as the efforts to improve public health and 
overall wellbeing of individuals both in the global North and global South, 
boost agricultural yields and encourage environment-friendly practices to 
mitigate the adverse effects of climate change. Several factors account for 
the significant value attached to the life sciences in the context of intense 
globalisation and continuous change. Surging population numbers and 
extended life expectancy are augmenting the demand for developing 
effective and affordable medications, novel approaches for the treatment of 
chronic diseases and additional cost-effective sources of energy and food 
production. At the same time, rising global trade and travel, coupled with 
371 Moore’s Law pertains to the rapid rate of technological development and advances in the semiconductor 
industry, specifically the doubling of the number of transistors on integrated circuits that occurs approximately every 
18 months. Although advances in the life sciences occur at more random intervals and are driven by new 
conceptual breakthroughs in understanding of biological processes, it is a useful metaphor for the exponential 
growth of knowledge related to biology. See Committee on the Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their 
Application to Next Generation  Bioterrorism and Biological Warfare Threats, An International Perspective on 
Advancing Technologies and Strategies for Managing Dual-Use Risks: Report of a Workshop, (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press, 2005).  
372 See, for example, Michael Hopkins et al. ‘The Myth of the Biotech Revolution: An Assessment of Technological, 
Clinical and Organisational Change’, Research Policy, vol.36 (2007), pp.566-589; Paul Nightingale and Paul Martin, 
‘The Myth of the Biotech Revolution’, Trends in Biotechnology, vol.22:11 (2004), pp.564-569. 
373 Ibid. 
374 National Research Council, Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of the Life Sciences (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press, 2006), p.2. 
375 Ibid, p.79. 
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increased urbanisation, and an uneven distribution of wealth are creating 
optimal conditions for disease outbreaks, pandemics and environmental 
degradation.376 Against this backdrop, biotechnology appears full of promise 
and critical to tackling social and natural concerns; enhancing disease 
prevention, preparedness and surveillance; promoting development; and 
alleviating human suffering.377 
 
Economic dynamics include national expenditure on research and 
development, purchasing power, trends in consumerism and market 
pressures and fluctuations. Besides public funding for R&D which remains a 
key factor in the growth and flourishing of bioindustry in developed and 
emerging economies alike, private investment from venture capital firms, 
start-up companies and transnational corporations (TNCs) have also played 
an indispensable role in capturing new markets and further facilitating the 
extension of bioeconomy on a global scale. DuPont’s significant footprint in 
India is indicative in this regard, not least because of the depth and diversity 
of the activity that the company has undertaken via its offshore R&D centres 
ranging from crop science to biofuels.378 Likewise, Merck has outlined a 1.5 
billion dollar commitment to expand R&D in China, as part of which it intends 
to establish an Asia headquarters for innovative drug discovery in Beijing.379 
 
Political dynamics are triggered by states’ increasing commitment to support 
the progress of biotechnology as a way of maximising their power and 
boosting their status in the international arena.380 In the aftermath of 9/11 and 
the ‘Anthrax letters’ attack of October 2001, substantial effort has been given 
to harnessing life science research for the purposes of national security. 
Biodefence and bioterrorism preparedness are thus considered high-priority 
areas for national investment by government agencies and the military alike. 
376 Jeffrey Macher and David Mowery, (ed.), Innovation in Global Industries: U.S. Firms Competing in a New World 
(Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2008),p.239. 
377 See, for example, Tara Acharya et al. ‘Biotechnology and the UN’s Millennium Development Goals’, Nature 
Biotechnology, vol.21:12 (2003), pp.1434-1436; Abdallah S. Daar, ‘Top Ten Biotechnologies for Improving Health in 
Developing Countries’, Nature Genetics, vol.32 (2002), pp.229-232. 
378 Charles Wessner and Alan Wolff (ed.), Rising to the Challenge: U.S. Innovation Policy for Global Economy, 
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2012), p.38.  
379 Burrill & Co, Biotech 2012: Innovating in the New Austerity, Burrill & Co’s 26th Annual Report on the Life Sciences 
Industry, (San Francisco CA: Burrill and Co, 2012), p.15. See also Burrill & Co, Biotech 2013: Capturing Value, (San 
Francisco CA: Burrill and Co, 2013).   
380 National Research Council, Biosecurity, Globalization and the Future of the Life Sciences, op cit, p.79. 
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An illustrative example of this two-tiered approach is the funding policy in the 
USA, where biodefence research is financed by the NIH, Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), to name a few.  
 
Under the synergistic influence of these three sets of forces – social, 
economic and political  – biotechnology has been transformed into a truly 
global fast-evolving enterprise encompassing a multitude of stakeholders, 
delivering considerable benefits and holding out still greater promise,  with 
profound and far-reaching implications for virtually every aspect of human 
well-being and social life.  
 
The pharmaceutical industry is a case in point, for its steady expansion would 
hardly be possible were it not for the vast array of techniques and methods 
enabled by the progress of the life sciences. Worth roughly 400 billion 
dollars, the global pharmaceutical market dominates the life sciences 
industry and arguably determines the trajectory of life sciences-related 
technological development and global spread.381 Gene cloning, DNA 
sequencing and recombinant construction of cell lines, to name a few, are all 
deemed indispensable for the development of novel medicines and 
therapeutics. It suffices to mention that more than half of the top selling 
commercially available drugs in the USA would not exist without those 
methods.382 Agriculture, too, has been heavily influenced by the on-going 
biotechnology revolution, as evidenced in the rapid growth and dispersion of 
commercialised transgenic crops (biotech crops) and the efforts to use 
GMOs (both animals and plants) for the production of vaccine antigens and 
other biologically active proteins (‘biopharming’).383 Indeed, the increase in 
the area of farmland planted with transgenic crops rose dramatically from 1.7 
hectares in 1996 to about 60 million hectares in 2002384 and is still growing. 
381 National Research Council, An International Perspective on Advancing Strategies for Managing Dual-Use Risks, 
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2005), p.36.  
382 Roger Brent, ‘In the Valley of the Shadow of Death’, DSpace@MIT, 22 November 2006, p.3, available at 
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/34914 (accessed 10/03/2013).  
383 National Research Council, Biosecurity, Globalization and the Future of the Life Sciences, p.94, op cit. 
384 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Biotechnology Promise: Capacity-Building for 
Participation of Developing Countries in the Bioeconomy, UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/MISC/2004/2, (New York/Geneva: 
United Nations, 2004), p.1. Available at http://www.unctad.info/upload/STDEV/docs/biotech.pdf (accessed 
21/10/13). 
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In addition, technological convergence385 between biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, information technologies and cognitive science has 
unlocked a broad scope of opportunities for maximising public (and private) 
welfare, offering substantial benefits in wide-ranging areas such as medicine, 
pharmacy, crime investigation and national security by ensuring precision 
and reliability, while at the same time, reducing the amount of time previously 
required for the performance of certain tasks. 
 
Four key features of biotechnology make it so appealing to the majority of 
stakeholders involved. First, biotechnology innovation is characterised by 
duality, whereby research yields results that simultaneously lead to advances 
in basic knowledge and stimulate product development.386 Second, the 
output that the life sciences generate in the form of new medicines, improved 
nutrition products, enhanced yields and novel materials, is ‘strongly 
positive’.387 The increasing utility of tools and strategies for human 
enhancement, whether in professional sport, for cosmetic and aesthetic 
purposes, or on the battlefield, vividly reflects the firm conviction that the 
transformative capacity of biotechnology, even at the most fundamental level, 
is something to be welcomed and vigorously embraced. What is more, 
biotechnology possesses proven economic viability, as illustrated in the 
burgeoning industries and new markets it has spurred. Against this backdrop, 
the high rate of biotechnology expansion is anything but surprising, since  
 
every increment in biological capability pays back 
the researcher and the researcher's sponsors in 
short order. Payback comes in the esteem of peers, 
in promotions, and in increases in the academic or 
corporate salaries of the researchers whose work 
generates knowledge and new therapies. Payback 
comes in the form of profits for the manufacturers 
of kits to perform the manipulations, royalties for 
the writers of the methods manuals profits for the 
385 See, for example, James Spohrer and Douglas Engelbart, ‘Converging Technologies for Enhancing Human 
Performance: Science and Business Perspectives’, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 1013 (2004), 
pp.50-82; Alfred Nordmann, Converging Technologies – Shaping the Future of European Societies (Brussels: 
European Communities, 2004); Tsjalling Swierstra et al. ‘Taking Care of the Symbolic Order: How Converging 
Technologies Challenge Our Concepts’, Nanoethics, vol.3 (2009), pp.269-280; Carl Elliot, ‘Enhancement 
Technologies and the Modern Self’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol.36 (2011), pp.364-374; George Khushf, 
‘The Ethics of NBIC Convergence’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol.32 (2007), pp.185-196; William 
Bainbridge, ‘Converging Technologies and Human Destiny’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol. 32 (2007), 
pp.197-216; Franc Mali, ‘Bringing Converging Technologies Closer to Civil Society: The Role of Precautionary 
Principle’, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, vol. 22:1 (2009), pp.53-75. 
386 Jeffrey Macher and David Mowery, ed. Innovation in Global Industries, op cit, p.237. 
387 Roger Brent, ‘In the Valley of the Shadow of Death’, p.4, op cit. 
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drug industry. Payback comes for the public in the 
form of new drugs and therapies.388 
 
Fourth, besides being cost-effective, many of the benefits that biotechnology 
offers are easy to obtain and disseminate. In other words, many of the 
various prospects for public (and private) betterment are not situated at some 
distant moment in the future but can be realised immediately, as a result of 
which pressing problems can be alleviated, if not fully resolved, and 
substantial revenue can be generated in the short term. Last but not least, 
while there are some risks and concerns associated with the advancement of 
biotechnology, few of those are deemed urgent or significant enough to 
impact on the pace of innovation. As the actual manifestation of such risks is 
often contingent upon the interplay of a variety of factors, this renders the 
likelihood of a major crisis unfolding as a result of the progress of 
biotechnology low. Moreover, there is a genuine belief that any challenges 
that may arise from the proliferation of novel technologies can either be 
foreseen or dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Given the enormous potential 
of biotechnology for addressing societal, economic and environmental 
challenges, it is unsurprising that most states have readily endorsed scientific 
and technological innovation and embarked on large-scale generously-
funded R&D programmes in the life sciences. 
 
Trends in Biotechnology Governance 
 
Given the powerful multifaceted impetus for biotechnology advancement, it is 
possible to identify at least five key trends in the governance of biotechnology 
that are common for highly industrialised and developing countries alike. 
Those include: high-level coordination, facilitation and funding; synergies 
within and between both the public and private sector; emphasis on strategic 
and competitive interests at the expense of precaution; regulations that seek 
to promote rather than restrict scientific and technological progress; and 
overreliance on technical solutions. 
388 Ibid. 
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High-Level Coordination, Facilitation and Funding 
 
At international level, the on-going expansion of biotechnology has been 
hailed not only as an inherently positive development but also as an essential 
prerequisite for enhancing human welfare and addressing various socio-
economic, environmental and health concerns. In its 2013 World Health 
Report, the WHO called for: 
 
Increased international and national investment and 
support in [life science] research aimed specifically 
at improving coverage of health services within and 
between countries.389 
 
 
The WHO has also strived to promote research on specific diseases, such as 
HIV/AIDS, cancer, pandemic influenza, tuberculosis and malaria, with the 
goal to improve methods for prevention and diagnostics and facilitate the 
development of effective therapeutics and vaccines.390 
 
In a similar fashion, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has 
highlighted the positive impact that biotechnology could have on the 
development of agriculture: 
 
…biotechnology could be a major tool in the fight 
against hunger and poverty, especially in 
developing countries. Because it may deliver 
solutions where conventional breeding approaches 
have failed, it could greatly assist the development 
of crop varieties able to thrive in the difficult 
environments where many of the world's poor live 
and farm.391 
 
 
It is not difficult to see how those assertions have been translated into 
national policies and practical steps across the globe. The US NIH that 
provide the bulk financial support for medical and health-oriented R&D in the 
US spent over 30.9 billion dollars during the fiscal year 2012, about a third of 
which was allocated for funding biotechnology and bioengineering 
389 WHO, World Health Report, 2013, available at  
http://www.who.int/whr/2013/main_messages/en/index.html (accessed 29/01/2014).  
390 See the ‘Infectious Diseases’ section of the WHO website: http://www.who.int/topics/infectious_diseases/en/ 
(accessed 19/01/2014).  
391 UN FAO, Wold Agriculture: Towards 2015/2030, Summary Report, 2002, available at  
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/004/y3557e/y3557e.pdf (accessed 19/01/2014). 
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projects.392 Within its Sixth Framework Programme for Research and 
Technological Development spanning the period 2002-2006 the European 
Union (EU) distributed more than 2.5 billion euro for projects under the theme 
‘Life Sciences, Genomics and Biotechnology for Health’.393 Developing 
countries, too, are increasingly investing in ‘red’ biotechnology as part of their 
efforts to address public health concerns. According to a recent WHO report, 
support for biotechnology and particularly, for cancer research, in Cuba has 
soared over the past 20 years, amounting to over one billion dollars.394 As a 
result, the Cuban biotechnology industry is burgeoning, holding around 1200 
international patents and exporting vaccines and pharmaceuticals to more 
than 50 countries. 
 
The prospect of climate change coupled with rising population numbers has 
compelled governments in the global North and South alike to explore ‘green’ 
biotechnology as a means of ensuring food security. The USA remains by far 
the largest commercial producer of GM crops. Several EU member states 
(France, Germany, Spain, Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Portugal and 
Slovakia), Canada and Australia further feature in the list of industrialised 
nations that have embarked on growing GM plant breeds. More and more 
emerging economies are striving to expand their agrobiotechnology sector, 
most notably Brazil, India, Argentina, South Africa, Mexico, Burkina Faso, 
Myanmar and Chile.395 In 2008, the Chinese government launched a major 
R&D initiative worth 4 billion dollars to develop new plant varieties by 2020 
that will enhance yields, have improved nutritional value and be resistant to 
pests.396 
392 For information on the NIH budget for 2012, see  
http://www.nih.gov/about/director/budgetrequest/NIH_BIB_020911.pdf (accessed 29/01/2014); on estimates of 
funding distributions for Various Research, Condition, and Disease Categories, 2011-2016 see 
http://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx (accessed 21/09/2015). For an overview of the NIH budget for 2015, 
see David Malakoff and Jeffrey Mervis, ‘First Look: US Spending Deal a Mixed Bag for Science’, ScienceInsider, 9 
December 2014, available at http://news.sciencemag.org/funding/2014/12/first-look-new-u-s-spending-deal-mixed-
bag-science (accessed 16/09/2015); Jocelyn Kaiser, ‘Within NIH’s Flat 2015 Budget, a Few Favourites’, 
ScienceInsider, 10 December 2014, available at http://news.sciencemag.org/funding/2014/12/within-nih-s-flat-2015-
budget-few-favorites (accessed 16/09/2015).  
393 For information on the EU Sixth Framework Programme and the Activity Area of Life Sciences, Genomics and 
Biotechnology for Health, see http://cordis.europa.eu/fp6/lifescihealth.htm (accessed 29/01/2014).  
394 See WHO, Cuba – Battling Cancer with Biotechnology, January 2013, available at  
http://www.who.int/features/2013/cuba_biotechnology/en/index.html (accessed 29/01/2014).  
395 See Clive James, Global Status of Commercialised Biotech/GM Crops: 2012, Brief No.44, International Service 
for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, 2012, available at  
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/44/executivesummary/pdf/Brief%2044%20-
%20Executive%20Summary%20-%20English.pdf (accessed 29/01/2014).  
396 ‘Plant Genetic Engineering: China Hesitates on the Brink’, GMO Safety, 30 August 2011, available at  
128 
 
                                                          
Synergies within and between Private and Public Sectors 
 
Public-private partnerships underpinned by access to early-stage risk capital 
and strong linkages between business, universities and entrepreneurial 
support networks constitute an important vehicle for promoting innovation 
and fostering technology transfer and product development. For instance, the 
Chinese government has launched a major initiative mobilising 2.5 billion 
dollars in venture capital to support start-ups in the immense Zhangjiang 
science park outside Shanghai;397 Russia’s Rusnano has entered a 760 
million dollar partnership with the US venture capital firm Domain Associates 
to fund ‘emerging life science technology companies and establish 
manufacturing facilities in Russia for production of advanced therapeutic 
products’; and Cleveland’s University Hospital has allocated 250 million 
dollars for setting up a ‘non-profit entity to fund and advise physician-
scientists on transitional research and a related for-profit accelerator that will 
develop selected compounds to proof of concept.’398 The Kauffman 
Foundation in the USA, a wealthy philanthropic establishment dedicated 
exclusively to the goal of entrepreneurship has been particularly zealous in 
its quest for promoting university-based entrepreneurial activities nationwide. 
Its Kauffman Campuses Initiative launched in early 2003 enjoyed so much 
popularity among universities that following the initial round of grants totalling 
25 million dollars, the Foundation announced its resolve to leverage a 100 
million dollar investment for the creation of new interdisciplinary education 
programmes.399 
 
University-industry partnerships, while not a novel phenomenon in the area of 
biotechnology, have considerably intensified over the past several decades, 
thus facilitating the widespread commercialisation of life science research. 
Indeed, 90 per cent of the companies in the US surveyed by Blumenthal et 
al. in 1996 had relationships with an academic institution in that year and in 
http://www.gmo-safety.eu/news/1347.genetic-engineering-china.html (accessed 29/01/2014). 
397 Charles Wessner and Alan Wolff ed., Rising to the Challenge, op cit, p.41. 
398 Jennifer Levin, ‘Government Academic, and Venture Firms Come Together in March to Fund Translational and 
Early-Stage Development’, FierceBiotech, 4 April 2012, available at 
http://www.fiercebiotech.com/press-releases/government-academic-and-venture-firms-come-together-march-fund-
translationa (accessed 21/10/13).  
399 Daniel Greenberg, Science for Sale: The Perils, Rewards and Delusions of Campus Capitalism (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), p.90. 
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more than half of those cases industry provided financial support for research 
in such institutions.400 According to another study, the total industry 
investment in academic life science research in the USA tripled between 
1985 and 1998 reaching almost 2 billion dollars and has been growing ever 
since.401 Against this backdrop, some commentators have put forward the 
‘Triple Helix’ model, which serves both as a conceptual tool and a policy 
blueprint. In the former case, it is used to elucidate the academic-industry-
government relationships that underpin the institutional arrangements and 
changing practices in the processes of production, transfer and application of 
knowledge in post-industrial societies; in the latter, it is promoted as a 
framework for economic development through state investment and 
knowledge sharing between academia and industry.402 
 
Others, however, have remained sceptical of the close integration of 
universities and the private sector voicing concerns about the possible 
deleterious effects arising therefrom:  
 
As in other activities, when big money flows fast, 
temptations and opportunities arise for risky 
behaviour and stealthy or even brazen wrongdoing 
in pursuit of personal or institutional advantage. 
The new world of academic-commercial dealings is 
characterised by some grey areas and evolving 
rules for permissible and impermissible conduct. 
The people who manage and conduct research in 
scientific organisations are not immune to the 
weaknesses and foibles so plentiful elsewhere, 
despite the accolades for probity that science 
bestows upon itself.403 
 
400 David Blumenthal et al. ‘Relationships between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences – an 
Industry Survey’, The New England Journal of Medicine, vol.334:6 (1996), pp.368-373; Jason Owen-Smith and 
Walter Powell, ‘The Expanding Role of University Patenting in the Life Sciences: Assessing the Importance of 
Experience and Connectivity’, Research Policy, vol.32 (2003), pp.1695-1711; Daniel Lee Kleinman, Impure 
Cultures: University Biology and the World of Commerce, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003). 
401Hui Yang and Steven Buccola, ‘University-Industry Relationships and the Design of Biotechnology Research’, 
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association, Montreal, Canada, July 
27-30 2000. Available at: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/21985 (accessed 25/11/2013); see also Dorothy 
Nelkin et al. ‘University-Industry Alliances’, Science, technology and Human Values, vol. 12:1 (1987), pp.65-74. 
402 See, for example, Henry Etzkowitz, ‘Entrepreneurial Science in the Academy: A Case of the Transformation of 
Norms’, Social Problems, vol.36:1 (1989), pp.14-29; Loet Leydesdorff and Martin Meyer, ‘The Triple Helix of 
University-Industry-Government Relations’, Scientometrics, vol. 58:2 (2003), pp.191-203; Henry Etzkowitz, The 
Triple Helix: University-Industry-Government Innovation In Action, (London: Routledge, 2008); Henry Etzkowitz and 
Loet Leydesdorff, ‘The Dynamics of Innovation: from National Systems and “Mode 2” to a Triple Helix of University–
Industry–Government Relations’, Research Policy, vol.29:2 (2000), pp.109-123.  
403 Daniel Greenberg, Science for Sale, op cit, p.102; Mark Cooper, ‘Commercialisation of the University and the 
Problem Choice by Academic Biological Scientists’, Science, Technology, and Human Values, vol.34:5 (2009), 
pp.629-653. 
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With more and more universities joining the biotechnology ‘gold rush’ and 
corporate values and goals steadily penetrating the professional academic 
cultures, scholarship turns into a result-oriented activity subject to the 
priorities and interests of business partners and industrial sponsors. Strategy 
and careful planning deemed essential to the pursuit of for-profit knowledge 
can have a restraining effect on the spontaneous vigour characteristic of 
academic research, limiting the range of problems that could be studied to 
those defined by the market.404 At the same time, scientists often find 
themselves under tremendous pressure striving to satisfy the demands of 
their industrial clients without utterly neglecting their academic duties ranging 
from mentorship through filing grant applications to publishing. The extensive 
workload coupled with the bright prospects for securing long-term research 
funding and achieving some individual gain and prominence provide a 
favourable environment in which instances of dubious, sometimes fraudulent, 
behaviour, conflicts of interest and lack of transparency, unless too severe, 
are unlikely to encounter widespread opprobrium and may even go 
unnoticed.405 In the race for patents and venture capital, the business 
mentality dulls scientific rigour and the ethics threshold appears not too 
difficult to cross. 
 
Governments Tend to Favour Strategic, Political and Economic 
Interests at the Expense of Precaution 
 
Given the tremendous benefits that biotechnology is expected to generate in 
virtually any sphere of human activity, it is not difficult to understand why its 
progress is predominantly viewed through an explicitly positive lens by policy-
makers. Since the opportunities for achieving public betterment and 
enhancing state prestige and international standing are too tempting and too 
abundant, there is a powerful urge to dedicate both will and resources to 
404 Ken Auletta, ‘Get Rich U’, The New Yorker, 30 April 2012, available at  
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/04/30/120430fa_fact_auletta (accessed 25/11/2013). See also Dina 
Biscotti et al, ‘The “Independent Investigator”: How Academic Researchers Construct Their Professional Identity in 
University-Industry Agricultural Biotechnology Research Collaborations’ in Nina Bandelj (ed.), ‘Economic Sociology 
of Work’, Research in the Sociology of Work Series, vol.18 (2009), pp.261-285; Mathias Kaisar, ‘Toward More 
Secrecy in Science: Comments on Some Structural Changes in Science – and on Their Implications for an Ethics of 
Science’, Perspectives on Science, vol.4:2 (1996), pp.207-230. 
405 Ibid; see also Daniel Greenberg Science, Money and Politics: Political Triumph and Ethical Erosion (Chicago, IL: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
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promoting the large-scale expansion of the life sciences. For one thing, the 
prospect of conquering disease and maximising human wellbeing provides 
solid justification for a deliberate and sustained investment in fostering 
scientific and technological prowess. Lack of commitment and reluctance to 
support R&D in the life sciences then becomes an unfavourable option in the 
political calculations of states regardless of their level of economic 
development and international status. Within the context of political calculus 
pervaded by realist fears, competition and power, the perceived risks of 
inaction with regard to scientific and technological development justify vast 
expenditure, lower regulatory barriers to innovation and product 
development. Political choices concerning biotechnology support are 
therefore frequently made at the expense of calls for caution and potential 
social, environmental and ethical concerns. 
 
The regulation of genetic engineering is a case in point. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, from the outset, the attempts of governments to impose 
strict controls on research involving rDNA faced a severe backlash from 
academic scientists and business executives alike. By the 1980s, the various 
legislative initiatives put forward in the USA were abandoned in favour of the 
regime established by the NIH Guidelines, which virtually exempted the 
biotechnology industry from formal regulation. While the leading US-based 
companies pledged to ‘voluntarily comply’ with the Guidelines, behind the 
scenes they craftily continued to push for a system that would insulate them 
from governmental and public scrutiny.406 Indeed, during the 1990s when the 
States Parties to the BTWC strived to strengthen the treaty by negotiating a 
binding verification mechanism corporate interests proved too big and too 
important to be ignored. Both the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) which represented the country’s major 
research-based pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, and the 
Biotechnology Industry Organisation (BIO) which at that time represented 
some 1400 biotechnology firms, became vocal opponents of any measures 
designed to promote international arms control which seemed to hinder in 
406 Susan Wright and David Wallace, ‘Varieties of Secrets and Secret Varieties: The Case of Biotechnology’, op cit. 
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any way the protection of proprietary information and intellectual property.407 
In the period between 1994 and 2001 the associations invested considerable 
effort, time and ingenuity in lobbying the US government and influencing the 
diplomatic talks in Geneva to secure an outcome that was in line with the 
demands of their constituencies. Of course, it would be naive to ascribe the 
US resolve to reject in 2001 both the text of the protocol and its utility in 
general for providing adequate verification and enhancing confidence among 
States Parties solely to the activity of the biotechnology industry; 
nevertheless, it would be equally naive to suppose that corporate interests 
played no significant role in the process.408  
 
Besides economic priorities, national security and military calculations can 
also provide a compelling rationale for downplaying the potential risks 
associated with biotechnology expansion. Following the ‘Anthrax letters’ 
attack in October 2001, the US government embarked on a massive financial 
investment to boost its bioterrorism preparedness and enable the prevention, 
early detection, monitoring and emergency response to biological threats. As 
outlined in Biodefense for the 21st Century, a presidential directive that set 
out a comprehensive framework for national biodefence policy, between 
2001 and 2005 the federal government provided roughly 6 billion dollars ‘to 
state and local health systems to bolster their ability to respond to 
bioterrorism and major public health crises’.409 Along with the highly 
controversial vaccination programme that the government envisaged,410 
another important development designed to enhance America’s biodefence 
preparedness and capability was the drastic increase both in the number of 
high-containment labs (BSL-3 and BSL-4) and the number of researchers 
with access to some of the most dangerous pathogens known to mankind, 
including the causative agents of Ebola, plague and Q fever. Some 
commentators have questioned the logic behind this policy highlighting the 
407 Ibid, p.53-54.  
408 For a detailed analysis on the US decision to reject the draft BTWC Protocol, see Malcolm Dando, Preventing 
Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). 
409 Office of Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: President Bush Signs Biodefence for the 21st Century, 28 April 2008, The 
White House, Washington DC, available at    
http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/AllAttachmentsByTitle/A-
21HSPD_10/$File/HSPD%2010.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 2/01/2014). 
410 Hillel Cohen, ‘The Pitfalls of Bioterrorism Preparedness: The Anthrax and Smallpox Experiences’, American 
Journal of Public Health, vol.94:10 (2004), pp.1667-1671; Michael Selgelid, ‘Bioterrorism and Smallpox Planning: 
Information and Voluntary Vaccination’, Journal of Medical Ethics, vol.30 (2004), pp.558-560. 
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heightened risk of accidental or deliberate release of pathogens.411 Far from 
being ill-founded or hypothetical, such fears stemmed from a range of high-
profile cases that occurred after 2001 across the US in which the lack of 
proper training and professional negligence resulted in scientists being 
exposed to or infected with deadly microbes.412 Real-life horror stories about 
vials of plague being transported in the hand-luggage of researchers on 
passenger aircraft without the required authorisation, and deadly cultures 
gone missing from what appeared to be secure laboratories further fuelled 
the criticism toward the US biodefence policy raising difficult questions about 
its appropriateness and actual goals even before the ‘Anthrax letter’ 
investigation revealed that the attack was ‘insider’s business’.413 
  
Biotechnology Regulations Seek to Promote rather than Restrict 
Technological Advancement 
 
Life science research, just as any other sphere of professional activity, is 
subject to a range of institutional, national and international regulations. 
Along with the more general rules such as those related to occupational 
health and safety, fair pay and job competition, conflict of interests, labour 
rights, and professional liability, there are also specific ones addressing 
particular aspects of the research process including project clearing (e.g. 
review by local biosafety committees), safe laboratory practice and transport 
of pathogens (e.g. 2005 International Health Regulations), exchange of viral 
strains (e.g. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, 2011), handling 
of dangerous pathogens (e.g. US Select Agent Programme) and ethical 
treatment of human subjects and samples obtained therefrom (e.g. The 2004 
411 See Susan Wright, ‘Taking Biodefence Too Far’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.60:6 (2004), pp.58-66; Eileen 
Choffnes, ‘New Labs, More Terror’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, vol. 58:5 (2002), pp.29-32.  
412 Nick Schwellenbach, ‘A Plague of Researchers’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.61:3 (2005), pp.14-16; Marylia 
Kelley and Jay Coghlan, ‘Mixing Bugs and Bombs’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.59:5 (2003), pp.24-31; 
Roxanne Khamsi, ‘Lab Loses Trio of Plague Mice’, Nature News, 16 September 2005, available at 
http://www.nature.com/news/2005/050912/full/news050912-13.html (accessed 2/01/2014).   
413 Martin Enserink and David Malakoff, ‘The Trials of Thomas Butler’, Science, vol. 302:5663 (19 December 2003), 
pp.2054-2063; for a detailed account of the ‘Anthrax letters’ attack and the controversy of the US biodefence 
programme see Jeanne Guillemin, American Anthrax: Fear, Crime, and the Investigation of the Nation’s Deadliest 
Bioterror Attack, (New York: Henry Hol and Co, 2011); Scott Shane, ‘Army Suspends Germ Research at Maryland 
Lab’, New York Times, 9 February 2009, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/washington/10germs.html?_r=0 (accessed 2/01/2014); Mark Wheelis and 
Malcolm Dando, ‘Back to Bioweapons?’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.59:1 (2003), pp.40-46. 
134 
 
                                                          
Human Tissue Act in the UK).414 While hardly exhaustive, this list suffices to 
convey the idea that the regulatory regime governing the practice of life 
science research is dense and comprehensive. With more than 30 
international organisations overseeing biotechnology from various 
perspectives,415 there is a prima facie reason to assume that the regime in its 
current form is sufficiently flexible to accommodate novel advances and hold 
any potential risks, which they may pose, at bay. Yet in reality over the past 
decade the opposite trend has prevailed, that is, the existing governance 
mechanisms have struggled to respond adequately to the proliferation of new 
scientific developments with multiple adaptive uses and the multiplicity of 
cutting-edge developments posing profound ethical quandaries. How to 
account for this discrepancy?  
 
Part of the problem stems from the fact that since at least the late 1970s the 
regulation of biotechnology has been streamlined so as to become 
compatible with and not a restriction on continued technological change and 
economic growth.416 As such, it rests upon the barely questioned assumption 
that the progress of biotechnology is inherently good and needs to be 
harnessed and vigorously promoted. Needless to say, any measures that 
seem to slow down or restrain its advancement are deemed undesirable and 
even detrimental to socio-economic development. Hence, when developing 
414 See, for example, International Health Regulations (WHO, 2005), specifically section ‘Laboratory’, available at 
http://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241596664/en/index.html (accessed 3/01/2014); Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Framework for the Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and other Benefits, (WHO, 
2011), available at http://www.who.int/influenza/resources/pip_framework/en/index.html (accessed 3/01/2014); 
Select Agent Programme (US, 2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/dsat.htm (accessed 3/01/2014); Human 
Tissue Act of 2004, see  
http://www.hta.gov.uk/legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/legislation/humantissueact.cfm (accessed 3/01/2014). 
For further discussion on the implementation of biotechnology regulations, see Bo Sundqvist et al. ‘Harmonisation of 
European Laboratory Response Networks by Implementing CWA 15793: Use of Gap Analysis and an “Insider” 
Exercise as Tools’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefence Strategy, Practice, and Science, vol.11:S1 (2013), 
pp.36-44; Julie Fisher and Rebecca Katz, ‘Moving Forward to 2014: Global IHR (2005) Implementation’, Biosecurity 
and Bioterrorism: Biodefence Strategy, Practice, and Science, vol.11:2 (2013), pp.153-156. On the development of 
health and safety regulations on the use of nanotechnology, see Eileen Kuempel et al. ‘Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management of Nanoparticles in the Workplace: Translating research into Practice’, Annals of Occupational 
Hygiene, vol.56:5 (2012), pp.491-505. 
415 See Catherine Rhodes, International Governance of Biotechnology, op cit. 
416 David Dickson, The New Politics of Science, op cit. p.268. There is a debate on whether the ‘American model’ of 
science-policy making underpinned by neoliberal ideology is fully embraced in Europe. See, for example, Gabriele 
Abels, ‘The Long and Winding Road from Asilomar to Brussels: Science, Policy and the Public in Biotechnology 
Regulation’, Science as Culture, vol14:4 (2005), pp.339-353; Herbert Gottweis, ‘Transnationalising Recombinant-
DNA Regulation: Between Asilomar, EMBO, the OECD, and the European Community’, Science as Culture, 
vol.14:4 (2005), pp.325-338. Further, a Policy Paper issued by a Business Taskforce appointed by the UK 
Government issued a Policy Paper in late 2013 demanding the liberalization of the existing EU legislation which, in 
their view, ‘places restrictions on products and technologies without adequate evidence of risk’. See Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills and the Prime Minister’s Office, Cut the EU Red Tape: Report form the Business Task 
Force, Policy Paper October 2013, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249969/TaskForce-report-15-
October.pdf (accessed 29/01/2014).  
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regulations, policy-makers have generally pursued a two-fold objective: first, 
to promote the safe practice of life science research by reducing any risks 
arising therefrom both to scientists and the general public; and second, to 
ensure that any issues that may hinder the expansion of biotechnology are 
not subject to restrictive legislation.  
 
A vivid manifestation of this approach is the way in which the ongoing debate 
on ‘dual use research of concern’ – benignly-intended research that seeks to 
maximise human welfare by responding to health, societal and environmental 
ills but could also facilitate to the development of more sophisticated and 
potent biological weapons and enable bioterrorism417 – has been handled. 
For more than a decade, researchers, journal editors, security experts and 
policy-makers have strived to devise oversight mechanisms and governance 
initiatives that could adequately tackle the challenge of dual use without 
stifling innovation. Unfortunately, to date their efforts have met with little 
success, as a result of which virtually each experiment of dual use concern is 
dealt with separately on a case-by-case basis. This is not to say that there 
are no similarities across the studies of this kind. On the contrary, a few of 
the most notable examples follow a similar paradigm, including the creation 
of a vaccine-resistant strain of the Mousepox virus, the artificial synthesis of 
the Polio virus, the recreation of the 1918 Spanish Influenza virus and, most 
recently, the production of a mammalian-transmissible H5N1 Avian Influenza 
virus (see Box 4.1). 418 All four of them were performed in strict compliance 
417 See, for example, National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), Proposed Framework for the 
Oversight of Dual Use Life Science Research: Strategies for Minimising the Potential Misuse of Research 
Information, June 2007, available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity_documents.html (accessed 
6/01/2014). On the potential for misuse of novel scientific developments, see James Petro et al. ‘Biotechnology: 
Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefence’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefence Strategy, Practice, and 
Science, vol.1:3 (2003), pp.161-168; Gregory Koblenz, ‘Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats 
and Responses’, International Security, vol.34:4 (2010), pp.96-132; Christian Enemark and Ian Ramshaw, ‘Gene 
Technology, Biological Weapons, and the Security of Science’, Security Studies, vol.18 (2009), pp.624-641. Some 
commentators have expressed scepticism toward the claim that scientific and technological advancement poses 
serious threats underscoring the importance of other factors, such as socio-economic and socio-technic contexts. 
See, for example, Kathleen Vogel, ‘Intelligent Assessment: Putting Emerging Biotechnology Threats in Context’, 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.69:1 (2013), pp.43-52; Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, ‘Barriers to Bioweapons: 
Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation, International Security, vol.36:4 (2012), pp.80-114.  Others, however, argue that 
advances in modern biology and medicine have implications for the evolution of biological weapon programmes. 
See Malcolm Dando, ‘The Impact of the Development of Modern Biology and Medicine on the Evolution of Offensive 
Biological Warfare Programmes in the Twentieth Century’, Defence Analysis, vol.15:1 (1999), pp.43-62; Kathryn 
Nixdorff and Wolfgang Bender, ‘Ethics of University Research, Biotechnology and Potential Military Spin-Off’, 
Minerva, vol.40 (2002), pp.15-35. 
418 See Ronald Jackson et al. ‘Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses 
Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox’, Journal of Virology, vol.75:3 
(2001), pp.1205-1210; Samatha Robins et al. ‘The Efficacy of Cidofovir Treatment of Mice Infected with Ectromelia 
(Mousepox) Virus Encoding Interleukin-4’, Antiviral Research, vol.66:1 (2005), pp.1-7; Rachel Nowak, ‘Disaster in 
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with the rules and procedures in place for laboratory biosafety, biosecurity 
and biorisk management and under appropriate physical containment 
conditions; all had passed thorough review by the respective local biosafety 
and bioethics committees; and all of them were deemed essential in terms of 
public health benefits. Above all, the ethical and security concerns that the 
studies have raised go far beyond the laboratory door, posing fundamental 
questions about how life science research is reviewed, conducted and 
communicated.  
 
Box 4.1: Examples of Experiements of Concern 
 
The Australian Mousepox Virus Study 
In early 2001, the Journal of Virology published a report of the creation of a 
highly-virulent strain of the Ectromelia virus, the causative agent of 
mousepox. The work described in the report was carried out by a group of 
Australian scientists based in Canberra. Its original goal was the 
development of an infectious immunocontraceptive that could be used 
against wild mice for the purpose of pest-control. To achieve this, the group 
drew upon previously published work. During the course of the experiment, 
the researchers unexpectedly discovered that the newly-engineered strain of 
the Mousepox virus, which they created, killed 60 per cent more mice than 
the parent virus, including mice that had been vaccinated or that had natural 
immunity. When the research was published, concerns were raised that it 
could potentially be misapplied for hostile purposes, or even that the same 
technique could be utilised for creating a more virulent strain of the Variola 
virus, which causes smallpox in humans.  
The Artificial Synthesis of the Polio Virus 
In 2002, a team of scientists led by Dr Eckard Wimmer from the University of 
New York at Stony Brook announced that they had successfully created a 
polio virus ‘from scratch’. To carry out the research, the scientists ‘followed a 
recipe they downloaded from the internet and used gene sequences from a 
mail-order supplier’.419 Once the virus created, it was tested on mice, as a 
the Making’, The New Scientist, vol.2273, 13 January 2001; Arno Mullbacher and Mario Lobigs, ‘Creation of Killer 
Poxvirus Could Have Been Predicted’, Journal of Virology, vol.75:18 (2001), pp.8353-8355; Jeronimo Cello et al. 
‘Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template’, op cit; 
Steve Connor, ‘Fears of Bioterrorism as Scientists Create Deadly Polio Virus’, The Independent, 12 July 2002;  
Michael Selgelid, ‘A Tale of Two Studies: Ethics, Bioterrorism and the Censorship of Science’, The Hasting Centre 
Report, vol. 37:3 (2007), pp.35-43; David Whitehouse, ‘First Synthetic Virus Created’, BBC News, 11 July 2002, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2122619.stm (accessed 6/01/2014); Terrence Tumpey et al. ‘Characterisation 
of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus’, Science, vol. 310:5745, (2005), pp.77-80. 
419 David Whitehouse, ‘First Synthetic Virus Created’, BBC News, 11 July 2002, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/2122619.stm (accessed 1/02/16).  
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result of which the infected animals became paralysed and died. The study 
spurred a wide-ranging debate, not least because it drew attention to the 
possibility of using synthetic biology for constructing de novo viruses for the 
purposes of bioterrorism.  
The Recreation of 1918 Spanish Influenza Virus 
In 2005, it was announced that CDC scientists together with colleagues from 
several research institutions across the USA had successfully re-created the 
influenza virus, that was responsible for the 1918 pandemic, which killed 
between 20 and 50 million people worldwide. Using DNA from a tissue of a 
flu victim buried in the permafrost in Alaska, the researchers managed to 
reconstruct the influenza virus and thus study its pathogenesis and properties 
that contributed to its virulence. Despite the scientific justification that was put 
forward, critics have argued that the study is ‘a recipe for disaster’, not least 
because the availability of the virus’ full-genome sequence and detailed 
method for its reconstruction on the Internet may facilitate its synthesis by a 
rogue scientist.420 
 
Yet none of the high-profile experiments of concern has proved critical 
enough to provoke a radical change in the way dual-use research is 
governed.421 Three points merit consideration in this regard. The first pertains 
to the manner in which the dominant discourse on dual use is framed, that is, 
in purely ethical terms as a dilemma. While bioethics undoubtedly has a role 
to play in the discussions on dual use, the language of ‘dual-use dilemmas’ is 
too abstract to offer appropriate analytical tools for dealing with the issues at 
play. As discussed above, the questions that dual-use research poses such 
as data sharing, research funding and project planning are far from 
hypothetical but they feature explicitly in everyday professional practice. 
420 Jan van Aken, ‘Ethics of Reconstructing Spanish Flu: Is It Wise to Resurrect a Deadly Virus?’, Heredity, vol.98 
(2007), pp.1-2.  
421 On the governance of dual-use research, see Christine Uhlenhaut et al. ‘Protecting Society: Biological Security 
and Dual-Use Dilemma in the Life Sciences – Status Quo and Options for the Future’, EMBO Reports, vol.14:1 
(2013), pp.25-30; Catriona McLeish and Ralf Trapp, ‘The Life Sciences Revolution and the BWC: Reconsidering the 
Science and Technology Review Process in a Post-Proliferation world’, The Non-Proliferation Review, vol.18:3 
(2011), pp.527-543. Some novel developments related to the way in which dual-use research is governed are worth 
of note. For instance, the Robert Koch Institute, the central federal institution responsible for disease control and 
prevention in Germany, has recently implemented an Internal Directive on Dual-Use Potential of Life Sciences 
Research featuring a Code of Conduct for risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation. Article 5 of the Code lists a number 
of activities in place for the purpose of raising awareness among the Institute staff of dual-use issues. The full text of 
the Code is available at  
http://www.rki.de/EN/Content/Institute/Dual_Use/code_of_conduct.html?nn=4005636 (accessed 27/01/2014); 
another example is the licensing programme run by the Danish Centre for Biosecurity and Biopreparedness, the 
national authority that controls the use of dual-use materials, which features an education and outreach component. 
A full description of the programme is available at http://www.biosikring.dk/eng (accessed 27/01/2014). For a 
proposal on how to improve the governance of emerging technologies with far-reaching implications, see Kenneth 
Oye et al. ‘Regulating Gene Drives’, Science, vol.345:6197 (2014), pp.626-628.  
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However, the ‘dilemma framework’ automatically strips them of the complex 
socio-technical arenas in which they have actually presented themselves by 
laying an emphasis on what action should ideally be taken, rather than what 
is practically feasible given the circumstances.422 Moreover, such issues are 
typically structural in nature for they constitute fundamental elements of the 
life sciences professional culture, and as such, could hardly be adequately 
addressed solely at the level of individual researchers. Yet framing social, 
legal and security concerns in terms of moral dilemmas allows for structural 
issues to be omitted from the discussion, rendering life scientists the chief, if 
not the only, moral agents expected to reach what is deemed to be the ‘right’ 
answer.423 Assigning abstract duties then comes to be regarded as an 
appropriate ‘solution’, even if those are virtually impossible to fulfil given the 
complexities of the working environment within which researchers operate.  
 
The second point is related to the reductionist view that dominates the 
discourse of what counts as a risk in life science research. Perhaps one of 
the most significant legacies of the Asilomar Conference on rDNA (see 
Chapter 3) is the emphasis on laboratory risk that could be effectively 
managed by dint of physical containment and rules and procedures for safe 
laboratory practice.424 It suffices to mention that the bulk of guidelines and 
formal regulations published by the WHO focus exclusively on promoting and 
refining measures that aim to maximise laboratory biosafety and prevent the 
accidental release of pathogens. Hence, it is hardly surprising that the 
concept of dual use and the idea of risks beyond the laboratory door implicit 
in it seem alien to the majority of practising researchers. Striking as it may 
appear, even though dual use research has been debated for more than a 
422 Daniel Chambliss, Beyond Caring: Hospitals, Nurses and the Social Organisation of Ethics (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), p.6. See also Jim Whitman, When Dual-Use Issues Are so Abundant, Why Are 
Dual-Use Dilemmas so Rare, Research Report for the Wellcome Trust Project on ‘Building Sustainable Capacity in 
Dual-Use Bioethics’, University of Bradford, 2010, available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics/media/ssis/bioethics/docs/monograph-7-JW.pdf (accessed 29/01/2014). On the 
limitations of the risk-benefit framework for assessing life science research of concern, see Brian Rappert. ‘Why Has 
Not There Been More Research of Concern’, Frontiers in Public Health, vol.2:74 (2014), pp.1-14. 
423 Daniel Chambliss, Beyond Caring op cit, p.92.  
424 See Marcia Barinaga, ‘Asilomar Revisited: Lessons for Today?’, Science, vol.287:5458 (2000), pp.1584-1585; 
Sheldon Krimsky, ‘From Asilomar to Industrial Biotechnology: Risks, Reductionism and Regulation’, Science as 
Culture, vol.14:4 (2005), pp.309-323. 
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decade now, the level of awareness among life scientists of the broader 
social, security and legal implications of their work remains low.425  
 
The third point deals with the way in which risks in life science research are 
assessed and mitigated. Given the narrow definition of risk encompassing 
technical particulars, physical containment and biosafety, risk assessment is 
considered an appropriate and reliable tool for ensuring research safety. The 
heavy reliance upon risk assessing tools is underpinned by two underlying 
assumptions. One is that it is possible to foresee and calculate most, if not 
all, things that could potentially go wrong both during the development phase 
of the project and after its completion. The other is that it is possible then to 
use the produced data as a basis for devising measures and strategies for 
eradicating, or at least, mitigating the risks likely to occur. Attractive as it may 
seem, this ‘new alchemy where body counting replaces social and cultural 
values’ presupposes a clear distinction between the risk assessment 
‘experts’ and the general public, whereby the former are granted a licence to 
make decisions about the risks that the latter cannot do without.426 Likewise, 
cost-benefit analysis on the basis of which research proposals are screened 
for potentials risks and security concerns has attracted some serious 
criticism. In the view of some commentators, besides being sometimes 
deeply inaccurate, the cost-benefit analysis is ‘ethically wrong’ since 
‘applying narrow quantitative criteria to human health and human life’ is 
425 See Malcolm Dando and Brian Rappert, ‘Codes of Conduct for Life Sciences: Some Insights from UK Academia’, 
Briefing Paper no.16 (2nd series: 2005), University of Bradford, available at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc (accessed 
8/03/2013). See also German Ethics Council, Biosecurity – Freedom and Responsbility of Research, (Berlin: 
Deutscher Ethikrat, 2014), available at  http://www.ethikrat.org/files/opinion-biosecurity.pdf (accessed 17/09/2015). 
426 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, op cit, p.12. On the framing of risk in 
biotechnology, see Geert van Calster, ‘Risk Regulation, EU Law and Emerging Technologies: Smother or Smooth?’, 
Nanoethics, vol.2 (2008), pp.61-71; Jenifer Kuzma and John Besley, ‘Ethics of Risk Analysis and Regulatory 
Review: From Bio- to Nanotechnology’, Nanoethics, vol.2 (2008), pp.149-162; Les Levidow et al. ‘European 
Biotechnology Regulation: Framing the Risk Assessment of a Herbicide Tolerant Crop’, Science, Technology, and 
Human Values, vol.22:4 (1997), pp.472-505; Lisa Clark, ‘Framing the Uncertainty of Risk: Models of Governance for 
Genetically Modified Crops’, Science and Public Policy, vol.40 (2013), pp.479-491; Jesper Toft, ‘Denmark’s 
Regulation of Agri-Biotechnology: Co-Existence Bypassing Risk Issues’, Science and Public Policy, vol.32:4 (2005), 
pp.293-300; Ereck Chakauyaa et al. ‘Riding the Tide of Biopharming in Africa: Considerations for Risk Assessment’, 
South African Journal of Science, vol.102 (2006), pp.284-288; Jean-Michel Marcoux and Lyne Le´tourneau, ‘A 
Distorted Regulatory Landscape: Genetically Modified Wheat and the Influence of Non-Safety Issues in Canada’, 
Science and Public Policy, vol.40 (2013), pp.514-532; Shawn Harmon et al. ‘Governing Risk, Engaging Public an 
Engendering Trust: New Horizons for Law and Social Science’, Science and Public Policy, vol.40 (2013), pp.25-33; 
Maaike van Tuyll, ‘Dealing with Future Risks in the Netherlands’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, 
Practice, and Science, vol.11: S1 (2013), pp.555-563. On the shortcomings of the existing models for public 
deliberation on the risks of biotechnology, see Les Levidow, ‘European Public Participation as Risk Governance: 
Enhancing Democratic Accountability for Agrobiotech Policy’, East Asian Science, technology and Society: an 
International Journal, vol.1 (2007), pp.19-51.  
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unacceptable.427 But there are other problems, too. As pointed out by 
Dickson, the cost-benefit analysis distorts political decision-making by 
omitting any factors that cannot be quantified, thus obscuring questions of 
equity, justice, power and social welfare behind a technocratic haze of 
numbers. 428 As a result, complex and politically charged decisions are 
reduced to a form that fits neatly into the technocratic ways of making 
regulatory decisions, whereby calculations and approximations made by the 
few substitute for the judgements of many.429 
 
The wide-ranging controversy that unraveled in late 2011 when two teams of 
scientists working independently in the Netherlands and the USA managed to 
produce an air-borne strain of the H5N1 Avian Influenza virus, a highly 
pathogenic and lethal microbe with over 60 per cent mortality rate in humans 
arguably constituted the pinnacle of the deliberation on dual use research. 
Both studies set alarm bells ringing for the security community who almost 
immediately jumped in the debate voicing concerns over the possibility of 
biological proliferation and bioterrorism. Some commentators even argued 
that the experiments ran counter to the spirit if not to the letter of the 1975 
BTWC.430 Against this backdrop, the resultant controversy was deemed at 
least initially to offer a timely opportunity to evaluate the existing governance 
mechanisms, determine their gaps and weaknesses and broaden the scope 
of deliberation inviting participation of a wide range of stakeholders. 
Unfortunately, the outcome of the debate proved far more moderate, 
signalling preference for preserving the status quo without disrupting the 
established systems for governance and oversight. Despite the extensive 
mass media coverage of the controversy, only few public consultations were 
held and none of those was designed as a platform for making policy 
proposals or developing action plans. Moreover, the densely-packed agenda 
prepared duly in advance left very limited scope for posing ‘tricky’ questions 
which the participating ‘experts’ might have struggled to answer. Needless to 
427 David Dickson, The New Politics of Science, op cit, p. 285. For critique of cost-benefit analysis, see also Brian 
Rappert, ‘The Benefits, Risks and Threats of Biotechnology’, Science and Public Policy, vol.35:1 (2008), pp.1-7. 
428 Ibid, 286. 
429 Ibid.  
430 See Tatyana Novossiolova et al. ‘The Creation of Contagious H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus: Implications for the 
Education of Life Scientists’, Journal of Terrorism Research, vol.3:1 (2012), pp.39-51. 
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say, all consequential decisions were made behind closed doors away from 
public scrutiny and on some occasions the people with the greatest vested 
interest in the publication of the studies were also the ones with the greatest 
say in the process.431 There were no significant changes in terms of 
governance initiatives, either. Far from being ground-breaking developments, 
the US Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research 
of Concern432 and the decision of the Dutch government to invoke export 
control legislation before allowing the publication of the study conducted 
within its jurisdiction were little more than desperate moves that aimed to 
obscure the inadequacy and shortcomings of the measures already in 
place.433 Overall, the manner in which the H5N1 debate was handled could 
be treated as a missed opportunity, whereby those in charge of the decision-
making process did little to address or even acknowledge the broader issues 
underpinning dual-use research of concern but simply ‘kicked the can down 
the road to the next manuscript’ waiting for the next controversy to erupt.434  
 
Reliance on Technical Fixes 
 
Technology seems to play a significant role in the governance of life science 
research. High-containment laboratories, well-equipped biosafety cabinets, 
sophisticated waste management systems, enhanced personal protective 
equipment and secure containers for the safe storage and transportation of 
biohazard materials are just a few of the tools and systems in place that allow 
the safe handling of dangerous pathogens and toxins and, at the same time, 
431 All meetings of the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) convened to discuss the 
manuscripts were restricted to selected individuals and full proceedings were never published. Moreover, the 
consequential Consultation Meeting organised by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in February 2012 which 
rejected the NSABB recommendation for a redacted publication of the manuscripts featured the lead scientists who 
conducted the experiments and representatives of the Us National Institutes of Health, the primary funding body of 
both studies. See Gretchen Vogel, ‘Flu Experts – and One Ethicist – Debate Controversial H5N1 Papers’, 
ScienceInsider, 16 February 2012, available at  
http://news.sciencemag.org/2012/02/flu-experts%E2%80%94and-one-ethicist%E2%80%94debate-controversial-
h5n1-papers (accessed 27/01/2014).  The full list of participants and final report of the Meeting are available at  
http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/list_participants/en/index.html (accessed 27/01/ 2014).  
432 For more information, see  
http://osp.od.nih.gov/office-biotechnology-activities/biosecurity/dual-use-research-concern (accessed 16/09/2015); 
Martin Enserink, ‘Fight Over Dutch H5N1 Paper Enters Endgame’, ScienceInsider, 24 April 2012, available at 
http://news.sciencemag.org/2012/04/fight-over-dutch-h5n1-paper-enters-endgame (accessed 6/01/2014).  
433 See Martin Enserink, ‘Fight Over Dutch H5N1 Paper Enters Endgame’, ScienceInsider, 24 April 2012, available 
at http://news.sciencemag.org/2012/04/fight-over-dutch-h5n1-paper-enters-endgame (accessed 17/09/2015); Martin 
Enserink, ‘Dutch Appeals Court Dodges Decision on Hotly Debated H5N1 Papers’, ScienceInsider, 16 July 2015, 
available at http://news.sciencemag.org/europe/2015/07/dutch-appeals-court-dodges-decision-hotly-debated-h5n1-
papers (accessed 17/09/2015).  
434 Letter from Michael Osterholm to Amy Patterson, 12 April 2012; see also Brendan Maher, ‘Bias Accusation 
Rattles US Biosecurity Board’, Nature News, 14 April 2012, available at http://www.nature.com/news/bias-
accusation-rattles-us-biosecurity-board-1.10454 (accessed 6/01/2014).  
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protect both laboratory personnel and the general public from exposure to 
deadly microbes. That said, the effectiveness of technical solutions should 
not be overstated if only for the fact that ‘problems’ of governance are barely 
technical matters per se but rather constitute complex issues of human 
relatedness. Nevertheless, the attractiveness of technological fixes as 
offering reliable risk mitigation and reassurance in the safety of biotechnology 
is ever growing. It suffices to mention that the H5N1 controversy discussed 
above was in part resolved after the lead researchers in the Netherlands and 
the USA respectively agreed to add a detailed section on the technical 
specificities and laboratory biosafety and biosecurity measures taken during 
the experiments.435 The strategy has proved effective in diverting attention 
from the rather inconvenient questions regarding the utility and significant 
potential for hostile misuse of the so called ‘gain-of-function’ (GOF) research 
and  concentrating it on more mundane issues dealing with in-house 
precautions and safety procedures. Once the latter were deemed adequately 
resolved, the former were effectively forgotten. 
 
Still, the value of technical means in ensuring reliable risk management 
should not be taken for granted. For one thing, laboratory biosafety 
precautions, however sophisticated, are far from perfect and accidents do 
occur. Such is the case with the Pirbright site in the UK which was at the 
centre of a major outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in 2007, as a result of 
which over 2100 animals were slaughtered.436 In 2012 the bioterrorism BSL-
3 laboratory at the US CDC in Atlanta suffered repeated problems with 
airflow systems designed to help prevent the release of infectious agents.437 
The faulty system could perhaps be regarded as an exception had it not been 
for the authoritative investigation report of the US Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) released in March 2013. According to the report, the cost of 
building and maintaining high-containment laboratories, coupled with the 
435 See Masaki Imai et al. ‘Experimental Adaptation of an Influenza H5 HA Confers Respiratory Droplet 
Transmission to a Reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 Virus in Ferrets’, Nature, vol.486 (2012), pp.420-430; Sander Herfst et 
al. ‘Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus between Ferrets: Materials/Methods, Supporting Text, Tables, 
Figures, and/or Refences’, Science, vol. 336:6088, (2012), pp.1534-1541. Supplementary materials are available at  
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/suppl/2012/06/20/336.6088.1534.DC1/1213362.Herfst.SM.pdf (accessed 
27/01/2014).  
436 Pallab Ghosh, ‘”Safety Incidents” at Animal Lab’, BBC News, 26 May 2011, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-13566593 (accessed 8/01/2014).  
437 Alison Young, ‘Airflow Problems Plague CDC Bioterror Lab’, USA Today, 12 June 2012, available at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-13/cdc-bioterror-lab/55557704/1 (accessed 8/01/2014).  
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absence of national standards for their design, construction, operation, and 
maintenance ‘exposes the nation to risk’.438 Far more critical is the situation 
in the developing world and emerging economies where lax regulations and 
technical failures have significantly heightened the risk of accidental release 
of pathogens, as demonstrated by the numerous ‘escapes’ of the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).439  
 
But even if technology functions impeccably, this hardly reduces the 
likelihood for a human error or inappropriate behaviour. Unlocked doors in 
high-containment facilities hosting deadly pathogens, eating and drinking in 
laboratories and poor waste disposal practices are just a small part of the 
otherwise long list of mundane mishaps that may result in severe 
consequences. It is worth mentioning that the US CDC came under the 
spotlight after internal e-mail correspondence revealed that doors in the BSL-
3 block where experiments involving the causative agenets of anthrax, SARS 
and influenza were performed were left unlocked on numerous occasions, 
thus increasing the risk of unauthorised access or theft.440 Given the chance 
of technical flaw and the potential for human error, some life scientists have 
begun to question the reliability of existing laboratory precautions and 
demand thorough review and evaluation. In a recent letter to the European 
438 US Government Accountability Office, High-Containment Laboratories: Assessment of the Nation’s Need Is 
Missing, 25 February 2013, available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/627140-gao-report-on-high-
containment-labs-february-2013.html (accessed 8/01/2014).  
439 Robert Walgate, ‘SARS Escaped Beijing Lab Twice’, The Scientist, 26 April 2004, available at http://www.the-
scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/22811/title/SARS-escaped-Beijing-lab-twice/ (accessed 8/01/2014); Lawrance 
Altman, ‘Lab Infection Blamed for Singapore SARS Case’, New York Times, 24 September 2003, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/24/world/lab-infection-blamed-for-singapore-sars-case.html (accessed 8/01/2014);  
440 Alison Young, ‘Security Lapses Found at CDC Bioterror Lab’, US Today, 27 June 2012, available at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-27/cdc-lab-security/55870990/1 (accessed 8/012014). 
Between 2014 and 2015, several high-containment facilities in the US have experienced serious biosafety lapses. 
Accidents involving dangerous pathogens such as the causative agents of anthrax and bird flu were reported. See 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Report on the Potential Exposure to Anthrax, 7 November 2014, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/about/pdf/lab-safety/Final_Anthrax_Report.pdf (accessed 17/09/2015); Editorial, 
‘Biosafety in the Balance’, Nature, 25 June 2014. Available at  
http://www.nature.com/news/biosafety-in-the-balance-1.15447 (accessed 17/09/2015); Marc Lipsitch, ‘Anthrax? 
That’s Not the Real Worry’, New York Times, 29 June 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/opinion/anthrax-
thats-not-the-real-worry.html?_r=0 (accessed 17/09/2015); Donald McNeil, ‘CDC Closes Anthrax and Flu Labs After 
Accidents’, New York Times, 11 July 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/12/science/cdc-closes-anthrax-and-flu-
labs-after-accidents.html (accessed 17/09/2015); Ian Sample, ‘From Anthrax to Bird Flu – the Dangers of Lax 
Security in Disease-Control Labs’, The Guardian, 18 July 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/anthrax-bird-flu-dangers-lax-security-disease-control-labs (accessed 
17/09/2015). About the same time, there were also reports about smallpox vials being retrived after having been left 
unaccounted for over 50 years. See AP, ‘Forgotten Vials of Smallpox Found in Storage Room’, New York Times, 8 
July 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/07/08/health/ap-us-med-forgotten-
smallpox.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=HpHeadline&module=first-column-region&region=top-
news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0 (accessed 17/09/2015). Most recently in 2015 there have been reports about live 
anthrax being shipped from US military research facilities worldwide. See Nicky Woolf, ‘Anthrax Shipment from 
Pentagon the result of a “Massive Institutional Failure”’, The Guardian, 23 July 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/23/anthrax-shipment-pentagon-institutional-failure (accessed 
17/09/2015).  
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Commission the Foundation for Vaccine Research has asked for ‘a rigorous, 
comprehensive risk-benefit assessment’ of GOF research that ‘could help 
determine whether the unique risks posed by these sorts of experiments are 
balanced by unique public health benefits which could not be achieved by 
alternative, safe scientific approaches’.441 
 
 Engines that Drive Biotechnology Momentum  
 
By and large, the ongoing progress of biotechnology is largely viewed and 
assessed through an explicitly positive lens which allows focusing almost 
exclusively on the benefits likely to be accrued notwithstanding the risks, 
actual and potential. The resultant distorted image is problematic, not least 
because it precludes any comprehensive discussion on the potential side 
effects and negative implications of novel life science advances. Above all, it 
sustains the barely questioned assumption that the existing governance 
mechanisms are adequate and sufficient to cope with the stresses and 
strains of the rapidly evolving biotechnology landscape. Yet given the 
complex and multifaceted dynamics shaping the life science enterprise, the 
rapid pace of innovation and the limits to predicting the synergistic and 
cumulative effects of the proliferation of new technologies, the uncritical 
acceptance of such assumptions is at best naïve and at worst dangerous. 
  
Integration of Biology with Other Disciplines 
 
Arguably the advancement of the life sciences has greatly benefited from the 
fascinating breakthroughs made in other areas of study, such as chemistry, 
engineering, computing, informatics, robotics, mathematics and physics. 
Some commentators even talk about a Third Revolution in Biotechnology 
underpinned by scientific and technological convergence: 
 
Convergence does not simply involve a transfer of 
tools sets from one science to another; 
441 Letter from the Foundation for Vaccine Research to the European Commission, Response to Letter by the 
European Society for Virology on ‘Gain-of-Function’ Influenza Research and Proposal to Organise a Scientific 
Briefing for the European Commission and Conduct Comprehensive Risk-Benefit Assessment, 18 December 2013, 
available at http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/7.14586!/file/vaccine%20foundation%20letter.pdf (accessed 
8/01/2014). On the ongoing debate on GOF, see National Research Council, Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-
of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop, (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2015).  
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fundamentally different conceptual approaches 
from physical science and engineering are imported 
into biological research, while life science’s 
understanding of complex evolutionary systems is 
reciprocally influencing physical science and 
engineering. Convergence is the result of true 
intellectual cross-pollination.442 
 
 
The resultant ‘New Biology’ has opened up a range of marvellous 
possibilities enabling the manipulation of living matter at the full range of 
scales, as well as the application of biological systems principles for the 
development of novel materials, processes and devices.443 As such, it has 
been largely hailed as possessing the ‘capacity to tackle a broad range of 
scientific and societal problems.’444 This is not an exaggeration. As noted by 
a recent report of the US NAS, the precipitous decline in the cost of genome 
sequencing would not have been possible without a combination of 
engineering of equipment, robotics for automation, and chemistry and 
biochemistry to make the sequencing accurate.445 Likewise, it is the 
combination of expertise from fields as diverse as evolutionary biology, 
computer science, mathematics, and statistics that has allowed both the 
analysis of raw genomic data and the subsequent use of these data to other 
fields.446 At the same time, advances in nanoscience and nanotechnology 
have considerably enhanced drug delivery making it more accurate by 
targeting specific parts of the body.447  
 
Yet the transformative potential of scientific and technological convergence 
comes at a price, not least because parallel to the benefits it offers there are 
risks the effects of which could be truly devastating.448 Take drug delivery, for 
442 Philip Sharp et al. The Third Revolution: The Convergence of the Life Sciences, Physical Sciences and 
Engineering, MIT White Paper, January 2011, Cambridge MA.  
443 See Committee on Biomocular Materials and Processes, National Research Council, Inspired by Biology: From 
Molecules to Materials to Machines, (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008).  
444 National Research Council, A New Biology for the 21st Century (Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 
2009), p.3.  
445 Ibid, p.42.  
446 Ibid. 
447 See Kinam Park, ‘Nanotechnology: What It Can Do for Drug Delivery’, Journal of Control Release, vol. 120:1-2 
(2008), pp.1-3; Kinam Park, ‘Facing the Truth about Nanotechnology in Drug Delivery’, ACS Nano, vol.7:9, (2013), 
pp.7442-7447;  Suwussa Bamrungsap et al,  ‘Nanotechnology in Therapeutics’, Nanomedicine, vol.7:8 (2012), 
pp.1253-1271; ‘Carbon Nanotubes – Bullets in the Fight against Cancer’, Community Research and Development 
Information Service, 10 September 2013, available at http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/36049_en.html (accessed 
13/01/2014).  
448 On the governance challenges brought about by the convergence between biology and other fields of science, 
see Francis Fukuyama and Caroline Wagner, Information and Biological Revolutions: Global Governance 
Challenges – Summary of a Study Group (Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 2000), available at 
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instance. Thanks to the technological breakthroughs over the past decade, 
doctors have gained unprecedented access to the human body which, in 
turn, has facilitated the treatment of previously incurable disease and 
conditions (e.g. some forms of cancer). Nanoparticles and aerosols are now 
utilised for delivering a precise dose of therapeutics to tissues and cells via 
novel pathways circumventing body’s natural defences and evading immune 
response. It is not difficult to imagine how such knowledge could be 
misapplied for malicious ends, including incapacitating and killing. Research 
on bioregulators is a case in point. Bioregulators are natural chemicals in the 
human body that play a vital role in the maintenance of the homeostasis but 
when administered in large quantities or in healthy individuals could be toxic 
and lead to serious disorders, even death. Given their properties, 
bioregulators constitute the perfect bioweapon: efficient and virtually 
impossible to detect. And if in the past, security analysts discounted the risk 
of their weaponisation due to the instability of the compounds when released 
in the atmosphere, the emergence of novel drug delivery techniques has 
significantly altered the security calculus.449 This is just but one example of 
the challenges that the increasing convergence between biology and 
chemistry poses to the integrity of the international biological and chemical 
non-proliferation regimes.450 Even though some effort has been made over 
the recent years to address those and other areas of concern and strengthen 
the international prohibition against biological and chemical warfare, in 
practical terms little has been achieved, as a result of which the risk of the 
hostile exploitation of novel scientific developments remains far from 
hypothetical.  
 
Along with the risk of misuse of new knowledge, there is the risk posed by 
the lack of sufficient scientific knowledge. Cross-disciplinary convergence 
opens a multitude of opportunities for manipulation and modification of living 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1139.pdf (accessed 29/01/2014); Spiez 
Convergence, Report of the First Workshop, 6-9 October 2014, available at http://www.labor-
spiez.ch/en/akt/pdf/Spiez_Convergence_2014_web.pdf (accessed 17/09/2015).  
449 See Jonathan Tucker, ‘The Body’s Own Bioweapons’, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.64:1 (2008), pp.16-
22.  
450 See Jonathan Tucker (ed.), Innovation, Dual Use, and Security: Managing the Risks of Emerging Biological and 
Chemical Technologies (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2012); US National Academy of Science, Life Sciences and 
Related Fields: Trends Relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention (Washington DC: National Academies 
Press, 2011).  
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matter but, at the same time, it precludes almost any sensible assessment of 
the potential interactions likely to occur in the process. Nano-based medicine 
is but one area that has attracted criticism in this regard. Since some 
elements behave differently at nano-scale, it becomes extremely difficult to 
assess their level of toxicity or other negative side effects that they may 
exert. Such is the case with long carbon nanotubes, which having been 
initially praised for their potential to improve implant development451 were 
later blamed for exhibiting asbestos-like behaviour that could lead to 
cancer.452 
 
Another area of converging science with far-reaching implications is synthetic 
biology, a cross-disciplinary field that draws upon strategies and techniques 
from molecular biology, chemistry, engineering, genomics and 
nanotechnology and thus enables the design and modification of biological 
systems at a fundamental level. Empowered by the tools of synthetic biology, 
in 2002 scientists managed to assemble a polio virus ‘from scratch’ in the 
absence of a natural template. And in 2010 Craig Venter and his team 
announced the construction of the first self-replicating synthetic cell which, in 
their view, was ‘a proof of the principle that genomes can be designed in the 
computer, chemically made in the laboratory and transplanted into a recipient 
cell to produce a new self-replicating cell controlled only by the synthetic 
genome.’453 The controversial work has attracted criticism on several 
grounds, including the potential negative effects of the accidental or 
deliberate release of the novel organism in the environment and the 
arrogance of scientists to ‘play God’.454 More broadly, both the polio and 
synthetic cell studies have exposed the obstacles to the regulation of 
451 Katherine Gammon, ‘Building Better Implants’, MIT Technology Review, 28 September 2007, available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/408759/building-better-implants/ (accessed 14/01/2014).  
452 Kevin Bullis, ‘Some Nanotubes Could Cause Cancer’, MIT Technology Review, 22 May 2008, available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/410172/some-nanotubes-could-cause-cancer/ (accessed 14/01/2014).  
453 ‘First Self-Replicating Synthetic Bacterial Cell’, Press Release, J. Craig Venter Institute, 20 May 2010, available 
at http://www.jcvi.org/cms/press/press-releases/full-text/article/first-self-replicating-synthetic-bacterial-cell-
constructed-by-j-craig-venter-institute-researcher/home/ (accessed 14/01/2014).  
454 Ian Sample, ‘Craig Venter Creates Synthetic Life Form’, The Guardian, 20 May 2010, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/may/20/craig-venter-synthetic-life-form (accessed 14/01/2014); ETC 
Group, ‘Synthia is Alive…and Breeding: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?’, News Release, 20 May 2010, available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/content/synthia-alive-%E2%80%A6-and-breeding-panacea-or-pandoras-box (accessed 
29/01/2014).  
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synthetic biology.455 While some commentators dismiss the risk of 
bioterrorism, underscoring the key role of tacit skills and knowledge and the 
difficulties that the lack thereof poses to the replication of the experiments,456 
other issues still merit attention. Consider the question of access to 
commercially available genomic sequences. Even though the oversight 
system for screening base pair orders has improved since the 2006 Guardian 
report that exposed the lax regulations under which virtually anyone could 
order gene sequences,457 gaps still remain leaving scope for abuse by those 
with malign intent. For example, Schmidt and Giersch have outlined at least 
three areas of emerging challenges that the existing governance regimes 
would struggle to accommodate, including ‘split orders’, ‘outsourcing’ and the 
potential for non-natural biological systems.458 
 
Biology as a Predictive rather than Descriptive Science  
 
The Human Genome Project completed in 2003 lasted over ten years and 
cost close to 3 billion dollars; by contrast, about a decade later, whole-
455 On the security implications of synthetic biology, see International Council for the Life Sciences, Security Aspects 
of Synthetic Biology, report of a Meeting, 5-7 2012, Heidelberg, Germany; International Council for the Life 
Sciences, Security Aspects of Synthetic Biology, report of a Meeting, 7-8 March 2013, Hong Kong, both available at 
http://iclscharter.org/our-work/synthetic-biology/ (accessed 28/01/2014); Alexander Kelle, Synthetic Biology and 
Biosecurity Awareness in Europe, Bradford Science and Technology Report No.9, November 2007, available at  
http://www.synbiosafe.eu/uploads/pdf/Synbiosafe-Biosecurity_awareness_in_Europe_Kelle.pdf (accessed 
28/01/2014); UNICRI, Security Implications of Synthetic Biology and Nanobiotechnology: A Risk and Response 
Assessment of Advances in Biotechnology (Turin: UNICRI, 2012), available at  
http://www.unicri.it/in_focus/files/UNICRI%202012%20Security%20Implications%20of%20Synthetic%20Biology%20
and%20Nanobiotechnology%20Final%20Public-1.pdf (accessed 28/01/2014). On the social and ethical aspects of 
synthetic biology, see Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, New Directions: The Ethics of 
Synthetic Biology and Emerging Technologies, December 2010, available at http://bioethics.gov/synthetic-biology-
report (accessed 28/01/2014); Andrew Balmer and Paul Martin, Synthetic Biology: Social and Ethical Challenges, 
May 2008, Institute for Science and Society, University of Nottingham, available at 
http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/web/files/reviews/0806_synthetic_biology.pdf (accessed 28/01/2014).  
456 See Kathleen Vogel, ‘Framing Biosecurity: An alternative to the Biotech Revolution Model’, Science and Public 
Policy, vol.35:1 (2008), pp.45-54; James Revill and Catherine Jefferson, ‘Tacit Knowledge and the Biological 
Weapons Regime’, Science and Public Policy, (2013), pp.1-14. Vogel’s view are contested in Jonathan Tucker 
‘Could Terrorists Exploit Synthetic Biology’, The New Atlantis, No.31 (Spring 2011), pp.69-81. 
457 James Randerson, ‘Lax Laws, Virus DNA and Potential for Terror’, The Guardian, 14 June 2006, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2006/jun/14/weaponstechnology.uk (accessed 14/01/2014). On the issue of 
commercial order screenings, see Stephen Maurer et al. Making Commercial Biology Safer: What the Gene 
Synthesis Industry Has Learned about Screening Customers and Orders, Working Paper, 17 September 2009, 
available at http://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/page/Maurer_IASB_Screening.pdf (accessed 28/01/2014); 
Michele Garfinkel et al. Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance, October 2007, available at 
http://www.synbiosafe.eu/uploads/pdf/Synthetic%20Genomics%20Options%20for%20Governance.pdf (accessed 
28/01/2014). On the governance of synthetic biology, see Catherine Lyall, ‘Governing Genomics: New Governance 
Tools for New Technologies’, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, vol.19:3 (2007), pp.369-386; Hans 
Bugl et al. ‘DNA Synthesis and Biological Security’, Nature Biotechnology, vol.25:6 (2007), pp.627-629; Stephen 
Maurer and Sebastian von Engelhardt, ‘Industry Self-Governance: A New Way to Manage Dangerous 
Technologies’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.69:3 (2013), pp.53-62; Jennifer Kuzma and Todd Tanji, 
‘Unpacking Synthetic Biology: Identification of Oversight Policy Problems and Options’, Regulation and Governance, 
vol.4 (2010), pp.92-112; Filippa Lentzos, ‘Synthetic Biology, Security and Governance’¸ BioSocieties, vol.7:4 (2012), 
pp.339-351. 
458 Markus Schmidt and Gregor Giersch, ‘DNA Synthesis and Security’, in Marissa Campbell (ed.), DNA 
Microarrays, Synthesis and Synthetic DNA (Nova Science Publishers, 2012), p.296. 
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genome sequencing can be performed within hours at a price of roughly 
1000 dollars or less.459 While still in its infancy, personalised medicine and 
individual genetic testing are steadily gaining popularity. Indeed, ‘up to 
100 000 people in England are expected to have their entire genetic makeup 
mapped in the first stage of an ambitious public health programme’ launched 
by the National Health Service in 2012 that aims to ‘revolutionise the 
treatment and prevention of cancer and other disease.’460 According to its 
proponents, genomic testing offers numerous advantages vis-à-vis traditional 
evidence-based medicine, including the possibility of early diagnostics of 
disease, of individually-tailored treatment and, perhaps most importantly, of 
disease prevention, as illustrated in the resolve of the Hollywood actress 
Angelina Jolie to undergo double mastectomy after discovering she has an 
inherited genetic mutation that puts her at high risk of breast and ovarian 
cancer.461 But this is just the beginning. In 2012 scientists managed to 
sequence a foetus’s entire genome using a blood sample from the mother 
and a saliva specimen from the father, a development that could potentially 
allow for a range of genetic disease conditions to be detected prenatally.462 
And laboratory experiments have already demonstrated the efficacy of 
genetic therapy to cure mitochondrial disease by creating an embryo with 
genetic material from both parents and a third person acting as a donor.463 
 
459 See Paul Rincon, ‘Science Enters $1,000 Genome Era’, BBC News, 15 January 2014, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-25751958 (accessed 27/01/2014); Carole Cadwalladr, ‘What 
Happened When I Had My Genome Sequenced’, The Observer, 8 June 2013, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/jun/08/genome-sequenced (accessed 9/01/2014); Julia Kollowe, ‘DNA 
Machine Can Sequence Human Genomes in Hours’, The Guardian, 17 February 2012, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/feb/17/dna-machine-human-sequencing (accessed 9/01/2014). For 
information on the Human Genome Project, see http://www.genome.gov/10001772 (accessed 9/01/ 2014). For 
information about commercial companies offering full-genome sequencing, see http://www.illumina.com/ (accessed 
9/01/2014). For an overview of the developments in genome-based therapy, see Steve Olson and Adam Berger, 
Genome-Based Diagnostics: Clarifying Pathways to Clinical Use: Workshop Summary, (Washington DC: National 
Academies Press, 2012); Adam Berger and Steve Olson, Genome-Based Therapeutics: Targeted Drug Discovery 
and Development: Workshop Summary, (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2012). 
460 Peter Walker, ‘DNA of 100,000 People to be Mapped for NHS’, The Guardian, 10 December 2012, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/dec/10/1000000-peoples-dna-mapped (accessed 9/01/2014).  
461 See Q. Tian et al, ‘Systems Cancer Medicine: Towards Realisation of Predictive, Preventive, Personalised and 
Participatory (P4) Medicine’, Journal of Internal Medicine, vol. 271 (2012), pp.111-121; Ben Quinn, ‘Angelina Jolie 
“Grateful and Moved” by Reaction to Her Mastectomy Decision’, The Guardian, 2 June 2013, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2013/jun/02/angelina-jolie-mastectomy-grateful-reaction (accessed 9/01/2014).  
462 Andrew Pollack, ‘DNA Blueprint for Fetus Built Using Tests of Parents’, New York Times, 6 June 2012, available 
at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/07/health/tests-of-parents-are-used-to-map-genes-of-a-
fetus.html?pagewanted=1&_r=5 (accessed 9/01/2014).  
463 Ian Sample, ‘”Three-Parent Babies” Cure for Illness Raises Ethical Fear´, The Guardian, 5 June 2012, available 
at   
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/jun/05/mitochondrial-genetic-disease-ethical-doubts (accessed 
9/01/2014).  
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While truly breathtaking, the advances outlined above raise a host of thorny 
issues of ethical, social and legal concern that merit public scrutiny and 
extensive deliberation before decisions regarding their widespread 
application are made. At a very basic level, there is the question of whether 
and to what extent we as individuals are capable of assimilating the 
information that our own genetic makeup may reveal. Are we sufficiently 
resilient to cope with the emotional distress, anxiety, shame, stigma and guilt 
that the awareness of severe medical conditions that we or our closed ones 
are suffering or likely to develop? Far from hypothetical, this question has 
prompted the establishment of a novel profession, that of the genetics 
counsellor whose task is to help patients overcome any negative effects, 
stress, or psychological trauma that the disclosure of their genomic map may 
create.464 This is just a partial solution though, for the crux of the matter lies 
in finding a way to deal effectively with risk and probabilities and we as 
humans are yet to demonstrate a capacity for understanding or relating them 
to our own lives.465  
 
Individual emotional turmoil, however significant, constitutes only the tip of 
the iceberg. According to Daniel Kevles, the torrent of new genetic 
information has already begun to fundamentally reconfigure social practices 
and inter-personal relations: 
 
It has been rightly emphasised that employers and 
medical or life insurers may seek to learn the 
genetic profiles of, respectively, prospective 
employees or clients. Employers might wish to 
identify workers likely to contract disorders that 
allegedly affect job performance while both 
employers and insurers might wish to identify 
people likely to fall victim to diseases that result in 
costly medical or disability payouts. Whatever the 
purpose, such genetic identification would brand 
people with what an American union official has 
called a life-long “genetic scarlet letter” or what 
some Europeans term a “genetic passport”.466 
 
 
464 See Carole Cadwalladr, ‘What Happened When I Had My Genome Sequenced’, op cit. 
465 Ibid. Another point that Cadwalladr raises is the danger of a negative placebo effect whereby doubts about 
certain genetic disorder may lead to psychosomatic symptoms. 
466 Daniel Kevles, ‘From Eugenics to Patents: Genetics, Law, and Human Rights’, Annals of Human Genetics, 
vol.75:3 (2011), p.330. 
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Linking genetic makeup with human identity would ultimately set the scene 
for the proliferation of technologies aimed at human enhancement: after all, if 
a gene therapy could allow one to stand a chance in a job competition, 
boosting one’s capabilities would potentially make them a more desirable 
candidate. Other issues of more immediate concern are also likely to arise. 
One is privacy. Gene-sequencing companies usually hold the genetic data of 
their clients in digital format on online platforms, which automatically creates 
a risk that personal information may be leaked, hacked or stolen.467 Further, 
there is the question of ownership. Consider, for instance, the controversial 
issue of human gene patenting, whereby patented genes are treated as 
research tools and, as such, are controlled by the patent holder who may 
restrict and charge for their use.468 Thus created, the system often operates 
to the detriment of patients by hindering research practice, elevating 
diagnostics prices and denying access to second and independent medical 
opinion.469 Gene identification alone has a potential ‘dark side’ too, for it 
could enable the development of weapons targeted at group-specific gene 
markers (e.g. ethnicity).470 
 
Pre-natal genetic testing is yet another significant bone of contention, not 
least because it evokes notions of state-mandated eugenic programmes and 
assaults on human rights and dignity. While a Nazi-like campaign for a 
superior race seems improbable in the twentieth-first century, this is not to 
say that other forms of eugenics may not be encouraged. Indeed, some 
commentators have highlighted the rise of ‘homemade eugenics’,471 whereby 
individual families can make decisions on the attributes of their progeny:  
467 See Abdul-Karrem Ahmed, ‘Unhidden Traits: Genomic Data Privacy Debates Heat Up’, Scientific American, 14 
August 2013, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/unhidden-traits-genomic-data-privacy-debates-
heat-up/ (accessed 27/01/2014).  
468 Daniel Kevles, ‘From Eugenics to Patents’, op cit, p.330. 
469 Ibid, p.331. See also Harriet Washington, Deadly Monopolies: The Shocking Corporate Takeover of Life Itself – 
and the Consequences for Your Health and Our Medical Future (New York: Doubleday, 2011); Sheila Jasanoff 
‘Taking Life: Private Rights in Public Nature’ in Kaushik Sunder Rajan ed. Lively Capital: Biotechnologies, Ethics, 
and Governance in Global Markets (Duke University Press, 2012), pp.155-184. 
470 See National Research Council, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, op cit; Malcolm 
Dando, ‘Benefits and Threats of Developments in Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering’ in SIPRI Yearbook, 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. On Ethnic gene 
markers, see Alice Roberts, The Incredible Human Journey: The Story of How We Colonised the Planet (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2009); Mark Shriver et al. ‘Ethnic-Affiliation Estimation by Use of Population-Specific DNA Markers’, 
American Journal of Human Genetics, vol.60, (1997), pp.957-964; Alastair Wood, ‘Racial Differences in the 
Response to Drugs – Pointers to Genetic Differences’, New England Journal of Medicine, vol.344:18 (2001), 
pp.1393-1395. 
471 Robert Wright, ‘The Achilles’ Helix’, New Republic, vol.203:2-3 (1990), pp. 21-26. 
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The lure of biologically improving the human race, 
having tantalised brilliant scientists in the past, 
could equally seduce them in the future, even 
though the expression of the imperatives may differ 
in language and sophistication. Objective, socially 
unprejudiced knowledge is not ipso 
facto inconsistent with eugenic goals of some type. 
Such knowledge may, indeed, assist in seeking 
them, especially in the consumer-oriented, 
commercially driven enterprise of contemporary 
biomedicine.472 
 
 
It is plausible to assume that when presented with the opportunity of having 
their future child tested for genetic disorders, many parents would barely 
hesitate to accept. Such a resolve could have far-reaching implications 
though. For instance, some genetic therapies entail the use of donor DNA 
different from that of the parents, whereby any genetic modifications in the 
embryo will pass down to future generations.473 Despite the government 
support for the ‘three-parent babies’ in the UK, local religious organisations 
have protested vociferously against the legalisation of the technique.474 At 
the same time, there are certain genetic disorders that can be diagnosed at 
an early stage but, as of yet, cannot be cured, which inevitably poses the 
tough choice between raising an unhealthy child and abortion. To be sure, 
such questions constitute more than individual parents’ dilemmas, for they 
touch upon established social and cultural values, something evident in the 
profound differences across national reproductive policies. More broadly, 
there are concerns that reproductive genomics may remain a prerogative of 
those affluent enough to afford it, thus further exacerbating the divide 
between the global rich and the global poor.475 
472 Daniel Kevles, ‘From Eugenics to Patents’, op cit, p.330. 
473 Ian Sample, ‘Britain Ponders “Three-Person” Embryos to Combat Genetic Disease’,  The Guardian, 20 March 
2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/mar/20/britain-three-person-embryos-genetic 
(accessed 10/01/2014).   
474 See Department of Health and Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Innovative Genetic Treatment to 
Prevent Mitochondrial Disease, Press Release, 28 June 2013, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/innovative-genetic-treatment-to-prevent-mitochondrial-disease (accessed 
10/01/2014); Peter Saunders, ‘Three-Parent Embryos for Mitochondrial Disease? Twelve Reasons for Caution’, 
LifeSiteNews, 28 June 2013, available at http://www.lifesitenews.com/blog/three-parent-embryos-for-mitochondrial-
disease-twelve-reasons-for-caution (accessed 10/01/2014); Ian Sample, ‘“Three-Parent” Babies Explained: What 
Are the Concerns and Are They Justified?’, The Guardian, 2 February 2015, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/feb/02/three-parent-babies-explained (accessed 22/09/2015). In February 
2015, the UK passed legislation allowing the use of the technique. See James Gallagher, ‘UK Approves Three-
Person Babies’, BBC News, 24 February 2015, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-31594856 (accessed 
22/09/2015). 
475 See Ronald Green, ‘Building Baby from the Genes Up’, The Washington Post, 13 April 2008, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/11/AR2008041103330.html (accessed 10/01/2014).  
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Diffusion of Life Science Expertise: International Collaboration, De-
Skilling and Amateur Biology 
 
The growth of life science capacity over the past few decades across the 
globe has been truly astonishing, leading to the emergence of a vibrant 
research community that brings together researchers from various parts of 
the world. Indeed, a 2011 NAS report highlights the extension of both North-
South and South-South partnerships, which has played a key role in 
synergising strengths and maximising competitiveness by improving the 
quality and effectiveness of research and facilitating data sharing.476 At the 
same time, increasing collaboration in the realm of biotechnology industry 
has offered companies situated in emerging economies access to the global 
market, thus contributing to economic development and growth.477  
 
Recent advances in technology and laboratory and experimental equipment 
have further impacted on the practice of life science research in profound 
ways. Improvements in DNA sequencing technology have significantly 
shortened the time required for the preparation of nucleic base-lines, thus 
relieving scientists of the burden of completing the task themselves and 
allowing them to focus on their actual project instead. Studies and 
experiments once performed by senior researchers with extensive 
experience are now carried out by Masters students. Aided by specially 
designed genetic engineering toolkits, children as young as the age of ten 
start exploring the realm of biology in an interactive and engaging manner. 
Needless to say, their notion of science and the world in general would differ 
significantly from that of their parents whose primary sources of knowledge 
used to be textbooks and encyclopaedias. Indeed, the increasing 
commercialisation of synthetic biology offers anyone curious enough to fiddle 
with biological systems the chance of doing so in the comfort of their own 
476 US National Academy of Science, Life Sciences and Related Fields, op cit, p.63. One commentator distinguishes 
between ‘Big Science’ which was ‘to-down, hierarchical, vertical’ and ‘networked science’ characterised by ‘open 
systems, open software, open participation’. See Diane Rhoten, ‘The Dawn of Networked Science’, Chronicle of 
Higher Education, vol.54:2, (2007), pp.78-90. On the changing patterns of science collaboration, see James Porter, 
‘Changing Dynamics of Collaboration in Life Sciences’, Science as Culture, vol.22:3 (2013), pp.388-393. 
477 Ibid. 
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home.478 Such modern gene hackers often lack formal background in biology 
and come from various walks of life. Driven by an insatiable appetite for 
knowledge and the vision of a ground-breaking discovery that could be 
turned into a multi-million dollar profit, they take up the rather unusual hobby 
of biohacking which entails the redesign of existing and the creation of novel 
biological systems. For just few hundred dollars bio enthusiasts set up 
laboratories easily obtaining all essential requisites and equipment from 
online sales. And if to some biohacking equates to little more than an unusual 
hobby, others highlight its potential to generate substantial revenue and fuel 
economic development.479  
 
Contrary to popular expectation, biohackers are not just eccentric individuals 
who work in solitude away from public attention. Rather, they are members of 
a wide global movement dedicated to the ideal of Do-It-Yourself Biology 
(DIY), which has branches in 45 locations on four continents.480 The 
movement has been partially institutionalised through the establishment of 
the BioBricks481 and International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) 
Foundations, which seek to promote the open and ethical conduct of 
biological engineering and stimulate innovation and creativity. To this end, 
iGEM holds an annual competition open to high school students, university 
undergraduates and entrepreneurs from all over the world. With more than 
200 participating teams, the competition constitutes the premiere forum at 
which biohackers can showcase their skills through project presentation.  
 
Exciting as it may seem, the ongoing diffusion of life science expertise poses 
an array of governance conundrums. At the level of professional practice, the 
proliferation of research facilities around the world has exposed the urgent 
need for laboratory biosafety and biosecurity training, especially in 
developing states where a tradition of handling dangerous pathogens is 
478 See, for example, Marcus Wohlsen, Biopunk: Solving Biotech’s Biggest Problems in Kitchens and Garages (New 
York: Penguin, 2011); Heidi Ledford, ‘Life Hackers’, Nature, vol.467 (2010), pp.650-652; Editorial, ‘Garage Biology’ 
Nature, vol.467 (2010), p.634. 
479 Robert Carlson, Biology Is Technology: The Promise, Peril, and New Business of Engineering Life (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).  
480 For more information, see http://diybio.org/ (accessed 14/01/2014).  
481 For more information, see http://biobricks.org/about-foundation/ (accessed 14/02/2014); 
http://igem.org/Main_Page (accessed 14/02/2014).  
155 
 
                                                          
lacking. The issue is further complicated, for such countries often lack the 
required legal and institutional infrastructure to ensure that professional 
practice is in compliance with relevant international regulations. Foreign aid 
has gone some way in helping overcome those deficiencies but it has given 
rise to new problems, too. For instance, it is far from unlikely for a donor state 
to provide material support for the construction of a state-of-the-art laboratory 
eventually leaving its maintenance to the local government, which can hardly 
afford the subsequent costs. A similar trend is observed in the area of 
capacity building and human resource development. Most projects that aim 
to promote biorisk management and a biological security culture tend to be 
severely constrained in terms of time and funding and overly ambitious in 
terms of agenda and expected outcomes. Lack of adequate mechanisms for 
quality assessment hinders progress evaluation and sometimes leads to 
duplication of effort and resources.  
 
The emergence of the DIY biologists in the life science arena has further 
added to the challenge of ensuring that novel scientific and technological 
developments are utilised in a safe and ethical manner. Even at the level of 
everyday practice, difficulties still persist. For instance, many amateur 
scientists have complained of the lack of manuals and guidelines regarding 
the safe operation and maintenance of home laboratories. Issues such as 
waste disposal, safe handling and storage of biological material and 
prevention of contamination pervade the work of biohackers who unlike 
professional researchers conduct experiments in a much more volatile 
environment.482 Potential security concerns are also present. With more and 
more individuals gaining access to biological engineering technologies, 
ensuring appropriate oversight of what goes on in garage laboratories 
becomes increasingly difficult. The experience of the US FBI is a case in 
point. Back in 2004 the FBI arrested Steven Kurtz, a professor at the 
University of Buffalo under the suspicion of plotting a bioterrorist attack.483 
482 See, for example, Markus Schmidt, ‘Diffusion of Synthetic Biology: A Challenge to Biosafety’, Systems and 
Synthetic Biology, vol.2:1-1 (2008), pp.1-6; Markus Schmidt, ‘Do I Understand What I Can Create: Biosafety Issues 
in synthetic Biology’ in Markus Schmidt et al. (ed.), Synthetic Biology: The Technoscience and Its Societal 
Consequences (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010). 
483 ‘Charge Dropped against Artist in a Terror Case’, The Associated Press, 22 April 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/nyregion/22bioart.html?_r=2& (accessed 14/02/2014).  
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The subsequent investigation revealed that all laboratory and DNA extraction 
equipment found in Kurtz’s house was legitimately obtained and used in his 
artwork. In an attempt to avoid mistakes of this kind, the FBI has drastically 
changed its approach to dealing with the DIY movement launching a series of 
outreach activities that seek to raise awareness of the potential security 
implications of biohacking.484 While undoubtedly necessary, such initiatives 
may well be seen as too little, too late in light of the wide spread of materials, 
tools and devices that could facilitate the malign misuse of the life sciences. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that as early as the late 1990s the US Defence 
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) managed to build a research facility that 
simulated the manufacture of weaponised anthrax using only commercially 
available materials and equipment.485 
 
The Role of States: Both a Poacher and Gamekeeper 
 
Structural factors have an important bearing on the development and growth 
of biotechnology. Economic considerations, power interests and realist fears 
generate potent dynamics that shape and influence and sometimes direct the 
life science trajectory. Within this context, states assume a dual role. On the 
one hand, they are expected to act as gamekeepers and regulate, monitor 
and control the process of life science research and the dissemination of 
novel technologies. On the other hand, though, they also have powerful 
incentives to act as ‘poachers’, not least because of the fascinating 
opportunities for enhancing their prosperity, prestige and security that 
484 See Edward Lempinen, ‘FBI, AAAS Collaborate on Ambitious Outreach to Biotech Researchers and DIY 
Biologists’, AAAS News, 1 April 2011, available at http://www.aaas.org/news/fbi-aaas-collaborate-ambitious-
outreach-biotech-researchers-and-diy-biologists (accessed 28/02/2014). Alternative governance frameworks 
include: National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), Strategies to Educate Amateur Biologists and 
Scientists in Non-Life Science Disciplines About Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences, June 2011, available at  
http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/FinalNSABBReport-AmateurBiologist-NonlifeScientists_June-2011.pdf 
(accessed 28/02/2014); Catherine Jefferson, Governing Amateur Biology: Extending Responsible Research and 
Innovation in Synthetic Biology to New Actors, Research Report for the Wellcome Trust Project ‘Building 
Sustainable Capacity in Dual Use Bioethics’, 2013, available at  
http://www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics/media/ssis/bioethics/docs/Jefferson_Governing_Amateur_Biology.pdf (accessed 
28/02/2014).  
485 See Jerry Seper, ‘Secret Project Manufactured Mock Anthrax’, The Washington Times, 26 October 2001, 
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/oct/26/20011026-030448-2429r/ (accessed 28/02/2014); 
Judith Miller et al. Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 
pp.297-299. 
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scientific and technological development open up.486 The following passage 
effectively outlines states’ dual function: 
 
Government has an important role in setting long-
term priorities and in making sure a national 
environment exists in which beneficial innovations 
will be developed. There must be a free and 
rational debate about the ethical and social aspects 
of potential uses of technology, and government 
must provide an arena for these debates that is 
most conducive to results that benefit humans. At 
the same time, government must ensure economic 
conditions that facilitate the rapid invention and 
deployment of beneficial technologies, thereby 
encouraging entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
to promote innovation.487 
 
 
Given that the agent (i.e. state governments) in charge of initiating ethical 
debates on the progress of biotechnology is also the one expected to provide 
the conditions that would allow this progress to generate outcomes likely to 
contribute to economic growth and political superiority, it is hardly surprising 
that any issues likely to slow down or otherwise hinder the enormous 
momentum of the life sciences are omitted from public discussion. This 
duality further informs how risks are perceived, framed and addressed. For 
instance, even though most of the developing countries lack capacity to 
manage dual use research of concern, they do not see this as an immediate 
priority and prefer to invest effort and resources in improving their laboratory 
biosafety and laboratory biosecurity infrastructure and capacity.488 In the view 
of their governments, the dangers of naturally occurring and circulating 
diseases constitute a far greater worry than the potential for misuse of 
cutting-edge research. By contrast, some developed countries, most notably 
the USA, have embarked on building their biological defence systems 
highlighting the grave threat posed by the potential use of bioweapons by 
non-state actors. Their activities have encountered severe opprobrium as 
486 Jim Whitman, ‘Global Governance and the Twenty-First Century Technology’ in Brian Rappert (ed.), Technology 
and Security: Governing Threats in the New Millennium, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), p.96. 
487 Mihail Roco and William Sims Bainbridge, Converging technologies for Improving Human Performance: 
Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information technology and Cognitive Science, (Washington, DC: National Science 
Foundation, 2002), p.30. 
488 Report of the WHO Informal Consultation on Dual Use Research of Concern, 26-28 February 2013, Geneva 
Switzerland, available at http://www.who.int/csr/durc/durc_feb2013_full_mtg_report.pdf (accessed 28/01/2014).  
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some analysts see them as a contravention of the norms embedded in the 
BTWC.489  
 
The evolution of the chemical and biological non-proliferation regime 
epitomises the attempts of states to avert the hostile exploitation of the life 
sciences whilst promoting their use for ‘peaceful, prophylactic and protective 
purposes’. The entry into force of the BTWC and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) in 1975 and 1997, respectively, is indicative both of 
states’ renunciation of chemical, biological and toxin weapons and of their 
commitment to the goals of arms control and disarmament. That said, the 
imperfections and shortcomings of these treaties signify the influence of 
realist fears and political calculations that pervade international negotiations. 
In the case of the BTWC, two points merit attention. The first pertains to the 
lack of verification mechanism when the treaty was first agreed back in the 
early 1970s. Subsequent revelations of secret state-led offensive biological 
programmes in the former Soviet Union, South Africa and Iraq up until the 
early 1990s have significantly undermined the Convention. Second, the 
failure to negotiate a binding protocol in 2001 has further dimmed the 
prospects for strengthening the regime and thus ensuring universal 
compliance with its prescriptions. Less acute but just as worrying is the 
situation regarding the CWC. Even though the Convention is exemplary in 
many respects, not least because of its verification system, almost universal 
membership and implementing body – Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) – it still faces serious challenges that need to be 
considered. For instance, while the treaty bans the development, production, 
acquisition and retention of chemical weapons, the definition of ‘purposes not 
prohibited under th[e] Convention’ entails ‘law enforcement including 
domestic riot control purposes’ (Article II.9d). Some commentators have 
argued that given the lack of a universally agreed definition what kind of 
activities count as ‘law enforcement’, this text opens a major loophole in the 
489 Alexander Kelle et al. Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), chapter 
5; Jonathan Tucker, ‘Biological Threat Assessment: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, Arms Control Today, 
vol.34 (October 2004), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Tucker (accessed 20/01/2014).  
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Convention.490 Several States Parties of the Convention have voiced 
concerns in this regard. Australia has noted that: 
  
The weaponisation of [Central Nervous System] 
acting chemicals for law enforcement purposes is 
of concern to Australia due to the health and safety 
risks and the possibility of their deliberate misuse, 
both of which have the potential to undermine the 
global norm against the use of toxic chemicals for 
purposes prohibited by the Convention. […] 
Australia’s position is that it is not possible for a 
State Party to disseminate anaesthetics, sedatives 
or analgesics by aerial dispersion in an effective 
and safe manner for law enforcement purposes.491 
 
Critics highlight the possibility for the deployment of novel chemical weapons  
for the purposes of countering terrorism, something evident in the 2002 
Moscow theatre siege (Dubrovka) when the Russian security forces used a 
fentanyl-derivative agent, as a result of which about a sixth of the hostages 
and all of the terrorists involved died.492 In 2011 the European Court of 
Human Rights ruled with regard to the Dubrovka operation that: 
there had been no violation of Article 2 (right to life) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights 
concerning the decision to resolve the hostage 
crisis by force and use of gas.493  
 
The Court, nonetheless, noted that: 
Even if the gas had not been a “lethal force” but 
rather a “non-lethal incapacitating weapon”, it had 
been dangerous and even potentially fatal for a 
weakened person […].494   
 
The Court further confirmed some of the earlier criticisms that were levelled 
against the Government, particularly in terms of preparedness and provision 
490 Julian Perry Robinson, ‘Difficulties Facing the Chemical Weapons Convention’, International Affairs, vol.84:2 
(2008), p.228; Michael Crowley, Dangerous Ambiguities: Regulation of Riot Control Agents and Incapacitants under 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, October 2009, University of 
Bradford. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics/monographs/ (accessed 21/07/2015). 
491 Statement By Australia, Weaponisation of Central Nervous System Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement 
Purposes, XIX Session of the Conference of the States Parties, 1-5 December 2014, OPCW, the Hague, the 
Netherlands. Available at https://www.opcw.org/index.php?id=2520 (accessed 21/07/15). 
492 Artem Krechetnikov, ‘Moscow Theatre Siege: Questions Remain Unanswered’, BBC News, 24 October 2012, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20067384 (accessed 28/01/2014).  
493 Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, Press Release: Use of Gas against Terrorists during the 
Moscow Theatre Siege Was Justified, but the Rescue Operation afterwards Was Poorly Planned and Implemented, 
ECHR 295 (2011), 20 December 2011.   
494 Ibid.  
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of medical assistance.495 According to the ruling, Russia had to pay damages 
to all the 64 applicants – representatives of siege victims. To date, Russian 
officials have withheld information concerning the exact formula of the gas, 
which was used during the Dubrovka operation, on security grounds.496 
Given the lack of an internationally agreed definition of what constitutes 
‘terrorism’ on the one hand, and the rise of irregular/asymmetric warfare and 
sporadic conflicts, on the other, some commentators have warned against 
the possibility of a ‘grey area’ which may enable states to utilise non-
traditional methods of war to gain advantage .497 
 
Speed Differential between Scientific Advancement and the Pace of 
Deliberative Systems 
 
Deliberative systems encompass a vast array of practices, processes and 
mechanisms, both formal and informal, whereby a polity considers the 
‘acceptability, appropriateness and control of novel developments in or 
impacting on, shared social and physical arenas’.498 By design, they reflect 
and are informed by the values, beliefs and standards shared among the 
group, or in other words, by the prevalent culture. As such, deliberative 
systems vary across societies with their intensity, inclusiveness and structure 
depending on the established political and social norms. Yet their chief 
purpose and function remain virtually the same, namely to help societies 
adapt to the changing circumstance of their milieu in a way that ensures 
stability, sustainability and safety. 
 
Public deliberation requires time; and wide-ranging life science advances, 
current and planned, offer profound challenges to shared ideas and ideals 
about the foundations of human relatedness and of social coherence, justice, 
495 See [in Russian] ‘Chto eto bylo? Spasenie zalozhnikov ili unichtozhenie terroristov?, Novaya Gazeta, No.86, 21 
November 2002, available at http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/14856.html (accessed 6/02/16); John Dunlop, The 
2002 Dubrovka and 2004 Beslan Hostage Crises: A Critique of Russian Counter-Terrorism (Stuttgard: Ibidem-
Verlag, 2006).  
496 [in Russian] Vladimir Bogdanov, ‘Sekretov bol’she net’, Rossiskaya Gazeta, No. 5917, 23 October 2012, 
available at http://www.rg.ru/2012/10/22/pamyat-site.html (accessed 6/02/16).  
497 Julian Perry Robinson, ‘Difficulties Facing the Chemical Weapons Convention’, op cit, p.226-227. See also 
National Research Council, Avoiding Surprise in an Era of Global Technology Advances, (Washington DC: National 
Academies Press, 2005), particularly Chapter 6. 
498 Jim Whitman, ‘The Challenge to Deliberative Systems of Technological Systems Convergence’, Innovation: The 
European Journal of Social Science Research, vol.20:4 (2007), p.330. 
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human dignity and many other norms, both formal and informal.499 Yet given 
the ruminative nature of deliberative processes, on the one hand, and the 
fast speed at which biotechnology innovation is evolving on the other, the 
danger of the former being steadily outpaced and overburdened by the latter 
is far from hypothetical. Consider the following passage sketching the scale 
of social changes likely to arise from the increasing convergence between 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, cognitive neuroscience and information 
technology: 
 
In the foreseeable future, we will be inundated with 
new inventions, new discoveries, new start-ups, 
and new entrepreneurs. These will create new 
goods and new services. […] As expectations 
change, the process of politics and government will 
change. People’s lives will be more complex and 
inevitably overwhelming. Keeping up with the 
changes that affect them and their loved ones 
exhausts most people. They focus most of their 
time and energy on tasks of everyday life. In the 
future, when they achieve success in their daily 
tasks, people will turn to the goods and services, 
the new job and investment opportunities, and the 
new ideas inherent in the entrepreneurial creativity 
of the Age of Transitions. No individual and no 
country will fully understand all of the changes as 
they occur or be able to adapt to them flawlessly 
during this time.500 
 
 
This vision of a ‘brave new world’ merits attention on two important grounds. 
First, it implies that the changes likely to occur in the not too distant future as 
a result of the rapid progress of science and technology are imminent and 
unavoidable in the sense that their advent hardly depends on or even 
requires extensive public deliberation. Second, given that our capacity for 
adaptation to and grasp of those changes will be considerably impaired, the 
Age of Transitions leaves little space for public deliberation. To add to this 
gloomy picture, there is already some evidence that the progress in the life 
sciences is overwhelming the existing deliberative mechanisms. For 
instance, Kelle et al. argue that the rapidity of biotechnology advancement 
coupled with the immensity and complexity of the knowledge accumulated 
499 Ibid, p.336. 
500 Mihail Roco and William Sims Bainbridge, Converging technologies for Improving Human Performance, op cit, 
p.39-40. 
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therefrom complicates efforts to deal with potential risks, something evident 
in the regulatory gap that the convergence of chemistry and biology has 
created in the area of arms control.501 This is problematic, for the reduced 
resilience of deliberative systems provides favourable conditions in which 
scientific and technological innovation can continue unabated. A vicious 
circle is thus created in which the inability of deliberative systems to cope 
with the strain exerted by biotechnology advancement fuels the latter turning 
it into a self-propelling force. The proliferation of contentious ‘gain-of-function’ 
research is a case in point. Even though the H5N1 controversy discussed in 
the preceding sections exposed the limitations of existing governance 
mechanisms for addressing the potential security, ethical and legal 
implications arising from such studies, it hardly precluded scientists from 
conducting similar experiments. Indeed, less than four months after the 
moratorium on research involving contagious H5N1 virus was lifted, a team 
of Chinese researchers announced the creation of a hybrid of the H5N1 
strain and the H1N1 virus that caused the 2009 flu pandemic.502 And it was 
not long until the newly-emerged H7N9 influenza virus became airborne, as 
well.503 If anything, those examples indicate that in light of the rapid pace of 
life science progress, addressing governance concerns on a case-by-case 
basis is not only self-defeating but given the number and variety of 
conundrums, it is likely to become unsustainable in the long run. 
 
Runaway Biotechnology? 
 
Given the significant potential of biotechnology to bring about multifaceted 
changes in different spheres of life and generate considerable benefits in the 
form of new products, enhancement of public and private capital and 
alleviation of social ills, there is a powerful urge to allow the ongoing 
expansion of the life sciences to proceed largely unfettered. Risks are 
carefully calculated and, where possible, downplayed as hypothetical at the 
501 See Alexander Kelle et al. Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race, op cit, p.60; Julian Perry Robinson, ‘Bringing 
the BWC Conventions Closer Together’, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue 80 (2008), pp.1-4, available at 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/documents/cbwcb80.pdf (accessed 20/01/2014).  
502 See Ying Zhang et al. ‘H5N1 Hybrid Viruses Bearing 2009/H1N1 Virus Genes Transmit in Guinea Pigs by 
Respiratory Droplet’, Science, vol. 340:6139, pp.1459-1463. 
503 Maria Zhu et al. ‘Infectivity, Transmission, and Pathology of Human-Isolated H7N9 Influenza Virus in Ferrets and 
Pigs’, Science, vol.34:6142 (2013), pp.183-186; Mathilde Richard et al. ‘Limited Airborne Transmission of H7N9 
Influenza A Virus between Ferrets, Nature, vol.501 (2013), pp.560-563.  
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expense of comprehensive deliberation. And even when proposals for risk 
mitigation measures are entertained, preference is usually given to those 
unlikely to hinder the progress of life sciences. By and large, there is a 
genuine belief that the existing governance mechanisms in the area of 
biotechnology can accommodate and cope with the wide-ranging pressures 
exerted by scientific innovation and the rapid diffusion of technologies with 
multiple uses, by offering ‘solutions’ and handling concerns on a case-by-
case basis. In particular, the technology of safety is still ‘celebrated as an 
unadulterated improvement for society as a whole’.504 
 
Yet there are reasons for scepticism toward the adequacy and effectiveness 
of the governance approaches currently in place. Much of the discussion in 
the preceding sections has focused on the ways in which the increasing 
pace, growth and global diffusion of biotechnology advances are beginning to 
expose the limits of the existing measures for control and risk management 
by challenging accepted values and beliefs and redefining established norms 
of practice. As the multifaceted dynamics driving the biotechnology 
momentum continue to intensify and multiply, it becomes more and more 
difficult to comprehend, let alone foresee, the various impacts that the large-
scale deployment and proliferation of novel scientific and technological 
advances have both on our social systems and the environment. Given the 
tight coupling between human-made and natural systems and their complex, 
often unanticipated interactions with catastrophic potential, the existing 
narrow definitions of risk are rendered inadequate.505 At the same time, the 
advent of new technologies with multiple adaptive applications opens up an 
array of possibilities for hostile exploitation thus compelling governments to 
make tough decisions in an attempt to reconcile the benefits of biotechnology 
with the potential security concerns arising therefrom. While the 
advancement of biotechnology promises tremendous public health benefits, it 
also holds a considerable catastrophic potential, as the case of ‘gain-of-
function’ experiments illustrate. As scientific capabilities and work involving 
dangerous pathogens proliferate globally, so do risks and the prospects of 
504 Nan Goodman, Shifting the Blame: Literature, Law, and the Theory of Accidents in Nineteenth-Century America, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 145. 
505 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents, op cit.  
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failures, whether technical or arising from human error. Indeed, assessing the 
rapidly evolving life science landscape some security commentators argue 
that ‘current genetic engineering technology and the practices of the 
community that sustains it have definitively displaced the potential threat of 
biological warfare beyond the risks posed by naturally occurring epidemics’. 
Laboratories, however well equipped, do not exist in isolation but are an 
integral part of a larger ecological system. As such, they constitute a ‘buffer 
zone’ between the activities carried out inside and the wider environment. 
And despite being technically advanced and designed to ensure safety, this 
‘buffer zone’, just as other safety systems is far from infallible. For one thing, 
mechanical controls leave room for human error and personal judgement, 
both of which are factors that could be highly consequential but which could 
hardly be modelled or predicted with exact certainty.506 
 
The speed at which the transformation of the life sciences is taking place is 
yet another factor that adds to the complexity of life science governance. 
Stability is a fundamental condition for the development and preservation of 
human and natural systems alike. In social systems, culture is the primary 
source of stability, for it determines what values, beliefs, practices and modes 
of behaviour are deemed acceptable and, as such, lays the foundations of 
order (Chapter 1). All forms of governance therefore are cultural artefacts 
and manifestations of culture. Culture also provides the tacit standards 
whereby change is assessed and treated as acceptable or unacceptable. 
Hence, any state of affairs in which the rate of change precludes regulation 
disrupts the ordinary functioning of the system and jeopardises its 
preservation: 
 
The breakdown of human regulation does not 
extinguish regulation of a simpler sort. […] The 
system formed by men and the rest of the natural 
world will continue to regulate itself after a fashion, 
even if human regulation wholly fails at all levels 
above the primary group. But the resulting ‘order’ 
would exclude all those levels of human order 
which man-made stability makes possible.507 
506 See Nan Goodman, Shifting the Blame, op cit, p. 147. 
507 Geoffrey Vickers, Freedom in a Rocking Boat: Changing Values in an Unstable Society (London: Penguin Press, 
1970), p.127. 
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To be sure, a world characterised by a runaway biotechnology would be far 
different from the one we know. The main challenge to averting this prospect 
lies in ensuring that the systems of governance are in sync with the progress 
of life sciences. History has shown that even highly developed, long-standing 
systems of governance can fail for reasons as diverse as disasters; loss of 
authority/legitimacy of governing bodies; and pervasive corruption. One 
further source of failure includes the inability of a society to adapt to its 
changing milieu: 
 
Men are adaptable; they can learn to live even in 
harsh and hostile environments – so long as the 
environment remains constant enough to give them 
time to learn. […] If they form the habit of adapting 
by constantly changing that to which they are trying 
to adapt, they build uncertainty into the very 
structure of their lives. They institutionalise 
cluelessness.508 
  
 
The process of adaptation is closely connected to cultural patterns and any 
serious disruptions in the latter could have detrimental effects and impair it 
severely. The extent to which change is taking place within the framework of 
the prevalent culture defines the borderline between system evolution and 
system disintegration. The governance mechanisms currently in place, both 
formal and informal, are all a function of historical, cultural and socio-political 
contingencies. As such, their capacity for adaptation largely depends on our 
ability to comprehend and assimilate the complex changes that the progress 
of biotechnology brings about. They can only evolve as fast as our shared 
standards, values, routines and perceptions allow them to. And that is why 
governance can hardly be reduced to a technocratic exercise; on the 
contrary, to be effective, it requires extensive deliberation and full 
appreciation of the far-reaching implications of novel life science advances.  
 
508 Geoffrey Vickers, Human Systems Are Different, op cit., p.146; on the deleterious effects of rapid change that 
precludes the preservation of culture, see Helena Norberg-Hodge, ‘Learning from Ladakh: A Passionate Appeal for 
‘Counter-Development’, Earth Island Journal, Vol.7:2 (1992), Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to 
Fail or Survive, (London: Penguin Books, 2005). Some commentators have critiqued the work of Diamond on the 
grounds of simplicity. For a summary of some of the criticisms levelled at his work, see Eric Powell, ‘Do Civilisations 
Really Collapse’, Archaeology, vol.61:2 (2008). 
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Chapter 5: Biotechnology Governance: The Case of Russia 
 
The Governance of Biotechnology as Shaped by History, Politics, and 
Culture 
 
The twentieth century witnessed a tremendous transformation in the attitude 
toward the role of science vis-à-vis society and the state. Rapid technological 
innovation manifested in the advent of new and more sophisticated modes of 
production, means of transport and communication, systems for energy 
supply, and wide-ranging consumer products attracted considerable public 
attention demonstrating the far-reaching implications of science for social 
progress and economic prosperity. At the same time, the military applications 
of cutting-edge technology resulted in the development weapons systems 
with enhanced accuracy and lethal capability endowing states with enormous 
destructive potential. From the electric light bulb and the telephone to 
mechanised manufacturing plants and mills; from the internal combustion 
engine to long-range missiles; and from rifles and machine guns to chemical 
weapons it was evident that science and technology were gradually 
beginning to have a bearing on everyday socio-economic and political life on 
a scale unprecedented before in history. The zeal of the Enlightenment that 
once embodied the pursuit of ultimate truth championing the values of 
reason, rigor, and scientific method was no longer an abstract domain limited 
to a chosen few but had evolved into an established profession enjoying 
social recognition and prestige. And just as with other professions, it paid 
substantial dividends by serving as a driver of innovation and technological 
advancement, a trend that has become particularly vivid in the aftermath of 
the Second World War. 
 
By 1945 it had already been demonstrated that the high-level coordination, 
organisation, and facilitation of science could yield significant socio-political, 
economic, and military benefits. Examples outlined in some detail in the 
preceding chapters feature the rise of the German chemical industry from the 
late 1800s onwards and the subsequent development of the German 
chemical weapons programme, as well as the establishment of the NRC in 
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the USA during the First World War and the organisation of war-related 
research under the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) 
which coordinated all military-oriented scientific endeavours during the 
Second World War, including the Manhattan Project. Nonetheless, for the 
most part of the first four decades of the twentieth century, large-scale state-
supported science programmes remained the exception rather than the rule. 
Indeed, few of the industrialised states at the time invested in science, with 
the bulk of money for research and innovation coming from private 
foundations, charities, and industry. A notable exception in this regard was 
the Soviet Union where from the 1920s the Bolshevik government, driven by 
both practical and ideological considerations, assumed full responsibility for 
financing science activities. It was not long before other countries adopted a 
similar pattern in their dealings with scientists. When accounting for 
governments’ growing interest in allocating a designated budget line for 
science and technology as part of public expenditure, several aspects merit 
attention. One is the enormous psychological impact of the role of science 
and technology in the Second World War. Guided ballistic missiles, radar, 
and proximity fuses highlighted the crucial advantage that a state could gain 
through an organised scientific effort even before the use of the A-bomb 
formally put an end on the hostilities. But physics was hardly the only area of 
science that found wide-ranging applications at the time. Advances in 
medicine contributed to saving lives and ameliorating the negative 
consequences of war. The discovery and mass production of penicillin is a 
case in point. Equally, the prospects for the hostile misuse of cutting-edge 
biological research were also revealed as evidenced in the Nazi 
concentration camps and the Japanese Unit 731. Second, if back in 1918 the 
prevalent perception among state leaders was that another total war seemed 
impossible, or at least, possible to prevent, in the late 1940s the situation 
drastically changed. With the ideological and political differences between the 
former allies steadily exacerbating and Europe divided into spheres of 
influence, the iron curtain acquired a material dimension. Once the US 
nuclear monopoly was broken, the world plunged into yet another war – the 
Cold War. Third, given the lasting union fostered between science and war, 
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scientific and technological innovation came to be regarded as an essential 
requirement for ensuring states’ national security: 
 
In a world where the prosecution of war or the 
avoidance of war demands that we be in the 
forefront in the applications of science to public 
health, industry, and preparations for fighting 
effectively in a modern sense, we can no longer 
afford to drift with a slow current. It is essential that 
we provide equality of opportunity of higher 
education in the full sense, […] so that highly 
endowed youngsters […] may come forward with 
full educational equipment to attack the great 
problems of the future, […].509 
 
If a state-coordinated scientific effort in war-time was capable of procuring 
sophisticated weapon systems and thus making an invaluable contribution to 
boosting states’ military potential and political influence, using this model for 
organising research in peace-time appeared key to long-term prosperity, 
economic stability, and reliable defence. The net result was a marriage of 
convenience between the ‘national security state’ and science, whereby the 
former could tap the vast technical expertise available at its disposal, and the 
latter could enjoy both regular, lavish financial support and an unprecedented 
access to decision-making power.  
 
Against the backdrop of the battle for ideological superiority in which the East 
and West strived both to demonstrate political resilience and economic might, 
and take the upper hand in the intensive arms race, scientific progress was 
elevated to the status of a social value and deemed an important source of 
public good. Within this context, the advancement of science and technology 
was to a considerable degree subordinated to the goals and interests of the 
state and shaped by economic, socio-political, and military considerations, 
which in turn gave rise to a distinct professional culture that readily adapted 
to the altered environment. Practical utility thus became a central criterion for 
assessing the value of research underscoring an underlying feature of the 
new role which scientists had taken up – that of being in service of society 
and the state.  
509 Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1950), p.264. 
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During the second half of the twentieth century the life sciences underwent a 
significant expansion. Equipped with modern, more accurate tools, scientists 
were able to study and manipulate living matter at a scale unimaginable 
before. The discovery of the DNA structure and later, the advent of genetic 
engineering captured public attention, highlighting the wide gamut of potential 
applications and fascinating opportunities that promised to revolutionise 
virtually every aspect of life. Public health benefits, improved foodstuffs, and 
mitigation of environment concerns were just few of the expected positive 
uses of the novel advances. Complex problems for once appeared to have 
easy, affordable, and attainable solutions. And it was not long before the 
emerging bio-industry demonstrated its economic viability convincing 
governments to promote measures and policies aimed at fostering favourable 
conditions for the growth of biotechnology. The choice of regulatory 
mechanisms largely reflected the dominant mentality of the day and, as such, 
was primarily informed by national security considerations and a strong 
interest in gaining advantage in the Cold War rivalry. To this end, regulations 
were designed in a way that allowed scientific advancement to continue 
uninhibited taking a narrow definition of ‘risk’ limited mainly to the technical 
aspects of scientific practice within laboratories. Broader issues related to the 
ethical, legal, and social implications of novel developments more often than 
not remained unacknowledged. Life scientists were granted almost exclusive 
decision-making powers in assessing the safety of emerging technologies 
and in providing expert advice on how best to address any potential 
questions that might pose an obstacle to the expansion of research. 
Insulated from public scrutiny and liberated from abstract constraints, 
biotechnology has continued to advance with its breakthroughs hardly 
safeguarded against potential malign intent. 
 
The Challenges Posed by 21st Century Biotechnology 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, world affairs have been increasingly 
shaped by the multifaceted forces of globalisation. Growing 
interconnectedness in the social, political, security, and economic realm has 
underscored both the changing character of challenges whereby local 
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concerns are no longer spatially limited but could have global repercussions, 
and the increasing need for international cooperation as individual states 
appear ill-placed to address potential threats on their own. From financial 
crunches to infectious diseases, from climate change to terrorism, and from 
political instability to the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the 
list of risks that can quickly become global in their reach or extent is now a 
key feature of the altered conditions in which states operate in the twentieth-
first century. Against this backdrop, the rapid advancement of biotechnology 
over the past few decades seems both promising and daunting. On the one 
hand, its wide-ranging applications have the potential to facilitate the 
development of new medicines, vaccines and therapeutics, environmental-
friendly technologies, improved foodstuffs, and forensic methods; on the 
other, they raise profound social, ethical, legal, and security concerns that cut 
across different religious and cultural norms and beliefs, hinder the 
verification of compliance with established rules and procedures, and expose 
the limitations of the existing regulatory mechanisms currently in place. The 
case of dual-use life science research is indicative in this regard. As the 
spectre of possible positive applications of biotechnology continues to 
expand, so do the prospects for its hostile misuse. Back in the late 1980s not 
long after gene splicing had become a reality, Commander Stephen Rose of 
the US Navy observed that: 
 
A key aspect of [biotechnology] is that weapons of 
mass destruction threaten to become 
commonplace. We are crossing into an era when 
tiny nations and terrorist groups can arm 
themselves with biological and chemical weapons 
of great destructiveness – the equivalent of the 
‘poor man’s atomic bomb’ […]; 
and that: 
[t]he outlook for biological weapons is grimly 
interesting. Weaponeers have only just begun to 
explore the potential of the biotechnological 
revolution. It is sobering to realize that far more 
development lies ahead than behind.510 
 
510 Stephen Rose, ‘The Coming Explosion of Silent Weapons’, Naval War College Review, vol.42:3 (summer 1989), 
p.7,p.21. 
171 
 
                                                          
Ominous as they are, his remarks offered only a foretaste of the type of 
challenges and security risks that were likely to arise from biotechnology in 
the near future. Two decades later, the future has arrived and the issues 
science policy-makers and security officials alike are grappling with remain 
as acute as ever. Dual-use life science research – peacefully-intended 
research which ‘can be reasonably anticipated to produce knowledge, 
information, products, or technologies that could directly be misapplied to 
pose a significant threat’ to public, animal, or plant health, infrastructure, the 
environment, or national security511 – strikes   right at the heart of the 
established international regime prohibiting the development, acquisition, 
stockpiling, and retention of biological weapons. Given its legitimate uses, 
such research is not subject to restrictive regulation and its results are openly 
disseminated. The issue is further exacerbated by the lack of an international 
mechanisms for ensuring that any related ethical, social, legal, and security 
concerns are tackled, or at least, taken into account before experimental 
work commences, something evident during the 2011 H5N1 controversy 
outlined in the preceding chapter. During that debate it also became apparent 
that limiting data sharing once the research had been completed and ready 
for publication was both infeasible from a practical and undesirable from an 
ethical point of view. Attempts to mitigate the potential security challenges 
posed by dual use research through technical means, biosafety procedures, 
and sophisticated laboratory equipment, whilst certainly an attractive solution, 
are already beginning to prove counterproductive hindering studies on highly 
dangerous pathogens and reducing public health benefits.512 And even if 
Asilomar-style consensus on dual-use research is reached, implementing 
international regulations or guidelines would be far from a straightforward 
task: 
[T]he research community is far larger, far more 
broadly international, and far more influenced by 
commercial pressures.  Whatever regulations are 
imposed, on prudential or ethical grounds, they 
511 See National Institutes of Health, Biosecurity, available at http://osp.od.nih.gov/office-biotechnology-
activities/biosecurity/dual-use-research-concern (accessed 14/07/15).  
512 See Stephen Morse, ‘Pathogen Security – Help or Hindrance’, Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology, 
vol.2 (2015), pp.1-12; Amy Shurtleff et al. ‘The Impact of Regulations, Safety Considerations and Physical 
Limitations on Research Progress at Maximum Biocontainment’, Viruses, vol.4 (2012), pp.3932-3951; N Wurtz et al. 
‘Negative Laws Regarding Biosecurity and Bioterrorism on Real Diseases’, Clinical Microbiology and Infection, 
vol.20:6 (2014), pp.507-515; Christian Devaux, ‘The Hidden Face of Academic Researches on Classified Highly 
Pathogenic Microorganisms’, Infection, Genetics, and Evolution, vol.29 (2015), pp.26-34.  
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could never be enforced worldwide – any more 
than the drug laws can. Whatever can be done will 
be done by someone, somewhere. […] The global 
village will have its village idiots and they’ll have 
global range.513 
 
 
Yet the dual use conundrum is only one aspect of modern biotechnology. 
The wide-spread diffusion of capabilities and expertise, coupled with the 
closer integration of biology with other disciplines such as computing, 
chemistry, and engineering have redefined the established loci in which the 
life sciences are traditionally found and significantly increased the number of 
individuals with access to manipulating living matter. The advent of garage 
biology and biohackers reflects both the democratisation and deskilling 
enabled by the progress of biotechnology. It is also symptomatic of the 
availability and accessibility of the materials and equipment necessary for 
setting up a laboratory in the comfort of one’s home. Nevertheless, a critical 
analysis of this trend highlights its potential ‘dark side’. A recent report has 
revealed the ‘disruptive effect’ that biotechnology e-commerce has had on 
arms control agreements in the area of biological disarmament.514 Using the 
Australia Group rules on export control, the authors of the report demonstrate 
the range of dual-use products, tools, and devices that could be bought 
online for the purpose of illicit development of biological weapons: 
 
Transactions serving BW programs can be carried 
out openly, in effect hiding in plain sight amongst 
lawful transactions. Compounding these issues, we 
found that online vendors routinely offered payment 
options that could be utilized by unscrupulous 
buyers to hide their identities and to launder 
funds.515 
 
As the highly heterogeneous and segmented landscape of biotechnology 
research unlocks an extensive gamut of opportunities open to various actors 
including those seeking to cause harm, the need for re-thinking the existing 
controls and regulatory barriers and adapting them to the new reality looms 
513 Martin Rees, ‘The World in 2050 and Beyond’, New Statesman, 26 November 2014, available at 
http://www.newstatesman.com/sci-tech/2014/11/martin-rees-world-2050-and-beyond (accessed 14/07/15). 
514 Raymond Zilinskas and Philippe Mauger, Biotechnology E-Commerce: A Disruptive Challenge to Biological Arms 
Control, CNS Occasional Paper No.21, Middlebury Institute of International Studies, 2015. 
515 Ibid, p.2. 
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large. Adding to this challenge is the rapid pace of technological innovation 
which makes it virtually impossible to keep track of novel discoveries and 
emerging technologies. Advances in genomics, synthetic biology, systems 
biology, and nanotechnology offer tremendous prospects for treatment of 
serious disease and medical conditions. At the same time, many of those run 
counter to socially-accepted ethical, religious, and moral norms and as such, 
possess the potential to fuel clashes and public disputes. The controversy 
over GMOs and food, stem cell research, ‘three-parent babies’, the creation 
of a synthetic live cell, gene therapy, embryo screening, and nano-based 
medications demonstrates the resistance and sometimes even public outcry 
with which scientific breakthroughs could be met. The problem is at least in 
part due to the character of the existing systems for public deliberation which, 
unlike technological innovation, tend to operate at a much slower pace. With 
powerful commercial interests, political and defence considerations, and 
vigorous competition in the conditions of intense globalisation shaping 
research agendas, progress, profits, and benefits are more often than not 
prioritised at the expense of caution, careful evaluation of risks, and public 
engagement. As a result, any potential ethical, social, and legal issues likely 
to hinder the pace of innovation tend to be addressed superficially and in 
outline with the goal of fencing off instead of engaging constructively with 
public fears and concerns. 
 
The challenges posed by modern biotechnology expose the shortcomings of 
the established governance mechanisms but equally, their complexity 
highlights the limits of easy fixes and readily available technical solutions. 
The systems, structures, power relations, regulations, professional norms, 
beliefs, and attitudes that shape and influence the development of the life 
science enterprise are products of historical, cultural, and political 
contingencies: whilst not static, they have evolved over time reflecting the 
prevalent world outlook and atmosphere of the day which in turn has made 
them stable and resilient. Resilience does not preclude change; rather it 
implies that sustainable change is achieved through adaptation since 
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there are limits to the possible rate at which human 
history can change without disintegration, since 
coherent change involves change in the whole set 
of cultural standards by which a society interprets 
its situation; and these standards are related to the 
life experience and hence the life span of 
individuals.516 
 
Inertia and Resistance to Change: The Case of Russia 
 
In December 1991 the USSR officially ceased to exist with Russia inheriting 
much of its military arsenal, diplomatic prerogatives, and political standing. 
But from the outset, the new Russia pledged to follow a radically distinct 
course of development and part for good with the heritage of autocratic rule, 
suppression of freedom, and ubiquitous surveillance. The steps made toward 
liberalisation during Gorbachev’s era galvanised the public into embracing 
what was once denounced as ‘degrading imperialist influence’. From the 
jeans culture and the concerts of Pink Floyd and Scorpions through 
McDonald’s to freedom of speech and recognition of the right to self-
determination, the triumph of democracy appeared imminent. By the time of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall that marked the end of the Cold War, the old order 
was already showing signs of crumbling away. After gaining its 
independence, Russia underwent an extensive transformation with the goal 
of achieving a swift transition to liberal democracy and market economy. 
Under the leadership of the first democratically-elected president, Boris 
Yeltsin, a package of drastic reforms was introduced aimed at building a 
Western-style state. State control over industry was abolished, prices were 
liberalised, and private initiative was encouraged. The one-party system was 
replaced with political pluralism and free elections were organised on a 
regular basis, which allowed citizens to express their political preference and 
will and, at the same time, hold their political representatives accountable. 
Yet by the mid-1990s the initial optimism of a smooth transition to a freer and 
economically stable society began to fade. The storm of the White House in 
1993,517 the war in Chechnya from 1994, and the rise of the oligarchs and 
516 Geoffrey Vickers, Human Systems Are Different (London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1983, p. xv).  
517 This refers to the armed siege of the Russian Parliament in October 1993 – the first major political crisis in post-
Soviet Russia. On 21 September 1993, President Yeltsin issued Decree No.1400, according to which the state 
legislature – the Congress of People’s Deputies and its Supreme Council were to be dissolved. As the Decree was 
175 
 
                                                          
resultant linkage of economic influence with politics demonstrated that past 
patterns, modes of behaviour, and power relations still persisted and played 
a crucial role in determining the course of Russia’s development. 
  
Besides economic and political restructuring, President Yeltsin faced another 
important task, namely the question of the enormous military complex, which 
Russia inherited following the Soviet Union’s collapse. A particularly sensitive 
issue that merited immediate attention was the offensive biological weapons 
programme. Along with the UK and the US, the Soviet Union was a 
depository State-Party to the BTWC that entered into force in 1975. During 
the 1980s, Moscow came under suspicion of illicit biological activities largely 
as a result of the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak and the reports on the alleged 
use of ‘yellow rain’ by the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Shortly before the 
disintegration of the USSR, two senior science administrators – Vladimir 
Pasechnik and Kanatzhan Alibekov (Ken Alibek) – defected to the UK and 
the USA, respectively, where they were debriefed by the local intelligence 
services. Based on their accounts, from the 1970s onwards the Soviet Union 
set out to expand and modernise its biological weapons programme. To this 
end, a special complex – ‘Biopreparat’ – was established. By design, 
Biopreparat was a civilian agency that served as a cover for the illicit 
research work carried out at research facilities and laboratories around the 
country. Along with the institutes under the auspices of the military, a large 
network of organisations associated with the Ministry of Health and the 
Academy of Sciences were also said to be involved in weapons 
development. Open-air trials were conducted on Resurrection Island in the 
Aral Sea.  Amidst the leak of information, in 1992 President Yeltsin passed a 
decree announcing the termination of the biological weapons programme and 
issued a law in line with Russia’s obligations under the BTWC. In the same 
inherently anti-constitutional, parliament refused to obey to its provisions. The resultant crisis featured vigorous 
protests against the Decree with violent clashes and armed struggles escalating on 3-4 October 1993 when the 
President deployed heavy weaponry around the White House where the Congress was based (today the building 
houses the Government of the Russian Federation and parliament – the State Duma – is found on Manege Square 
in close proximity to the Kremlin. About 30 per cent of the total area of the White House was destroyed by tanks and 
machine guns which forced the deputies to surrender eventually. Key figures, including the first and last Vice-
President of the Russian Federation, Aleksandr Rutskoy and the Chairman of the Supreme Council, Ruslan 
Khasbulatov were arrested. For a timeline of the events, see History in Real Time: Relieve the 1993 Russian 
Parliament Siege¸ Russia Today, 5 October 2013, available at http://www.rt.com/news/parliament-siege-yeltsin-
timeline-691/ (accessed 4/8/2015). For analysis, see Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political 
Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Cornell University Press, 2001), particularly Chapter 5. 
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year, the Russian government reported its clandestine activities to the 
Convention.  
 
Over the last few years, Russia has invested significant efforts and resources 
on technical and economic modernisation. In this regard, biotechnology is 
deemed a critical priority and, as such, has received considerable attention 
and support. The assimilation and implementation of cutting-edge life science 
advances in various fields of activity ranging from medicine and food 
production through drug development and agriculture to energy and 
environment protection are among the primary goals of both the public and 
the private sector. Against the backdrop of a shaky democratic transition 
highlighted in the persistence of a Soviet-style mentality and politico-
economic elite comprising cadres closely associated with the old regime, and 
the legacy of the Soviet bioweapons programme, Russia is an excellent test 
case to examine the extent to which the Soviet normative and institutional 
inertia in the life sciences constitutes a governance challenge and whether it 
can be reconciled against the country’s ongoing biotechnology expansion. 
 
Research Hypotheses and Research Question 
 
 
The dissertation advances two research hypotheses: 
• It is argued that throughout the world, systems of life science 
governance carry historical, cultural, and political legacies that now 
confront the revolutionary and pervasive advances of the twenty-first 
century biotechnology. Nations’ adaptability to the twin challenges of 
attempting to secure the benefits while reducing the risks and threats 
is a large and still burgeoning governance challenge.  
• It is argued that the legacy of the Soviet Union is particularly important 
in this regard, since the history of a prolonged authoritarian rule and 
intense development of biological weapons in combination with the 
continuing scientific and technological prowess of Russia is a 
governance challenge, unprecedented in its nature and scale. 
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The primary research question that the dissertation seeks to examine is: 
• To what extent and by what means is it possible for Russia to 
reconcile its on-going expansion in biotechnology with the institutional 
and normative inertia arising from its Soviet past? 
 
Methodology 
 
The primary object of the research is the professional life science culture in 
Russia, that is, the  complex of shared beliefs, norms, routines, and practices 
prevalent within the life science community in that country. Since professional 
cultures do not exist in a vacuum but constantly interact with and are 
impacted upon by the surrounding larger cultures, any analysis of 
professional cultures could hardly be divorced from the context and the 
historical, political, and economic contingencies in which the latter develop 
and operate. The concept of culture is an abstraction that does not refer to a 
fixed structure or entity readily found in reality. Rather, cultures are products 
of human relatedness and people’s shared perceptions of normal and 
abnormal, acceptable and unacceptable, right and wrong. They are intricate 
webs of delicate intangibles that delineate the scope of and ground rules for 
human interaction. The study of cultures therefore inevitably presupposes 
elements of interpretation and subjectivity, for an objective observation would 
preclude analysis and any attempt to critically engage with the language, 
jargon, and modes of behaviour encountered in an ‘alien’518 culture would 
entail an explanation informed, at least in part, by one’s experience, world 
outlook, and choice of words.519 Bias is one issue that merits attention in this 
regard. Some commentators have pointed out that the ‘process of knowing 
involves the whole self’520 arguing against the need for fencing off personal 
518 Alien here is used to signify a culture to which an individual does not belong.  
519 On the issue of ‘objectivity’ and relativism, see Linda Alcoff, ‘Objectivity and Its Politics’, New Literary History, 
vol.32:4 (2001), pp.835-848; Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and 
Praxis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (ed.), Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press, 1982); Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1999); Kenneth Gergen, ‘Correspondence versus Autonomy in the Language of Understanding Human Action’, in 
Donald Fiske and Richard Shweder (ed.), Metatheory in Social Science: Pluralisms and Subjectivities (Chicago IL: 
Chicago University Press, 1986), pp.136-163; Daniel Little, ‘Evidence and Objectivity in the Social Sciences’, Social 
Research, vol.60:2 (1993), pp.362-396; Eleonora Montuschi, ‘Rethinking Objectivity in Social Science’, Social 
Epistemology, vol.18:2-3 (2004), pp.109-122.  
520 Renato Resaldo, ‘Subjectivity in Social Analysis’ in Steven Seidman (ed.), The Postmodern Turn: New 
Perspectives on Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.177. 
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bias and advocating for an attempt to incorporate one’s assumptions and 
preconceptions into the research findings (phenomenological research).521 
Given the inherent risk of a too close researcher’s involvement and resultant 
distortion of the data analysis, the present research has adopted a different 
approach, whereby personal bias is acknowledged and its potential impact 
recognised, but related personal reflections are nevertheless kept separate 
from the overall analysis. 
  
Several factors have a bearing on the author’s bias, including family 
background and professional experience. Being a native Russian who has 
spent most of her life living abroad, first in Bulgaria and more recently, in the 
United Kingdom, has influenced the lens through which she approaches the 
normative and institutional dimensions of life science research in Russia. At 
the same time, by dint of being a social scientist, she is an outsider to the 
professional setting that she studies which in turn leaves a scope for 
interpretation.  
 
In order to engage with the structural, professional and behavioural aspects 
of life scientists’ work in Russia and to begin to understand their meanings, 
the enquiry has used qualitative research methods. Those include qualitative 
analysis of primary and secondary sources such as government documents, 
official statements, reports, and academic publications, as well as semi-
structured interviews with Russian practising life scientists, bioethicists, 
diplomatic representatives, and government officials. The overview of the 
evolution of professional life science culture in Russia from the late imperial 
period (second half of XIX century) until the present time has benefited from 
an extensive literature review using both English and original Russian 
sources. Being a Russian speaker has enabled the author to gain access to 
a wide range of relevant online materials, newspapers, video briefings and 
interviews, and documentary TV programmes, as well as follow social media 
discussions and open forums. Whenever quotes from original Russian 
publications have been used throughout the text, those have been subject to 
translation by the author. Likewise, while every effort has been made to 
521 See Colin Robson, Real World Research, 3 ed. (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2011), p.151.  
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locate official English versions of government and policy documents available 
online, whenever this has not been possible, the author’s translation has 
been used instead. The author’s translations throughout the text are clearly 
marked. All materials originally produced in Russian, such as official 
documents, books, and journal articles have been cited with their original 
Russian titles following transliteration from Cyrillic into Latin script in 
accordance with the relevant rules in Russian language whereby only the first 
word in a title is spelled with a capital letter. Soft sign indicating vowel 
reduction in Russian is indicated throughout the text with an apostrophe (’) 
following the consonant after which it occurs.    
 
The fieldwork carried out as part of the research entailed two visits to Russia, 
interactions with representatives of the Russian Federation at the bi-annual 
meetings of the BTWC in Geneva, Switzerland, and participation in 
numerous seminars, conferences and workshops held across Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) countries, including Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, 
and Tajikistan. In addition, an extended fieldwork mission was undertaken 
between September 2014 and December 2014 at the BTWC Implementation 
Support Unit at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva, 
Switzerland. During the visits to Russia, focus was given to Moscow and 
Akademgorodok (Academy City) near Novosibirsk as leading science 
centres. These two cities were chosen because of their key strategic role in 
the development of life sciences both during the Cold War after the collapse 
the Soviet Union. The cities host many leading universities and research 
institutes, and also serve as important administrative science centres with the 
Russian Academy of Sciences and its Siberian branch, respectively. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with life scientists and ethics teaching 
staff from three universities and five research institutes and an on-site facility 
visit with a tour of a BSL-3 laboratory at one of the institutes was carried out. 
For the purpose of observing the principles of confidentiality, the identity of 
interviewees is not disclosed. Ethical approval for the fieldwork was granted 
by the University of Bradford’s Ethics Committee in May 2013 and all 
research activities involving human participation were performed in 
compliance with the University’s Research Ethics Policy. Interviews were 
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conducted in Russian and were not taped but field notes were taken instead. 
Whenever a direct quote from an interview has been used, the English 
translation has been subject to a prior agreement with the interviewee. In 
addition to the interviews, the extensive resource base of the Russian State 
Library was utilised allowing access to a wide range of relevant publications 
and documents.  
 
Besides interactions with Russian life scientists and officials in Russia and 
Geneva, the research has benefited from insights gained through multiple 
interactions with life scientists working in FSU countries and experts involved 
in the implementation of relevant projects in the region. Among those, it is 
worth noting representatives of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the 
Palladin Institute of Biochemistry (Kiev), the Ukrainian Biosafety Association, 
Agricultural University of Georgia (Tbilisi), the Georgian Biosafety 
Association, National Centre for Disease Control and the R. Lugar Centre for 
Public Health Research, Georgia,  the National Centre for Public Health and 
Ministry of Defence (Republic of Moldova), the Anti-Plague Stations in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan, the Biosecurity Association of 
Tajikistan, and the two intergovernmental organisations set up to promote the 
peaceful use of science in the region – the International Science and 
Technology Centre (based in Kazakhstan) and the Science and Technology 
Centre of Ukraine (based in Ukraine). The research has further benefited 
from the author’s close involvement in the organisation of two international 
conferences held in Georgia (2014) and Tajikistan (2015), respectively.   
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Chapter 6: Organisation and Governance of Soviet 
Biotechnology 
 
 
Science in the Soviet Union 
 
Prior to the disintegration of the USSR in the early 1990s, the scientific 
community in the country ranked among the largest in the world, with the 
number of individuals employed as nauchniye rabotniki (scientific workers) 
effectively approaching the two million mark.522 Yet what is so impressive 
about this figure is the fact that it obscures more than it reveals, which is why 
a careful analysis is needed in order to fully grasp its significance. For one 
thing, in the Russian language the concept of nauka (science) has a broad 
meaning encompassing all fields of study, theoretical and practical alike (e.g. 
the natural and social sciences, humanities, philosophy, medicine, 
engineering, technology). As such, it is semantically closer to the German 
concept Wissenschaft and its English equivalent, knowledge or scholarship. 
Following this logic, the term nauchniy rabotnik does not necessarily refer to 
a scientist as commonly understood in the West but, on the contrary, applies 
to virtually any individual involved in scientific activity of any stripe and in any 
type of specialised institution. Likewise, it does not presuppose a clear 
distinction between teaching and research; between fundamental and applied 
research; or between research and development. Revisiting the 
aforementioned statistics in light of the all-encompassing meaning of nauka 
and by extension of nauchniy rabotnik therefore offers invaluable insights not 
only into the structure and composition of the Soviet scientific community but 
also, and even more importantly, into the role and status assigned to science 
and its practitioners in the Soviet Union.  
 
By the time of the Bolshevik Revolution Russian science had already 
achieved some prominence, even if the systems in place to support and 
encourage its promotion and development lagged behind the ones 
established in other European countries at the time. Two key factors account 
522 See [in Russian] Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1990: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik, (Moscow: USSR State 
Statistics Commission, 1991).  
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for this trend. First, it was not until the 1860s that radical socio-economic 
reforms, such as the abolishment of serfdom, were introduced in an attempt 
to modernise the Russian Empire and overcome its deficiencies vis-à-vis the 
Great Powers in the West exposed in the Crimean War. The extensive divide 
between the nobility and the representatives of lower estates fuelled by 
pervasive illiteracy and limited social mobility forced the autocracy to take 
steps toward the emancipation of peasants by increasing the existing and 
creating new educational opportunities in the form of specialised technical 
schools and enhanced support for universities. In order to counterbalance the 
potential threat of growing revolutionary spirit among the expanding 
intelligentsia, the Imperial government retained strict control over universities, 
keeping their influence in check at the expense of the strengthened authority 
of the more conservative but close-to-the-court Academy of Sciences. The 
reforms, nevertheless, had a positive impact on science, as ‘admission to 
universities was broadened, class privileges were reduced [...], travel abroad 
for the purpose of study was again permitted, and the education of women on 
the secondary level was stimulated.’523 Likewise, during the same period, the 
Academy underwent a process of ‘domestication’ aimed to break with the 
long-standing legacy of employing foreigners by turning it into a truly national 
institution.524 
 
The second factor worthy of note pertains to the prevalent economic situation 
in the Russian Empire. In the second half of the nineteenth century the 
country was still largely agrarian with the question of industrialisation subject 
to a heated debate. Cognizant of the need for fostering innovation and 
industrial development, the government was fearful of the potential political 
implications that the rise of an influential bourgeois class might have, as a 
result of which no significant measures were implemented for alleviating 
Russia’s economic backwardness. Adding to this deficiency was the fact that 
most of the existing pockets of industrial production were under the control of 
foreign capital and, as such, heavily dependent on the import of raw 
523 Loren Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), p.37. 
524 Alexander Vucinich, Science in Russian Culture 1861-1917, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970), 
p.68-73. 
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materials and research knowledge from abroad. Thus, little progress was 
made to foster linkages between the academic and corporate sectors, 
leaving applied research in Russia practically undeveloped.525 
 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the pursuit of science 
in the Russian Empire took place both at the universities and the Imperial 
Academy of Science. While the former typically were the source of major 
breakthroughs, it was the latter that enjoyed generous support and 
preferential treatment from the government. Besides Moscow and St 
Petersburg, strong university scholarship developed in Kazan, Khar’kov, 
Kiev, and Odessa. Alongside the already existing research facilities, including 
the Pulkovo Observatory, new laboratories, experimental stations and 
workshops were created which added fresh impetus to the growth of the 
natural sciences. Although much of the research effort was concentrated on 
theoretical issues, the participation of Russia in the First World War 
demanded the development of practically-oriented projects to meet the ever-
increasing needs for manufacturing supplies, processing raw materials and 
supplying everyday goods. Notable examples in this regard are the War-
Chemical Committee that grew out of the collaboration between the Russian 
Chemical Society and the military, and the Commission for the Study of 
Natural Resources (KEPS) established under the auspices of the Imperial 
Academy of Science to provide advice on war-related matters. 
 
It is worth noting that the generation of Russian scholars that emerged in the 
second half of the nineteenth century differed significantly from their 
predecessors. Many of them received their education or worked abroad and 
had access to the works of their foreign peers; they fostered professional 
525 See Alexei Kojevnikov, ‘The Great War, the Russian Civil War, and the Invention of Big Science’, Science in 
Context, vol.15:2 (2002), pp.239-275; Loren Graham, The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party 
1927-1932, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), p.8; Nathan Brooks, ‘Chemistry in War, Revolution, 
and Upheaval: Russia and the Soviet Union, 1900-1929’, Centaurus, vol.39 (1997), pp.349-367. On the mixed 
attitudes of scientists toward ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ research see, Alexei Kojevnikov, Stalin’s Great Science: The Times 
and Adventures of Soviet Physicists, (London: Imperial College Press, 2006). On science in Tsarist Russia, see 
Michael Gordin, ‘Points Critical: Russia, Ireland, and Science at the Boundary’, Osiris, vol.24:1 (2009), pp.99-109; 
Elizabeth Hachten, ‘In Service to Science and Society: Scientists and the Public in Late-Nineteenth-Century Russia’, 
Osiris, vol.17 (2002), pp.171-209; Kirill Rossianov, ‘Taming the Primitive: Elie Metchnikov and His Discovery of 
Immune Cells’, Osiris, vol.23:1 (2008), pp.213-229; Andy Byford, ‘Turning Pedagogy into a Science: Teachers and 
Psychologists in Late Imperial Russia (1897-1917)’, Osiris, vol.23:1 (2008), pp.50-81; Michael Gordin, ‘The 
Heidelberg Circle: German Inflections on the Professionalisation of Russian Chemistry in the 1860s’, Osiris, vol.23 
(2008), pp.23-49.   
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networks both domestically and internationally, published in journals and 
periodicals, and participated in conferences and congresses. Just like their 
European colleagues, Russian scientists praised rigor, truth and objectivity 
and were convinced that those could only be achieved through the proper 
use of approved scientific methods. And even though the majority of them 
were passionate critics of the autocracy, as professionals they always strived 
to affirm the apolitical nature of their activity: as science was synonymous 
with truth, it was above religion, above ideology, and above politics.526  
 
As much as the Russian scientific community endorsed the February 
Revolution which overthrew the tsarist regime, the Bolsheviks’ usurpation of 
power nine months later was met with deep suspicion. By and large, the 
scholars in the country subscribed to liberal ideals and were thus supportive 
of the provisional government formed in the aftermath of Nicolay II’s 
abdication. Unsurprisingly, the opposing socialist faction (Petrograd Soviet), 
which sought to mobilise the masses of workers and peasants was at best, 
disdained and, at worst, deemed dangerous. Ironically, it was precisely the 
radical ‘hard’ Marxists led by Vladimir Ulyanov-Lenin that saw the future of 
Russia through the prism of scientific and technological progress and was 
eager to fully utilise the transformative potential that new knowledge could 
offer for achieving social welfare and maximising economic prosperity. 
Science was, in short, their ‘closest revolutionary ally’ and a key asset to the 
goal of building communism.527 
 
From the outset, the Bolsheviks demonstrated deep commitment to science 
and its practitioners commonly summarised in the slogan ‘Communism is the 
526 Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, op cit. 
527 Alexei Kojevnikov, ‘The Phenomenon of Soviet Science’, op cit, p.122. On the history of Soviet science, see 
Helena Sheehan, Marxism and the Philosophy of Science: A Critical History, (Humanities Press International, 1993); 
The UNESCO Courier, July 1970 (23rd year), pp.4-22, special issue on Lenin and Science, Education, and Culture; 
David Joravosky, Soviet Marxism and Natural Science, 1917-1932 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961); 
Stephen Fortescue, The Communist Party and Soviet Science (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1986); Loren 
Graham (ed.) Science and the Soviet Social Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Hilary Rose 
and Steven Rose, Science and Society, (London: Penguin Press, 1969), especially pp.160-168; Paul Josephson, 
Totalitarian Science and Technology, op cit; Loren Graham, ‘Big Science in the Last Years of the Big Soviet Union’, 
Osiris, vol.7 (1992), pp.49-71; E.P. Strjukova, [in Russian] ‘Istoriografiya Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoi Politiki v SSSR v 
1950-1990’, Contemporary History Archive, 2010, Ural Federal University,  available at  
http://elar.urfu.ru/handle/10995/19780?locale=en (accessed 7/8/2015).On the appraisal of Soviet science, see V. 
Trapeznikov, ‘Scientific Policy in the Soviet Union: The Efficiency of Science in the Soviet Union’, Minerva, vol.5:4 
(1967), pp.546-552; John Turkevich, ‘Soviet Science Appraised’, Foreign Affairs, vol.44:3 (1966), pp.489-500; Ivan 
London, ‘Toward a Realistic Appraisal of Soviet Science’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.13:5 (1957), pp.169-
176;  
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Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.’528 Having 
abandoned the doctrine of ‘war communism’, they embarked on the 
implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) as part of which the state 
retained its control over banking and key industries while, at the same time, 
allowing private ownership and initiative in trade and small-scale 
manufacturing.529 Along with the economic reforms, science and education 
were also vigorously promoted. The education system was expanded and 
new opportunities were created for the members of previously oppressed 
social strata through affirmative action policies and the establishment of 
special workers’ departments at universities – rabfaki – to enable people with 
limited education to acquire advanced degrees and qualifications. New 
institutions, such as the Institute of Red Professors and the Communist 
Academy of Science were set up for the purpose of nurturing scientific elite of 
a proletarian stripe in order to overcome the regime’s reliance on bourgeois 
expertise.  
 
Fostering close relations with the techno-scientific community in the 1920s 
was a key priority for the Bolshevik government. The task was challenging in 
its own right. On the one hand, most scientists, at least initially, were 
reluctant to associate themselves with the Marxist leaders whom they treated 
with distrust. On the other hand, the state desperately needed scientists and 
engineers in order to fulfil its grand vision of an advanced modern society 
based on the principles of communism. The situation was further complicated 
by the fact that Russian scholars belonged to the despised bourgeois class 
and so allying with them, even in the name of communist ideals, threatened 
to erode the credibility of the Bolshevik leaders in the eyes of their 
constituencies. Still, pressed with the immediate socio-economic and health 
concerns following the Russian involvement in World War One, the 
government adopted an expedient solution. As the sole patron of science, the 
state offered generous support in the form of material resources, organisation 
of conferences and symposiums, and the creation of new institutions. 
528 Vladimir Lenin, Our Foreign and Domestic Position and Party Tasks, Speech delivered to the Moscow Gubernia 
Conference of the R.C.P.(B), 21 November 1920, available at  
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/nov/21.htm#fw01 (accessed 21/07/15). 
529 Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, op cit, p.17. 
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Scientists were granted a wide range of privileges which sought to cajole 
them into contributing their skills and knowledge at the government’s 
disposal.530 They could keep their property and status, had access to 
decision-making power, and enjoyed protection from arrest and other forms 
of high-level harassment.  
 
In the aftermath of ‘big Revolution’ science experienced its own ‘little 
revolution’ characterised, above all, by the emergence of ‘big science’ as a 
state-sponsored establishment.531 This trend vividly manifested itself in the 
formation of scientific institutes, a type of specialised research institution 
dedicated to innovation and knowledge-production. Contrary to the popular 
belief, the idea of scientific institutes dated back at least to the late Imperial 
period when the Moscow Society for a Research Institute was created 
(1914).532 A few years later the chief of KEPS, Vladimir Vernadsky, 
envisioned the creation of new research institutions oriented toward utilitarian 
service and governed on the principles of centralism, planning and 
collectivism, effectively outlining the model of what later became the Soviet 
research institute.533 Under the Soviet regime, science was permanently 
transformed from an elitist activity confined largely to universities into ‘a new 
mass profession and a branch of the civil service, recognised as socially 
important and supported in its own right, rather than indirectly via higher 
education, by generous public funds.’534 
530 Ibid, p.19. On the relationship between science and the state in the Soviet Union in the years after the 
Revolution, see Paul Josephson, ‘Soviet Scientists and the State: Politics, Ideology, and Fundamental Research 
from Stalin to Gorbachev’, Social Research, vol.59:3 (1992), pp.589-614; Peter Kneen, Soviet scientists and the 
State: An Examination of the Social and Political Aspects of Science in the USSR, (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1984); Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1992), especially Chapter 3. 
531 See Nikolai Krementsov, ‘Big Revolution, Little Revolution: Science and Politics in Bolshevik Russia’, Social 
Research, vol.73:4 (2006), pp.1173-1204. See also Raymond Hutchings, Soviet Science, Technology, Design: 
Interaction and Convergence (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), particularly Chapter 2; Loren Graham, 
Science in Russia and the Soviet Union, op cit;  
532 See Alexei Kojevnikov, ‘The Great War, the Russian Civil War, and the Invention of Big Science’, op cit.  
533 Ibid. On the history of the Soviet research institute, see Boris Yudin, ‘Istoriya sovetskoi nauki kak protsess 
vtorichnoi institutsionalizatsii’, Filosofskie issledovaniya, No.3 (1993), pp.83-106; M.Bastrakova, ‘Akademiya nauk i 
sozdanie issledovatel’skikh institutov: Dve zapiski V.I. Vernadskogo’, Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniya i tekhniki 
(VIET), No.1 (1991), pp.157-167; E.I.Kolchinsky, Nauka i krizisy: Istoriko-sravnitel’nye ocherki, (St Petersburg: 
Dmitrii Bulanin, 2003). For an alternative explanation of the origins of the Soviet institute, see Loren Graham, ‘The 
Formation of Soviet Research Institutes: A Combination of Revolutionary Innovation and International Borrowing’, 
Social Studies of Science, vol.5:3 (1975), pp.303-329. For the role of organisational culture in the development of 
the Soviet research institute, see Mark Adams, ‘Science, ideology, and Structure: The Kol’tsov Institute, 1900-1970’ 
in Linda Lubrano and Susan Gross Solomon (ed.) The Social Context of Soviet Science (Boulder CO: Westview 
Press, 1980), pp.173-199. 
534 See Alexei Kojevnikov, ‘The Phenomenon of Soviet Science’, op cit. On the organisation of science in the Soviet 
Union, see Kendal Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical 
Intelligentsia, 1917-1941, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); Susan Gross Solomon (ed.) The Social 
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But the institutional dimension was just one aspect of the ‘little revolution’. A 
much more fundamental change that occurred in the late 1920s and became 
deeply embedded in the Soviet science policy in the later years pertained to 
the dominant outlook on the role of science as a central ideology which 
surpassed philosophy and religion. Many of the early Bolshevik leaders were 
scientists and, as such, aligned themselves, to a greater or lesser extent, 
with the cult of rationality evident in Lenin’s writings. They further shared the 
conviction that the idea of a just and equal society was achievable through 
the proper implementation of the principles of science, rational division of 
labour, and bureaucracy, all of which transcended politics and class 
discrepancies.535 Within this context, science was considered not just a 
source of technological progress but a key doctrine for the organisation and 
conduct of socio-economic and political affairs. Yet the science in question – 
the science of ‘Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism’ – constituted a special type of 
science rooted in the tradition of dialectic materialism, whereby practicality 
was deemed a major criterion for evaluation of any and all activities in the 
Soviet Union.536 It was precisely this type of science and its nearly dogmatic 
character that determined which projects in any discipline were to be pursued 
and that in effect set the scene for the rise of Lysenkoism in the 1930s.  
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July 1962; W. Hosrley Gantt, ‘A Medical Review of Soviet Russia: V. The Medical Profession, Soviet Science, and 
Soviet Sanitation’, The British Medical Journal, vol.1:3450 (1927), pp.338-340; Michael Gordin and Karl Hall, 
‘Introduction: Intelligentsia Science Inside and Outside Russia’, Osiris, vol.23 (2008), pp.1-19; Valentina Markusova 
and B.C Griffith, ‘Highly Cited Soviet Journals in the Physical and Life Sciences: A Study of the Function of 
Journals’, Scientometrics, vol.21:1 (1991), pp.99-113; Walter Grunden et al, ‘Laying the Foundation for Wartime 
Research: A Comparative Overview of Science Mobilisation in National Socialist Germany, Japan, and the Soviet 
Union’, Osiris, vol.20 (2005), pp.79-106.  
535 See John Turkevich, ‘The Progress of Soviet Science’, Foreign Affairs, vol.32:3 (April 1954), pp.430-439. 
536 See Nikolai Krementsov, A Martian Stranded on Earth: Alexander Bogdanov, Blood Transfusions, and 
Proletarian Science (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011).   
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Some commentators have linked the science of ‘Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism’ 
described above to the concept of ‘proletarian science’. The latter featured 
vividly in the works of one of the founders of the Bolshevik Party, Aleksandar 
Bogdanov, who was expelled from it some eight years before the Revolution. 
In his view, the proletariat bore unique values (e.g. collectivist spirit) that 
were not shared by other classes which in turn presupposed that a bourgeois 
culture (and by extension, bourgeois science) could not serve its interests. By 
the same token, bourgeois specialists could not contribute to the 
advancement of proletarian science and instead, a new intelligentsia of a 
proletarian stripe had to be nurtured for the purposes of the Soviet state.537 
Whilst Lenin rejected Bogdanov’s idea of ‘proletarian science’ as premature 
and dangerous, the Soviet science promulgated after Stalin’s ‘Great Break’ 
and characterised by ‘highly differentiated, strictly regulated, and thoroughly 
conventionalised activities’ reflected many of the elements outlined in 
Bogdanov’s vision.538 
 
One point that merits special attention is the danger of overstating the extent 
to which ‘proletarian science’ took root and developed in the Soviet Union. 
True, it was vigorously imposed by dint of various measures, including 
funding policies and sometimes overtly oppressive means. Nonetheless, it is 
still important to appreciate that even such a tragic phenomenon as 
Lysenkoism constituted an exception rather than a rule, if only for the fact 
that it remained confined within the boundaries of a single discipline. It can 
be argued therefore that the interplay between the extensive Communist 
Party apparatus and various state agencies, on the one hand, and the Soviet 
scientific community, on the other, was far from straightforward but complex, 
multi-faceted and pervaded by power struggles and competing interests. Just 
as the Politburo sought to mobilise science to serve the needs of socialist 
537 According to Bogdanov, the proletariat had to create a new culture of a strictly class character. The new 
‘proletarian culture’ would assimilate everything in pre-existing culture that bore the imprint of common humanity but 
this material would be recast by the proletariat to reflect its own class consciousness. In order to promote the idea of 
‘proletarian culture’, a movement called Proletkult was set up as early as 1918. See Helena Sheehan, Marxism and 
the Philosophy of Science, op cit, specifically Chapter 4. For its part, proletarian science had to be ‘acceptable, 
understandable, and accountable to the proletariat’s life mission, a science that is organised from the proletariat’s 
point of view, one that is capable of leading [the proletariat’s] forces to struggle for, attain, and implement its social 
ideals’. Its proponents maintained that the proletariat could apply, synthesise and produce scientific knowledge 
differently from other classes. By 1923 Proletkult lost support. On Proletkult and Proletarian science see Lynn Mally, 
Culture of the Future: The Proletkult Movement in Revolutionary Russia, (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1990), p.162-163.  
538 See Nikolai Krementsov, A Martian Stranded on Earth, op cit. 
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construction, scientists and engineers, for their own part aimed to adapt to 
the prevalent politico-ideological setting and exploit the generous resources 
available for advancing their own research agendas and boosting their career 
prospects. A case in point in this regard is the development of the biological 
sciences to be examined in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
Growth and Consolidation of Biotechnology Research in the Soviet 
Union 
 
The development of biology as a separate scientific discipline had a long-
standing tradition in Russia, the origins of which dated back at least to the 
reign of Peter the Great when the first serious comprehensive study of the 
Russian flora and fauna was conducted.539 The knowledge acquired through 
those surveys allowed Russian naturalists to undertake over the next one 
hundred and fifty years taxonomic investigations in botany and zoology, the 
latter of which laid the groundwork for fascinating discoveries in such areas 
as embryology, anatomy, and physiology. The refinement of the 
methodological apparatus for empirical studies facilitated by the emergence 
of new and improved tools and equipment in the late nineteenth century 
further contributed to the growth of cutting-edge scholarship, as evidenced in 
the work of Ivan Sechenov, Aleksandr Kovalevskii, Ilya Mechnikov, and Ivan 
Pavlov. Another dominant trend characteristic of the period and bearing far-
reaching implications for the overall shaping and direction of the trajectory of 
biology, was the publication of Darwin’s On the Origins of Species. Nowhere 
in the world did the theory of evolution receive such a warm welcome as it did 
from the Russian biological community. Or, so it seemed on the surface, not 
least because the main opponents of Darwinism in Russia largely came from 
the ranks of theology, even if a small group of trained biologists also levelled 
some vociferous criticism at it. Yet this is not to say that all of the remaining 
biology scholars readily embraced the theory of evolution to the extent that 
some of its most vocal supporters, such as Timiriazev and Menzbir did.540 
Instead of trying to prove the ultimate supremacy of the principles outlined in 
539 See Alexander Vucinich, Science in Russian Culture, op cit, especially Chapter 9. 
540 Ibid, p.294-295. 
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Darwin’s work, many Russian biologists embarked on the task of reconciling 
those with relevant competing theories, a trend that prominently manifested 
itself in the area of genetics, as Mendelism was gaining in popularity in the 
West.541 Indeed, four of the eighteen founders of the synthetic theory of 
evolution, which sought to combine Mendel’s laws on inheritance and 
Darwinism, were of Russian origin, including Sergei Chetverikov, Nikolay 
Timofeev-Ressovsky, Nikolay Dubinin, and Theodosius Dobzhansky. The list 
of renowned geneticists further features Aleksandr Serebrovskii who coined 
the concept of genofond known in English as ‘gene pool’ and the proponent 
of the centre of origin theory, Nikolai Vavilov. 
   
Up until the early nineteenth century, virtually all medical affairs including the 
training of physicians and distribution of drugs were managed by the Medical 
Collegium, a St Petersburg-based state institution.542 At that time it was only 
the Medical Faculty of Moscow State University created in 1755 that offered 
academic degrees in medicine.543 An Emperor’s decree of 1798 laid the 
foundations for the establishment of the Imperial Medical-Surgical Academy 
and over the next two decades medicine was taught at four more universities 
across the country. For most part of the 1800s, medical practice in Russia 
focused on the prevention rather than the treatment of disease, a trend 
evident in the national public health policy and the measures implemented to 
address the spread of infectious diseases (e.g. plague), as well as in the 
activities of professional societies, such as the Pirogov Society and its 
preoccupation with zemstvo medicine.544 The relative effectiveness of such 
541 This trend was particularly popular among the Russian biologists of the younger generation at the time, including 
Nikolai Vavilov. In 1910, the Bureau of Applied Botany, a subsidiary of the Scientific Committee of the Central 
Administration of Land Tenure and Agriculture published an entire issue of its Proceedings dedicated to Mendel’s 
Experiments in Plant Hybridisation. See Alexander Vucinich, Science in Russian Culture, op cit; Loren Graham, 
Science in Russian and the Soviet Union, op cit, p.241-242.  
542 See Loren Graham, Science in Russian and the Soviet Union, p. 245.  
543 Moscow State University Records [in Russian: Letopis’ Moskovskogo universiteta], available at 
http://letopis.msu.ru/facultet/medicinskiy (accessed 3/8/2015). 
544 Zemstvo medicine refers to a state-supported programme of primary rural medical and clinical healthcare that 
emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century in Russia. It is named after the local organs of self-government 
introduced as part of the Great Reforms under Alexander II – zemstva. Zemstvo medicine focused chiefly on 
preventive practices including sanitation and community education. For further discussion, see Lore Graham, 
Science in Russia and the Soviet Union, op cit; Susan Gross Solomon and John Hutchinson, Health and Society in 
Revolutionary Russia, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990); L.E. Gorelova and T.I. Surovtseva, 
‘Zemstvo District Medicine and Charity in Russia’, History of Medicine [Istoriya meditsiny], vol.4 (2014); Nancy 
Frieden, ‘Physicians in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: Professionals or Servants of the State?’, Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine, vol.49:1 (1975), pp.20-29; Terrence Emmons and Wayne Vucinich, The Zemstvo in Russia: An 
Experiment in Local Self-Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).    During the pre-
bacteriological age in Russia, two sets of measures were identified and implemented to combat epidemics and 
infectious diseases. The first one was defined by the Quarantine Charter (1866) under temporary such in those 
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preventive approaches in the fight against plague even led one professor 
from the Medical-Surgical Academy to acknowledge in 1874 that by then, a 
human would need to be either cattle or a pig to get infected with plague, for 
the prevalent culture had made Homo Sapiens lose his predisposition to the 
disease.545 The advances in basic science coupled with growing 
understanding of the role of pathogens in causing disease provided medical 
workers with incentives to direct their efforts to experimental studies with the 
goal of developing new cures and methods of prophylactics. To this end, the 
first research institute in Russia – the Institute of Experimental Medicine – 
was founded in 1890 in St Petersburg by Prince Oldenburg, who modelled it 
on the example of Louis Pasteur’s institute in Paris and Robert Koch’s 
institute in Berlin.546 The institute was initially divided into six departments 
specialising in physiology, chemistry, general bacteriology, pathoanatomy, 
syphilology, and epizootiology. In 1897, the institute acquired an additional 
research space – an anti-plague laboratory – which was established under 
the auspices of the State Anti-Plague Commission (KOMOChUM) at the 
former military fort, ‘Alexander I’. Besides plague, other dangerous 
pathogens studied at the laboratory included anthrax, cholera, and typhus.547 
For over two decades, ‘Alexander I’ served as an important facility for the 
production of vaccine and sera and many of the medications developed there 
were sold on the international market. Following the Revolution, the 
laboratory was closed and anti-plague research was moved to Saratov on the 
Volga River. 
 
Support and patronage for the life sciences in Tsarist Russia came from 
various sources.548 Apart from government subsidies, private donations 
played a key role in providing adequate facilities for the development of 
places where they were considered necessary. The second set was defined by the Charter on Medical Police 
(1857) and entailed measures against the spread of disease though isolation and disinfection of sick people, their 
living areas and belongings. See Mikhail Supotnitskii and Nadezhda Supotnitskaia, [in Russian] Ocherki Istorii 
Chumy, (Moscow: 2006), in particular Ocherk XX, available at http://www.supotnitskiy.ru/book/book3.htm (accessed 
2/2/2015). 
545 Mikhail Supotnitskii and Nadezhda Supotnitskaia, Ocherki Istorii Chumy, op cit.  
546 See [in Russian] Istoriya Sozdaniya Instituta Eksperimental’noi Meditsiny, available at   
http://www.iemrams.spb.ru:8101/russian/hisiemru.htm (accessed 2/2/2015).  
547 T. Andrjushkevich and T. Grekova, [in Russian] ‘Chumnoi Fort’, Istoria Peterburga, vol.5:15 (2003), pp.48-53; 
also see, Chumnoi Fort: Osobaya Laboratoriya IEM, available at http://www.iemrams.spb.ru/russian/fort.htm 
(accessed 2/2/2015); Alexander Melikishvili, ‘Genesis of the Anti-Plague System: Tsarist Period’, Critical Reviews in 
Microbiology, vol.32 (2006), pp.19-31. 
548 See [in Russian] Elena Soboleva, Organizatsiya nauki v poreformennoi Rossii, (Leningrad: Nauka, 1983).  
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biology-related disciplines, as evidenced in the case of the Medical Faculty of 
Moscow State University and Shaniavskii University.549 The Ledentsov 
Society for the Advancement of the Exact Sciences and Their Practical 
Applications (1909) functioned as private endowment offering grants to 
deserving scholars (among whom was Ivan Pavlov), fostering ties with 
foreign scientific institutions, and commissioning research in areas of 
relevance to industry.550 Private sponsorship also facilitated the activities of 
learned and professional societies supplementing the funds raised through 
subscription fees and publication revenue. Besides the Pirogov Society 
described above, other prominent organisations of this type featured the 
Society of Russian Physicians, the Moscow Medical Society, the Moscow 
Surgical Society, the Russian Entomological Society, the Ural Society of 
Naturalists, and the Russian Microbiological Society.551 Such entities sought 
to provide scholars with similar interests with a space for debate and 
exchange of ideas and experience. To this end, they hosted regular 
meetings, congresses, and symposia, disseminated information on relevant 
scientific topics, and some even provided free public services.552It is worth 
noting that under the Imperial regime the development of the life sciences 
depended almost exclusively on the initiative and motivation of individual 
researchers ready to show perseverance in finding sponsors, organising 
laboratories, and establishing new disciplines. The career of the renowned 
neurophysiologist Vladimir Bekhterev is indicative in this regard.553 During his 
term at Kazan University in the late 1880s, Bekhterev managed to embed 
psychiatry in the formal academic curriculum, along with which he founded a 
psychophysiological laboratory, set up the Kazan Society of 
Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists, and began publishing the first 
neuroscience journal in Russia, Neurological Messenger (1893). Upon his 
transfer to the Military-Surgical Academy, he continued to promote 
neuroscience by organising scientific societies and establishing two more 
549 See Samuel Kassow, Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1989). On the development of research centres in biology-related disciplines in the later years, see Z.B. 
Shamina, ‘Establishing the School for the Biology of Plant Cultured Cells and Biotechnology in the USSR’, Russian 
Journal of Plant Physiology, vol.52:1 (2005), pp.137-140; M.V. Padkina and E.V. Sambuk, ‘Biochemical Genetics in 
St. Petersburg University: From Gene –Enzyme Model to Medical Biotechnology’, Russian Journal of Genetics, 
vol.43:10 (2007), pp.1135-1138. 
550 Alexander Vucinich, Science in Russian Culture, op cit, p.210, 211. 
551 Ibid, p.91, 327. 
552 Ibid. 
553 Ibid, p.321-322. 
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journals, Review of Psychiatry, Neurology, and Psychology (1895) and 
Psychology of Criminal Anthropology and Hypnotism (1904). 
  
After the end of the Civil War in the early 1920s, the biological sciences 
underwent significant expansion, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. 
Some commentators have even pointed out that in no other area of science 
in Russia was the ‘little revolution’ as vivid as it was in the biological 
sciences.554 Indeed, there is some evidence that in the initial stages of the 
Soviet regime, biology and medicine-related disciplines were considered a 
resource of great national significance and, as such, were granted 
preferential treatment in terms of support and patronage.555 Several factors 
account for the Bolsheviks’ inclination to promote the biological sciences. 
First, the advancement of biology held some promise to enhance human 
welfare which fit in the Bolsheviks’ overall utilitarian conception of science as 
a means of building a new, improved society based on Marxist principles. In 
particular, what captured the attention of the Soviet leaders were the 
fascinating breakthroughs associated with the unfolding revolution in 
experimental medicine which coincided with their ascent to power. 
Mesmerised by the tremendous transformative potential that the application 
of biological knowledge seemed to possess, they demonstrated firm 
dedication to fund undertakings of various kinds with the goal of advancing 
their own political objectives. A second factor worth noting pertains to the 
socio-economic and health conditions prevalent in early Soviet Russia. The 
involvement in World War One and the two Revolutions and subsequent Civil 
War coupled with the negative impact of the attempts to implement war 
communism left the state economically and demographically crippled, 
pervaded by famine, disease, and low morale. Since addressing such urgent 
ills was of paramount importance, highlighting the benefits that biology could 
yield if managed in accordance with the principles of equity and collectivism 
became an indispensable element of the Bolshevik propaganda. The third 
factor that had bearing on the rapid institutionalisation of the biological 
554 See Nikolai Krementsov, Revolutionary Experiments: The Quest for Immortality in Bolshevik Science and Fiction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Nikolai Krementsov, A Martian Stranded on Earth, op cit. 
555 The analysis on this point draws on the findings presented in Nikolai Krementsov, Revolutionary Experiments, op 
cit. 
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sciences was a matter of immediate concern to the Soviet leadership, namely 
the quality of their own health. Given the highly centralised government 
system, individual political figures enjoyed considerable influence. Yet being 
human and therefore susceptible to disease, their loss could pose some 
serious obstacles to the stability of the regime, not least in its initial stages. It 
suffices to mention that the high-rank Bolsheviks had access to healthcare 
and relevant facilities the quality of which far exceeded those available to the 
average Soviet citizen. Moreover, some disciplines, including endocrinology 
and the study of blood transfusion in part owed their establishment to their 
perceived utility to the top echelon of the Bolshevik Party.556 
 
The cumulative effect of those three factors manifested itself in the growth of 
the institutional infrastructure that facilitated the promotion and development 
of the life sciences. Several state entities offered funding opportunities for 
biology-related disciplines, including the People’s Commissariat of Public 
Health (Narodniy komissariat zdravookhraneniya: NARKOMZDRAV), 
People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment (Narodniy komissariat 
prosveshteniya: NARKOMPROS), and People’s Commissariat of Agriculture 
(Narodniy komissariat zemedeliya: NARKOMZEM). Research institutes 
specialising in a range of disciplines such as microbiology, infectious 
diseases, biochemistry, virology, zoology, palaeontology, morphology and 
genetics mushroomed from the 1920s onwards. One area that considerably 
flourished in the early days of the Soviet regime was social hygiene closely 
linked to the study of eugenics. Whilst the eugenics movement had its roots 
in Tsarist Russia, it was after the Bolshevik Revolution that the discipline was 
formally institutionalised and began to feature in formal medical curricula.557 
Unlike some of their foreign peers, Soviet social hygienists rejected racial 
discrimination, denouncing forced sterilisation and segregation, and instead 
focused on using the knowledge acquired on the principles of inheritance of 
556 Ibid. 
557 Nikolai Krementsov, ‘From “Beastly Philosophy” to Medical Genetics: Eugenics in Russia and the Soviet Union’,  
Annals of Science, vol.68:1 (2011), pp. 61-92; Nikolai Kreemntsov, ‘Eugenics in Russia and the Soviet Union’ in 
Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine, The Oxford Handbook on the History of Eugenics, op cit, pp.413-429.  On 
social hygiene, see Susan Gross Solomon, ‘Social Hygiene in Soviet Medical Education, 1922-1930’,  Journal of the 
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, vol.45 (1990), pp.607-643; Mark Adams et al. ‘Human Heredity and 
Politics: A Comparative Institutional Study of the Eugenics Record Office  at Cold Spring Harbour (United States), 
the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics (Germany), and the Maxim Gorky 
Medical Genetics Institute (USSR)’, Osiris, vol.20 (2005), pp.232-262.  
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traits to finding appropriate methods for improving the genetic quality of 
future generations.558 This trend was hardly surprising though since any 
policies based on racial, ethnic, let alone, socio-economic discrimination did 
not sit comfortably with the ideal of building a classless multinational state 
vigorously pursued by the Bolshevik leaders. At the same time, any 
measures directed at the eradication of disease and social degradation and 
overall human betterment were warmly welcomed, which in turn created 
favourable conditions for the promotion of eugenics both as a research and 
policy agenda. Spearheaded by prominent geneticists, including Nikolai 
Kol’tsov and Yurii Filipchenko, the social hygiene movement grew 
exponentially. In 1920 the Russian Eugenics Society (RES) was set up in 
Moscow and over the following years, similar research groups cropped up in 
provincial centres nation-wide. New journals, such as the Russian Eugenics 
Journal and the Herald of the Bureau of Eugenics were founded, and a 
massive propaganda campaign aimed as sensitising the general public on 
the value of social hygiene for the purposes of state-building and social 
welfare was launched. A direct implication of the convergence of interests 
and agendas pursued by the life scientists, on the one hand, and the Soviet 
leadership, on the other was the increasingly greater role that medical and 
public health officials came to play in social policy-making and 
implementation, effectively using eugenics to ‘bolster their claims as 
government experts and advisers in a variety of fields, ranging from family 
and marriage policies to pedagogy and demography.’559 It was precisely this 
legacy that continued to pervade decision-making on certain social policy 
issues in the Soviet Union even after eugenics was formally ‘abolished’ with 
the advent of Stalinism, mainly on politico-ideological grounds.560 
 
It would be naïve to assume therefore that the rapid expansion of the 
biological sciences in early Soviet Russia was solely state-driven. Indeed, as 
the government emerged as the sole patron and provider of material support 
for science, scientists eagerly sought to exploit the Bolsheviks’ preoccupation 
with the value of knowledge production for advancing their own agenda of 
558 Nikolai Krementsov, ‘From “Beastly Philosophy” to Medical Genetics, op cit, p.72. 
559 Ibid, p.90. 
560 Ibid, p.91. 
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sustaining and further enhancing the momentum of scientific progress. While 
initially reluctant to cooperate with the new leadership, life scientists, similarly 
to their counterparts in other fields, took full advantage of the opportunities 
made available adopting various tactics to highlight the practical benefits of 
their work and thus secure funding and acquire prominence.561 The net result 
of the synergy between the science-oriented policy of state agencies and the 
inclination of the life science community to excel and remain competitive with 
their international peers was the development of an extensive network of 
schools, faculties, experimental stations, laboratories, institutes, and 
universities dedicated to furthering teaching, research and development in 
biology-related fields. 
 
Besides the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the supreme all-Union 
scientific organisation, two other high-standing entities were established 
specifically for managing the work performed in the life sciences, namely the 
Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (Vsesoyuznaya akademiya 
sel’sko-khozyaistvenyi nauk imeni Lenina: VASKhNIL) founded in 1929 and 
the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR (Akademiya meditsinskikh 
nauk: AMN) founded in 1944. The Cold War and resultant arms race 
underpinned by the vigorous quest for scientific and technical superiority 
further intensified the efforts to promote research and development, 
something evident in the creation of ‘science cities’ such as Pushchino and 
Obolensk near Moscow, and Academgorodok and Kol’tsovo near Novosibirsk 
which housed some of the largest biological research complexes. A unique 
feature of the Soviet life science research infrastructure was the Anti-Plague 
(AP) System, a nation-wide network of institutes and stations designed to 
ensure adequate public health protection by serving multiple objectives 
including disease diagnostics and surveillance, development of therapeutics, 
and training and preparation of cadres. The scope of research carried out 
within the facilities of the AP System was broad, encompassing work on 
various highly dangerous infections (osobo opasniykh infektsii: OOI) caused 
by bacteria and viruses alike, regardless of whether their prime target was 
561 See Linda Lubrano and Susan Gross Solomon (ed.), The Social Context of Soviet Science (Boulder CO: 
Westview Press, 1980). 
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humans, plants, or animals. At the heart of the AP System was the ‘Microbe’ 
Institute in Saratov where the research on infectious diseases was 
transferred after the closure of Fort Alexander I. Five more research institutes 
formed the backbone of the System – Irkutsk, Rostov-on-Don, Alma-Ata, 
Volgograd, and Stavropol. In addition, more than twenty anti-plague stations 
were created across the USSR, for example, in Tbilisi, Baku, Dushanbe, 
Bishkek, Tashkent, Kishinev, Simferopol, and Odessa. From the 1960s 
onwards, all of the AP institutes and many of the stations were equipped with 
mobile units – specialised anti-epidemic brigades (spetsialniy 
protivoepidemicheskie brigadiy: SPEBiy) – to be rapidly deployed in case of a 
disease outbreak to isolate the epidemic perimeter, conduct tests and 
diagnostics, and offer clinical support and assistance.562  
 
Research and teaching units had a different standing within the Soviet 
ranking system. According to the classification adopted in 1951, there were 
three categories of scientific entities and it was this categorisation that 
determined the status of the organisation, its employment and equipment 
quota, and the amount of funding it was entitled to. The research and 
educational units under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences of the 
USSR and those dealing with military-oriented projects fell in the first and 
most privileged group; those associated with the Academy of the Medical 
Sciences, VASKhNIL, and the academies in the provincial Soviet Republics 
were divided between the first and second group; and the facilities related 
with ministries and those specialising in industrial and agricultural matters of 
local significance comprised the third group.563 
 
Besides the principle of institutional differentiation, the life science community 
was further organised on the basis of individual academic credentials. The 
latter had an enormous impact on scientists’ careers, since it determined the 
562 The special anti-epidemic teams (brigades) still exist in Russia today, see Federal Service for Surveillance in the 
Sphere of Consumers Rights Protection and Human Welfare, Modernized Specilaized Anti-Epidemic Teams of the 
ROSPOTREBNADZOR (Saratov: FGIH RusRAPI ‘Microbe’, 2014).   
563 See Zhores Medvedev, Soviet Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p.68-70. On research institutes, 
see also Alexander Korol, Soviet Research and Development: Its Organisation, Personnel, and Funds (Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press, 1965), particularly Chapter 5; Stephen Fortescue, Science Policy in the Soviet Union, (London: 
Routledge, 1990), particularly Chapter 6. 
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salary rate irrespective of the particular job position.564 A postgraduate 
research degree was thus a precondition both for a higher income and 
brighter career prospects, not to mention that the lack thereof virtually 
precluded independent research. There were two types of research degrees 
in the Soviet system: a ‘candidate of science’ approximately equal to a PhD, 
and a ‘doctor of science’ (doctor nauk) awarded as a result of a significant 
contribution to a specific field. Both degrees were granted upon a successful 
defence of an original written thesis in front of a specialised committee, with 
the final decision being made by the Highest Central Attestation Commission 
for Scientific Degrees and Titles at the Ministry of Education (Viyshaya 
attestatsionnaya komissiya: VAK). A ‘candidate’ degree constituted an 
essential requirement for applying for the ‘doctor’ one. Academic titles varied, 
as well and given the lack of a clear divide between research and teaching it 
was far from uncommon that individuals with a higher research degree would 
also hold an academic title, such as ‘docent’ (equivalent to associate 
professor), ‘professor’, ‘corresponding member of the Academy’, and ‘full 
academician’. 
 
Academic and professional merit was valued and awarded formal recognition 
at a national level. Established in 1925, the Lenin Prize (Leninskaya premiya) 
was the highest state acknowledgement of scientific achievement. Its award 
was suspended between 1935 and 1957, and in 1941 the Stalin Prize 
(Stalinskaya premiya) was introduced instead. There were three degrees of 
Stalin Prize granted in various areas of science, including separate 
categories for medicine, biology, and agriculture. During the Khrushchev era, 
the Stalin Prize was renamed State Prize (Gosudarstvennaya premiya) and 
the Lenin Prize was re-established in 1957 with a broader scope covering 
such areas as science, art, technology, literature, and journalism. 
Internationally, the Russian life sciences yielded two Nobel Prizes in 
medicine: one earned by Pavlov in 1904 and the other by Mechnikov in 1908. 
 
 
564 See Zhores Medvedev, Soviet Science, op cit. p.78-79. 
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Features of Soviet Biotechnology Governance  
 
The Soviet science system constituted a ‘carefully charted administrative 
pyramid’:565 it was ‘a huge, centralised, hierarchical institutional structure’566 
under the strict control of the Communist Party. To be sure, many of those 
features are to be observed as far as the governance of the life sciences is 
concerned. Yet rather than presenting a detailed historiographic account of 
the evolution of the institutional infrastructure tasked with the administration, 
coordination and control of Soviet biotechnology, the purpose of this section 
is to sketch the prevalent dynamics that shaped and impacted on the 
biotechnology enterprise until 1991. And those dynamics were hardly one-
sided. On the contrary, along with the top-down forces that directed life 
science practice, there were much more subtle in character but just as 
powerful in magnitude bottom-up pressures arising from within the life 
science community, as the latter strived to adapt to and in turn influence the 
formation and execution of policy. The resultant professional culture thus 
constituted a complex amalgamation of the norms of scientific research and 
the internalised artefacts of Soviet politics and ideology. 
 
Centralised Hierarchical Bureaucracies  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, several arms of the 
newly-established central government organ, the Council of People’s 
Commissars (Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov: SNK) assumed responsibility for 
the administration and financing of the biological sciences. General science 
policy was supervised by the Main Administration of Scientific Institutions 
(Glavnauka) established under NARKOMPROS. The role of Glavnauka was 
especially prominent as far as universities were concerned, not least 
because from the outset teaching institutions were subject to much stricter 
state control than the ones specialising chiefly in research.567 Research 
relevant to the needs and purposes of agriculture was governed by the 
565 Nicholas De Witt, ‘Reorganization of Science and Research in the U.S.S.R’ in Norman Kaplan ed. Science and 
Society, (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally & Company, 1965), p.303. 
566 Nikolai Kremenstov, Stalinist Science, p. 54. 
567 By design, the science system in the Soviet Union was conceived in a way whereby teaching and research were 
separated. Universities remained, as they were in Tsarist Russia, institutions focusing primarily on teaching, whilst 
research was concentrated in specialized research institutes.  
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Scientific Council created under NARKOMZEM. Medically-oriented research 
was primarily consolidated under the auspices of NARKOMZDRAV with two 
key institutions being in charge of its organisation and management, namely 
the Main Scientific Medical Council (Glavnyi Uchenyi Meditskinskii Sovet: 
GUMS) and the Pasteur State Institute of Healthcare (Gosudarstvenyi 
nauchnyi institute narodnogo zdravoohraneniya imeni Pastera: GINZ). 
Officially founded in 1920, GINZ was tasked with the ‘consolidation of 
scientific forces and the governance of relevant scientific research with clear 
practical application’.568 In terms of structure, GINZ constituted a centralised 
entity unifying eight large research institutes in a wide range of scientific 
enquiry, including biochemistry, microbiology, epidemiology, and nutrition 
physiology. Besides GINZ, other institutes, such as the State Institute of 
Social Hygiene, the Academy of Psycho-neurology and Clinical Institutes of 
Functional Diagnostics and Experimental Therapy, despite being much 
smaller in comparison, also contributed to the development of life science 
research in the early years of the new regime. A common underlying feature 
of the way in which the majority of those institutions were governed was the 
explicitly fundamental role played by individual directors which in turn 
accounts, at least in part, for the fact that many of them disintegrated 
following a change in leadership.569 
 
The science system underwent tremendous restructuring under Stalin’s rule 
and it was during this period that many of its key and long-lasting elements 
came into being. Starting in the late 1920s, the government embarked on a 
massive campaign for ensuring total control over each and every aspect of 
social life in the USSR. As a result, the Academy of Sciences, which until 
then enjoyed relative autonomy over its own affairs was brought under the 
stringent supervision of the Communist Party.570 In the area of life sciences 
two new state institutions were established under the command of SNK 
568 See (in Russian) Irina Karneeva, Istoria Formirovaniya i Dinamika Struktury Rossiiskoi Akademii Meditsinkskikh 
Nauk, Doctoral Thesis, Nauchno-issledovatelskii Centr “Meditsinkii Musei”, Russian Academy of Medical Sciences 
(RAMN), 1994, Moscow, p.34.  
569 Ibid, p.38. 
570 On the relationship between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and political power in the early days of the Soviet 
Union, see Loren Graham, The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party,1927-1932, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1967). A detailed account of the development of the Soviet Academy of Sciences is 
presented in Alexander Vucinich, Empire of Knowledge: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1917-1970), 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984). For a detailed overview on the development of the Academy, 
see Jack Cross, A Guide to the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2nd edition (Austin, Texas: Cross Associates, 1997). 
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(later, Sovet ministrov: SOVMIN), namely VASKhNIL and VIEM (All-Union 
Institute of Experimental Medicine, Vsesoyuznyi institute eksperimental’naya 
meditsina). The former was charged with overseeing the development of 
agricultural research and would in the later years become notorious as a 
bastion of Lysenkoism; the latter, founded in 1933, took over the coordination 
of biomedical research following the disintegration of GINZ three years 
earlier. Both VASKhNIL and VIEM were patterned on the bureaucratic 
structure of the USSR Academy of Science, that is, their main governing 
body, usually a presidium, comprised a range of designated sections and 
departments which dealt with personnel selection, planning, administration, 
enrolment, and student affairs.571 Since all members of the presidium had to 
be formally approved by the Party’s Central Committee, the government 
could exercise de facto control over the practice of scientific institutions.572 
By design, VIEM constituted a scientific complex with each department and 
its subordinate entities playing an essential role in the overall coordination 
and management of research. In 1944 following a decision (postanovlenie) of 
the SNK, it was officially transformed into the USSR AMN. According to that 
postanovlenie, AMN had three departments: Medico-Biological Sciences; 
Hygiene, Microbiology, and Epidemiology; and Clinical Medicine. The first 
president elect was academician Nikolay Burdenko, surgeon-in-chief of the 
Red Army during the Second World War and one of the founders of 
neuroscience in the USSR. From the outset, it became abundantly clear that 
AMN would conduct its affairs under the close supervision of the government, 
in particular, the Ministry of Healthcare (Ministerstvo zdravookhraneniya: 
MINZDRAV)573 and later, also the State Committee of Science and 
Technology (Gosudarstvenyi komitet po nauke i tekhnike: GKNT). For 
instance, when in 1947 MINZDRAV resolved to take steps toward regaining 
its administrative powers over a number of institutes and laboratories which 
after 1944 came under the auspices of AMN, the Academy’s presidium 
simply approved the resolution which it had been presented with.574 In a 
571 Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, op cit, p.38. 
572 Ibid. 
573 In 1946 Soviet commissariats became ministries.   
574 The report still requested MINZDRAV to reconsider their decision with regard to the Institute of Malaria, Medical 
Parasitology and Helminthology. In the end, all institutions initially named in the resolutions were transferred under 
the MINZDRAV, apart from the antibiotics laboratory of the Institute of Malaria and the neuropharmacology 
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similar fashion, in 1970 GKNT was tasked to consider MINZDRAV’s proposal 
for the establishment of an AMN affiliate in Novosibirsk, which the AMN’s 
presidium subsequently affirmed a year later. 
 
Besides VASKhNIL and AMN, at least two more entities featured prominently 
in the governance of biological research in the Soviet Union. One was the 
USSR Academy of Sciences through its Department of Chemical and 
Biological Sciences. Following the reforms in the 1960s and the emergence 
of GKNT as the ‘highest administrative-coordinating agency in the country’, 
the Academy effectively was turned into ‘its main arm in the field of basic 
research’ and so, ‘acquired the authority to make decisions mandatory for the 
republic academies.’575 As already noted MINZDRAV exercised direct control 
over a number of research establishments. The AP System outlined in the 
preceding section is a case in point. Placed under the direct oversight of the 
Main Sanitary Epidemiological Directorate (Glavnoe sanitarno-
epidemiologicheskoe upravlenie: GSEU) and later moved under the auspices 
of the Directorate of Quarantine Infections (Glavnoe upravlenie karantinnykh 
infektsii: GUKI), the AP System constituted a rigidly organised hierarchical 
structure comprising three main components: field stations,576 AP regional 
and observation stations, and AP institutes. Both the regional stations and 
the institutes received their funding from MINZDRAV but the former were still 
subordinate to the latter as far as scientific and methodological matters were 
concerned.577 
 
The overall hierarchical organisation of life science research was further 
replicated in the context of individual institutions. Research institutes, for 
instance, were typically governed on the principle of edinonachalie (one-man 
management), with the director enjoying predominant influence and decision-
making powers. Local party units played a major role in the selection of 
laboratory. See Irina Karneeva, Istoria Formirovaniya i Dinamika Struktury Rossiiskoi Akademii Meditsinkskikh 
Nauk, op cit, p.75-76.  
575 Alexander Vucinich, Empire of Knowledge: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1917-1970), (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), p.304-305. 
576 Field stations typically referred to ‘support points, test field and experimental stations’. See Alexander  Korol, 
Soviet Research and Development: Its Organization, Personnel, and Funds, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), 
p.144.  
577 See Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, ‘Growth of the Anti-Plague System during the Soviet Period’, Critical 
Reviews in Microbiology, vol.32 (2006), p.42-43.   
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candidates for the director’s post and high-level sanction was required for 
any successful nominee before they could assume position. Once in power, 
institute directors could not be challenged and would often serve for an 
indefinite period of time.578 Beneath the director, there were a number of 
deputy directors each performing a distinct scope of functions. The deputy 
director for science (zamestitel’ direktora po nauke) was the second most 
important person in the hierarchy, usually tasked with overseeing research 
activities and standing in for the director in their absence. By contrast, other 
deputy directors dealt with administrative matters for which a scientific 
background was often not required and, as such, served primarily as 
assistants to the director.579 The highest institutional collective body was the 
Academic Council (uchenyi sovet) which, whilst providing some space for 
inclusive discussion, had little decision-making power, insofar as its 
resolutions and recommendations needed the director’s approval prior to 
implementation.580 The Council was further responsible for the monitoring 
and evaluation of projects and the overall progress of the institute, as well as 
for reviewing professional appointments and existing contract renewals. It 
was, by and large, made up of the senior management including 
administrative staff, the Communist Party local secretary, a trade union 
representative, senior researchers, and heads of departments (otdely) and 
laboratories. 
  
Top-Down Regulation 
 
In the USSR, the state was the chief and only patron of scientific R&D and 
the sole initiator and guardian of relevant rules and regulations. Virtually each 
and every aspect of science practice was subject to detailed and extensive 
regulatory oversight. Designated state agencies oversaw the implementation 
and verified compliance with the various respective laws, decrees, executive 
orders, and decisions.  
578 Some commentators note, for example, that directors were appointed for a three-year term which was renewable 
indefinitely. See Norman Kaplan, ‘Research Administration and the Administrator: U.S.S.R. and U.S.’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, vol.6:1 (1961), p.54.  
579 See Stephen Fortescue, Science Policy in the Soviet Union (London: Routledge, 1990), p.100. 
580 Ibid, p.102. 
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By dint of being closely linked to the economy, scientific research in the 
USSR was subject to meticulous high-level planning. Implicit in this trend was 
a recognition that science constituted a natural resource for the development 
of which the state was directly responsible. By the early 1930s, an array of 
principles of planned science were enunciated ranging from ‘a stress on 
empirical data on the organisation and personnel of the science 
establishment, to enthusiastic calls for increased creativity by the promoters 
of NONT [nauchnaya organizatsiia nauchnogo truda – scientific management 
of scientific labour], to the efforts to establish priorities and identify the 
functions of science planning’.581 In 1931 one of the key figures in the 
Bolshevik Party, Nikolai Bukharin, outlined a detailed proposal mapping five 
different areas of science that could be planned, including (1) the amount of 
labour force and budgetary resources to be devoted to science; (2) the 
logistical support of scientific research institutions; (3) the geographical 
placement of research facilities; (4) the number, distribution, qualifications 
and use of scientific personnel; and (5) the subjects of scientific research.582 
Following the administrative and structural reforms under Stalin, as part of 
which the State Planning Committee (Gosudarstvennaya planovaya 
komissiya: GOSPLAN) was brought under the auspices of SNK (and later, 
SOVMIN), planning became formally and permanently embedded in the 
overall science policy. By design, science planning covered not only 
budgetary, logistical, and personnel matters but also the range of research 
topics to be studied and the specific research targets to be met. For instance, 
the first Five-Year Plan for the Development of AMN SSSR presented in 
1945 listed a number of basic research problems deemed of high priority, 
namely:583 
1. Combating infectious diseases 
581 By the early 1920s Taylorism had become a buzzword for both the NOT movement – nauchnaya organizatsiia 
truda [‘scientific management of labour’] – launched by Alexei Gastev with the goal of improving the productivity of 
factory workers and its companion, the NONT movement – nauchnaya organizatsiia nauchnogo truda [‘scientific 
management of scientific labour’] – which focused specifically on increasing the productivity of researchers by 
examining the type of factors with impact on individual creativity. See Loren Graham, The Soviet Academy of 
Sciences, 1927-1932, op cit, particularly Chapter 2; Kendall Bailes, ‘Alexei Gastev and the Soviet Controversy over 
Taylorism, 1918-24’, Soviet Studies, vol.29:3 (1977), pp.373-394; Isaac Deutscher, ‘Socialist Competition’, Foreign 
Affairs, vol.30, April (1952), pp.376-390. 
582 See Loren Graham, ‘The Development of Science Policy in the Soviet Union’ in T. Dixon Long and Christopher 
Wright, Science Policies of Industrial Nations, op cit, p.24. 
583 See Irina Karneeva, Istoria Formirovaniya i Dinamika Struktury Rossiiskoi Akademii Meditsinkskikh Nauk, op cit, 
p.67. 
205 
 
                                                          
2. Eradication of the health consequences of war 
3. The issue of long-term effects of war trauma and disability 
4. The issue of plastic surgery 
5. The issue of child- and mother-care 
6. The issue of cancer, tuberculosis, and ulcers. 
Even so, some commentators, however, have remained deeply sceptical of 
the extent to which science planning developed in practice, noting that the 
Soviet Union’s attempts to establish planned science remained contained ‘in 
the rise and fall of various planning committees’ and even Bukharin’s report 
appeared more as a blueprint for the planning for science rather than for the 
planning of science.584 
 
Research work was subject to strict state control with virtually each and every 
aspect being formally regulated. In the life sciences this is particularly vivid as 
far as laboratory biosafety practices and procedures were concerned. One 
aspect worth noting is that measures for ensuring research safety had a long-
standing tradition in the biological sciences in the USSR dating back to the 
late nineteenth century. Indeed, accounts of the efforts to combat plague 
outbreaks in the Russian Empire in the pre-bacteriological age and early 
twentieth century offer some insight into the measures adopted by the 
medical personnel including personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
decontamination methods. Models of respirators and special clothing 
designed to ensure the safe treatment of patients emerged as early as 1878 
and whilst no data are available whether those models achieved practical 
realisation at the time, evidence suggests that by 1910 crude prototypes 
were already in use.585 Moreover, a detailed description of the way in which 
Fort Alexander I was organised and operated has revealed that attempts to 
ensure the safe handling of dangerous pathogens under laboratory 
conditions seemed to have attracted scientists’ attention long before the 
Bolshevik Revolution.586 
 
584 See Loren Graham, The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927-1932, op cit, p.67. 
585 Mikhail Supotnitskii and Nadezhda Supotnitskaia, Ocherki Istorii Chumy, op cit, see Ocherk XXXI. 
586 Ibid, see Ocherk XXX.  
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In the USSR MINZDRAV was the principal agency responsible for the 
development of relevant instructions, orders, and rules with regard to 
laboratory biosafety. By and large, those were binding documents which 
entered into force immediately after they had been officially issued. Key 
orders (prikazy) included ‘On Measures for the Improvement of Occupational 
Safety in Institutions, Enterprises, and Organisations within the System of the 
USSR Ministry of Health’ (1968), ‘On Measures Undertaken for the Further 
Improvement Occupational Safety and Safety Equipment’ (1982), and ‘On 
Strengthening the Regime of Work with Pathogenic Microorganisms’ 
(1977).587 Rules and state standards further covered such areas as the 
accounting, storage, handling, release and transfer of pathogenic and toxin 
cultures; safety equipment and occupation health regime during 
biotechnology production; occupational safety during disinfection and 
decontamination; and work with aerosols of highly pathogenic organisms.588 
Non-compliance with any of the regulations was deemed a legal offence, with 
liability usually shared among the institution administration and 
laboratory/departmental heads. In 1989 MINZDRAV released a document 
titled Health and Anti-Epidemic Rules on the Safety of Work with 
Recombinant DNA Molecules (Bezopasnost raboty s rekombinantnymi DNK. 
Sanitarno-protivoepidemicheskie pravila) developed by the Interdepartmental 
Commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences and modelled on the Soviet 
Temporary Rules of the Safety of Work with Recombinant DNA (1978) and 
the US NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules 
(1986). Unlike the NIH Guidelines which covered only federally-funded 
research, MINZDRAV Rules extended to any organisation or institution 
conducting research involving recombinant DNA, whether for scientific of 
industrial purposes.  
587 See [in Russian] Prikaz Minzdrava SSSR, O merakh po uluchsheniyu okhrany truda v uchrezhdeniyakh, 
predpriyatiyakh i organizatsiyakh sistemy Ministerstva zdravookhraneniya SSSR, no.494, 20 June 1968; Prikaz 
Minzdrava SSSR, O merakh po dal’neishemu uluchsheniyu okhrany truda i tekhniki bezopasnosti v organakh, 
uchrezhdeniyakh, organizatsiyakh i na predpriyatiyakh sistemy Ministerstva zdravookhraneniya SSSR, No.862, 30 
August 1982; Prikaz Minzdrava SSSR, Ob usilenii rezhima raboty s patogennymi mikroorganizmami, No.142, 22 
February 1977.   
588 See [in Russian] Pravila ustroistva, tehkniki, bezopasnosti, proizvodstvennoi sanitarii, 
protivoepidemiologicheskogo rejima i lichnoi gigieny pri rabote v laboratoriyakh (otdeleniyakh, otdelakh) sanitarno-
epidemiologicheskikh uchrezhdenii sistemy Ministrestva zdravookhraneniya SSSR, Moscow: 1981; ‘Occupational 
Safety Standard: Biological Safety’ (GOST 12.1.008-76 Mezhgosudarstvennyi standart: Biologicheskaya 
bezopasnost’), issued on 1/01/1977; ‘Occupational Safety Standards System: Means of Protection’ (GOST 
12.4.011-89 Gosudarstvennyi standart Soyuza SSR: Sistema standartov bezopasnosti truda: Sredstva zashtity 
rabotajushchikh), issued on 1/07/1990. 
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Science secrecy, a trend characteristic of the Cold War period as noted in 
Chapter 3, was institutionalised in the USSR, effectively redefining the norm 
of scientific openness by equating it with a criminal ‘anti-patriotic’ activity. In 
1947 the highest legislative body, the USSR Supreme Soviet (Verkhovnyi 
Sovet SSSR), enacted a new decree ‘On Responsibility for Disclosure of 
State Secrets’ which envisaged severe penalties, including confinement to a 
labour camp for a term of eight to twenty years for anyone who shared or 
otherwise revealed information classified as a ‘state secret’.589 For the 
purposes of the new law, ‘state secret’ was broadly defined and included 
‘discoveries, inventions, technical improvements, research, and experimental 
work in all spheres of science, technology, and the national economy until 
they are fully completed and permission has been obtained for 
publication.’590 The law was in some respects the materialisation of a move 
toward enhanced secrecy that had been steadily underway at least from the 
1930s. An administrative reform introduced by the revised 1936 USSR 
Constitution provides some evidence in this regard. The reform in question 
related to the restructuring of the Main Directorate for Literary and Publishing 
Affairs (Glavnoe upravlenie po delam literaturyiizdatel’stv: GLAVLIT) 
originally created under NARKOMPROS to oversee the publication of written 
materials and ensure their ideological coherence and subsequently 
converted into a stand-alone unit under the direct control of SNK renamed to 
Main Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press (Glavnoe 
upravlenie po okhrane gosudarstvenikh tain v pechati: GLAVLIT). Thus 
reformed the agency was tasked with the supervision of the media and press, 
to prevent the broadcast, publication, or other forms of dissemination of 
classified and sensitive information. 
 
Scientific publishing, too, was closely monitored and readily demonstrated 
compliance with the tightened secrecy measures. For example, when in 1947 
the Orgburo of the Communist Party’s Central Committee (Tsentral’nyi 
589 See Nikolai Krementsov, ‘In the Shadow of the Bomb: US-Soviet Biomedical Relations in the Early Cold War, 
1944-1948’, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol.9:4 (2007) p.59. See also, Nikolai Krementsov, The Cure: A Story of 
Cancer and Politics from the Annals of the Cold War (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002). On the issue 
of scientific publication in the Soviet Union, see also Aleksey Levin, ‘Anatomy of a Public Campaign: “Academician 
Luzin’s Case” in Soviet Political History’, Slavic Review, vol.49:1 (1990), pp.90-108.  
590 Nikolai Kremtsov, ‘In the Shadow of the Bomb’, op cit.  
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komitet: TsK) shut down several scientific journals which had been made 
available in foreign languages on the grounds of national security against 
potential espionage, the USSR Academy of Sciences was quick to release 
that same day its own instructions ‘On the Principle of Scientific Publications’ 
which prohibited the Academy’s journals from translating their abstracts and 
tables of contents into foreign languages.591 The practice soon became 
ubiquitous thanks to the active intervention of the Communist Party and its 
regional and local committees. The culture of secrecy featured vividly in the 
life sciences, not least because of the blanket ‘information eclipse’ imposed 
over disseminating any information related to such socially sensitive issues 
as infant/children mortality, infectious diseases, abortion, drug abuse, 
sexually-transmitted diseases, and alcoholism.592 Official statistics on those 
matters were often skewed in favour of the state in order to be suitable for 
propaganda purposes. Likewise, life science theses, whether at kandidat or 
doctor level that dealt with a topic deemed sensitive or secret were defended 
before much smaller committees comprising pre-selected individuals who 
had ‘the right to know’. Upon a successful defence, such theses were 
classified as ‘internal use only’ (dlya sluzhebnogo pol’zovaniya: DSP) and 
were never made publicly available.593 
  
State/Party Control 
 
According to Article 6 of the USSR Constitution adopted on 7 October 1977 
The Communist Party of the USSR [CPSU] is the 
leading and directing force of the Soviet society, the 
nucleus of its political system and state and social 
organisations. CPSU exists for the people and 
serves the people.594 
 
591 Ibid, p.60. 
592 See Casey Mahoney, James Toppin, and Raymond Zilinskas, Stories of the Soviet Anti-Plague System, CNS 
Occasional Paper No.18, (Monterey CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2013), particularly Part II, ‘The 
Anti-Plague System in Russian and Western Media’.  
593 Interview, 25 March 2014, Tbilisi, Georgia. See also [in Russian] N. Makhotina, ‘Fond izdanii ogranichennogo 
rasprostraneniya v biblioteke: teoreticheskoe i instruktivno-metodicheskoe obespechenie’, Bibliosfera, No.1 (2007), 
pp.68-71.    
594 See (in Russian) Konstitutsia (Osnovnoi Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskih Sotsialisticheskih Respublik, Verkhovnogo 
Soveta SSSR, 7 October 1977, available at http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/cnst1977.htm#i (accessed 11/03/2015). 
Author’s translation. 
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What is curious about the text is not so much its contents as it is the fact that 
this was the first time it appeared in the Constitution, since neither of its 
earlier versions – of 1924 and 1936 – made an explicit reference to the 
leading role of the Party in the organisation and conduct of political and social 
affairs. Yet this is not to say that the 1977 addition introduced a substantive 
change but rather, it merely affirmed a long-established trend dating back to 
the early days of the Bolshevik regime. Indeed, enormous as it was, the state 
bureaucratic machine served as little more than a mechanism for putting into 
effect the vision, decisions, and proposals of the Communist Party’s TsK and 
its Politburo. 
 
Science governance, too, was subject to close supervision by the Party 
exercised through its dense network of institutional, local, regional, and 
national committees tasked with monitoring political behaviour and ensuring 
ideological obedience. Besides the formal measures codified in various 
legislative instruments, prikazy and policies, there existed other less 
conspicuous forms of political control. The nomenklatura system was a case 
in point. Whist not officially defined, it provided the basis for personnel 
recruitment, appointment and career development in virtually any walk of life, 
science included. By design, it constituted ‘a list of posts that could not be 
occupied or vacated without permission from the appropriate party 
committee’: 
The nomenklatura system was strictly hierarchical – 
the higher the post, the higher the party committee 
controlling its personnel. The posts of president, 
vice-president, and scientific secretary of such 
central institutions as the USSR Academy of 
Sciences and VASKhNIL, were in the nomenklatura 
of the Politburo. The posts of institute director and 
editor-in-chief of a journal were in the nomenklatura 
of the Central Committee Secretariat. The position 
of laboratory head belonged to the nomenklatura of 
the regional party committee. Even the post of 
librarian in a scientific institute was in the 
nomenklatura of the local party committee.595 
 
595 Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, op cit, p.40.  
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The ‘affirmative action’ known in the Soviet Union as vydvizhenie was 
another set of measures designed to promote party loyalist to key positions 
within the scientific community. Featuring stipends, bursaries, relaxed entry 
requirements to higher education, university admission quotas, and 
accelerated courses, vydvizhenie granted trusted proletarian and peasant 
youth access to graduate training (aspirantura) and the prospect for a 
subsequent speedy ascent up the career ladder in their chosen field of study. 
As a result of the ‘affirmative action’, a considerable number of women, 
representatives of ethnic minorities, and students from underprivileged 
backgrounds and remote areas of the country found their way to comfortable 
positions in life science research.596 
 
Taken together, the nomenklatura system and the vydvizhenie campaign 
allowed the Communist Party to tighten its grip and keep scientists in check. 
Their positive outcomes notwithstanding, the net effect of those policies 
manifested itself in the reconfiguration of power distribution across the 
scientific community both horizontally and vertically by dint of elevating 
political loyalty at the expense of talent as the primary criterion for promotion 
and awarding merit and recognition. 
The negative impact of the State-Party monopoly on the development of 
science in qualitative terms is difficult to overstate. The prominent Soviet 
physicist and dissident, and a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Andrei Sakharov 
has described in a succinct manner the far-reaching pernicious implications 
of the institutionalisation and forced imposition of ideology upon society: 
The complete unification of ideology at all times 
and places – from the school desk to the 
professorial chair – demands that people become 
hypocrites, timesavers, mediocre, and stupidly self-
deceiving. The tragicomic, ritualistic farce of the 
loyalty oathis played over and over, relegating to 
the background all considerations of practicality, 
common sense, and human dignity. Writers, artists, 
actors, teachers, and scholars are under such 
monstrous ideological pressure that one wonders 
why art and humanities have not altogether 
596 See Alexander Korol, Soviet Research and Development, op cit, p. 123; also see Olga Valkova, ‘The Conquest 
of Science: Women and Science in Russia, 1860-1940’, Osiris, vol.23:1 (2008), pp.136-165 (Special issue on 
‘Intelligentsia Science: The Russian Century, 1860-1960’).  
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vanished in our country. The influence of those 
same anti-intellectual factors on the exact sciences 
and the applied sciences is more indirect but not 
less destructive.597  
  
At times, the struggle to affirm the Party’s dominant role in society and 
politics materialised in an overt expression of power, as evidenced in the 
activity of the secret police in the face of the People’s Commissariat of 
Internal Affairs (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrenninkh Del: NKVD) which 
reached its peak during the Stalinist era. Surveillance, repressions, purges, 
and arrests pervaded the scientific community spreading fear and creating an 
atmosphere of suspicion and permanent distrust, thus impinging scientific 
openness and eroding collegiality. The growing politicisation of the scientific 
community, structured along the lines of ‘us’ (true Communists) and ‘them’ 
(‘bourgeois’ researchers) paved the way for framing scientific disputes in 
political terms and thus, ridding science of traitors and unreliable cadres.  
International contacts were curtailed, foreign visits limited and trips abroad 
restricted. The organisation of scientific meetings and conferences was 
hampered, a vivid illustration of which were the administrative bottlenecks 
encountered during the preparation of the Seventh International Congress in 
Genetics initially scheduled to be held in Moscow in 1937 and subsequently 
relocated to Edinburgh in 1939.598  
 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s monumental work, The Gulag Archipelago, offers a 
glimpse of the harsh reality brought about by the Stalinist regime, whereby 
the state apparatus employed a vast array of cunning tactics to crush virtually 
any form of resistance or opposition.599 Arbitrary arrests, a prolonged 
detention under severe conditions, and an exile in gulag – the state operated 
network of concentration camps where human life was deemed expendable – 
was the most common scenario for those with ‘dangerous minds’, who were 
not immediately sentenced to death. More than 20 million people 
597 Andrei Sakharov, My Country and the World (London: Collins and Harvill Press, 1975), p.30.  
598 See Nikolai Krementsov, International Science between the World Wars: The Case of Genetics, (London: 
Routledge, 2005). 
599 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). See also Oleg Khlevniuk, 
‘The Gulag and the Non-Gulag as One Interrelated Whole’, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 
vol.16:3 (2015), pp.479-498; Harvey Fireside, ‘Dissident Visions of the USSR: Medvedev, Sakharov and 
Solzhenitsyn’, Polity, vol. 22:2 (1989), pp.213-229. 
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‘disappeared’ in Stalin’s labyrinth of horror and hopelessness. The 
intelligentsia suffered immensely. Those scientists, who despite being 
arrested somehow managed to avoid a death sentence, or a placement in a 
labour camp (gulag), mostly continued their research in prison research 
institutes (sharashki) and prison scientific complexes under severe 
conditions.600 A case in point is the career of one of Nikolai Kol’tsov’s 
students, Nikolay Timofeev-Ressovsky.601 Upon Kol’tsov’s recommendation, 
Timofeev-Ressovsky was sent to work at the Keiser Wilhelm Institute for 
Brain Research in Berlin, alongside with Oskar Vogt – the scientist who 
studied Lenin’s brain after the Soviet leader’s death. The ‘German’ period in 
the career of Timofeev-Ressovsky makes him a deeply controversial figure, 
not least because of the alleged links between his workplace and the Third 
Reich. There is some evidence that he wanted to return to the USSR in the 
mid-1930s, but was advised by Kol’tsov not to, due to the unravelling witch-
hunt in the field of genetics, that was caused by the rise of Lynsekoism (the 
latter is dicussed below). After the fall of Berlin in 1945, Timofeev-Ressovsky 
was arrested by the Soviet Army and subsequently sent to a ‘sharashka’ near 
Sungul’ in the southern Urals, alongside with captured German scientists.602 
There, he headed the biology division of ‘Laboratory B’, taking the lead on 
the study of the impact of radiation on living organisms. Despite his post, he 
lived in similar conditions as the rest of the prisoners. Timofeev-Ressovsky’s 
resilience during the years of imprisonment undoubtedly proved instrumental 
for restablishing his scientific career on Soviet soil in the second half of the 
twentieth century. More importantly, it is indicative of what Joseph Brodsky’s 
refers to as ‘turning the other cheek’ in a way that would make evil appear 
‘absurd through excess’:603 
 
[…] it suggests rendering evil absurd through 
dwarfing its demands with the volume of your 
compliance, which devalues the harm. […] The 
victory that is possible here is not a moral but an 
existential one. The other cheek here sets in motion 
not the enemy’s sense of guilt (which he is perfectly 
600 On ‘sharashki’, see Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); Asif Siddiqi, 
‘Scientists and Specialists in Gulag: Life and Death in Stalin’s Sharashka’, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and 
Eurasian History, vol.16:3 (2015), pp.557-588. 
601 See [in Russian] Daniil Granin, Zubr (Leningrad (St Petersburg): Sovetskii pisatel’, 1987).  
602 See [in Russian] Aleksandr Moiseev, Nemtsy na yuzhnom Urale (Chelyabinsk: Moi dom, 2013).  
603 Joseph Brodsky, Less Than One: Selected Essays (London: Penguin, 1986), p.389. 
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capable of quelling) but exposes his senses and 
faculties to the meaninglessness of the whole 
enterprise: the way every form of mass production 
does.604  
 
By design, the ‘sharashka’ setting was anything but intellectually stimulating 
or welcoming to science. Work was organised in a routine manner, discipline 
was strict, and contacts with the outside world were close to non-existant. 
Still, the fact that the scientific mind and genius could not only survive, but, at 
times even thrive within this context highlights both the absurdity of the 
sharashka system and the limits of its dehumanising effects.  
 
As the Cold War was moving into top gear in the late 1940s, the Party once 
more tightened its ideological grip, which the brief rapprochement with the 
West in the final stages of the Second World War seemed to have relaxed. 
This resolve, in turn, gave rise to a ‘strident ideological campaign’ named 
after its principal architect, the Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov – 
zhdanovshchina.605 Underpinned by vociferous criticism against ‘the 
pernicious influence of burgeois culture’, the campaign vigorously attacked 
public figures for ‘servility and slavishness before Western culture’.606 
Science, just as other areas of social activity, was hardly insulated from the 
effects of the Party quest for ideological supremacy, whereby ‘militant Soviet 
nationalism’ supplanted scientific internationalism and ideologists assumed 
power over the management of science.607 
 
The notorious KR Affair involving two prominent life scientists, Grigorii Roskin 
and Nina Klyueva, demonstrated that even in the late 1940s when the Soviet 
leadership was desperate to attain the nuclear weapon technology, physics 
was hardly the only area of science that attracted the attention of the 
Politburo. Indeed, symbolically referred to as a ‘biological atomic bomb’, 
Kluyeva and Roskin’s anticancer drug research was deemed of such an 
immense value to the Kremlin that attempts to share the results with 
American colleagues and engage in active collaboration resulted in the 
604 Ibid. 
605  Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, op cit, p.129.  
606 Ibid. 
607 Ibid, p.131. 
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Soviet scientists being subject to official public reprimand for their anti-
patriotic actions and forced to acknowledge their mistakes at an honour court 
trial.608 The case had far-reaching implications for the Soviet scientific 
community as a whole. For instance, following the TsK’s Orgburo refusal to 
allow the USSR Academy of Sciences to elect prominent foreign scientists as 
corresponding members in the aftermath of the KR Affair, Soviet researchers 
were in turn required to give up their positions in scientific societies abroad. 
Moreover, any international scientific visits to and from the Soviet Union had 
to be explicitly approved by the Politburo, with Soviet delegations being 
accompanied by a representative of the secret police and specifically 
instructed on what they could and could not do.609 The Party further used the 
KR Affair to re-educate the scientific community about their patriotic duties 
and responsibilities and, more broadly, about the appropriate manner of 
professional behaviour in light of the constant threat of coming into contact 
with Western intelligence services. 
 
By far the most often cited and well-documented example of an attempt to 
bring science under political control initiated by the Communist Party is the 
fate of genetics following the Lysenko Affair.610 Contrary to the popular view, 
it is naïve to assess the events of 1948 and resultant ‘death sentence’ for 
modern genetics in the USSR solely through the lens of a clash between 
608 See Nikolai Krementsov, ‘In the Shadow of the Bomb, op cit.  
609 Ibid, p.60-61. 
610 The Lysenko Affair has been well documented. Examples include David Jarovsky, The Lysenko Affair, (Chicago 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Zhores Medvedev, The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko, (New York, NY: 
University of Columbia Press, 1969); Dominique Lecourt, Proletarian Science: The Case of Lysenko, (London: NLB, 
1977); Nils Roll-Hansen, The Lysenko Effect: The Politics of Science, (Amherst NY: Humanity Books, 2005); 
Richard Lewontin and Richard Levins, ‘The Problem of Lysenkoism’ in Hilary Rose and Steven Rose (ed.) The 
Radicalisation of Science: Ideology of/in the Natural Sciences, (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1976), pp. 
32-64; Nils Roll-Hansen, ‘The Persistence of T.D. Lysenko’s Agrobiology in the Politics of Science’, Osiris, vol.23:1 
(2008), pp.166-188;  William Dejong-Lambertand and Nikolai Krementsov, ‘On Labels and Issues: The Lysenko 
Controversy and the Cold War’,  Journal of the History of Biology¸ vol.45 (2012), pp.373-388; Michael Gordin, ‘How 
Lysenkoism Became Pseudoscience: Dobzhansky to Velikovsky’, Journal of the History of Biology, vol.45 (2012), 
pp.443-468; George Bernard Shaw, ‘Behind the Lysenko Controversy’, The Saturday Review of Literature, 16 April 
1949, p.10; H.J. Muller, ‘It Still Isn’t a Science: A Reply to George Bernard Shaw’, The Saturday Review of 
Literature, 16 April 1949, p.11; Julian Huxley, ‘Soviet Genetics: The Real Issue’, Nature, vol.163:4155 (1949), 
pp.935-942; Nils Roll-Hansen, ‘The Practice Criterion and the Rise of Lysenkoism’, Science and Technology 
Studies, vol.2:1 (1989), pp.3-16; Maxim Mikulak, ‘Darwinism, Soviet Genetics, and Marxism-Leninism’, Journal of 
the History of Ideas, vol.31:3 (1970), pp.359-376; Nikolai Krementsov, ‘A “Second Front” in Soviet Genetics: The 
International Dimension of the Lysenko Controversy, 1944-1947’, Journal of the History of Biology, vol.29:2 (1996), 
pp.229-250; David Holloway, ‘Scientific Truth and Political Authority in the Soviet Union’, Government and 
Opposition, vol5:3 (1970), pp.345-367; Kirill Rossianov, ‘Editing Nature: Joseph Stalin and the “New” Soviet 
Biology’, Isis, vol.84 (1993), pp.728-745; Olga Elina et al. ‘Plant Breeding on the Front: Imperialism, War, and 
Exploitation’, Osiris, vol.20 (2005), pp.161-179; [in Russian] E. Levina, Vavilov, Lysenko, Timofeev-Resovsky: 
Biologiya v SSSR: Istoriya i istoriografiya, (Moscow: Airo, 1995). A far less documented example of pseudoscience 
is Olga Lepeshinskaya’s theory of the critical role of cell membranes in the life of the cell. Despite her success in 
securing some political endorsement for her work, the case of Lepenshinskaya has received considerably less 
attention than the one of Lysenko’s. See Valery Soyfer, ‘Stalin and Fighters against Cellular Theory’, Studies in the 
History of Biology, vol.3:2 (2011), pp.83-96.   
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science and ideology. Rather, in order to grasp and appreciate both the 
nature and implications of the Lysenko Affair, it is essential to uncover and 
analyse the complex dynamics that underpinned it, as well as to take into 
account the context provided by the rise of zhdanovshchina 
 
The name of Trofim Lysenko gained in popularity during the 1930s and 
especially the 1940s in the USSR in connection with his ‘sensational’ 
discoveries in agrobiology, a discipline that he himself coined drawing upon 
concepts from plant physiology, genetics, cytology, and evolutionary 
theory.611 A notable representative of vydvizhenie, Lysenko managed to 
secure the Communist Party high command’s praise and protection on the 
grounds of his ‘scientific’ work on plant vernalisation which, in his own words, 
offered tremendous practical benefits for revitalising Soviet agriculture. To 
further boost his claims, he argued in favour of a proletarian-style 
(Lamarckian) genetics based on the theory of environmentally acquired 
characteristics. Lysenko’s quick ascent in the scientific hierarchy and 
eventual appointment as president of VASKhNIL in 1938 allowed him to 
solidify his position and set the scene for the fateful 1948 VASKhNIL meeting 
at which the triumph of Lysenkoism over ‘bourgeois’ genetics was officially 
proclaimed.612 
 
While high-level sanction and support from Politburo played an indispensable 
role in facilitating the rise of Lysenkoism as a dominant doctrine in science, 
several other factors provided a favourable atmosphere for it to flourish. By 
the mid-1930s, modern genetics and its scholars in the Soviet Union were 
already treated with suspicion by the Communist Party leadership, not least 
because of its linkage to eugenics and the racial discrimination and ‘fascist’ 
policies promulgated in Nazi Germany. At the same time, following the forced 
collectivisation of agriculture, finding ways to improve efficiency and increase 
crop yields became top state priorities. It was against this backdrop that the 
figure of Trofim Lysenko – a peasant with virtually no formal schooling but 
deeply committed to the goals and ideology of the party – came to the fore 
611 See Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, p.59.  
612 See, for example, [in Russian] Dmitrii Zykov, Oshibochnye polozheniya v agronomicheskom uchenii V.R. 
Vil’yamsa v svete nauchnogo analiza T.D. Lysenko, (Alma-Ata: Kazakh State Publishing House, 1951).  
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proposing a relatively simple technique ‘proven’ to deliver rapid practical 
results and enhanced farming productivity. To complete the picture, his work 
enjoyed some initial recognition and praise from within the life science 
community and even one of his later, most vocal critics, Nikolai Vavilov, was 
on record proudly announcing Lysenko’s ‘remarkable discovery’ at the Sixth 
International Congress in Genetics in the US in 1932.613 A few years later, 
both Vavilov and Kol’tsov, among others, fell victims to the witch-hunt, 
directed against those who opposed Lysenko’s ideas and as such, were seen 
as anti-Soviet.614  
 
One additional factor that had bearing on the way in which the Lysenko Affair 
unfolded pertained to the extension of party culture and rituals to the area of 
science. In the absence of political opposition, the Communist Party adopted 
a system of inter-party democracy featuring various deliberative mechanisms 
designed to resolve controversies and prevent power abuse within the 
hierarchies. Given the centrality of science as an institution of social and 
political significance and the need to stimulate its progress, the Party, 
through its Department of Propaganda and Agitation (Upravlenie agitatsii i 
propagnady: AGITPROP) sought to utilise the deliberative tools available at 
its disposal for tackling the scientific disputes of the day. Among the areas 
that attracted AGITPROP’s attention were philosophy, genetics, linguistics, 
physiology, and political economy. The 1948 VASKhNIL meeting that  
affirmed the victory of Lysenkoism thus resembled a party congress (s’’ezd) 
the overall goal of which was to produce a single unified and final true 
answer of the debate between geneticists and Lysenkoists. The defeated 
side was then expected to ‘disarm’ themselves through samokritika (self-
criticism) and admit to their ‘mistakes’. A similar pattern was adopted in the 
other four disputes of the period, yet none of them produced the tragic result 
613 See Nikolai Vavilov, The Process of Evolution in Cultivated Plants, Sixth International Congress of Genetics, 
1932, Ithaca, USA. Available at http://www.esp.org/books/6th-congress/facsimile/contents/6th-cong-p331-
vavilov.pdf (accessed 13/03/2015). On the point of initial scientific support for Lysenko’s work, see also Nils Roll-
Hansen, ‘A New Perspective on Lysenko?’, Annals of Science, vol.42 (1985), pp.261-278. On the tragic fate of 
Nikolai Vavilov in the years following Lysenko’s rise to power, see Mark Popovsky, The Vavilov Affair, (Hamden, CT: 
Archon Books, 1984). More recently, some evidence has emerged suggesting that the fate of Nikolai Vavilov was 
decided even before his open confrontation with Lysenko. On the latter point, see Eduard Kolchinsky. ‘Nikolai 
Vavilov in the Years of Stalin’s “Revolution from Above”’, Centaurus, vol.56:4 (2014), pp.330-358. 
614 Nikolai Vavilov was arrested and died in prison in 1942. See Mark Popovsky, The Vavilov Affair (Hamden, CT: 
Archon Books, 1984).  Kol’tsov lost his directorship position at the Institute of Experimental Biology and died of 
stroke shortly thereafter in 1940. See Vadim Birstein, The Perversion of Knowledge (Cambridge MA: Westview 
Press, 2001).  
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yielded in the Lysenko Affair, a trend that has prompted Alexej Kojevnikov to 
describe the Stalinist system as ‘chaotic’, since it often ‘reacted on a random 
basis but with excessive power, producing outputs which were quite 
irrelevant to the level of the incoming “signal from below”.’615 Nevertheless, 
any important political decision, even those resulting from an internal chaos 
were then presented as logical outcomes consistent with the Party’s 
ideology.616 
Nikolai Krementsov adds to the analysis of the 1948 meeting by 
contextualising it in the broader setting of socio-political polarisation, 
manifested in the zhdanovshchina campaign. Against this backdrop, science 
constituted ‘a mere extension of politics’ with ‘no broader loyalties to anything 
but the state; and no interests aside from those set by the state: it was a 
merely an instrument for pursuing state objectives.’617 This model, in turn, 
required the complete subordation of science to the state – both institutionally 
and intellectually.  
 
The net effect of the institutionalisation of Lysenkoism is hard to assess but it 
suffices to mention that following the 1948 August session of VASKhNIL 
modern genetics was treated as a scientific heresy and virtually ceased to 
exist in the Soviet Union before it was formally re-established in the 1960s. 
Textbooks were re-written, courses re-designed and research lines 
abandoned. Many prominent researchers suffered under the pressures of the 
Stalinist repressive apparatus as a result of their disinclination to ‘disarm’ and 
recognise the superiority of Lysenko’s pseudoscience (l’zhenauka). Equally 
devastating were the effects of the practical application of Lysenkoism in 
agriculture. Most of his ‘innovative methods’, including the planting of winter 
615 Alexei Kojevnikov, ‘Rituals of Stalinist Culture at Work: Science and the Games of Interparty Democracy circa 
1948’, The Russian Review, vol.57 (1998), p.51. See also Ethan Pollock, ‘From Partiinost’ to Nauchnost’ and Not 
Quite Back Again: Revisiting the Lessons of the Lysenko Affair’, Slavic Review, vol.68:1 (2009), pp.95-115. On the 
significance of Party rituals in the Soviet Union, see Alexei Kojevnikov, ‘President of Stalin’s Academy: The Mask 
and Responsibility of Sergei Vavilov’, Isis, vol.87 (1996), pp.18-50. 
616 Ibid. 
617 Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, op cit, p.179.  
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wheat in Siberia, of sugar beet in Central Asia, or potatoes in summer met 
with little success and were eventually abandoned.618  
  
Military-Oriented Research 
  
Efforts to develop biodefence capability in case of biological attacks dated 
back to 1930 when the Vaccine-Serum Laboratory under the auspices of the 
Military-Sanitary Directorate of the Red Army (Vaksinno-sevyrotochnaya 
laboratoriya voenno-sanitarnogo upravleniya RKKA) was established.619 As it 
quickly became apparent, probably due to the Soviet intelligence reports that 
the Japanese army had commenced offensive biological activities in 
Manchuria, a single laboratory seemed hardly sufficient to ensure adequate 
preparedness in case of a biological attack. Hence, three years later the 
laboratory was converted into a specialised institute and its director, 
Professor Ivan Velikanov, was appointed as the institute chief. Between 1933 
and 1937 the institute was tasked with the development of means of defence 
against biological and chemical weapons and some significant progress was 
made in this regard. Having changed its location on a number of occasions, 
in 1942 it was finally moved to Kirov where it became known as a Scientific 
Research Institute of Epidemiology and Hygiene (Nauchno issledovatel’skii 
institute epidemiologii i gigieny: NIIEG). During the War years a number of 
important medications, including vaccines against anthrax, tularaemia, and 
brucellosis, and methods for the mass production of penicillin and 
streptomycin were developed there.620 Other research centres under the 
direction of the military in the USSR were created in Sverdlovsk (today 
Yekaterinburg) and Zagorsk (today Sergiev Posad). 
 
Some commentators have suggested that the origins of the Soviet 
bioweapons programme can be traced back to late 1920s, that is, offensive 
and defensive activities in the area of the biological sciences ran in parallel. 
According to Anthony Rimmington, the decision to pursue offensive biological 
618 Sarah White, ‘Death of the Peasant Demagogue’, New Scientist, vol.72:1029 (1976), p.528. For a detailed 
dicussion on the negative impact of Lysenkoism on agriculture, see David Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair (Chicago IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970).  
619 Mikhail Supotnitskii and Nadezhda Supotnitskaia, Ocherki Istorii Chumy, op cit, see Ocherk XXXV.  
620 A method for the mass production of streptomycin in the Soviet Union was first developed between 1946 and 
1947. See ibid.   
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capability ‘was made against a background of genuine alarm within the 
Soviet leadership concerning the deteriorating international position and the 
country’s lack of military and economic preparation to defend itself.’621 
Another factor that possibly influenced that decision was the shared 
conviction among the Soviet echelons that the German and Japanese 
military command were pursuing biological weapons. From the scarce data 
available it appears that the effort to develop biological weapons initially met 
with some success, an example of which could be considered the 
establishment of an open-air testing site on Vozrozhdenie (‘Resurrection’) 
Island in the Aral Sea in 1935.622 The programme received a fresh impetus 
after 1945, driven in part by the intensifying Cold War dynamics and resultant 
arm race, and in part by the revelations of the extensive offensive work 
conducted at Japan’s Unit 731. By that time, however, the biological weapon 
endeavour had already suffered significant losses as a result of the Stalinist 
purges. It suffices to mention that the chief of the RKKA, Professor 
Velikanov, was executed in 1938 on suspicion of being a spy. In the 
subsequent years, the programme was significantly hampered by the triumph 
of Lysenkoism which set back the development of the biological sciences for 
almost two decades. Little is known about the activities carried out between 
1945 and 1970, even though some evidence appears to suggest that open-
air testing of biological weapons took place on Vozrozhdenie Island. 
 
Perhaps the most controversial element of the history of the Soviet 
bioweapons programme is the period between the 1970s and the early 
1990s. Over the past twenty years, a considerable body of literature has 
emerged shedding some light on the ‘modern’ period of the programme – the 
time when it is said to have been considerably expanded and equipped with 
the latest advances in biotechnology, including genetic engineering.623 
Accounts of Soviet defectors such as Vladimir Pasechnik and Ken Alibek, 
and Igor Domaradskii, who did not defect but published his memoirs both in 
Russian and English, have played a significant role in piecing together the 
621 See Anthony Rimmington, ‘Invisible Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Soviet Union’s BW Programme and Its 
Implications for Contemporary Arms Control’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol.13:3 (2000), p.3.   
622 Ibid, p.24.  
623 See Milton Leitenberg and Raymond Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, op cit.  
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history of how the military high command and the Party leadership assisted 
by senior science administrators set out to build an enormous web of 
institutes, laboratories and experimental stations in which research on deadly 
pathogens for the purposes of obtaining offensive capability was carried 
out.624 Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1992 the then 
President of the already independent Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin 
formally admitted to the existence of the programme and announced its 
termination. Suspicions of possible bioweapons development in the USSR 
were already growing in the early 1980s as a result of an anthrax outbreak in 
Sverdlovsk in 1979 believed to have been caused by the accidental release 
of anthrax spores from a military research facility situated nearby, known as 
Compound 19, and reports that the Soviet Union supplied ‘yellow rain’ to 
Vietnam and later used it during the Afghan war.625 It is worth noting that by 
that time the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and acquisition of 
biological weapons had been prohibited under the 1975 BTWC of which the 
USSR was a depositary State Party. Ironically, according to the prevailing 
narrative on the Soviet biological weapons programme, the decision to 
624 On the Soviet bioweapons programme, see Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True 
Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Programme  in the Word – Told from the Inside by the Man Who 
Ran It, (London: Arrow, 2000); Igor Domaradskij and Wendy Orent,  Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/Russian Biological 
War Machine, (Amherst NY: Prometheus Books, 2003); David Hoffman, The Dead Hand: Reagan, Gorbachev and 
the Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race, (London: Icon Books Ltd, 2011); Jeanne Guillemin, Biological 
Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programmes to Contemporary Bioterrorism, (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2005); Jeanne Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak, (Berkeley 
CA: University of California Press, 2001); Kathleen Vogel, Phantom Menace or Looming Danger?: A New 
Framework for Assessing Bioweapons Threats, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013); Sonia 
Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise and Organisation for weapons 
Development, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014); John Hart, ‘The Soviet Biological weapons Programme’ 
in Mark Wheelis et al (ed.), Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006), pp.132-156; Anthony Rimmington, ‘The Soviet Union’s Offensive Programme: Implications for 
Contemporary Arms Control’ in Susan Wright (ed.), Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems / New 
Perspectives, (New Deli: Vision Books, 2003), pp.103-148; Igor Domaradskij and Wendy Orent, ‘Achievements of 
the Soviet Biological Weapons Programme and Implications for the Future’, Revue Scientifique et Technique, 
vol.25:1 (2006), pp.153-161; Valentina Markusova et al, ‘From Bioweapon to Biodefense: The Collaborative 
Literature of Biodefence in the 1990s’, Scientometrics, vol.53:1 (2002), pp.21-38; Anthony Rimmington, ‘From 
Offence to Defence: Russia’s Reform of Its Biological Weapons Complex and the Implications for Western Security’, 
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol.16:1 (2003), pp.1-43; Neil Metcalfe, ‘A Short History of Biological 
Warfare’, Medicine, Conflict, and Survival, vol.18:3 (2002), pp.271-282; Anthony Rimmington, ‘Fragmentation and 
Proliferation: The Fate of the Soviet Union’s Offensive Biological Weapons Programme’, Contemporary Security 
Policy, vol.21:1 (1999), pp.86-110; Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and Kathleen Vogel, ‘The Social Context 
Shaping Bioweapons (Non) Proliferation’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefence Strategy, Practice, and Science, 
vol.8:1 (2010), pp.9-24; Raymond Zilinskas, ‘Confronting Biological Threats to International Security: A Biological 
Hazards Early Warning Programme’, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol.666 (1992), pp.146-176.  
625 See Jeanne Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak, (Berkeley CA: University of California 
Press, 2001); Philip Towle, ‘The Soviet Union and the Biological Weapons Convention’, Arms Control, vol.3:3 
(1982), pp.31-40; Raymond Zilinskas, ‘Anthrax in Sverdlovsk?’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.39:6 (1983), pp.24-
27; Charles Gregg, ‘Anthrax in Sverdlovsk: Commentary’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.39:8 (1983), p.63; 
Michael Gordin, ‘The Anthrax Solution: The Sverdlovsk Incident and the Resolution of  Biological Weapons 
Controversy’, Journal of the History of Biology, vol.30 (1997), pp.441-480; Elisa Harris, ‘Sverdlovsk and Yellow 
Rain: Two Cases of Soviet Noncompliance?’, International security, vol.11:4 (1987), pp.41-95; Julian Perry 
Robinson, ‘The Soviet Union and the Biological Weapons Convention and a Guide to Sources on the Sverdlovsk 
Incident’, Arms Control, vol.3:3 (1982), pp.41-56; Jonathan Tucker, ‘The “Yellow Rain” Controversy: Lessons for 
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expand the offensive effort was made about the same when the BTWC 
negotiations were taking place. Nevertheless, any allegations of possible 
offensive biological activity still carried some political strength, something 
evident in verbal exchange between the US and Soviet delegation on the 
Sverdlovsk incident at the First Review Conference of the BTWC in 1980.626 
 
From the 1970s onwards, the ‘modern’ Soviet BW programme reportedly 
commenced. Besides the military research facilities under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Defence (Ministerstvo oborony: MO), an enormous research 
complex, Biopreparat, was established as a branch of the Main Directorate of 
Biotechnology Industry (Glavnoe upravlenie mikrobiologicheskii 
promyshlenosti: GLAVMIKROBIOPROM). Biopreparat was supposedly 
conceived as a dual-use agency formally tasked with the development of 
vaccines and pharmaceuticals but in practice offering a comfortable disguise 
for military-related work to go unfettered. Given the involvement of the civilian 
sectors, it is believed that a significant number of institutes and laboratories 
of MINZDRAV, including the AP System, AMS, and the USSR Academy of 
Sciences contributed to weapons development. It is worth noting that as the 
programme ran under utmost conditions of secrecy with many of those on the 
frontlines of research being virtually unaware of the overall objectives of their 
work.627 Some commentators point out to a four-layer legend (legenda) used 
to ensure that only a handful of individuals at the highest level of authority 
were aware of the real purpose of Biopreparat. Alongside the offensive work, 
code-named Ferment, a defensive biological programme, Problem 5, was 
established. Besides the anti-personnel bioweapons programme, effort was 
made to acquire anti-crop and anti-livestock biowarfare capability. To this 
end, a special programme, code-names Ekologiya (‘Ecology’) was set up 
under the Main Directorate for Scientific-Research and Experimental-
Production Establishments of the Ministry of Agriculture (Glavnoe upravlenie 
626 Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final Document, 
BWC/CONF.I/10, 1980, Geneva, Switzerland. Available at http://www.unog.ch/bwcdocuments/1980-03-
1RC/BWC_CONF.I_10.pdf (accessed 7/8/2015). 
627 On the alleged involvement of the Anti-Plague System in the Soviet bioweapons programme, see Sonia Ben 
Ouagrham-Gormley, ‘Growth of the Anti-Plague System during the Soviet Period’, Critical Reviews in Microbiology, 
vol.32 (2006), pp.33-46; Raymond Zilinskas, ‘The Anti-Plague System and the Soviet Biological Warfare 
Programme’, Critical Reviews in Microbiology, vol.32 (2006), pp.47-64; Milton Leitenberg and Raymond Zilinskas, 
The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, op cit. 
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nauchno-issledovatel’skikh i eksperimental’no-proizvodstvennykh 
uchrezhdenii pri Ministerstve sel’skogo khozyaistva SSSR).628 At its peak, 
the Soviet biological weapons effort is considered to have encompassed tens 
of thousands of scientists spread across facilities nationwide. 
  
Professional Life Science Culture 
 
Neither the Communist Party nor the life science community constituted 
homogenous, static entities, which is why presenting them as such creates a 
partial and even distorted representation of their otherwise dynamic set of 
interactions. And it is precisely this multifaceted constantly-evolving 
relationship that gave rise to the Soviet life science professional culture with 
its whole gamut of distinct nuances, shared rituals and norms, and 
sanctioned jargon and behaviour. Contrary to the popular belief, in totalitarian 
systems pervaded with ubiquitous mechanisms for control and assertion of 
dominance of a single politico-ideological culture, the role of quasi-formal 
cultures is far from insignificant. Indeed, given the limitations of total forms of 
governance, such cultures occupy a central place filling in crevices and 
normative vacuums, moulding opaque hierarchical structures, and producing 
chaotic, often unexpected outcomes.  
 
To be a scientist in the Soviet Union was synonymous with prestige and a 
corresponding social status. And even if the extent to which such privileges 
were shared among researchers depending on their rank and field of study 
varied, in the public mindset the scientific profession largely evoked respect 
and a sense of deep appreciation. The latter was particularly true as far as 
medical workers and life scientists were concerned, not least because their 
work was underpinned by a strong conviction of public service. This 
professional ethos had a long-standing tradition dating back to the time of the 
Russian Empire and was only enhanced rather than suppressed following the 
Bolshevik Revolution. For instance, in 1964 SOVMIN passed a resolution to 
raise the salaries of healthcare professionals as part of a broader strategy 
628 Anthony Rimmington, ‘Invisible Weapons of Mass Destruction’, op cit, p.12; Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, 
Biohazard, op cit. 
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directed toward those working in ‘branches of the state economy offering 
immediate public service’.629 
 
Enhanced social standing was inevitably tied to increased duties and 
responsibilities before the state, a trend that manifested itself in the rapid 
Bolshevisation and politicisation of the scientific community from the 1930s 
onwards. With the rise of political loyalty as a vital precondition for acquiring 
a degree and making a career, demonstrating ideological compliance 
became an underlying normative feature of science professional culture. This 
is not to say that the majority of scientists joined the Communist Party 
overnight. On the contrary, by and large researchers found themselves 
playing political games, paying lip service to the Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
Thus, dressing up scientific writings in political jargon and referring to the 
‘founding fathers’ of the respective fields, say Charles Darwin for biology and 
evolutionism and Ivan Pavlov for neurophysiology emerged as a commonly-
used approach for enhancing the credibility of scientific findings.630 In a 
similar fashion, given the state’s preoccupation with projects of practical 
utility, any research, be it of pure or applied character, was virtually 
presented as promising practical benefits in order to ensure that the work 
would be granted approval.  
 
The rigid structures and impenetrable power hierarchies enforced by the 
dense bureaucracies of the Communist Party and state apparatus provided 
some space for informal interactions and ‘behind the scenes’ lobbying and 
policy-making. Personal contacts and ties and senior Party officials turned 
into indispensible tools which scientists vigorously employed in an attempt to 
push their agenda and secure a favourable answer to their requests. During 
the 1930s, for instance, when the Stalinist purges were unfolding, 
researchers often turned for help to the renowned writer Maxim Gorky, who, 
by dint of enjoying a preferential treatment by the Party echelon and Stalin 
himself, managed to successfully intervene and influence on several 
629 [in Russian] Prikaz Minzdrava SSSR, O povyshenii zarabotnoi platy rabotnikov zdravookhraneniya, N 470, 15 
August 1964, available at http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=ESU;n=15806 (accessed 
6/09/2015). 
630 See Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, op cit. 
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occasions arrest decisions.631 In a similar fashion, whilst Lysenko was 
striving to consolidate his position prior to the 1948 VASKhNIL meeting, 
leading Soviet geneticists joined forces utilising any possible channel of 
communication with the senior Party leadership, including writing directly to 
Stalin striving to expose the shortcomings of Lyesenkoism and avert its 
spread. As discussed, their efforts did not meet with success in the end but 
the fact that such a campaign existed is vivid illustration that even at times of 
tightened political control, the scientific community was not completely left at 
the mercy of the state but actively sought ways of expressing resistance 
using the means it had at its disposal.632  
 
For the most part, science in the USSR remained insulated from public 
scrutiny. With the state being the sole patron of research, scientists were not 
required to compete for funding, nor were they held regularly accountable 
about how the money was spent. Research priorities were typically 
determined by GOSPLAN in the Five-Year Plans and subsequently 
announced to the Academies and the administration of the respective 
institutions. The presidium of each Academy was then expected to rubber-
stamp the proposed plan and move on to its implementation. In research 
institutes the Academic Council fulfilled a similar function. The general public 
usually learnt about the Soviet latest scientific and technological 
breakthroughs from the media and press but overall had very little if any 
bearing on the decision-making process regarding the role and place of 
science in society. It was only toward the late 1980s within the context of 
perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost’ (openness) that this trend began to 
change, something evident in the emergence of ‘green’ and ‘eco’ movements 
as the scale and degree of environmental degradation caused by industrial 
production, including the biotechnology industry, became apparent.633 
 
 
631 See Alexei Kojevnikov, Stalin’s Great Science: The Times and Adventures of Soviet Physicists, (London: 
Imperial College Press, 2006). 
632 See Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, op cit. 
 633 See Anthony Rimmington, ‘Biotechnology Falls Foul of the Environment in the USSR’, Nature Biotechnology, 
vol.7 (1989), pp. 785-788; Marjorie Sun, ‘Soviet Biotechnology Meets Glasnost’, Science, vol.241:4867 (1988), 
p.781. 
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Chapter 7: Post-Cold War Institutional and Infrastructural 
Legacies 
Walking down the street 
Distant memories  
Are buried in the past  
Forever 
‘Scorpions’, 1990 
 
The Collapse of the USSR and Its Impact on the Life Sciences 
 
On 25 December 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Secretary General of the 
Communist Party of the USSR, resigned from his post, effectively 
announcing the dissolution of what had been one of the world’s two 
superpowers. The processes unleashed by the radical reforms as part of 
perestroika and glasnost’ introduced over the previous six years, coupled 
with a crippled economy and social stagnation, swept the country fuelling 
waves of nationalism and inspiring calls for independence. As a result, by the 
early 1990s the socialist system had collapsed with the former ‘evil empire’634 
giving rise to fifteen sovereign states. The world’s political map thus redrafted 
has prompted some commentators to proclaim the ‘end of history’635 
manifested in the overall triumph of liberal democracy and market-based 
economy. In the former Soviet space the time was ripe for a fundamental 
Change.636 
 
The chief successor of the USSR was the Russian Federation which took 
over not only the lion’s share of its former territory and population but also 
assumed its positions in international organisations, including the permanent 
seat in the United Nations Security Council. The first president of the newly-
independent state was Boris Yeltsin who won Russia’s first presidential 
634 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, 8 March 1983, 
Orlando, Florida, USA. Available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/30883b.htm (accessed 
3/09/2015). 
635 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Penguin, 1992).  
636 In the popular culture of the countries of the Former Soviet Union, the concept of ‘change’ is a temporal signifier 
commonly used in everyday speech. Time is divided into two epochs: before the ‘changes’ and after the ‘changes’. 
On the final years of the Soviet Union, see Alexander Dallin and Gail Lapidus (ed.), The Soviet System in Crisis: A 
Reader of Western and Soviet Views, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1991); Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Stephen White, Gorbachev and After, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). For an overview of Russian politics after 1991, see Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 4th 
ed. (London: Routledge, 2008); Stephen White et al. (ed.), Developments in Russian Politics, 8th ed. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2014); Michael Waller, Russian Politics Today, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); 
Cameron Ross, Russian Politics Under Putin, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); Rick Fawn (ed.), 
Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy, (London: Frank Cass, 2003).  
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elections held in June 1991, defeating the Gorbachev-backed Communist 
Party’s candidate, Nikolai Ryzhkov.637 Starting in 1992, Russia’s new 
leadership embarked on a large-scale campaign for socio-economic 
transformation, a course which had been hinted at by President Yeltsin a few 
months prior to the country’s official declaration of independence. In essence, 
the package of measures that the government introduced, such as price 
liberalisation, strict fiscal discipline, and privatisation sought to achieve a 
rapid conversion of the state-controlled command economy into a market-
based one. The resultant ‘shock therapy’ exacerbated the already 
skyrocketing hyperinflation, cut social welfare spending and state subsidies 
to critical levels, and a severe credit crunch unfolded. Amidst growing 
impoverishment, mass bankruptcy of industries, shortage of basic goods, and 
flourishing black markets the cabinet of Yegor Gaidar was forced to resign. 
For the most part, the 1990s constituted a volatile and unpredictable period, 
marked by socio-economic instability and political uncertainty. Oligarchs, 
organised crime, and a military intervention in Chechnya were among the 
highlights of the turbulent transition from a totalitarian past to a relatively 
freer, quasi-democratic society. With yet another economic crisis well 
underway in 1998 and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) bombers 
flying over Kosovo in the following year, the prospects for Russian domestic 
and foreign policy as widely perceived in the Kremlin on the brink of the new 
millennium were hardly bright. 
 
The dissolution of the USSR had a tremendous impact on the organisation 
and governance of science. Calls for reforms to democratise science 
institutions and make the funding system more competitive intensified in the 
late 1980s culminating in Gorbachev’s decree of 1990, which made the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences independent from the government.638 Struggles 
for power predominantly driven by those on the margins of the scientific 
community manifested themselves in vociferous attacks on the Academy and 
637 Boris Yeltsin played a key role in the attempted coup of 19-22 August 1991 (Avgustovskii putch) when a group of 
hardliners of the Communist Party tried to overthrow the Gorbachev regime. For a timeline of the events of August 
1991, see [in Russian] ‘Avgustovskii putch GChKP. Khronika sobytii 19-22 avgusta 1991goda’, RiaNovosti, 19 
August 2011, available at http://ria.ru/spravka/20110819/415632412.html (accessed 3/09/2015).  
638 See Ukaz Prezidenta SSSR O Statuse Akademii Nauk SSSR, No.627, 23 August 1990, Moscow. The decree 
was later reversed by President Boris Yeltsin.  
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deliberate campaigns for the establishment of rival intuitions, developments 
which subsequently resulted in the creation of a separate Russian Academy 
of Sciences (Rossiiskaya akademiya nauk: RAN) even before the USSR 
disintegration was formally announced. Yet the socio-economic environment 
in the new, independent Russia proved far less favourable to science, 
especially in the early days of the transition to democracy. State support for 
science, virtually taken for granted during the Soviet time, ceased once the 
government commenced the implementation of its ‘shock therapy’ policies. 
With the flow of money practically frozen, many research institutes were 
compelled to close and those that still managed to reorganise faced the 
brutal reality of equipment and materials shortages and irregular, meagre 
salaries. Confronted with the dire consequences of the financial crisis, a 
significant number of talented individuals opted out of science to seek 
employment in other walks of life. Ironically, the job of a shop assistant or a 
taxi driver appeared much more attractive in terms of pay compared to what 
even a senior researcher could earn labouring on the bench.639 Emigration 
constituted another tempting alternative option which scientists, especially 
those enjoying some prominence in their respective fields, readily embraced. 
Brain drain thus soon emerged as a disturbing trend hardly limited to a 
particular generation of researchers or field of scholarship but being 
particularly acute in the natural sciences. By the mid-1990s job hunting 
abroad among fresh Russian graduates peaked, as many of them, lured by 
the prospects of a comfortable career in their desired area of study aimed to 
secure a position in a foreign institution even before their diploma was 
issued.640 
 
639 See Paul Josephson, ‘Russian Scientific Institutions: Internationalisation, Democracy and Dispersion’, Minerva, 
vol.32:1 (1994), pp.1-24; Peter Aldhous, ‘A Scientific Community on the Edge’, Science, vol.264 (1994), pp.1262-
1264; Colin Norman and Daniel Koshland Jr, ‘Editorial: Science in Russia’, Science, vol.264 (1994), p. 1235; Elena 
Mirskaya, ‘Russian Academic Science Today: Its Societal Standing and the Situation within the Scientific 
Community’, Social Studies of Science, vol.25 (1995), pp.705-725; Toni Feder, ‘New Minister Is Unlikely to 
Resusciatate Russian Science’, Physics Today, vol.51:8 (1998), pp.54-55; James Watson and Gerson Sher, ‘Does 
Research in the Former Soviet Union Have a Future’, Science, vol.264 (1994), pp.1280-1281.   
640 See ‘The Soviet Brain Drain is the U.S. Brain Gain’, Bloomberg Buisnessweek, 3 November 1991, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1991-11-03/the-soviet-brain-drain-is-the-u-dot-s-dot-brain-gain (accessed 
5/09/2015); R.Adam Moody, ‘Reexamining Brain Drain from the Former Soviet Union’, The Nonproliferation Review, 
Spring-Summer 1996; Irina Ivankhnyuk, Brain Drain from Russia: In Search for a Solution, (Warsaw, Poland: Centre 
for International Relations, 2006); Loren Graham and Irina Dezhina, Science in the New Russia: Crisis, Aid, Reform, 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008). 
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Against the backdrop of economic hardship and mass exodus of scientists 
from Russia to the West, efforts to salvage science and ensure its long-term 
survival were two-sided – internal and external – entailing domestic 
institutional and infrastructural reforms in the system of knowledge 
production, as well as, international aid and cooperation. Far from being a 
novelty, the links between Russian scientists and foreign-based 
philanthropies went back a long time, as evidenced in the fellowship 
programme of the Rockefeller Foundation which allowed gifted Soviet 
scholars in the 1920s to undertake research abroad.641 Whilst the Foundation 
never managed to provide substantial material assistance in terms of new 
facilities and equipment, mainly due to political constraints, it still replied 
positively to requests for books and scientific literature. In a similar fashion, 
around the same period the Harriman Foundation demonstrated a favourable 
inclination to supply RES with relevant publications in the field of genetics 
and eugenics.642 East-West scientific collaboration received fresh impetus 
during the détente years when it was incorporated in a range of formal 
agreements.643 Exchange programmes jointly administered by the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences and the US NAS allowed researchers across both 
sides of the iron curtain to catch a glimpse of one another’s professional 
settings at a time when the USSR borders remained largely sealed for 
average citizens. Given those long-standing scientific ties, it is barely 
surprising that when the political conditions in Russia radically changed in the 
early 1990s private philanthropies and charities were among the first to offer 
assistance in an attempt to bring science back to its feet. The list of donors 
featured prominent organisations including the George Soros’s International 
Science Foundation (ISF), Fulbright, and IREX (International Research and 
Exchanges Board). Following the example of their American counterparts, 
European charities such as the Wellcome Trust, British Council, and 
International Association for the Promotion of Cooperation with Scientists 
641 See Susan Gross Solomon and Nikolai Krementsov, ‘Giving and Taking across Borders: The Rockefeller 
Foundation and Russia, 1919-1928’, Minerva, vol.39 (2001), pp.265-298; Susan Gross Solomon, ‘Being There: 
Fact-Finding and Policymaking: The Rockefeller Foundation’s Division on Medical Eduaction and the “Russian 
Matter”, 1925-1927’, Journal of Policy History, vol. 14:4 (2002), pp.384-416; [in Russian] Alexei Kojevnikov, 
‘Filantropia Rokfellera i sovetskaya nauka’, Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniya i tekhniki (VIET), No.2 (1993), pp.80-
111.  
642 Nikolai Krementsov, ‘From “Beastly Philosophy” to Medical Genetics’, op cit. 
643 See David Finley. ‘Soviet-U.S. Cooperation in Space and Medicine: An Analysis of the Détente Experience’ in 
Nish Jamgotch Jr. (ed.), Sectors of Mutual Benefit in U.S.-Soviet Relations, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1985), pp.137-151.  
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from the Independent States of the former Soviet Union (INTAS) announced 
funding calls aimed at supporting local research projects and encouraging 
scientific partnerships. In the absence of a regular flow of state funding for 
science, foreign aid proved indispensable in sustaining research activities in 
Russia. Moreover, through the assistance channels thus created Russian 
scientists for the first time became exposed to an alternative system for 
money procurement, one based on peer-review and competition, whereby 
individual talent and ingenuity could be recognised, acknowledged, and 
rewarded accordingly.644 
 
For their part, the Russian government introduced a range of measures and 
policies directed at ameliorating the budgetary deficit in science financing and 
promoting innovation and growth. Throughout the 1990s the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (at present the Ministry of Education and Science, 
Ministerstvo obrazovania i nauki: MINOBRANAUKI) strived to implement its 
grand strategy for reforming the way in which science was managed. In 
pursuing the goal of a radical transformation of the science system, 
privatisation was deemed a top priority. To this end, new legislation regarding 
the establishment of foundations and non-governmental organisations and 
intellectual property rights was adopted with the view of fostering private 
ownership and market-oriented R&D.645 As far as foreign aid is concerned, 
provisions were made for tax exemption and co-financing. The science 
644 See Loren Graham and Irina Dezhina, Science in the New Russia: Crisis, Aid, Reform, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2008). For an overview of the biotechnology sector in the Soviet Union in the years of Perestroika, 
see Rod Greenshields et al. ‘Perestroika and Soviet Biotechnology’, Technology Analysis and Strategic 
Management, vol.2:1 (1990), pp.63-70. On the financial support provided by foreign donors, see Valery Soyfer, 
‘Soros Support for Science Education in the Former Soviet Union’, Science, vol.264, (1994), pp.1281-1282; Peter 
Aldhous and Alexander Dorozynski, ‘Saving Russia’s Threatened Biological Heritage’, Science, vol.264 (1994), 
p.1266; Richard Stone, ‘U.S., Russia to Provide Crucial Aid to Scientists’, Science, vol. 268 (1995), p.979; Peter 
Aldhous, ‘Elite Groups Struggle on with a Little Help from the West’, Science, vol.264 (1994), pp.1264-1267; 
Richard Stone, ‘Post-Cold War Science Thrives in the Heart of Siberia’, Science, vol.270:5243 (1995), pp.1753-
1755. On the reforms in the Russian science policy and system of science funding, see Nadezhda Gaponenko, 
‘Transformation of the Research System in a Transitional Society: The Case of Russia’, Social Studies of Science, 
vol.25 (1995), pp.685-703; Irina Dezhina, ‘Financing Russian Science: New Reforms and Mechanisms’, Problems of 
Economic Transition, vol. 39:11 (1997), pp.78-92; Valentina Markusova et al. ‘Information Behaviour of Russian 
Scientists in the “Perestroika” Period: Results of the Questionnaire Survey’, Scientometrics, vol.37:2 (1996), pp.361-
380; Theodore Gerber and Deborah Yarsike Ball, ‘Scientists in a Changed Institutional Environment: Subjective 
Adaptation and Social Responsibility Norms in Russia’, Social Studies of Science, vol.39:4 (2009), pp. 529-567; 
Natalia Gorodnikova, ‘Transformation of R&D in Russia: The Role of Government Priorities’ in David Dyker and 
Slavo Radosevic (ed.), Innovation and Structural Change in Post-Socialist Countries: A Quantitative Approach, 
NATO ASI Series: Science and Technology Policy – Vol.20,  (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 
pp.261-290; Natalia Kovaleva, ‘Higher Education and the Labour Market in Russia: Trends in the Transition Period’ 
in David Dyker and Slavo Radosevic (ed.), Innovation and Structural Change in Post-Socialist Countries: A 
Quantitative Approach, NATO ASI Series: Science and Technology Policy – Vol.20, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1999), pp.429-446.   
645 See Loren Graham and Irina Dezhina, Science in the New Russia, op cit. 
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funding system was fundamentally restructured. Block funding for research 
institutes whereby the amount of money allocated to a particular facility was 
determined by its size and previous budgets was replaced with a grant 
competition awarded on the principle of peer-review. The drastic departure 
from the Soviet status quo manifested itself in the creation of the Russian 
Foundation for Basic Research (Rossiiskii fond fundamental’nykh 
issledovanii: RFFI) in 1992 and, to an extent, constituted an expedient 
measure designed to make up for the significant reductions in the state 
expenditure on science.646 Funds (fondy) were another source of material 
support set up specifically for the purpose of promoting innovation and 
commercially-viable research. For instance, the Russian Fund for 
Technological Development (Rossiiskii fond tekhnologicheskogo razvitia: 
RFTR) established in 1992 depended solely on voluntary allocations from 
industry to finance technology-oriented projects in various fields of study.647 
By contrast, the Fund for Assistance to Small Innovative Enterprises (Fond 
sodeistvia razvitiu malykh form predpriatii v nauchno-tekhnicheskoi sfere), 
which came into existence two years later had its own state budget line 
independent from other agencies to provide support to science entrepreneurs 
and start-ups.648 
 
Significant effort was dedicated to the development of laws on intellectual 
property rights. The USSR acceded to the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property in 1965, which brought the Soviet domestic 
patent legislation in line with the international legal requirements.649 Yet it is 
worth noting that the Soviet system for protection of intellectual property 
recognised two types of instruments: certificates and patents. Certification 
was by far a more commonly used form of ascertaining inventor’s rights but, 
646 Ibid. For an English summary of the mission, objectives, goals and activities of the Russian Foundation for Basic 
Research, see the organisation’s Erawatch page, available at  
http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu/erawatch/opencms/information/country_pages/ru/organisation/organisation_mig_00
04 (accessed 6/09/2015). The official page of the Foundation in Russian is available at http://www.rfbr.ru/rffi/ru/ 
(accessed 6/09/2015). 
647 In 2014 the Russian Fund for Technological Development was restructured and renamed Fund for Industrial 
Development. Information about the Fund and its history is available at the Fund’s official webpage, 
http://www.rftr.ru/fund/ (accessed 6/09/2015). 
648  The Fund is still in existence at the time of writing and in 2014 celebrated its twentieth anniversary. Further 
information is available at the Fund’s official webpage, http://www.fasie.ru/ (accessed 6/09/2015). 
649 On the Soviet patent system, see M.Hoseh, ‘The U.S.S.R. Patent System’, 4 Patent, Trademark and Copyright 
Journal of Research and Education, 220 (1960), pp.220-232; Lisa Cook, A Green Light for Red Patents?: Evidence 
from Soviet Domestic and Foreign Inventive Activity, 1962 to 1991, April 2011, Michigan State University, USA.   
231 
 
                                                          
in contrast to patents, it assigned exclusive rights of use, exploitation, and 
development to the state. The inventor was nonetheless entitled to certain 
remuneration in the form of cash, especially in those cases when the new 
research product was deemed commercially viable.650 Soviet citizens were 
largely expected to apply for certificates, whereas foreign applicants were 
typically granted patents in their name with the ultimate ownership remaining 
with the Soviet state.651 Major changes were introduced during the final years 
of Gorbachev’s rule when revolutionary legislation was adopted patterned on 
the European and American patent regulations. This trend persisted after 
1992 when Russia’s patent agency, ROSPATENT (Federal’naya sluzhba po 
intellektual’noi sobstvennosti) took over the responsibilities of the USSR 
GOSPATENT (Gosudarstvennoe patentnoe agentsvo SSSR), with the new 
Russian laws on intellectual property mirroring the provisions of the 
European Patent Convention (EPC).652 Based on the 1992 Patent Act, 
research institutes, industrial enterprises, and innovation firms received rights 
to intellectual property on knowledge and technology that were previously the 
property of the government.653 
 
A major area of concern that attracted considerable international attention in 
the newly independent Russian Federation was the need both for securing 
the enormous arms arsenal inherited from the USSR and demilitarising 
science. The risk of possible proliferation of WMD was high. Besides Russia, 
several sovereign republics, including Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, 
found themselves in possession of Soviet nuclear stockpiles. At the same 
time, the revelation that the USSR maintained and operated a clandestine 
biological weapons programme alarmed the international community, which 
demanded that immediate steps should be taken to assess the potential 
threat and dismantle any equipment used for the conduct of offensive 
activities in the life sciences. With the bulk of scientific R&D and industrial 
650 See Raymond Zilinskas, ‘Biotechnology in the U.S.S.R, Part 2’, Nature Biotechnology, vol.2 (1984), p.687; 
Bernie Burrus, ‘The Soviet Law of Inventions and Copyright’, Fordham Law Review, vol.30:4 (1962), p.709. 
651 Raymond Zilinskas, ‘Biotechnology in the USSR, Part 2’, op cit. 
652 For further information on ROSPATENT, see the organisation’s official webpage, http://www.rupto.ru/ (accessed 
6/09/2015). On the restructuring of the patent system in Russia, see also Laura Pitta, ‘Intellectual Property Laws in 
the Former Soviet Republics: A Time of Transition’, Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal, vol.8:2 (1992), 
pp.499-505, especially p. 503.   
653 Loren Graham and Irina Dezhina, Science in the New Russia, op cit. 
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production dedicated to military ends and the prospect of a ‘brain drain’ of 
weapons scientists to ‘rogue’ states or terrorist groups looming large against 
the backdrop of the dire financial circumstances of post-Soviet science, the 
question of the Russian defence conversion became a pressing matter of 
paramount importance.654 
 
Under the Nunn-Lugar Soviet Threat Reduction Act passed in November 
1991, the US DoD initiated a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
Programme, which pursued the following objectives: 
• Dismantling FSU's WMD and associated  infrastructure; 
• Consolidating and securing FSU WMD and related technology and 
materials; 
• Increasing transparency and encouraging higher standards of conduct 
in adherence to nuclear agreements and non-proliferation activity; 
• Supporting defence and military cooperation with the objective of 
preventing proliferation.655 
 
Initially conceived to address nuclear proliferation concerns, the Programme 
was subsequently expanded to support biological and chemical disarmament 
654 See, for example, Kathleen Vogel, ‘Pathogen Proliferation: Threats from the Former Soviet Bioweapons 
Complex’, Politics and the Life Sciences, vol.19:1 (2000), pp.3-16; Colin Macliwain, ‘Russian Weapons Labs 
Become the Top Priority for Western Funding’, Nature, vol.384 (1996), pp.295-296; Anthony Rimmington, 
‘Fragmentation and Proliferation? The Fate of the Soviet Union’s Offensive Biological Weapons Programme’, 
Contemporary Security Policy, vol.20:1 (1999), pp.86-110; Amy Smithson, Toxic Archipelago: Preventing 
Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Complexes, Report No.32, December 1999, The 
Henry Stimson Centre, Washington DC; Stephen Black, ‘Threats to and from the Former Soviet Union’, The Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies, vol.21:3 (2008), pp.491-526;  Richard Wenzel, ‘Recognizing the Real Threat of Biological 
Terror’, Transactions of the American Clinical and Climatological Association, vol.113 (2002), pp.42-55. On the 
efforts to convert former weapon facilities to peaceful use and work, see Vlad Genin (ed.), The Anatomy of Russian 
Defense Conversion, (Walnut Creek, CA: Vega Press, 2001); Erhard Geissler et al. (ed.), Conversion of Former 
BTW Facilities, NATO Science Series: Disarmament Technologies – Vol.21, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1998); Lev Sandakhchiev and Sergey Netesov, ‘Strengthening the BTWC through R&D Restructuring: 
The Case of the State Research Centre of Virology and Biotechnology “VECTOR”’ in Alexander Kelle et al. (ed.), 
The Role of Biotechnology in Countering BTW Agents, NATO Science Series: Disarmament Technologies – Vol.34, 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp.53-60; John Compton, ‘Dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
Introduction of a Market Economy and the Future BTWC Compliance Protocol: Impact on the Russian 
Biotechnology Industry’ in Alexander Kelle et al. (ed.), The Role of Biotechnology in Countering BTW Agents, NATO 
Science Series: Disarmament Technologies – Vol.34, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 61-68; 
Sonia Ben Ouagrham and Kathleen Vogel, Conversion at Stepnogosrk: What the Future Holds for Former 
Bioweapons Facilities, Occasional Paper No.28, February 2003, Cornell University Peace Studies Programme, 
Ithaca, NY; Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva et al, Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present, 
and Future, Occasional Paper No.1, June 1999, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey CA. 
655 See David Steensman, Testimony Statement to the House Committee on Armed Services on US-Russian 
Cooperative Threat Reduction and Non-Proliferation Programs, Department of Defence, Office of Inspector General, 
4 March 2003; see also Justin Bresolin, Fact Sheet: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, June 
2014, available at  
http://armscontrolcenter.org/publications/factsheets/fact_sheet_the_cooperative_threat_reduction_program/(access
ed 27/03/2015). See also United States Government Accountability Office, Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce 
Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses Risks, April 2000, Washington DC. Available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-138 (accessed 6/09/2015). 
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efforts. Assistance with regard to biological-related concerns and their 
effective management has included the  
• Consolidation of dangerous pathogen collections into central reference 
labs or repositories; 
• Improvement in the safety and security of biological facilities; 
• Enhancement of states’ capabilities to detect, diagnose, and report 
bio-terror attacks and potential pandemics; 
• Engagement of scientists with biological weapon-related expertise in 
research that supports force protection, medical countermeasures, 
diagnostics, and modelling.656 
Attention was given to the need both for keeping weapon-scientists in 
employment and for their re-direction to civilian and peace-oriented work. A 
prominent actor in this domain has been the International Science and 
Technology Centre (ISTC), an intergovernmental body, set up in 1992 on the 
basis of an agreement between Russia, Japan, the EU, and the United 
States and still active at the time of writing. Since 1994, the ISTC has been 
providing material assistance and research grants across the former Soviet 
space to prevent diversion and help ensure that activities in the area of 
science are consistent with international law.657 A sister organisation – the 
Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine (STCU) – was established in 
1995 to ‘support research and development activities for peaceful 
656 See Paul Bernstein and Jason Wood, The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction: Case Study 
3, (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 2010); Sharon Weiner, ‘Reconsidering Cooperative Threat 
Reduction: Russian Nuclear Weapons Scientists and Non-Proliferation’, Contemporary Security policy, vol.29:3 
(2008), pp.477-501; John Shields and William Potter (ed.), Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives on 
the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1997);  Mary 
Nikitin and Amy Woolf, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress, CRS Report for 
Congress, June 2014, Washington DC; Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme, official webpage 
available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/offices/c55411.htm (accessed 6/09/2015); National Research Council, The 
Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense: From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable 
Partnerships, (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2007); National Research Council, Countering Biological 
Threats: Challenges for the Department of Defense’s Nonproliferation Program Beyond the Former Soviet Union, 
(Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2009), ‘Celebrating 20 Years of the Nunn-Lugar Program’, Nuclear 
Threat Initiative Newsroom, 3 December 2012, available at http://www.nti.org/newsroom/news/celebrating-20-years-
nunn-lugar-program/ (accessed 6/09/2015). In 2012 Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly announced that his 
country will not renew the agreement for a further extension of the Nunn-Lugar Programme. See David 
Herszenhorn, ‘Russia Won’t Renew Pact on Weapons with U.S.’, The New York Times, 10 October 2012, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/world/europe/russia-wont-renew-pact-with-us-on-weapons.html (accessed 
7/09/2015); Bryan Bender, ‘Russia Ends US Nuclear security alliance’, The Boston Globe, 19 January 2015, 
available at  https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/01/19/after-two-decades-russia-nuclear-security-
cooperation-becomes-casualty-deteriorating-relations/5nh8NbtjitUE8UqVWFIooL/story.html (accessed 7/09/2015). 
657 For further information about the goals and activities of the ISTC, see its official webpage at 
http://www.istc.ru/istc/istc.nsf/fa_MainPageMultiLang?OpenForm&lang=Eng (accessed 6/09/2015). As of July 2015, 
the Russian Federation has officially withdrawn from the organisation and the ISTC Headquarters has been moved 
from Moscow to Astana, Kazakhstan.  
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applications by Ukrainian, Georgian, Uzbekistani, Azerbaijani and Moldovan 
scientists and engineers, formerly involved with development of WMD and 
their means of delivery, as part of the general process of conversion to a 
civilian, market-oriented environment.’658 The USA unilaterally has also 
contributed to the efforts to demilitarise Soviet science and facilitate its 
conversion to civilian work through fostering partnerships and exchange 
visits. Several arms of the American government, including the Department 
of Agriculture, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of 
Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency have pursued 
collaborative projects and active engagement with Russian scientists in such 
areas as plant and animal diseases, vaccine development, detection and 
prevention of infectious diseases, and environmental effects of biowarfare.659 
Non-governmental organisations, too, have further sought to promote 
dialogue and scientific cooperation. Notable examples in this regard are the 
Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CDRF), a public-private 
partnership non-profit entity founded in 1995 to ‘facilitate mutually-beneficial 
scientific and technical collaboration’ between the USA and the FSU 
countries, and the US National Academies of Science which have provided 
expert advice on non-proliferation policy issues.660 
 
Persistence of Soviet Inertia 
 
The Scorpions’ emblematic song ‘Wind of Change’ released shortly after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall to celebrate the positive effects of perestroika and 
subsequent end of the Cold War conjures up a vivid picture of the 
‘restructured’ USSR: ‘the world is closing in’ and the old regime is ‘buried in 
the past forever’. Such was the atmosphere of the time that, for once, a 
fundamental change toward a freer and more open society seemed both 
possible and attainable. It is precisely this idealist vision of a quick and 
smooth transition from a socialist past to a democratic future that gave the 
early reforms in the new Russia a fresh impetus. Over the following years, it 
658 For further information about the goals and activities of the STCU, see its official webpage at http://www.stcu.int/ 
(accessed 6/09/2015).  
659 See Michelle Cook and Amy Woolf, Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the 
Former Soviet States, CRS Report for Congress, April 2002, Washington DC, especially p.7-13.  
660 Ibid. 
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has gradually become evident that there is more to democracy than elections 
and party pluralism; more to market economy than privatisation; and more to 
a civil society than a freedom of speech. In a similar fashion, the reforms in 
the governance of the life sciences have demonstrated that ‘borrowing’ 
foreign practices and ‘modelling’ foreign institutions do not automatically 
meet with success but instead, require the development of a relevant 
mentality and professional ethos in order to produce a long-lasting 
sustainable change. To this end, old habits need to be abandoned; past 
patterns need to be altered; and previously-established power relations need 
to be reconfigured. Since those processes are products of historical, cultural, 
and political contingencies, they are likely to prove resistant to a rapid, let 
alone, smooth change. Hence, it is hardly surprising that despite the effort 
invested in reforming the legislative, institutional, and administrative context 
of Russia’s biotechnology over the past two decades, trends related to the 
Soviet heritage persist and manifest themselves in the policy and everyday 
practice of life science research. 
 
Biotechnology as a Vital State Asset  
 
If throughout the 1990s the Russian government strived to ensure that 
science did not perish under the pressures of economic uncertainty, Yeltsin’s 
successors have set themselves a far more ambitious goal, namely to restore 
Russia’s scientific and technological prowess, and thus solidify the nation’s 
position on the international stage. Implicit in the strategic vision of the need 
to invest in R&D has been the assumption that scientific and technological 
advancement is an essential prerequisite for ensuring sustainable national 
security through economic growth and prosperity, flourishing industry, military 
superiority, and political prestige. Indeed, in the National Security Strategy of 
the Russian Federation until 2020, science, technology, and education are 
listed as ‘strategic national priorities’ in their own right: 
 
24. In order to ensure national security and achieve 
the basic priorities of national security, the Russian 
Federation concentrates its efforts and resources 
on the following priorities of sustainable 
development:  
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- increasing the quality of life of Russian citizens by 
guaranteeing individual security and high standards 
of living; 
- economic growth which is achieved first and 
foremost by developing a national system of 
innovation and by investing in human capital;  
- science, technology, education, health care and 
culture, which are developed by reinforcing the role 
of the state and improving public-private 
partnership […]661 
 
 
Within this context, biotechnology is deemed a sector of a particular 
significance, which despite being ripe for development as demonstrated in 
the experience of Western industrialised states, is still lagging behind in 
Russia. According to the State Coordination Programme for the Development 
of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation until 2020 (BIO 2020), a lengthy 
government document published in 2012 with the approval of the then Prime 
Minister, Vladimir Putin: 
 
Three areas of technological advancement are key 
for the development of modern innovation 
economy: information technology, nanotechnology, 
and biotechnology. Advanced information 
technology has been implemented in Russia over 
the last twenty years. [...] For the past five years 
nanoindustry has been in a state of an active 
development. Whilst promising and with an 
enormous potential for sizable new markets, 
biotechnology, with the exception of biopharmacy 
has not yet received sufficient impetus for 
development in Russia.662 
 
The overall objective of BIO 2020 is ‘the emergence of Russia as a global 
leader in the area of biotechnology and its various sub-disciplines, including 
biomedicine, agrobiotechnology, industrial biotechnology and bioenergy, as 
well as, the creation of a globally competitive bioeconomy.’663 To this end, 
661 [in Russian] ‘Strategia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda’, approved by a 
Presidential Decree No.537, 12 May 2009, Moscow. Full text in Russian is available at 
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html (accessed 7/09/2015). Author’s translation. On the link between basic life 
science research and national security, see [in Russian] A. Spirin, ‘Fundamental’naya nauka i problemy 
biologicheskoi bezopasnosti’, Vestnik RAN, vol.74: 11 (2004), pp.963-972. 
662 See [in Russian] ‘Kompleksnaya programma razvitiya biotekhnologii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2020’, 
24 April 2012, Moscow. Full text in Russian is available at 
http://economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/innovations/development/doc20120427_06 (accessed 7/09/2015). 
English summary is available at http://bio-economy.ru/upload/BIO2020%20(eng)%20-%20short.pdf (accessed 
7/09/2015). 
663 Ibid. 
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the Programme seeks to foster infrastructure that will support biotechnology 
development; promote bioindustry nationwide; attract and execute high-
priority innovation and investment biotechnology projects; support research in 
the life sciences and physic-chemical biology; and implement novel 
education programmes to build capacity in biotechnology. The federal 
budgetary spending on the implementation of the programme between 2011 
and 2015 is estimated to be 5659.8 million roubles and the approximate 
extra-budgetary expenditure for the same period is 6208.5 million roubles. 
 
Analysing the current trends of biotechnology expansion in Russia, there are 
at least two issues that merit specific attention. The first one pertains to the 
context—that is, the global state of biotechnology development and the 
nation’s ranking vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Part of the rationale for BIO 
2020 is the argument that Russia has been lagging behind in terms of 
biotechnology when compared both with the Western economies, including 
the USA and EU, and some of its BRICS counterparts, most notably China 
and India. Whereas the Soviet bioindustry used to be a symbol of national 
pride and international prominence, its sudden drop from lead standing to 
seventieth place has invited a good deal of criticism from politicians and 
industry representatives alike. An article that appeared in Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta in 2008 summarised Russia’s unsatisfactory performance in a 
warning tone: 
 
The coming decade in Russia will be decisive for 
laying the foundations of innovation economy. We 
will either very soon become closely familiar with 
novel technologies which determine the face of the 
twentieth-first century, or will be left behind forever. 
In the conditions of vigorous international 
competition this is not just a question regarding the 
rate and quality of our economic growth but a 
question regarding the survival of Russia as a great 
power.664 
 
 
664 Oleg Morozov and Raif Vasilov, ‘I nakormit, i vylechit: K 2010 godu mirovoi rynok bioekonomiki sostavit bolee 2 
trillionov evro’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 4572, 25 January 2008, available at 
http://www.rg.ru/2008/01/25/biotehnologii.html (accessed 7/09/2015). Author’s translation. 
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Critics have pointed out the government’s neglect of the life sciences and the 
lack of a clear systemised policy of how best to revitalise and further enhance 
domestic R&D in areas as diverse as pharmaceutical and food production, 
environment-friendly technology, and industrial manufacturing in order to 
both boost economic growth and avoid dependency on foreign imports. In an 
attempt to ameliorate the existing deficiency in strategic planning and 
adequate state approach to biotechnology, the ruling party – United Russia – 
has actively joined forces with the Russian Society of Biotechnologists aiming 
to promote modernisation and foster cross-sectorial innovation. The scope of 
its policies will be discussed in detail in the next chapter but at this stage it 
suffices to highlight that the ongoing trajectory of biotechnology expansion is 
unlikely to be abandoned. Given the strong linkage between scientific 
progress and state power and security, and Russia’s quest for asserting its 
status of a global leader once associated with the Soviet Union, establishing 
sustainable systems for biotechnology advancement remains a task of 
paramount importance. Moreover, this trend has been further reinforced over 
the past year with the international sanctions imposed as a result of the 
situation in Ukraine, forcing the Kremlin to concentrate resources on 
domestic production. 
  
The second important aspect of the ongoing biotechnology is the way in 
which it is being framed. During the Soviet era, science used to be regarded 
as an essential prerequisite for social welfare and national prosperity and, as 
a result, enjoyed generous support and a privileged position within society. 
The resurgence of government interest in promoting R&D and innovation in 
Russia can be seen as a continuation of this trend, not least because of the 
prevalent unquestioned belief that the progress of the life sciences is 
inherently positive and desirable. Official policy texts more often than not 
tend to present a one-sided account of scientific advancement underscoring 
the wide range of potential benefits which can be accrued through sustained 
state investment. Thanks to the image thus constructed, biotechnology is 
granted the status of a public good which needs to be supported in its own 
right which in turn paves the way for the unfettered expansion of the life 
sciences on terms dictated by the government. 
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State Control over Life Science Institutions  
 
In 2013 the Russian Duma passed highly controversial legislation with far-
reaching implications for the overall organisation of science. The bill, entitled 
‘On Russian Academy of Science, Reorganisation of the State Science 
Academies, and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian 
Federation’ was signed into law on 27 September and effectively dissolved 
the two principal science bodies responsible for the coordination and 
distribution of funds in the area of life sciences – the Russian Academy of 
Medical Sciences (Rossiiskaya akademiya meditsinkiikh nauk: RAMN) and 
the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences (Rossiiskaya akademiya 
selskokhozyaistvenyikh nauk: RASKhN).665 Both entities used to be direct 
heirs of their Soviet counterparts and following the end of the Cold War 
assumed most of their responsibilities. But before examining in detail the fate 
of RAMN and RASKhN, it is worth tracing back some of the key episodes of 
the evolution of the science institutional infrastructure in independent Russia.  
During the last years of the Soviet Union one of the chief bones of contention 
in the realm of science policy pertained to the status and organisation of the 
Academy of Sciences. Increased political openness and growing 
decentralisation gave rise to calls for reforms, a phenomenon which was 
particularly notable among junior scientists who saw the strictly hierarchical 
system of the Academy as an obstacle to their career advancement. Those in 
favour of radical changes maintained that the Academy should be 
transformed into an honorary institution pointing to the example of the British 
Royal Society or the US NAS. By contrast, those on the opposite end of the 
spectrum held a much more conservative view, expressing a strong 
preference for the preservation of the status quo. It suffices to mention that 
during the 1991 coup, a few months before the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, a significant number of senior Soviet Academy’s scientists sided with 
the supporters of the old regime. Yet contrary to the expectation that RAN 
would bear virtually no resemblance in substance to its Soviet counterpart 
and would rather ‘become a mere learned society, prestigious but not 
665 [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF,  O Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, reorganizatsii gosudarstvennykh akademii nauk 
i vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No.253-FZ, 27 September 2013, full text 
of the Act published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.6194, 30 September 2013, available at   
http://www.rg.ru/2013/09/27/ran-site-dok.html (accessed 7/09/2015). 
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administratively important’,666 the transformation did not occur. In other 
words, it seems to be the case that when a choice had to be made between 
more democracy but little say in policy matters, and a rigid hierarchy but 
material and decision-making powers, the temptation of retaining the 
Academy’s established position within society turned out to be too hard to 
resist. As a result, RAN managed to preserve an enormous network of 
institutes and laboratories, maintain its insulation from public accountability, 
and retain its primacy in the area of fundamental research. 
 
Over the years, the Academy has been seriously criticised on at least two 
grounds. The first source of criticism stems from the poor performance of 
Russia’s basic science when compared to the progress being made in the 
USA and EU. Whilst some commentators have pointed out that neither the 
number of publications, nor the citation index provide a precise 
representation of the quality of Russian research, such claims do not seem to 
be entirely ill-founded. For instance, an extensive evaluation study on the 
state of RAN published in 2005 showed that the Academy was performing at 
about 40% of its overall research potential, that is, less than half of all the 
scientists employed in the institutes under its auspices were actively engaged 
in research.667 Analysing the causes of this worrying trend, the study 
highlighted the poor management or the lack thereof observed within many 
research institutes and the Academy as a whole; the poor links between 
fundamental science and its practical application; the disconnect between 
universities (which are still perceived mainly as teaching institutions) and the 
Academy; and the lack of a clear regulatory framework regarding trade 
secrets and intellectual property.668 
666 On the issue of the future of the Russian Academy of Sciences after1991, Loren Graham and Irina Dezhina, 
Science in the New Russia, op cit.  
667 See [in Russian] Sergei Belanovskii, Otsenka sostoyaniya Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk: Kratkii otchet, 2005, 
Centre for Strategic Research, Moscow, available at http://polit.ru/article/2005/12/15/ran/ (accessed 7/09/2015). On 
the need for an institutional reform, see also [in Russian] Irina Dezhina, Reforma RAN: Prichiny i posledstviya dlya 
nauki v Rossii, No.77, May 2014, IFRI, Paris, France, available at 
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_rnv_77_ran_reforma_rus_dezhina_may_2014.pdf (accessed 
7/09/2015). On the debate on the need for a reform, see [in Russian] Alexandr Ogurtsov, ‘Kto zakazal 
klasterizatsiju?’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 October 2005, available at http://www.ng.ru/science/2005-10-
26/13_claster.html (accessed 7/09/2015); Sergei Belanovskii, ‘Nauka: ot finansovogo audita k vlasti effektivnykh 
menedhzerov’, Polit.ru, 15 December 2005, available at http://www.polit.ru/article/2005/12/15/science/ (accessed 
7/09/2015).  
668 Sergei Belanovskii, Otsenka sostoyaniya Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk: Kratkii otchet, op cit. By contrast, Dezhina 
points out that among the chief criticisms levelled at the Academy has been the poor management of property. She 
further rejects the allegation of the lack of links between the Academy and universities elaborating on their close 
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 The second criticism levelled at RAN relates to the lack of transparency 
regarding the distribution of financial support among its subordinate 
institutes.669 Critics have pointed out that there appears to be an apparent 
conflict of interests, built into the structure of the Academy, since the same 
people who sat on its Presidium holding decision-making powers on a range 
of matters, including budget spending, were also more often than not institute 
directors. 
 
Some of the initial attempts to reform RAN date back to the early 2000s when 
the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology developed a plan for 
restructuring the network of research institutions by dividing them into three 
separate categories. Thus, (1) academic entities involved in first-class R&D 
were to remain budgetary institutions; (2) less successful academic entities 
were to be re-oriented toward scientific servicing; and (3) some academic 
entities were to be transformed into commercial organisations but were 
nonetheless to remain within the Academy’s system.670 Another round of 
reforms was proposed in 2004 as part of the Government’s Conception of 
Participation of the Russian Federation in the Management of Government 
R&D Organisations which envisioned a substantial reduction both in the 
number of existing research institutes under the auspices of the Academy 
and its staff. 671 Yet the Conception offered only general criteria for 
determining which research institutes were to be preserved and did not 
assign clear responsibility as to which agency was to be tasked with 
overseeing the reform process. The situation was further complicated, as the 
Conception in its final version not only re-affirmed the Academy’s leading role 
collaboration. See Irina Dezhina, Reforma RAN: Prichiny i posledstviya dlya nauki v Rossii, No.77, May 2014, IFRI, 
Paris, France,  
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_rnv_77_ran_reforma_rus_dezhina_may_2014.pdf (accessed 
7/09/2015). For a comparative analysis of the performance of the Russian Academy of Science vis-a-vis its foreign 
counterparts, see Quirin Schiermeier, ‘Russia to Boost University Science’, Nature, vol.464 (2010), p.1257.  
669 Irina Dezhina, Reforma RAN: Prichiny i posledstviya dlya nauki v Rossii, No.77, May 2014, IFRI, Paris, France,  
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_rnv_77_ran_reforma_rus_dezhina_may_2014.pdf  (accessed 
7/09/2015), p.14.  
670 See [in Russian] Irina Dezhina ‘Reforma RAN: Popytki i Itogi’, Polit.ru, 3 August 2014, available at 
http://polit.ru/article/2014/08/03/science/(accessed 22 April 2015).  
671 Loren Graham and Irina Dezhina, Science in the New Russia, op cit. On the same point, see also [in Russian] 
Roy Medvedev, Vladimir Putin: Tret’ogo sroka ne budet?, (Moscow: Vremya, 2006), p.40. For a draft of the 
Conception, see [in Russian] Kontseptsiya uchastiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii v upravlenii imushestvennymi 
kompleksami gosudarstvennykh organizatsii, osushestvlyayushtikh deyatel’nost’ v sfere nauki, available at 
http://www.intelros.org/lib/doklady/nauka/nauka3.htm (accessed 10/09/2015).  
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in the governance of fundamental research but also granted it additional 
functions as a coordinator for state-funded applied research.672 The resultant 
process of ‘self-reformation’ initiated by RAN itself at that time was largely 
cosmetic.673 
  
A notable development in the government-led campaign toward the 
reformation of RAN took place in 2006 when the then President Vladimir 
Putin approved amendments to the Act ‘On Science and State Science and 
Technology Policy’.674 By dint of the newly-introduced provisions, the 
Academy and two sector-specific academies, including RAMN and RASKhN, 
were defined as ‘state academies of science’, that is, they were given the 
status of government entities. Thus, their respective Charters were to be 
approved by the Government and their presidents were to be approved by 
the President of the Russian Federation. The Act further clarified the question 
of ownership as far as the infrastructure and land within the remit of the 
academies was concerned. As a result, all relevant property was to be 
treated as state property. The latter point is crucial, not least because the 
issue of the academies’ property and estate has attracted a significant 
attention from the government to the extent that some commentators have 
referred to the battle over RAN’s substantial land assets as the primary 
rationale for the amendments.675 At the same time, others saw the move as 
an attempt by the government to take over science and an infringement on 
academic freedom. Still others have described the law as nothing more than 
a continuation of an established trend highlighting the long-standing 
relationship based on dependency between the Academy and the state ever 
since the former’s initial conception back in the late eighteenth century.676 
The debate over the motives underpinning the 2006 amendments 
notwithstanding, in retrospect there seem to be some grounds to treat them 
672 See [in Russian] Irina Dezhina, ‘Osnovnye naprevleniya reform v rossiiskoi nauke: tseli i rezul’taty’, 
Informatsionnoe obshestvo, No.1 (2006), pp.50-56. For a detailed overview of the early RAN reforms, see [in 
Russian] N.A. Gordeeva and M.M. Fil’, Pravo i reformirovanie nauki: problem i resheniya, (Moscow: Novaya 
Pravovaya Kul’tura, 2005); Irina Dezhina, Gosudarstvennoe regulirovanie nauki v Rossii, (Moscow: Magistr, 2008).  
673 [in Russian] Irina Dezhina, ‘Osnovnye napravleniya v rossiiskoi nauke’, op cit.  
674 See [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, O vnesenii izmeninii v Federal’nyi zakon “O nauke i gosudarstvennoi 
nauchno-tekhnicheskoi politike”, No.202-FZ, 4 December 2006, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.4243, 8 
December 2006, available at http://www.rg.ru/2006/12/08/nauka-dok.html (accessed 28/09/2015). 
675 Andrey Allakhverdov and Vladimir Pokrovsky, ‘Kremlin Brings Russian Academy of Sciences to Heel’, Science, 
vol.314 (2006), p.917.  
676 Loren Graham and Irina Dezhina, Science in the New Russia, op cit. 
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as part of a well-planned strategy, the pinnacle of which arguably was the 
2013 legislation and resultant power shift from RAN to the government. 
 
The Bill on the reform of RAN came as a surprise to the majority of the 
scientific community in Russia. Drafted in secrecy, the Bill was largely 
perceived as a deliberate assault against the Academy and upon disclosure, 
provoked an outcry and spurred a wave of protests, rallies, and petitions in 
an attempt to reverse the process of implementation of the reforms.677 
Amidst lengthy negotiations with the government, the scientific community 
strived to introduce a number of crucial amendments to the original text 
which, as some commentators have pointed out, has only highlighted how 
radical the tone of the initial version of the document had been.678 Among the 
most notable changes were: (1) the Academy should not be dissolved but re-
organised by merging it with RAMN and RASKhN; (2) the main objective of 
RAN should be the conduct of fundamental and applied research; (3) the 
functions of the coordinating government agency proposed by the bill should 
be limited only to dealing with the Academy’s estate, land, and property; (4) 
the three regional branches of the Academy – the Uralsk, Siberian, and the 
Far-Eastern – should retain their status of legal entities; (5) the two-tier 
system of Academy membership and the corresponding titles ‘corresponding 
member’ and academician should be preserved and the Academy should 
retain its right to decide when and how new members should be elected.679 
 
The Act approved at third reading contained some of the proposed changes 
leaving out the one that was arguably of paramount importance to scientists, 
namely the division of functions and responsibilities between the Academy 
and the federal agency to be created. As a result, all entities, over a 
thousand in total, previously associated with RAN, including research 
institutes, hospitals, and museums, were to be placed under the auspices of 
677 On the controversy surrounding the RAN reform, see [in Russian] Anton Didikin, Pravovoe regulirovanie 
innovatsinnoi deyatel’nosti v Rossii, (Novosibirsk: IFPR SO RAN, 2014); Vladimir Gubarev , Ubiistvo RAN: 
Noveishaya istoriya nauki v Rossii, (Moscow: Algoritm, 2014). A detailed database and timeline with relevant 
materials, documents, and meeting proceedings is available [in Russian] at http://www.ccas.ru/reforma/reforma.htm 
(accessed 10/09/2015). The database is hosted on the web page of the Dorodnicyn Computing Centre of RAS 
(Vychislitel’nyi tsentr im. A.A. Dorodnicyna, Rossiskaya akademii nauk), http://www.ccas.ru/index-e.htm (accessed 
10/09/2015).  
678 See Irina Dezhina, Reforma RAN: Prichiny i posledstviya dlya nauki v Rossii, op cit.  
679 Ibid. See also [in Russian] Tamara Shkel’, ‘Zakon o reforme RAN uchel popravki akademikov’, Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta, 29 September 2013, available at http://www.rg.ru/2013/09/27/ran2-site.html (accessed 11/09/2015). 
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the government. The Presidential decree announcing the creation of the 
Federal Agency of Scientific Organisations (Federal’noe agentstvo 
nauchnykh organizatsii: FANO) was issued just a day after the Duma had 
passed the legislation. FANO assumed full responsibility not only for dealing 
with the Academy’s estate and property but also for developing and 
implementing science policy.680 Thus, the 2013 Act effectively achieved what 
back in the early 1990s appeared a virtually impossible task, namely to 
convert the Academy into an honoured society with few decision-making 
powers. 
 
Two years after its entry into force the Act on the reform of RAN continues to 
be a vigorously debated issue. The lack of clear, reliable information on 
either the reasons for its enactment, or the objectives which it has sought to 
achieve has left a significant space for speculation over the driving forces 
behind the reform process. That said, the scarce facts available still lend 
themselves to preliminary analysis. There seems to be a certain degree of 
consensus that a reform of the Academy was deemed both necessary and 
desirable. Yet given the high level of resistance demonstrated by RAN 
previously, there have been serious doubts regarding the extent to which a 
reform could be prompted internally. Indeed, over the past two decades the 
Academy has proved to be a conservative structure keen on maintaining its 
privileged position in society at all costs. Against this backdrop, a 
government-led reform appeared a logical step forward. However, the way in 
which the reform was planned and implemented has raised a lot of questions 
regarding the actual motivations and goals of its architects. The secrecy 
surrounding the draft Act, including the anonymity of its authors, the haste 
with which the Act was passed, and the reluctance of the government to 
actively engage and listen to the concerns voiced by scientists make it hard 
to imagine that the reform was genuinely aimed at serving the interests of 
Russian science. A further sign that the provisions of the new Act were poorly 
defined and myopic was the resolve of President Putin to impose a year-long 
680 See [in Russian] Ukaz Prezidenta RF, O Federal’nom agentstve nauchnykh organizatsii, No.735, 27 September 
2013, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.6194, 30 September 2013, available at   
http://www.rg.ru/2013/09/27/fano-site-dok.html  (accessed 11/09/2015).  
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moratorium on any deals by FANO involving the Academy’s estate and 
property.681 
  
In effect, the clash over the 2013 reform was not a matter solely between 
RAN and the government but rather between science and the state. True, the 
Academy has been at the forefront of the debate but that debate, perhaps for 
the first time over the past two decades, has managed to unite the scientific 
community against what has been perceived as a government-led attack on 
fundamental research. Within this context, the chief bone of contention lies in 
the transfer of responsibility for research policy from RAN to FANO, a move 
which many fear would lead to mass reductions in the number of personnel 
and institutions, and could eventually result in dismantling of the system of 
research institutes.682 Since the onus is on state bureaucrats with little 
understanding of science to decide which lines of research are worth 
pursuing and by whom, there is an uneasy feeling among scientists about the 
future of Russian scientific research.683 It suffices to note that a recent study 
suggests that a significant proportion of junior scientists appear dissatisfied 
with the new Act and even contemplate searching for career prospects 
abroad, a trend which, if it materialises, could further deepen the ‘brain drain’ 
problem.684 But the battle seems far from over just yet. Increased 
681 See [in Russian] ‘Putin predlozhil ustanovit’ godovoi moratoria na reformy RAN’, Forbes, 31 October 2013, 
available at http://www.forbes.ru/news/246824-putin-predlozhil-ustanovit-godovoi-moratorii-na-reformu-ran 
(accessed 11/09/2015). On the same point, see also [in Russian] Kira Latukhina, ‘Za grantom: Vladimir Putin 
obsudil s uchenymi reformirovanie nauki’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.6265, 23 December 2013, available at 
http://www.rg.ru/2013/12/23/putin-ran.html (accessed 11/09/2015).  
682 See [in Russian] Vladimir Kuz’min, ‘Komu FANO nado: Kabinet ministrov utverdil polozhenie o FANO’, 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.6218, 28 October 2013, available at http://www.rg.ru/2013/10/25/kotukov-site.html 
(accessed 11/09/2015); Yurii Medvedev, ‘Akademicheskii treugol’nik’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.6644, 8 April 2015, 
available at http://www.rg.ru/2015/04/08/kotykov.html (accessed 11/09/2015); Nataliya Demina, ‘Reforma v bol’shikh 
kavychkakh’, Troitskii variant, No.143, 3 December 2013, p.6-7, available at http://trv-
science.ru/2013/12/03/reforma-v-bolshikh-kavychkakh-2/ (accessed 11/09/2015); Marina Sklyarenko i Roman 
Romanyuk, ‘V trevozhnom ozhidanii akademicheskogo effekta’, Ekspert Severo-Zapad, 12 February 2015, available 
at http://www.expertnw.ru/news/2015-02-12/v-trevozhnom-ozhidanii-akademicheskogo-effekta (accessed 
11/09/2015).   
683 See I. Libin et al, ‘The Reform of the Russian Academy of Science: Possible Causes and Consequences of the 
Reform: For Whom the Bell Tolls’, [in Russian], Mezhdunarodnyi zhurnal eksperimental’nogo obrazovaniya, No.8 
(2014), pp.115-117, available at http://www.rae.ru/meo/pdf/2014/8-2/5915.pdf (accessed 7/09/2015); [in Russian] 
Askol’d Ivanchik, ‘Reforma buksuet, ili Apofeoz bjurokratii’, Troitskii variant, No.176, 7 April 2015, p.2, available at 
http://trv-science.ru/reforma-buksuet/ (accessed 7/09/2015); Vladimir Gubarev, ‘“Reforma RAN” na chinovnichii 
maner’, Pravda.Ru, 15 March 2014, available at http://www.pravda.ru/science/academy/15-03-2014/1198830-ran-0/ 
(accessed 11/09/2015); Aleksandr Yemel’yanenkov, ‘Trio “Akademiya” v poiskakh sebya’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
No.6334, 19 March 2014, available at  http://www.rg.ru/2014/03/19/fortov.html (accessed 11/09/2015); Kira 
Latukhina, ‘Putin: Gosudarstvo ne budet komandovat’ uchenymi’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 20 December 2013, 
available at http://www.rg.ru/2013/12/20/sovet-site.html (accessed 11/09/2015).  
684 See [in Russian] Ol’ga Kolesova, ‘Chemodan, vokzal…reforma RAN vyzvala u molodykh zhelanie uekhat’’, 
Poisk, No.4-5, 31 January 2014, available at http://www.poisknews.ru/theme/ran/8940/ (accessed 11/09/2015). On 
the issue of a possible ‘brain drain’ among perspective scientists, see also [in Russian] Nikolai Podorvanyuk, 
‘Zhalko, esli vperedi vybor – professiya ili strana’, Gazeta.Ru, 17 December 2013, available at 
http://www.gazeta.ru/science/2013/12/17_a_5806413.shtml (accessed 11/09/2015); Richard Stone, ‘Embattled 
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bureaucracy and discontent with FANO’s handling of science affairs following 
the introduction of the reform has apparently motivated scientists to try once 
more to reclaim the Academy and restore at least some of its lost powers, 
particularly in the area of coordinating fundamental research.685 Moreover, 
there seems to be increasing ‘critical mass’ within the scientific community in 
favour of modernisation both of the system of higher education and research 
entities.686 At this stage it is still uncertain how the process of science 
reformation will proceed but unless the Academy manages to come up with 
constructive proposals on how best to move forward, there is little doubt that 
further government-initiated reforms would be introduced. 
 
Science funding institutions also remain largely under state control. Despite 
the emergence of private foundations offering support for science and 
education in Russia over the past fifteen years, the state continues to be the 
main source of research funding.687 Given the drastic decrease in science 
expenditure in comparison with the Soviet period, several new schemes have 
been developed to replace ‘block funding’ for research organisations. One 
features subsidies, whereby various arms of the government, including the 
Ministry of Education, FANO, Ministry of Healthcare, and Ministry of 
Agriculture, allocate a fixed amount of money in exchange for a specific 
project. In other words, the government tasks a particular institute to fulfil a 
President Seeks New Path for Russian Academy’, ScienceInsider, 11 February 2014, available at 
http://news.sciencemag.org/people-events/2014/02/embattled-president-seeks-new-path-russian-academy 
(accessed 11/09/2015); Quirin Schiermeier, ‘Putin’s Russia Divides and Enrages Scientists’, Nature, vol.516 (2014), 
pp.298-299.   
685 Dariya Mendeleeva, ‘Reforma Rossiiskoi akademii nauk: chto budet dal’she?’, Pravoslavie i Mir, 27 May 2015, 
available at http://www.pravmir.ru/reforma-ran-poryadok-dostizheniya-haosa/ (accessed 11/09/2015); Alexey 
Yablokov, ‘Academy “Reform” is Stifling Russian Science’, Nature, vol.511 (2014), p.7; Nataliya Demina, ‘God posle 
reform: byurokratizatsiya usililas’’, Troitskii variant, No.158, 15 July 2014, p.2, available at http://trv-
science.ru/2014/07/15/god-posle-reformy-byurokratizaciya-usililas/ (accessed 11/09/2015).   
686 On the civil society initiatives that developed as a result of the RAN reform, see [in Russian] Boris Shtern, ‘Klub 
“1 iyulya”’, Troitskii variant, No.133, 16 July 2013, p.5, available at http://trv-science.ru/2013/07/16/klub-1-iyulya/ 
(accessed 28/09/2015). Beside the dissident Club ‘1 July’, other initiatives include [in Russian] Komissiya 
obshestvenogo kontrolya v sfere nauki (Committee for Public Control over Science), available at 
http://rascommission.ru/statements/125-club-1-july-20-04-2015 (accessed 28/09/2015); and [in Russian] ‘Sokhranim 
nauku vmeste’ (‘Save Science’ Movement), available at http://iph.ras.ru/save_ran.htm (accessed 28/09/2015). The 
latter social movement also maintains a web platform, available at http://www.saveras.ru/ (accessed 28/09/2015).    
687 A notable exception in this regard constitutes the ‘Dynasty’ Fund set up by Dmitrii Zimin, Honourable President of 
the Open Joint Stock Company ‘VympelKom’ which own the Beeline trademark – one of the main mobile network 
providers. The Fund operates four principal sponsorship programmes, namely ‘Support for Science and Education’, 
‘Popularisation of Science’, ‘Social Science Enlightenment’ and ‘Special Projects’ related to culture or aimed at 
solving a social problem. Further information is available at      http://www.dynastyfdn.com/ (accessed 7/09/2015). 
On 5 July 2015, the Fund’s Council took a decision to terminate its activity, see [in Russian] 
http://www.dynastyfdn.com/news/1296 (accessed 11/09/2015). For news reports on the topic see Paevl Kotlyar and 
Nikolai Podorvanyuk, ‘Konets “Dinastii”’, Gazeta.Ru, 8 July 2015, available at 
http://www.gazeta.ru/science/2015/07/08_a_7629877.shtml (accessed 11/09/2015); Pavel Kotlyar, ‘Esli “Dinastiyu” 
zakroyut, eto budet moshtnyi signal’, Gazeta.Ru, 12 May 2015, 
http://www.gazeta.ru/science/2015/05/12_a_6683177.shtml (accessed 11/09/2015).  
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certain project and provides it with the required funds. In theory, the scheme 
is supposed to offer both researchers and institute administrators a degree of 
flexibility, as it does not lay down strict requirements regarding the number of 
staff expected to participate on the project, nor the amount of salary to be 
paid. In practice, however, it has been described as a ‘bureaucratic 
nightmare’, not least because the way in which the size of funding is 
calculated does not take into account the criteria used at research institutes 
for determining staff payment.688 As a result, the bulk of subsidies are largely 
spent on staff salaries rather than on research.689 Critics have argued that 
the existing arrangements are self-serving for the government, providing 
state bureaucracies with a comfortable excuse for making scientists at former 
Academy institutes redundant.690 
  
As already mentioned, state research foundations emerged in the early 
1990s as an alternative funding mechanism to compensate for the reduced 
science budget in the immediate post-Soviet period. Based on the 2011 
amendments to the 1996 Act ‘On Science and State Scientific and 
Technological Policy’ and Article 251 of the Tax Code, ‘state foundations can 
be budgetary or autonomous entities’.691 In the former case, an entity’s 
budget is part of the overall state budget and therefore guaranteed; in the 
latter, the entity is solely responsible for raising funds to support its activity.692 
The amendments further stipulated that the Government of the Russian 
Federation acts as the founder of state foundations and all corresponding 
functions and powers lay with it. According to its revised   2012 Charter, the 
RFFI is a ‘non-profit organisation in the form of a federal state budgetary 
entity’.693 By dint of being tasked with the duties and responsibilities of its 
688 See [in Russian] Evgenii Onishchenko, ‘Byurokraticheskaya revolyutsiya’, Troitskii variant, No.177, 21 April 2015, 
pp.1-2, available at http://trv-science.ru/2015/04/21/byurokraticheskaya-revolyuciya/ (accessed 11/09/2015). See 
also [in Russian] Erofei Esperazus, ‘Byudzhet vsekh institutov RAN sokrashen’, Moskovskii komsomolets, 27 March 
2015, available at http://www.mk.ru/science/2015/03/27/nachalsya-vtoroy-etap-reformy-ran-finansirovanie-institutov-
sokratyat.html (accessed 11/09/2015).    
689 Evgenii Onishchenko, ‘Byurokraticheskaya revolyutsiya’, op cit.  
690 Interview, 29 May 2015, Moscow, Russia.  
691 See [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nyi zakon “O nauke i gosudarstvennoi 
nauchnoi-tekhnicheskoi politike” i statiju 251 chasti vtoroi Nalogovogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii v chasti 
utochneniya pravovogo statusa fondov podderzhki nauchnoi, nauchno-tekhnicheskoi i innovatsionnoi deyatel’nosti, 
13 July 2011, Moscow. Full text of the Act is available at http://www.rfbr.ru/rffi/ru/documents (accessed 7/09/2015).  
692 See [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, Ob avtonomnykh uchrezhdeniyakh, No.174-FZ, 3 November 2006, 
Moscow. Full text of the Act is available at http://www.rg.ru/2006/11/08/zakon-doc.html (accessed 7/09/2015).  
693 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, Ob ustave federal’nogo gosudarstvennogo bjudzhetnogo 
uchrezhdeniya “Rossiiskii fond fundamental’nykh issledovanii”, No.133, 15 Februry 2012, Moscow. 
http://www.rfbr.ru/rffi/ru/documents (accessed 7/09/2015). 
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founder, the Russian Government holds decision-making powers with regard 
to any re-organisation of the RFFI, altering its type and dismantling; it 
approves the RFFI’s Charter and any amendments made to it; appoints and 
dismisses the Chair of the RFFI Board and the RFFI Director; and approves 
the RFFI Board’s composition. 
 
Besides the RFFI, the Russian Science Foundation (Rossiiskii nauchny fond: 
RNF) created in 2013 offers grants for pure and applied research in various 
fields of science, including biology, medicine, and agriculture.694 The RNF is 
a legal entity governed by a Board of Trustees appointed by the President of 
the Russian Federation for a maximum term of five years.695 The Board’s 
Chair is also appointed by the Russian President and each Board member, 
including the Chair, can be dismissed pre-term on the basis of a Presidential 
decision. The Director General of the RNF is a Board member and his 
appointment is subject to approval by the President of the Russian 
Federation. All Board members apart from the RNF Director can hold public 
sector and civil service positions alongside their Board membership. 
  
Two additional schemes launched under the auspices of MINOBRANAUKI – 
the Federal Targeted Programme (Federal’naya tselevaya programma: 
FTsP) on ‘R&D in Priority Directions for the Development of the Russian 
Scientific and Technological Complex 2014-2020’ and Mega-grants 
(Megagranty) – have further sought to boost applied science and enhance 
the research capacity within Russian universities.696 Initiated in 2010, 
Megagranty has attracted substantial international attention, not least 
because of its size (90 billion-roubles which at that time amounted to about 
2.8 billion US dollars) and the ambitious goals it was set to achieve.697 Whilst 
694 See [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, O Rossiiskom nauchnom fonde i vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye 
zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No.291-FZ, 2 November 2013. Full text of the Act is available at 
http://www.rscf.ru/?q=node/17 (accessed 7/09/2015). 
695 Ibid.  
696 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie, O federal’noi tselevoi programme “Issledovaniya i razrabotki po prioritetnym 
napravleniyam razvitiya nauchno-tekhnologicheskogo kompleksa Rossiina 2014-2020 gody”,   No.426, 21 May 
2013. Full text is available at http://fcpir.ru/upload/medialibrary/332/tekst-programmy.pdf (accessed 7/09/2015). The 
programme can be seen as a continuation of Russia’s earlier efforts to enhance the standing of its universities. On 
this point, see Quirin Schiermeier, ‘Russia to Boost University Science’, Nature, vol.464 (2010), p.1257. On 
‘Megagrants’, see Irina Dezhina, ‘State of Science and Innovation in 2011’ in S.Sinelnikov-Murylev et al. (ed.), 
Russian Economy in 2011: Trends and Outlooks, Issue 33 (Moscow: Gaidar Institute, 2012), pp.344-375. 
697 See Quirin Schiermeier and Konstantin Severinov, ‘Russia Woos Lost Scientists’, Nature, vol. 465 (2010), p.858; 
Editorial, ‘Seizing the Moment’, Nature, vol.467:7313 (2010), p.251; Quirin Schiermeier, ‘Russia Revitalises 
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aimed at home universities, the scheme is intended to lure Russian scientists 
working and residing abroad to return and undertake projects in the 
motherland. Thus, the competition for grants of a maximum value of 150 
million roubles is open to both local and foreign-based researchers and the 
involvement of junior scientists is explicitly required as part of the application 
process. 
 
All grant schemes operate on a competitive basis through a peer-review 
process, which in itself is a significant departure from the Soviet funding 
system, whereby researchers were not required to compete for financial 
resources. Although the development has been largely welcomed by the 
scientific community, its overall success has been overshadowed by a 
number of limitations. Bureaucratic obstacles, lack of transparency, and bias 
and preferential treatment are only some of the concerns voiced by scientists 
familiar with the system.698 Lack of anonymity at the application and 
evaluation process has further raised concerns of the money being allocated 
on the basis of affiliation rather than individual merit.699 Limited rotation of 
peer reviewers and senior foundation staff has stimulated heavy lobbying by 
prominent scientists and science administrators which means that more often 
than not vested interests and not individual merit dictate how funding 
decisions are made.700 In some cases, e.g. the Mega-grants scheme, foreign 
experts have been recruited as part of the peer-review process as a way of 
improving quality control and helping ensure that grants are distributed in a 
fair manner and in accordance with the established criteria. Additional 
hurdles in the competition for funding include poor relations between the 
foundations and the public, especially with regard to the communication of 
Science’, Nature, vol.473 (2011), pp.428-429; [in Russian] Nikolai Podorvanyuk i Aleksandra Borisova, ‘Poshli 
navstrechu nauchnomu soobshesvu’, Gazeta.Ru, 30 October 2010, available at 
http://www.gazeta.ru/science/2010/10/29_a_3433172.shtml (accessed 11/09/2015).  
698 On the problems and limitations of the existing science funding mechanisms in Russia, see Loren Graham and 
Irina Dezhina, Science in the New Russia, op cit. While some of the complaints about the quality of the peer-review 
system voiced by the Russian scientific community are not uncommon among scientists in the West (see, for 
example, Daniel Greenberg, Science, Money and Politics, op cit.), there have been reports about quite serious 
problems. See [in Russian] ‘Eto takie khoroshie lyudi, kak im mozhno ne dat’ deneg: Kak uchenye raspredelyayut 
den’gi na fundamental’nuyu nauku v Rossii’, Gazeta.Ru, 16 July 2014, available at 
http://www.gazeta.ru/science/2014/07/16_a_6116337.shtml (accessed 11/09/2015); Nikolai Podorvanyuk, ‘Voprosy 
lukavstva v nauke stali reshat’sya’, Gazeta.Ru, 30 January 2015, available at  
http://www.gazeta.ru/science/2015/01/30_a_6392429.shtml (accessed 11/09/2015); Aleksandr Fradkov, ‘Ideal’naya 
ekspertiza’, Troitskii variant, No.159, 29 July 2014, pp.1-2, available at http://trv-science.ru/2014/07/29/idealnaya-
ehkspertiza/ (accessed 11/09/2015).   
699 Loren Graham and Irina Dezhina, Science in the New Russia, op cit. 
700 Ibid. 
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relevant information; the existence of programmes for which only applicants 
of certain age are eligible (e.g. ‘young’); required minimum number of 
publications; complicated application procedures and grant bookkeeping; and 
delays and incompleteness in financing projects.701 Whilst the criticisms 
levelled at the science funding system are by no means unique to the 
Russian context, here the problem is particularly acute, not least because 
grants constitute a vital source not only of material support for research but in 
many cases also of a salary and employment. The absence of adequate 
block funding, coupled with a fierce competition for foundations’ money thus 
creates favourable conditions for reducing the size of the scientific 
community by making anyone who fails to meet the funding requirements set 
by the state institutions redundant. 
  
The Legacy of the Soviet Bioweapons Programme 
 
Arguably one of the most controversial aspects of the history of the biological 
sciences in the Soviet Union is the development of an offensive biological 
weapons programme, a topic which more than twenty years after the 
dissolution of the USSR is still deemed sensitive and enveloped in the 
legacies of secrecy, including partial information and competing narratives.702 
Kalinina, for instance, argues that whereas there seems to be little doubt that 
the Soviet Union was involved in biological weapons development, the bulk 
of relevant data regarding the programme remains classified and the official 
statements issued by the Soviet and later Russian government suggest that 
701 Ibid. On the various criteria for science funding, see [in Russian] Aleksandr Khlunov, ‘RNF: teoriya vs. praktika’, 
Troitskii variant, No.151, 8 April 2014, p.4, available at http://trv-science.ru/2014/04/08/rnf-teoriya-vs-praktika/ 
(accessed 11/09/2015).  What is more, once awarded the grant apparently could be terminated at any point if the 
researcher fails to meet any of the bureaucratic requirements. For instance, in 2013 the RFFI annulled more than 20 
per cent of the nearly 300 initially approved awards to junior scientists justifying its decision by a late receipt of the 
contract from the awardees. The case is staggering, for according to the RFFI rules, ‘the fund preserves the right to 
re-consider its decision whether to terminate a grant if the Contract has been received after the deadline.’ On the 
latter issue, see [in Russian] Mariya Logacheva, ‘Molodym vezde u nas – chto? Ili edinyi bilet – kuda?’, Troitskii 
variant, No.144, 24 December 2013, p.2, available at http://trv-science.ru/2013/12/24/molodym-vezde-u-nas-chto-ili-
edinyjj-bilet-kuda/ (accessed 11/09/2015).   
702 There is very limited Russian literature on the bioweapons programme and the few existing works are based on 
information already made available through Western academic scholarship. See, for example, [in Russian] Lev 
Fedorov, Sovetskoe biologicheskoe oruzhie: istoriya, ekologiya, politika, (Moscow: International Social-Ecological 
Union, 2005); N. Kalinina, Mezhdunarodnye i natsional’nye problemy biologicheskoi bezopasnosti i perspektivy ikh 
resheniya, (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2012); Aleksei Arbatov (ed.), Protivodeistvie bioterrorizmu: politicheskie, 
tekhnicheskie i pravovye aspekti, (Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia, 2008). Igor Domaradskii, an esteemed 
academician and microbiologist, published his memoirs in Russian in 1995 under the title Perevertysh (lit. 
Changeling). There he discussed his involvement in the Soviet biological weapons programme during his time at the 
Institute for Applied Microbiology at Obolensk near Moscow. Subsequently, the book was translated into English, 
see Igor Domaradskij and Wendy Orent, Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/Russian Biological War Machine, (Amherst, 
NY: Prometheus Books, 2003).  
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only biodefence-related activities were carried out.703 She nevertheless 
acknowledges that the primary purpose of President Yeltsin’s decree issued 
on 11 April that same year was to terminate the offensive biological weapons 
programme but highlights that the information provided by the government to 
the United Nations (UN) as part of the BTWC CBMs process has not been 
publicly disclosed in Russia.704 The submission in question pertains to Form 
F of the politically-binding CBMs in which States Parties to the BTWC are 
expected to declare any past offensive biowarfare activities. Based on the 
information contained therein, the Soviet biowarfare programme reportedly 
commenced in the late 1940s under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Defence.705 Experimental work was conducted in the biological research 
centres in Kirov, Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg), and Zagorsk (Sergiev Posad) 
and later, in the 1960s, production facilities were established in Sverdlovsk 
and Zagorsk. Aerosol test chambers and an open-air test site were situated 
on the Island of Vozrozhdenie (Resurrection Island) in the Aral Sea. In the 
early 1970s, a biological defensive programme began encompassing a 
number of research centres, including Kol’tsovo, Obolensk, and Leningrad 
(St Petersburg). The biodefence effort focused on assessing protection 
against biological agents, including those in aerosolised form. In the military 
facilities, offensive biological research continued. Bioweapons production 
lines were dismantled during the 1980s in preparation of the Second Review 
Conference of the BTWC in 1986. Research activities formally ceased in 
703 See [in Russian] N. Kalinina, Mezhdunarodnye i natsional’nye problemy biologicheskoi bezopasnosti i 
perspektivy ikh resheniya, (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2012); p.46. Also see [in Russian] Verkhovnyi sovet Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, Postanovlenie, Ob obespechenii vypolneniya mezhdunarodnykh obyazatel’stv Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 
oblasti khimicheskogo, bakteriologicheskogo (biologicheskogo) i toksinnogo oruzhiya, No.3244-1, 8 July 1992.  The 
Resolution confirmed that Russia accepted the obligations of the USSR under the BTWC. In an interview given 
shortly after the publication of Ken Alibek’s book Biohazard the then Head of the Biodefence Control Department 
(Upravleniya po biologicheskoi zashtite) of the Ministry of Defence, Valentin Evstigneev, re-asserted the narrative 
presented in the 1992 CBM underscoring that the principal goal of the Soviet military programme was the 
development of adequate biodefence. When asked about the Soviet biological offensive capability, he explained 
‘that the development of biodefence measures required the development of a model of offensive measures. It was 
this cycle of work that constituted the so called offensive element of the Ministry of Defence’s programme […] and 
which in 1992 was banned and terminated.’ According to Evtigneev, all equipment which could potentially be 
deemed questionable for peaceful purposes was dismantled in 1989 and ever since Russia could be suspected only 
of intentions, for in his words, there were no clear internationally-agreed criteria regarding the definition of a 
‘biological weapon’, the relevant equipment necessary for its production, and the equipment and technical 
production means which should be prohibited. See [in Russian] Interview with Valentin Yevstigneev, ‘Shtamm Eboly 
v Rossiju privezli razvedchki’, Yadernyi kontrol’, vol.46:4 (1999), pp.16-26. Author’s translation. On the issue of 
denial, see Jan Knoph and Kristina Westerdahl, ‘Re-Evaluating Russia’s Biological Weapons Policy, as Reflected in 
the Criminal Code and Official Admissions: Insubordination Leading to a President’s Subordination’, Critical 
Reviews in Microbiology, vol.32 (2006), pp.1-13.   
704 See [in Russian] Ukaz Prezidenta RF, Ob obespechenie vypolneniya mezhdunarodnykh obyazatel’stv v oblasti 
biologicheskogo oruzhiya, No 390, 11 April 1992.  
705 See Tatyana Elleman, ‘Russian Federation’ in Kathryn McLaughlin et al. (ed.), Bioweapons Monitor 2014, 
(Bradford: University of Bradford, 2014), p.207, available at     
http://www.bwpp.org/documents/BWM%202014%20WEB.pdf (accessed 8/09/2015). 
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1992 and a Trilateral Agreement between Russia, the US, and the UK 
designed to help foster reassurance and ensure compliance with 
international law was signed. 
  
One aspect on which the CBM offers little clarification is the 1979 anthrax 
outbreak in Sverdlovsk, which caused 68 fatalities. According to the records 
of the First Review Conference of the BTWC held in March 1981, the head of 
the USSR delegation, Victor Israelyan when responding to the allegations 
that the outbreak was a result of illicit activities carried out in a military facility 
located nearby, ‘[t]he Soviet Union had always scrupulously observed the 
Convention’s provisions, pursuant to a decree by the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet on 11 February 1975. The incident in 1979 referred to by the 
United States delegation had in fact resulted from an epidemic caused by 
consumption of infected meat which had not been subjected to normal 
inspection before sale; it in no way reflected on the Soviet Union’s 
compliance with the Convention.’706 The ‘infected meat’ thesis thus emerged 
as the prevailing explanation of the outbreak during the Soviet era and has 
been subsequently adopted by the Russian leadership. Yet throughout the 
1980s and the 1990s teams of foreign experts led by Matthew Meselson, a 
renowned microbiologist and former science policy advisor to the US 
President Richard Nixon, conducted independent detailed enquiries yielding 
results which ran counter to the narrative put forward by Soviet and later 
Russian officials. In particular, their findings suggested that the outbreak 
‘resulted from the windborne spread of an aerosol anthrax pathogen; [and] 
that the source was at the military microbiology facility.’707 Drawing upon a 
range of sources, including scientific and victims’ accounts, administrative 
data, the geographical distribution of anthrax cases, and surface 
observations showing the wind directions and speed, Meselson and his 
colleagues presented evidence that: 
 
706 Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Summary Record of the 
Twelfth Meeting, BWC/CONF.I/SR.12, 21 March 1981, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, available at 
http://www.unog.ch/bwcdocuments/1980-03-1RC/BWC_CONF.I_SR.12.pdf (accessed 8/09/2015). 
707 Matthew Meselson et al. ‘The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979’, Science, vol. 266:5188 (1994), p.1206.  
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(i) most people who contracted anthrax worked, lived, or attended 
daytime military reserve clases during the first week of April 1979 in a 
narrow zone, with its northern end in a military microbiology facility in 
the city and its other end near the city limit 4 km to the south; 
 
(ii) livestock died of anthrax in villages located along the extended axis 
of the same zone, out to a distance of 50 km; 
 
(iii) a northerly wind parallel to the high-risk zone prevailed during 
most of the day on Monday, 2 April, the first day that the military 
reservists who contracted anthrax were within the zone; and 
 
(iv) the first cases of human and animal anthrax appeared 2 to 3 days 
thereafter.’708  
 
The team further asserted that: 
 
The narrowness of the zone of human and animal 
anthrax and the infrequency of northerly winds 
parallel to the zone after 2 April suggest that most 
or all infections resulted from the escape of anthrax 
on that day. Owing to the inefficacy of aerosol 
deposition and resuspension, few if any inhalatory 
infections are likely to have resulted from 
secondary aerosols on subsequent days. A single 
date of inhalatory infection is also consistent with 
the steady decline of onsets of fatal cases in 
successive weeks of the epidemic.709 
 
Jeanne Guillemin’s compelling account based on scientific evidence and 
extensive interviews with victim families, medical personnel involved in the 
treatment of 1979 patients, and senior state officials has further cast serious 
doubts on the plausibility of the ‘infected meat’ thesis revealing how a 
concerted action by the military and the government carried out in utmost 
conditions of secrecy has made it possible to keep the incident away from the 
708 Ibid. 
709 Ibid. 
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public domain.710 To date, the Russian government has never openly 
acknowledged whether there was any military involvement in the Sverdlovsk 
outbreak, as a result of which no reasonability for the 68 fatalities has been 
ascribed, nor has anyone ever been held to account in relation to the event. 
According to Guillemin, the persistent silence regarding the role of 
Compound 19 in causing the largest epidemic of inhalation anthrax yet on 
record has reinforced the army’s right to remain aloof, allowing the military to 
disregard their responsibility to the local citizens they were bound to serve 
and protect in the first place.711 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, secrecy pertains not only to the restriction of 
information but also to the context that allows sustaining and perpetuating 
secrets. Both of those dynamics seem to be at play as far as the Sverdlovsk 
case is concerned. The rapid intervention of the KGB (Committee of State 
Security: Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti) has reportedly helped 
ensure that any relevant information related to the outbreak remains only with 
those who need to know. Given the lack of publicly accessible evidence, the 
tragedy could relatively easily be depicted as a natural disease outbreak, an 
explanation, which despite being challenged scientifically, still appears to be 
upheld politically. 
  
Secrecy breeds uncertainty and uncertainly in turn breeds suspicion. When in 
1992 Russia made its CBM submission admitting to the development of an 
offensive biological weapons programme, concerns were raised over what 
appeared to be a discrepancy between the content of the submitted text and 
the accounts provided by several high-ranking Soviet defectors regarding its 
size and scope. Some analysts have argued that the CBM submission is 
710 See Jeanne Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak, (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1999). See also Jeanne Guillemin, ‘Detecting Anthrax: What We Learned from the 1979 Sverdlovsk 
Outbreak’ in Malcolm Dando et al. (ed.), Scientific and Technological Means of Distinguishing Between Natural and 
Other Outbreaks of Disease, NATO Science Series: Disarmament Technologies – Vol.35, (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2001), pp.75-86.  
711 Jeanne Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1999), p.232. In April 1992, President Yeltsin approved a law designed to grant financial support to those families 
who suffered losses during the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak. The law, however, avoided any mention of the 
causes of the outbreak. See [in Russian] Zakon, Ob uluchshenii pensionnogo obespecheniya semei grazhdan, 
umershikh vsledstvie zabolevaniya sibirskoi yazvoi v gorode Sverdlovske v 1979 godu, No.2667-1, 4 April 1992.  
255 
 
                                                          
incomplete and suffers from ‘significant omissions’,712 a point that the US 
highlighted at the time when the Russian government disclosed the initial 
draft history of the offensive programme.713 Nevertheless, no subsequent 
revised versions of Form F have been submitted. As part of the efforts to 
guarantee Russia’s biological disarmament under the 1992 Trilateral 
Agreement a series of inspection visits on an exchange basis were held.714 
British and American teams were thus granted access to several non-military 
biodefence facilities. However, the Russian government has demonstrated 
reluctance to open up for international inspection any of the three biological 
research institutions under the auspices of the military.715 
 
Over the past two decades Russia’s intention to comply with international law 
has been questioned on a several occasions. For instance, in 1997 Vaccine 
published a paper describing a study in which a team of Russian scientists of 
the State Research Centre for Applied Microbiology at Obolensk created a 
vaccine-resistant genetically engineered strain of Bacillus anthracis, the 
agent responsible for anthrax.716Against the backdrop of the information 
provided by Ken Alibek, the experiment has been widely cited as an example 
of offensive biological research.717 Moreover, when assessing Russia’s 
compliance with the BTWC, the 2005 Adherence to and Compliance with 
Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and 
Commitments report prepared by the US Department of State concluded that 
‘based on all available evidence […] Russia continues to maintain an 
712 Nicolas Isla, Transparency in Past Offensive Biological Weapon Programmes: An Analysis of Confidence 
Building Measure Form F, 1992-2003, Occasional Paper No.1, June 2006, Hamburg Centre for Biological Arms 
Control, Hamburg, Germany. Available at  http://www.biological-arms-control.org/publications/FormF_1992-2003.pdf 
(accessed 26/04/2015).  
713 See Nicolas Sims, The Evolution of Biological Disarmament, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies, 
no.19, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.13.  
714 See David Kelly, ‘The Trilateral Agreement: Lessons for Biological Weapons Verification’ in Trevor Findlay and 
Oliver Meier (ed.), Verification Yearbook 2002, (London: VERTIC, 2002), pp.93-109.  
715 Milton Leitenberg and Raymond Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, ip.cit, p.711. In 1997 an 
ISTC-sponsored international scientific conference took place at one of the civilian institutes situated in Kirov, 
namely the Volga-Vyatka State Scientific Centre for Applied Microbiology. For more information on this event, see 
National Research Council, The Unique U.S. – Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology, 
(Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2013), p.40. 
716 See A.P. Pomerantsev, ‘Expression of Cereolysine AB Genes in Bacillus AnthracisVaccine Strain Ensures 
Protection against Experimental Hemolytic Anthrax Infection’, Vaccine, vol.15:17/18 (1997), pp.1846-1850.  
717 See Jonathan Tucker, ‘In the Shadow of Anthrax: Strengthening the Biological Disarmament Regime’, The Non-
Proliferation Review, Spring 2002, pp.112-121; Jan van Aken and Edward Hammond, ‘Genetic Engineering and 
Biological Weapons’, EMBO Reports, vol. 4 (2003), pp.S57-60; William Broad, ‘Gene-Engineered Anthrax: Is It a 
Weapon?’, New York Times, 14 February 1998, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/14/world/gene-
engineered-anthrax-is-it-a-weapon.html(accessed 5/05/2015). 
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offensive BW programme in violation of the Convention.’718 Despite being 
considerably softened, the tone of the 2014 report shows that ambiguity 
regarding Russia’s activities of relevance to the BTWC persists: 
 
Available information during the reporting period 
indicated Russian entities have remained engaged 
in dual-use, biological activities. It is unclear that 
these activities were conducted for purposes 
inconsistent with the BWC. It also remains unclear 
whether Russia has fulfilled its BWC obligations in 
regard to the items specified in Article I of the 
Convention that it inherited.719 
 
 
Also in 2014, a US Congressional Hearing titled ‘Assessing the Biological 
Weapons Threat: Russia and Beyond’ was held during which Russia’s 
potential offensive biological capability was given considerable attention.720 
At that Hearing, a reference was made to a passage in a 2012 essay 
published by the then-Prime Minister Putin, ‘Staying Strong: Guarantees for 
Russia’s National Security’, listing the scope of novel weapons likely to be 
developed in the distant future including beam, geophysical, genetic, and 
psychophysical.721 In particular, it was claimed that the passage was 
‘extremely problematic and troubling’, for it indicated Russia’s intention to 
develop genetic weapons, which would be in contravention with the 
BTWC.722 In a statement released shortly after the Hearing, the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs refuted the allegations as ‘absolutely groundless’, 
pointing out to Russia’s consistent support for strengthening the Convention 
through a legally-binding Protocol.723 As far as the 2012 essay was 
718 See U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and 
Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, August 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/51977.htm 
(accessed 8/09/2015). 
719 See U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and 
Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 2014, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf (accessed 8/09/2015).  
720 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, Subcommittee 
Hearing: Assessing the Biological Weapons Threat: Russia and Beyond, 7 May 2014, Washington DC, available at 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-assessing-biological-weapons-threat-russia-and-
beyond (accessed 8/09/2015).   
721 See [in Russian] Vladimir Putin, ‘Byt’ sil’nymi: garantii natsional’noi bezopasnosti dlya Rossii’, Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta, 20 February 2012, available at http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html (accessed 8/09/2015). 
Author’s translation.  
722 See Milton Leitenberg, Testimony Statement, The Biological Weapons Program of the Soviet Union, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, Subcommittee Hearing: 
Assessing the Biological Weapons Threat: Russia and Beyond, 7 May 2014, Washington DC, p.44, available at 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20140507/102195/HHRG-113-FA14-Transcript-20140507.pdf (accessed 
8/09/2015). 
723 See [in Russian] Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Komentarii Departamenta informatsii i 
pechati MID Rossii po povodu iskazheniya v Kongresse SShA pozitsii Rossii po voprosam KBTO, 12 May 2015, 
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concerned, the passage in question was designed to underscore the 
potential military implications of scientific and technological advances for the 
future of warfare. Instead, ‘the thought was turned upside down and 
misinterpreted as Russia’s aspirations for creating new types of weapons.’ 
  
In the absence of an internationally-agreed verification mechanism to monitor 
States Parties’ compliance with the provisions of the BTWC, biological 
weapons are likely to continue to be treated as a sensitive matter hardly 
immune to interpretation and speculation. According to Kalinina’s rather 
pessimistic verdict: 
If [...] a mechanism for international inspections is 
not implemented, and clear criteria for reporting are 
not defined, mutual accusations among states of 
unscrupulous intentions will continue, and their 
intensity will be determined by the prevalent 
political circumstances at any given point in time.724 
 
Hurdles to International Scientific Collaboration  
 
During the Cold War, tight state controls over the Soviet scientific community 
severely impeded foreign professional contacts and collaborative effort. 
Travel restrictions, secrecy, background checks, and systematic surveillance 
guarded scientists from ‘degrading, imperialist influence’ and sought to 
ensure that only trusted, politically loyal individuals were allowed to represent 
the Soviet science abroad. In short, just as in other areas of professional 
activity involving foreign interaction, scientific cooperation was subject to 
state sanction. The US-Soviet cooperation in the field of medicine is a case in 
point.725 The Lacy-Zarubin agreement signed in 1958 laid the foundations of 
an exchange programme which facilitated not only information sharing in the 
form of films, scientific journals, and publications but also reciprocal visits of 
medical delegations and individual specialists between the two countries. 
The professional and diplomatic ties thus fostered set the scene for two key 
available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/EFB4514EC9DD87C744257CD60051B081 (accessed 
8/09/2015).  
724 See N. Kalinina, Mezhdunarodnye i natsional’nye problemy biologicheskoi bezopasnosti i perspektivy ikh 
resheniya, op cit, p.51. 
725 David Finley, ‘Soviet-U.S. Cooperation in Space and Medicine: An Analysis of the Detente Experience’, op cit, 
p.139. 
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developments that occurred in the early 1970s, namely the establishment of 
a US-USSR Joint Committee for Health Cooperation in 1972 and the Nixon-
Brezhnev accords in the Field of Medical Science and Public Health finalised 
in May that same year. The latter in particular gave joint work a fresh impetus 
and visibility. Besides collaborative research activities, medical cooperation 
further entailed exchange programmes, sharing of equipment and biological 
samples, organisation of conferences and symposia, and exchange of data 
on investigation trends. Moreover, the 1972 agreement made provisions for 
collaboration with international organisations, most notably the WHO, from 
which the Soviet Union had previously withdrawn. Although the joint medical 
effort was hailed largely as a success, the activities waned rapidly following 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. 
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union effectively terminated the isolation of 
Russian science and offered an opportunity for a revived international 
cooperation. What initially began as assistance programmes in the early 
1990s has gradually evolved over the years into professional partnerships of 
mutual benefit. Nevertheless, carrying out international collaborative life 
science activities in Russia remains an area pervaded by obstacles ranging 
from administrative and bureaucratic barriers through legal conundrums to 
diplomatic hurdles.726 For a joint foreign project to commence, all appropriate 
paperwork needs to be in place.727 To this end, a formal high-level approval 
needs to be obtained from the senior management of the respective 
institution or relevant government authorities, or sometimes both. Failure to 
present the required documentation with the correct stamps and signatures 
may result in unnecessary delays, disruption, and suspension of the 
endeavour in question, its objectives and anticipated outcomes 
notwithstanding. Once in progress, the project is susceptible to impediments 
of various kinds to the extent that even otherwise mundane work-related 
aspects may turn into insurmountable challenges. Consider, for instance, 
foreign travel and exchange visits. Visa applications take time to be 
processed and delays cannot always be accommodated. Moreover, under 
726 National Research Council, The Unique U.S. – Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology, 
(Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2013), Chapter 7. 
727 Ibid, p.92. 
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the existing rules, foreigners are allowed to conduct research in Russia for no 
more than 90 days on a single or double entry visa, which automatically 
imposes constraints on the duration of their stay and the contribution they 
could make.728 
  
Whilst in-person contact may not be deemed critical given the availability of 
low-cost, reliable means for long-distance communication, a number of 
practical issues still need to be addressed. One pertains to the exchange of 
experimental samples. Shipping biological agents across the Russian border 
is subject to strict customs regulations and as such, prone to significant 
delays. As one life scientist jokingly summarised the conundrum: ‘It is 
possible to send biological material internationally but no one in Russia has 
done it yet.’729 Receiving cultures from abroad is also pervaded with 
obstacles. In some cases, by the time the samples are cleared by the 
customs office, they have become unusable.730 The international transfer of 
biological phials appears just as challenging. In 2006 customs officials at 
Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport confiscated twenty phials with non-
pathogenic strains of typhus vaccine.731 Oleg Mediannikov, a researcher of 
the capital-based Gamelaya Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology who 
carried the phials was on his way to Marseilles as part of a collaborative 
effort with colleagues at the University of the Mediterranean. The two 
institutions shared a long-standing partnership in the study of typhus and 
were recognised WHO Collaborating Centres for Rickettsial Reference and 
Research. In early 2007 Mediannikov was accused of having attempted to 
smuggle the samples for the purpose of bioterrorism even though the export 
was formally sanctioned by the Russian Ministry of Healthcare. In May the 
same year the shipment of a human specimen abroad was temporarily 
prohibited as a result of an intelligence report suggesting that such material 
could be utilised for the development of genetic weapons.732 The ban was 
lifted two weeks later amidst an outcry in the media and the scientific 
728 Ibid, p.93-94.  
729 Interview, 7 April 2014, Novosibirsk, Russia.  
730 Interview, 15 April 2014, Moscow. Russia.  
731 Quirin Schiermeier, ‘Russian Scientists See Red over Clampdown’, Nature, vol.449 (2007), pp.122-123.  
732 See [in Russian] Dmitrii Butrin et al. ‘Rossiya blyudet chelovecheskii obrazets’, Kommersant, 30 May 2007, 
available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/769777 (accessed 11/09/2015).  
260 
 
                                                          
community. The shipment of pathogens, however, has remained under tight 
control. 
 
Mediannikov’s case unravelled against the backdrop of a series of high-
profile investigations in which Russian scientists came under fire and faced 
serious charges for allegedly disclosing state secrets. Secrecy is yet another 
factor that has bearing on scientific cooperation.733 Apart from classified 
projects, research on sensitive topics, including in the area of the life 
sciences, is subject to restrictions regarding data sharing and findings 
dissemination. Scientists involved in such activities are supposedly required 
to report any interactions with foreigners they may have, whether by phone, 
email, or in person, and any manuscripts to be submitted to foreign journals 
need to be cleared for publication beforehand.734 Given the lack of a clear 
definition of what topics should be treated as ‘sensitive’, the policy has been 
largely left open to interpretation with few in-built mechanisms to prevent 
abuse. 
  
Possible legal complications can further arise. The concept of intellectual 
property is not yet sufficiently well understood in Russia, which could 
severely inhibit data sharing as part of joint international projects (see 
Chapter 8). Given the Soviet predicament, patents and research 
commercialisation are still considered novel practices with which Russian life 
scientists, unlike their Western counterparts, hardly have any in-depth 
experience. Similarly, despite the existence of an extensive body of laws 
designed to ensure intellectual property protection, the Russian court system 
has barely dealt with cases of this kind and as such may appear unreliable in 
733 See, for example, Amy Ninetto, ‘“Civilisation” and Its Insecurities: Traveling Scientists, Global Science, and 
National Progress in the Novosibirsk Akademgorodok’, Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers, Vol.86 (2001), 
pp.181-201; Bryon McWilliams, ‘Russia Says Scientist Revealed State Secrets’, Chronicle of Higher Education, vol. 
51:26 (2005), p.A38; [in Russian] Dariya Sukhikh, ‘Zachem FSB i Gostaina b’yut po sud’bam uchenykh v Rossii’, 
Troitskii variant, No.194, 22 December 2015, pp.1-2, available at http://trv-science.ru/2015/12/22/zachem-fsb-i-
gostajjna-bjyut-po-sudbam-uchenykh-v-rossii/ (accessed 7/02/16). On the legal framework pertaining to state 
secrets, see [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, O gosudarstvennoi taine, No. 5485-1, 21 June 1993 (last amended 
on 8 March 2015), available at https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_2481/ (accessed 7/02/16); 
Ukaz Prezidenta RF, Ob utverzhdenii perechnya svedenii, otnesennykh k gosudarstvennoi taine (s izmeneniyami i 
dopolneniyami), No.1203, 30 November 1995 (last amended on 28 May 2015), available at  
http://base.garant.ru/10105548/#block_1000 (accessed 7/02/16).   
734 Amy Ninetto, ‘“Civilisation” and Its Insecurities’, op cit.  
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the eyes of foreign partners.735 Russia’s tax policy is also perceived as a 
hindrance, particularly as far as funding from foreign-based organisations 
and agencies is concerned. In 2008 the Russian Government issued Decree 
485 titled ‘On the List of International Organisations whose Grants (free-of-
charge assistance) Awarded to Russian Tax-Payers Shall Be Exempt from 
the Taxation Levied against the Revenues of Russian Grantees’.736 The 
Decree was highly consequential as it significantly reduced the total number 
of international donors allowed to provide tax-exempt financial support to 
non-for-profit entities in Russia, including universities and research institutes, 
from 101 to 12. Thus, the revised list featured the following international 
bodies: 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) 
EU Commission 
The Council of the Baltic Sea States 
The Nordic Council of Ministers 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
European Cinema Support Fund of the Council of Europe Joint Institute 
for Nuclear Research (EURIMAGES) 
In 2010, the Intergovernmental Foundation for Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Cooperation (IFESCCO) was added to the list.737 The Decree, 
however, laid down no clear criteria for the selection of specific 
735 National Research Council, The Unique U.S. – Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology, op 
cit. 
736 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, O perechne mezhdunarodnykh organizatsii, poluchaemy 
nalogoplatel’shchikami granty (bezvozmezdnaya pomosh’) kotorykh ne podlezhat nalogooblozheniju i ne 
uchityvajutsya v tselyakh nalogooblozheniya v dokhodakh rossiiskikh organizatsii – poluchitelei grantov, No.485, 28 
June 2008, Moscow, available at http://www.rg.ru/2008/07/03/granti-nalogi-dok.html (accessed 9/09/2015). 
737 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, O vnesenii izmeneniya v perechen’ mezhdunarodnykh i 
inostrannykh organizatsii, poluchaemy nalogoplatel’shchikami granty (bezvozmezdnaya pomosh’) kotorykh ne 
podlezhat nalogooblozheniju i ne uchityvajutsya v tselyakh nalogooblozheniya v dokhodakh rossiiskikh organizatsii 
– poluchitelei grantov, No.585, 2 August 2010, available at 
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_103411/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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organisations.738 Many of the institutions previously involved in offering 
grants to Russian life scientists, most notably the CRDF and the various 
arms of the US Government have been left out, as a result of which they are 
now liable to pay taxes to the state budget. In 2011 the Russian government 
further announced that it would cease its cooperation with the ISTC which 
has been a major vehicle for channelling foreign financial and material 
support to life scientists. As of 2015, ISTC no longer operates on the territory 
of Russia. 
 
Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and subsequent crisis in Eastern Ukraine 
in 2014 have led to a growing tension between Moscow and the West which 
has manifested itself in the sanctions that both sides have imposed against 
one another. Whilst it is difficult to assess the overall impact of the 
geopolitical diplomatic confrontation on scientific cooperation, not least 
because of the relative progress being made toward ending the hostilities in 
Donetsk region, it is noteworthy that by the summer of 2014 the US had 
already put on hold a number of collaborative scientific projects with Russia 
and each joint project was to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.739 
 
Limited Engagement among Life Scientists with the Broader 
Implications of Their Work 
 
Situated in Bolotnaya Square in downtown Moscow, Shemyakin’s famous 
sculpture complex, ‘Children – Victims of Adults’ Vices’ (Deti – zhertvy 
porokov vzroslykh) constitutes an original allegory of what the artist deems to 
be the most critical challenges confronting society in the twentieth-first 
century. Among the thirteen statues depicting various representations of evil, 
there is one titled L’zhe-uchenost’ (literally, pseudoscience). It is a statue of a 
blind-folded woman dressed in robes holding a scroll and marionette. The 
scroll symbolises pseudoscientific knowledge, which, if misapplied, could 
738 Aleksej Bogoriditskii, ‘Russia’, The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, vol.12:3 (2010), pp.28-34.  
739 Eli Kintisch, ‘Geopolitics Disrupt Scientific Exchange with Russia’, ScienceInsider, 1 August 2014, available at 
http://news.sciencemag.org/scientific-community/2014/08/geopolitics-disrupt-scientific-exchange-russia (accessed 
9/09/2015). For analysis of the broader impact of the sanction on Russian science, see [in Russian] Irina Dezhina, 
‘Sostoyanie nauki i innovatsii’ in B. Mau et al. (ed.), Rossiiskaya ekonomika v 2014 godu: Tendentsii i perspektivy, 
(Moscow: Gaidar Institute, 2015).  
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result in a mass catastrophe, the development of dangerous weapons, or 
unnatural interference with the environment. The potential negative 
consequences of pseudoscience are demonstrated by the marionette 
presented here as a two-headed mutant dog. The idea for the marionette has 
allegedly arisen when the author came across information about the 
deleterious effects of thalidomide in the 1960s (see Chapter 3).740 Another 
curious detail about the statue is that its English caption does not read 
‘pseudoscience’ but ‘irresponsible science’, which if literally translated into 
Russia would read bezotvestvennaya nauka. The discrepancy matters 
insofar as the former seeks to uphold the value of science as the pursuit of 
true objective knowledge emphasising honesty and rigour whereas the latter 
draws attention to the link between science and its broader social context. A 
recent report by the IAP Responsible Conduct in the Global Research 
Enterprise (formerly the Inter-Academy Panel), of which the RAN is a 
member, defines the role of scientists with regard to society as follows: 
 
Because of the increasing importance of research 
in the broader society, scientists and other scholars 
bear a responsibility for how research is conducted 
and how the results of research are used. They 
cannot assume that they work in a domain isolated 
from the needs and concerns of the broader 
world.741 
 
According to Academician Boris Judin, far from being incidental, the 
inaccuracy in translation could, at least in part, be ascribed to the fact that in 
Russia the concept of responsible science (otvestvennaya nauka) as related 
to the relationship between scientists and society remains 
underdeveloped.742 To an extent, it even sounds like an oxymoron. This is 
hardly surprising given the dominant lens through which science was 
perceived during the Soviet period. From its inception, the Soviet state laid a 
740 Guided tour of the sculpture complex, 30 May 2015. For a brief overview of the sculpture complex, see [in 
Russian] Neobychnye pamyatniki Moskvy: No 20 Porokam (Moscow’s Unconventional Monuments: No 20 Vices), 
available at http://www.unmonument.ru/mon020.html (accessed 9/09/2015).  
741 See InterAcademy Council / IAP, Responsible Conduct in the Global Research Enterprise: A Policy Report, 
September 2012, p.x, available at http://www.interacademies.net/file.aspx?id=19789 (accessed 9/09/2015). 
742 See [in Russian] Lyubov Borusyak, ‘Mozhet li etika ogranichit’ nauku: Beseda s filosofom Borisom Yudinym’, 
Polit.Ru, 19 August 2009, available at http://polit.ru/article/2009/08/19/b_judin/ (accessed 9/09/2015). On the issue 
of pseudoscience (lzhenauka) in Russia today, see [in Russian] David Raskin, ‘Uchenye o bolevykh tochkakh 
rossiiskoi nauki’, Troitskii variant, No.177, 21 April 2015, pp.4-5, available at http://trv-
science.ru/2015/04/21/uchenye-o-bolevykh-tochkakh-rossijskoj-nauki/ (accessed 11/09/2015).   
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tremendous emphasis on scientific progress, turning it into a driving force of 
prosperity and public welfare. Science was thus construed as an inherently 
moral activity and a source of significant socio-economic and political 
benefits. Similarly, scientists were considered moral in their own right, not 
least because they worked in the service of the Soviet society, which, as 
propagated by the official Communist Party line, was organised on the 
principles of justice, fairness, and equality. In other words, if the society was 
moral and if science was deemed the primary engine of progress in that 
society, then science could only be praised as beneficently-intended activity: 
 
It was a particular society that gave science and its 
implications a moral value and passed a value 
judgement on concrete scientific endeavours: in 
immoral society, science would be immoral, while in 
a moral society, science would ‘automatically’ 
become moral.743 
 
Implicit in this assumption is an uncritical belief that science was value-free 
and when applied in the context of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, it would 
yield solely positive outcomes. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of 
the Bolshevik revolution, one area of science that enjoyed generous 
endorsement from the state was experimental biology.744 Promulgated as 
possessing transformative potential for enhancing human resilience against 
disease, experimental biology attracted substantial attention from the 
government. Whilst some of the studies conducted as part of the newly-
established research agenda were considered at best questionable, the 
ethical issues arising therefrom were barely addressed. Commenting in 
private correspondence on a report entitled ‘Experiments with a revived dog’s 
head’ (Opyty s ozhivlennoi golovoi sobaki) published in 1926, the eminent 
Russian writer and anthroposophist, Ivanov-Razumnik complained about the 
‘ethical deafness’ of scientists who refused to think about the ethical 
implications of their work.745 Even he, however, proved reluctant to offer a 
definitive answer whether such studies would have been justified if the goal 
was the improvement of human health. 
743 Nikolai Krementsov, Revolutionary Experiments, op cit, p.62. 
744 Ibid, p.26. 
745 See [in Russian]  A. Lavrov and D. Mal’mstad, Andrei Belyi i Ivanov-Razumnik: Perepiska, (St Petersburg: 
Atheneum, 1998), p. 408.  
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 By contrast, the development of medical ethics has followed a significantly 
different trajectory. Humanist ethics constituted an indispensable element of 
the medical practice in Russia long before the Revolution. Evidence suggests 
that by 1917 at least several of what are considered to be fundamental 
principles of biomedical research in the twenty-first century were formally 
codified, including confidentiality, autonomy, voluntary participation, and 
informed consent.746 In 1936 the Academic Council of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the supreme body governing the 
healthcare services, issued a set of regulations ‘On the Order of Testing New 
Medical Remedies and Methods, which Could Be Harmful to the Health and 
Life of the Patient’ (O poryadke ispytaniya novykh meditsinskikh sredstv i 
metodov, mogushtikh predstavit’ opasnost’ dlya zdorov’ya i zhizni bol’nykh) 
which defined the required legal criteria for conducting clinical trials. In 
particular, emphasis was laid on the need for an adequate preclinical 
examination; the need for voluntary informed consent; the need for medical 
staff to be properly qualified; and the need for disclosure of the research 
results irrespective of the findings.747 Nevertheless, for its most part, 
biomedical ethics, just as other areas of life in the Soviet Union, was framed 
in a way which unconditionally prioritised the state’s interests over the 
interests of the individual.748 Dubious practices indicative of this trend 
included breaches of confidentiality and forced medical treatment for certain 
medical conditions in such areas as psychiatry and venereology.749 Life 
science research that did not involve human subjects was regulated primarily 
from the standpoint of safety with little appreciation being dedicated to the 
potential ethical concerns pertaining to scientific advances, including those 
prompted by the advent of genetic engineering. 
  
746 See [in Russian] G.L. Mikirtichan et al, ‘Rossisskaya Federatsiya’, in O.I. Kubar’, Eticheskaya ekspertiza 
biomeditsinskikh issledovanii v gosudarstvakh-uchasnikakh SNG (sotsial’nye i kul’turnye aspekty), (St Petersburg: 
Phoenix: 2007), pp.248-316.  
747 Alexei Sozinov et al. ‘The Development of Ethical Review Practices in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Past, 
Present, and Future’, Pharmaceutical Medicine, vol.22:5 (2008), p.278.  
748 See [in Russian] Yurii Lopukhin, ‘O bioetike: Bioetika v Rossii’, Vestnik RAN, vol.71:9 (2001), pp.771-774. 
749 See, for example, Robert van Voren, ‘Political Abuse of Psychiatry: An Historical Overview’, Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, vol.36:1 (2010), pp.33-35; Richard Bonnie, ‘Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union and China: 
Complexities and Controversies’, Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry Law, vol.30 (2002), pp.136-144.  
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Following the collapse of the Soviet Union bioethics was institutionalised as a 
university discipline and by 1994 it was already being taught across medical 
universities in Russia. The content of the courses, however, remains narrow 
covering mainly issues of relevance to medical practice rather than to 
laboratory life science research. In the context of the latter, bioethics is still 
largely limited to the requirement of humane treatment of animals. The remit 
of work of the institutional bioethics committees in place is thus narrowly 
focused on a single facet of scientific conduct. Likewise, the rules pertaining 
to laboratory safety deal exclusively with the technical aspects of scientific 
work. Broader issues related to the potential legal and social implications of 
biotechnology are marginalised and there are virtually no adequate 
mechanisms which would allow such concerns to be raised and tackled. The 
prevalent conviction within the life science community seems to be that a 
clear demarcation line needs to be drawn between biotechnology research, 
on the one hand, and the use thereof, on the other. ‘The problem is not 
science per se but how it is applied, and this depends on the individual’ is a 
common leitmotif among Russian life scientists.750 The debate on the dual 
use and biosecurity aspects of the biological sciences so prominent in the 
West is practically non-existent and little local effort has been made to 
engage practising life scientists with the broader context of their work (see 
Chapter 8). Part of the reason for this trend is the fact that most health 
officials in Russia consider issues such as the prevention of deliberate 
misuse of biological assets to be a less urgent task that servicing the day-to-
day public health needs of the general population.751 At the same time, there 
seems to be persistent resistance among life scientists to broadening 
scientific debates and opening them up to the public. Against the backdrop of 
the legacy of Lysenkoism, the involvement of ‘lay people’ is largely perceived 
as potentially dangerous to science and research integrity.  
 
750 See, for example, [in Russian] Vladimir Gubarev, ‘Chaepitiya v Akademii: v zerkale jizni’, Pravda, 15 May 2012, 
available at http://www.pravda.ru/science/academy/15-05-2012/1114971-rem_petrov-0/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
751 National Research Council, The Unique U.S. – Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology, op 
cit, p.88. Also see National Research Council, Biological Sciences and Biotechnology in Russia: Controlling 
Diseases and Enhancing Security, (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2006).  
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Chapter 8: Life Science Policy and Practice in Present-Day 
Russia 
 
Current State of Biotechnology in Russia 
 
The development of biotechnology in Russia following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union can generally be divided into three phases, with the first phase 
spanning the two Yeltsin administrations up until the late 1990s; the second 
encompassing the first decade of the 2000s; and the third spanning the 
aftermath of the global economic crunch. Each of those phases has been 
extremely dynamic and subject to internal and external socio-political 
contingencies and market fluctuations. Prior to its dissolution in 1992, the 
Soviet Union maintained a vast biotechnology complex coordinated by 
GLAVMIKROBIOPROM, later the Ministry of the Medical Industry 
(Ministerstvo Meditsinskoi Promyshlenosti: MINMEDPROM).752 With its more 
than 130 microbiological factories, 192, 000 employees, and 634 million 
roubles worth of investment, the Soviet biotechnology industry made a 
tremendous contribution to the country’s agriculture and medicine, and 
constituted, in bulk terms, the world’s largest such enterprise.753 Key areas of 
specialisation included large-scale production of single-cell protein, microbial 
pesticides, enzymes, amino acids, antibiotics, vitamins, and influenza 
vaccine.754 Whilst significant, this output was largely limited to developments 
that were relatively easy in terms of concept and scale-up, which in turn 
created a technological gap between the Soviets and their Western 
counterparts, as the latter embarked on introducing more sophisticated 
biotechnologies in food, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and waste 
management. Far from stemming from a scientific lag, the gap was mainly a 
consequence of the organisational and structural limitations which pervaded 
the Soviet biotechnology industry such as the poor links between research 
and production facilities, the lack of incentives for innovation and keeping up 
with contemporary technology trends, and top-down administrative 
752 Established in 1966 under SOVMIN, GLAVMIKROBIOPROM existed until 1985 before it was restructured and 
renamed MINMEDPROM. 
753 Rod Greenshields et al. ‘Perestroika and Soviet Biotechnology’, Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 
vol.2:1 (1990), p.63.   
754 Ibid, p.64. 
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hierarchies.755 Toward the late 1980s, the sector further acquired notoriety 
for being associated with pollution and environmental degradation. 
 
The first phase of biotechnology development in independent Russia was 
associated with a turbulent decline and severe industrial downturn. 
Production decreased, enterprises shut and research subsidies shrunk. 
Macroeconomic instability and political uncertainty put investors off and 
limited career prospects forced gifted prospective Russian scientists to 
search for employment elsewhere. By the late 1990s many biotechnology 
products available on the Russian market were replaced by imported ones 
with domestic manufacturing accounting for about 30 per cent of 
consumption.756 
 
During President Putin’s first term in office in the early 2000s, the tide 
gradually began to turn. Oil prices surged and it was not long before Russia 
was on track for an economic recovery. The second phase of biotechnology 
development thus started on a positive note, as the government strived to 
fulfil its ambitions for modernisation through scientific and technological 
advancement and innovation. The state bonded with the private sector over 
the need for support for cutting-edge technologies for the purposes of 
promoting drug development, diagnostics, food security, and an environment-
friendly economy. By 2007 then, Russia was a leading producer of a range of 
items, including immunological medications, veterinary products, and 
environmental protection technology.757 The total annual investment for 2007 
increased more than two-fold in comparison with the 2006 levels and the 
projected rate of market growth for the period of 2008-2010 was 10 per 
cent.758 The list of forward-looking products to be developed entailed bio-
targets, computer-based methods for drug discovery, peptides and 
biopharmaceuticals, antivirals and antimicrobials, biochips and biosensors, 
biopesticides and biofertilizers, and probiotics. Over a thousand institutions 
755 Ibid; see also See Raymond Zilinskas, ‘Biotechnology in the U.S.S.R, Part 2’, op cit.  
756 See Roger Roffey, Biotechnology in Russia: Why Is not a Success Story?, April 2010, FOI, Swedish Defence 
Research Agency, Stockholm, p.66. Full text is available at http://www.foi.se/report?rNo=FOI-R--2986--SE 
(accessed 9/09/2015). 
757 Mikhail Rabinovich, ‘Biotech in the Russian Federation’, Biotechnology Journal, vol.2 (2007a), p.778.  
758 Ibid. See also Roger Roffey, Biotechnology in Russia, op cit, p.65. 
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were involved in research in physicochemical biology. Other areas of interest 
ripe for investment featured cell technologies, bioinformatics, post-genome 
technologies, such as proteomics and metabolomics. Nanobiotechnology and 
nanomedicine were singled out as fields of high priority and a detailed 
research agenda was set out. Among the specific lines of study to be 
pursued were: 
 
• Biological nanochips for diagnostics of somatic and infectious 
diseases; 
• Nanoparticles as new-generation pharmaceuticals; 
• Medical nanorobots; 
• Nanopores for molecular devices for genome sequencing; 
• Biocompatible nanomaterials with a wide spectrum of applications.759 
 
The 2008 global financial crisis has had a significant impact on Russia’s 
economy. In 2009 the GDP fell by almost 8 per cent and the bulk of foreign 
investment alone declined by 41 per cent.760 Commenting on the inability of 
the state to face up to the challenges posed by the economic downturn 
Russia, the then President Dmitry Medvedev stated: 
 
We need to recognise that we have not done 
enough over these last years to resolve 
the problems we inherited from the past. We have 
not freed ourselves from a primitive economic 
structure and humiliating dependence on raw 
materials. We have not refocused our industry 
on consumers’ real needs. The habit of living off 
export earnings is still holding back innovative 
development. Russian business still prefers to sell 
goods produced abroad, and our own goods’ 
competitiveness is disgracefully low.761 
 
759 Mikhail Rabinovich, ‘Prospects of Nanobiotechnology and Nanomedicine in Russia’, Biotechnology Journal, vol.2 
(2007b), p.788. 
760 ‘Russia’s GDP Falls 7.9%, Hit by Falling Oil Prices’, MarketWatch, 1 Feb 2010, available at 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/russias-economy-contracts-79-in-2009-2010-02-01(accessed 13/05/2015); see 
also Roger Roffey, Biotechnology in Russia, op cit, p.61.  
761 Dmitry Medvedev, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 12 November 2009, 
available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/5979 (accessed 13/05/2015). See also 
Evgeny Klochikhin, ‘Russia’s Innovation Policy: Stubborn Path-Dependencies and New approaches’, Research 
Policy, vol.41 (2012), pp.1620-1630.  
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He then went on to highlight Russia’s chief priorities as part of the 
modernisation effort: 
 
The modernisation area of top importance for our 
people is developing medical technology, medical 
equipment, and the pharmaceuticals industry. We 
will provide people with quality and affordable 
medicines and also the latest technology 
for preventing and treating diseases, especially 
the diseases that are the biggest causes 
of sickness and death in our country.762 
 
Drug development, especially for treating cardiovascular disease and cancer 
was deemed a strategically important area which had to be vigorously 
promoted domestically so that by 2020 Russian-made medicines would 
account for more than half of the market.763 A similar message echoed in the 
President’s address delivered the following year when he added that the 
share of domestic innovative pharmaceutical products should rise by 60 per 
cent.764 Overcoming Russia’s high dependence (about 80 per cent)765 on 
imported biotechnology products and raw materials, particularly in critical 
fields such as pharmaceuticals and food production has thus become a 
crucial state imperative and even more so in light of the still ongoing crisis in 
Eastern Ukraine and resultant economic sanctions. 
  
As of 2015, Russia’s share of the international biotechnology market remains 
about 0.1 per cent, although this figure is distributed unevenly as far as 
different sectors are concerned.  For instance, whereas its share on the world 
market of veterinary biopreparations amounts to 5 per cent, in the areas of 
biofuels and biodegradable substances Russia’s contribution is virtually non-
existent.766 Agricultural biotechnology is considered a vital asset, not least 
because agriculture accounts for 3 per cent of the state’s GDP, employing 7 
per cent of its population. Other sectors are also slowly undergoing 
762 Ibid. 
763 Ibid. 
764 Dmitry Medvedev, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 30 November 2010, 
available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/9637(accessed 13/05/2015). 
765 Nicole Burghardt et al. ‘Industrial Biotechnology in Russia: Waking up from Its Deep Sleep’, Industrial 
Biotechnology, vol.6 (2015), p.60. 
766 See [in Russian] Tekhnologicheskaya platforma BioTekh2030, Strategicheskaya programma issledovanii, 22 
April 2015, Moscow, p.6, available at http://biotech2030.ru/deyatelnost/ (accessed 9/09/2015). Author’s translation.  
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expansion. Two plants for amino acid manufacturing are to open in 2015, in 
Belgorod and Volgodonsk Rostov regions, respectively; as of 2011 one of the 
world’s largest plants for the production of wood pellets – Vyborgskaya 
Timber Corporation – has been in operation in Leningrad region; and in late 
2014 the first plant for the production of protein concentrates was established 
in the Altai region.767 Whilst poorly developed at the time of writing, bioenergy 
constitutes an area with prospects for economic viability. Indeed, estimates 
demonstrate that in the coming decades the production of biofuel from 
biomass in Russia could be commensurate with the annual output of oil, coal, 
or natural gas.768 Similarly, forestry biotechnology holds a tremendous 
promise given Russia’s significant wood resources. Along with it, industrial 
biotechnology and bioenergy, agricultural and food biotechnology, 
environmental biotechnology, and marine biotechnology have been defined 
as key priorities for the next fifteen years.769 
 
Mapping Russia’s Life Science Policy  
 
Together with information and communication technologies and 
nanotechnology, biotechnology is seen as one of the three fundamental 
pillars upon which the modernisation of the Russian economy is expected to 
rest upon. Over the past several years, considerable attention, effort, and 
financial resources have been dedicated to the goal of building sustainable 
bio-industry underpinned by domestic production, internationally competitive 
export goods, and favourable market conditions. The purpose of this section 
therefore is to examine the chief trends in Russia’s biotechnology policy and 
map the wide range of initiatives and actors involved in the endeavour. Key 
elements of the regulatory framework within which life science R&D takes 
place in Russia as well as its main sources of funding will also be discussed. 
The biotechnology policy landscape in Russia is rich, comprising an array of 
instruments and initiatives that aim to foster innovation and facilitate scientific 
and technological development. State Programmes (Gosudarstvennye 
767 See Arnold Dale, Wood Pellets in Russia, presentation at the Wood Pellet Association of Canada, 18-20 
November 2013, Vancouver, Canada. Available at http://www.pellet.org/images/21_-_Arnold_Dale_-
_From_Russia_with_Love_2013.pdf (accessed 18/07/15).  
768 Tekhnologicheskaya platforma BioTekh2030, Strategicheskaya programma issledovanii,op cit, p.14.   
769 Ibid, p.77. 
272 
 
                                                          
programmy), for example, are deemed important instruments for promoting 
sector-specific action. Federal Targeted Programmes (Federal’nye tselevye 
programmy: FTsP) and Sub-Programmes (Podprogrammy) constitute 
auxiliary mechanisms featuring activities, regulations, and procedures which 
aim to facilitate the execution of the goals, proposals, and recommendations 
defined by the State Programmes. By design, Federal Targeted Programmes 
are used by the state as instruments both for fulfiiliing priority tasks and 
chanelling budgetary support for science.770 Each State Programme is 
usually underpinned by a set of Targeted Programmes outlining concrete 
steps and measures. Appendix 1 contains detailed information on the main 
policy documents with relevant to biotechnology, including State and Federal 
Targeted Programmes. 
In terms of policy priorities, a significant emphasis has been laid on 
promoting applied research and product development.771 A case in point is 
the constant increase of public funding envisaged for supporting the Federal 
Targeted Programme, ‘Research and Development in Priority Areas of 
Development of the Russian Scientific and Technological Complex for 2014-
2020’, which in 2014 was entirely re-directed toward applied research for the 
purposes of industry. The underlying rationale behind this trend has been the 
Russian Government’s resolve to address the country’s dependency on 
foreign imports, an issue that has become particularly acute in light of the 
international sanctions that were introduced against Russia after the 
annexation of Crimea.  
Another aspect that merits attention is that biotechnology and medical 
research are among the areas of prime interest for state investment. Whilst 
the funds available for space and aviation programmes are being reduced, 
those for medicine and pharmacy are increasing.772 If this trend is preserved, 
by 2017 medicine and pharmacy will be second in the top five spheres of 
national economy, as far as budgetary contributions to applied research are 
concerned. 
770 See [in Russian] Irina Dezhina, Mekhanizmy gosudarstvennogo finansirovaniya nauki v Rossii, (Moscow: IEPP, 
2006), p.71. Author’s translation.  
771 [in Russian] Irina Dezhina, ‘Sostoyanie nauki i innovatsii’, in V. Mau et al., Rossiskaya ekonomika v 2014: 
Tendentsii i perspektivy (Moscow: Gaidar Institute, 2015), p.345.  
772 Ibid.  
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Although the focus on biotechnology as an area of state investment is 
certainly to be welcomed, it needs to be highlighted that the various policy 
instruments leave little scope for public deliberation on the potential risks and 
implictaions of novel life science advances. This trend, in turn, raises 
questions regarding the extent to which the governance of new technologies 
can be properly ensured. 
 
Regulations 
 
The aim of this sub-section is to outline some of the key regulations pertinent 
to life science research and practice in Russia. 
 
a. Laboratory Biosafety 
 
In 2005 the WHO published a revised version of the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) which require states to develop a set of core capacities for 
the purpose of disease prevention, surveillance, detection, reporting, and 
response.773 Thus, the overall aim of the IHR is to help enhance states’ 
preparedness to address public health threats regardless of whether those 
are naturally-occurring diseases or caused by the accidental or deliberate 
release of pathogens. 774 The IHR core capacity titled ‘Laboratory’ deals with 
laboratory biosafety and biosecurity practices directed at ensuring the safe 
handling of pathogens under appropriate containment conditions, as well as 
the security of research facilities against possible theft, displacement, or 
misuse of hazardous biological materials. The IHR are legally binding and all 
states are required to report on the steps taken at national level to 
demonstrate compliance. Back in 2004, the WHO issued a third edition of its 
‘Laboratory Biosafety Manual’ which first appeared in 1983.775 The Manual is 
an authoritative guiding document but is not mandatory. In 2008 the 
European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) released CWA 15973:2008 
773 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations, 2nd ed. (Geneva: WHO, 2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241596664/en/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
774 This objective has been internalised in Russia’s policy on biosafety and biosecurity. See, for example, [in 
Russian] Genadii Onishchenko et al. ‘Conceptual Bases of Biological Safety: Part 1’, Vestnik RAMN, No.10 (2013), 
pp.4-13; G. Onishchenko and V. Kutyreva, Biologicheskaya bezopasnost’: termini i opredeleniya, (Moscow: 
Meditsina, 2011).  
775 World Health Organization, Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd ed. (Geneva: WHO, 2004), available at       
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_CSR_LYO_2004_11/en/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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‘Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard’.776 The document was prepared 
following a CEN Workshop with wide international participation, including 
experts from Russia. Whilst non-binding, the CEN Workshop Agreement 
constitutes an important stepping stone in the development of international 
laboratory biosafety and biorisk standards. In 2011 CWA 15973 was renewed 
for another three years and is currently being converted into an ISO 
standard.777 
  
The origins of the Russian laboratory biosafety system date back to the late 
imperial period spanning the end of nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
During the Soviet era the system was formally codified and institutionalised 
and many of its elements have been preserved following the collapse of the 
USSR. Federal Act No.52 of 30 March 1999 ‘On Sanitary and 
Epidemiological Welfare’ defines the legal framework for any activity 
involving biological material.778 Article 2 stipulates that any potentially 
hazardous services, products, or activity are subject to licensing and that any 
potentially hazardous biological and chemical substances and materials are 
subject to state registration. The Act further lays down the sanitary and 
epidemiological rules and requirements for conducting work involving 
biological material and biological and microbiological organisms, and toxins 
(Article 26); organising and performing prophylactic activities (Article 29); and 
enforcing quarantine (Article 31). It also outlines the specific licensing 
requirements for different potentially hazardous activities (Article 40), as well 
as the structure of and mechanisms for government sanitary and 
epidemiological oversight (Article 46). The Act is underpinned by 
776 CEN Workshop Agreement, CEN Workshop Agremment (CWA): 15793:2008 Laboratory Biorisk Management 
Standard, (Brussels: CEN, 2008), available at http://www.absa.org/pdf/CWA15793_Feb2008.pdf (accessed 
9/09/2015).  
777 At a subsequent Workshop held in 2011, a follow-up document known as ‘CWA: 15793: 2011 Laboratory Biorisk 
Management’ was agreed. The 2011 document supersedes the previous version agreed in 2008 without making 
any substantive changes but for dropping the word ‘Standard’ from the title. See CEN, CWA: 15793:2011 
Laboratory Biorisk Management, (Brussels: CEN, 2011), available at http://globalbiorisk-public.sharepoint.com/links 
(accessed 9/09/2015). On the progress of the conversion of the CEN Workshop Agreement into an ISO Standard, 
see Gary Burns, ‘Development of an ISO Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard: Can ISO/AWI 35001 Help in 
Supporting the BTWC’, a paper presented at the BWC 40th Anniversary Commemorative Events, 30 March 2015, 
Council Chamber, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, available at http://www.unog.ch/bwc/bwc40 (accessed 
9/09/2015).  
778 See [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, O sanitarno-epidemiologicheskom blagopoluchii naseleniya (s 
imeneniyami i dopolneniyami, vstup. v silu s 24.07.2015), No.52-FZ, 30 March 1999, Moscow, available at 
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_22481/ (accessed 9/09/2015). For a detailed discussion of the 
Act, see also Kalinina, Mezhdunarodnye i natsional’nye problemy biologicheskoi bezopasnosti i perspektivy ikh 
resheniya, op cit, p.263.  
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Government Resolution 569 of 15 September 2005, ‘On the Implementation 
of State Sanitary and Epidemiological Oversight’, according to which the 
responsibility for state sanitary and epidemiological supervision is vested in 
ROSPOTREBNADZOR.779 Any organisation conducting activities involving 
biological materials and/or organisms has to pass through a two-tiered 
certification process administered by ROSPOTREBNADZOR. First, it has to 
apply for a license in accordance with Federal Act No. 99-FZ of 4 May 2011, 
‘On the Licensing of Certain Types of Activity’;780 second, as stipulated in the 
Sanitary and Epidemiological Regulations SP 1.2.1318-03, ‘On the 
Procedure for Acquiring a Sanitary and Epidemiological Certificate for 
Conducting Work Involving Pathogenic Microorganisms (II-IV Group), 
Genetically-Modified Organisms, Toxins, and Helminths’, it has to receive a 
Sanitary and Epidemiological Certificate.781 The Certificate has to be 
renewed every five years.782 The process of certification is done on the basis 
of the categorisation of pathogens. According to the Russian system of 
categorisation, pathogens are divided into four groups, according to which 
the ones deemed highly dangerous, such as Variola virus, Ebola virus, 
Yesinia pestis, and Bacillus anthracis are found in Groups I and II, and those 
deemed less dangerous are found in Groups III and IV. By contrast, in the 
system of classification adopted in the West, highly dangerous pathogens 
occupy categories III and IV. Life science research in Russia is subject to 
various sets of regulations, including: 
• Sanitary Regulations, SP 1.2.036-95, ‘On the Accounting, Storage, 
Transfer, and Transportation of Pathogenic Microorganisms, I-IV 
Group’, issued 28 August 1995;783 
779 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, O Polozhenii ob osushestvlenii gosudarstvennogo nadzora v 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No.569, 15 September 2005, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.3882, 23 September 2005, 
available at http://www.rg.ru/2005/09/23/epidemiologiya-doc.html (accessed 9/09/2015).  
780 See [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, O litsenzirovanii otdel’nykh vidov deyatel’nosti, No.99-FZ, 4 May 2011, 
published in Russkaia Gazeta, No.5473, 6 May 2011, available at http://www.rg.ru/2011/05/06/license-dok.html 
(accessed 9/09/2015).  
781 See [in Russian] ROSPOTREBNADZOR, Poryadok vydachi sanitarno-epidemiologicheskogo zaklyucheniya o 
vozmozhnosti provedeniya rabot s vozbuditelyami infektsionnykh zabolevanii cheloveka II-IV grupp 
(mikroorganizmami, vozbuditelyami gel’mintozov i protozoozov i t.d.), v sootvetsvie s trebovayami saniranykh pravil 
SP 1.2.1318-03 ‘Poryadok vydachi sanitarno-epidemiologicheskogo zaklyucheniya o vozmozhnosti provedeniya 
rabot s vozbuditelyami infektsionnykh zabolevanii cheloveka I-IV grupp patogennosti (opasnosti), genno-
inzhenerno-modifitsirovannymi mikroorganizmami, yadami biologicheskogo proizhozhdeniya’, 24 April 2003, 
Moscow, available at http://26.rospotrebnadzor.ru/rl/830/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
782 Interview, 16 April 2014, Moscow.   
783 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Goskomsanepidnadzora RF, Sanitarnye pravila SP 1.2.036-95: Poryadok 
ucheta, khraneniya, peredachi i transportirovaniya mikroorganizmov I-IV grupp patogennosti, No.14, 28 August 
1995, available at http://www.ecobest.ru/snip/folder-1/list-77.html (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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• Sanitary Regulations, SP 1.1.2193-07, ‘Organisation and Exercise of 
Production Control on the Implementation of Sanitary Regulations and 
the Fulfilment of Prophylactic Activities’, issued 27 March 2007;784 
• Sanitary Regulations, SP 1.3.2322-08, ‘Safety during Work Involving 
III-IV Group Pathogens and Parasites’, issued 2 June 2009;785 
• Order of the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development, No 708n, 
‘Laboratory Practice Rules’, issued 22 October 2010;786 
• Sanitary Regulations, SP 1.3.3118-13, ‘Safety during Work Involving I-
II Group Pathogens’, issued 28 November 2013.787 
 
Non-compliance with the Sanitary Regulations is considered a criminal 
offence and subject to penalties. The Criminal Code788 makes the following 
provisions: 
 
• Article 236, non-compliance with the sanitary and epidemiological 
regulations due to negligence leading to the accidental spread of 
disease – punishable by modes of punishment including a fine of up to 
80 000 roubles and imprisonment of up to 5 years; 
• Article 247, non-compliance with the rules pertaining to the handling of 
environmentally hazardous materials and wastes, including 
bacteriological materials and wastes – punishable by modes of 
punishment, including a fine of up to 300 000 roubles and 
imprisonment of up to 8 years; 
• Article 248, non-compliance with the rules pertaining to the handling of 
microbiological or other biological agents or toxins – punishable by 
784 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Glavnogo gosudarstvennogo vracha RF, Sanitarnye pravila SP 1.1.2193-07: 
Organizatsiya i provedenie proizvodstvennogo kontrolya za soblyudeniem sanitarnykh pravil i vypolneniem 
sanitarno-epidemiologicheskikh (profilakticheskikh) meropriyatii, No.13, 27 March 2007.  
785 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Glavnogo gosudarstvennogo vracha RF, Sanitarnye pravila SP 1.3.2518-09: 
Bezopasnost’raboty s mikroorganizmami III-IV grupp patogennosti (opasnosti) i vozbuditelyami parazitarnykh 
boleznei, No.42, 2 June 2009. 
786 See [in Russian] Prikaz Ministerstva zdravookhraneniya i sotsial’nogo razvitiya RF, Ob utverzhdenii Pravil 
laboratornoi praktiki, No.708n, 23 August  2010, Moscow, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.5319, 22 October 
2010, available at http://www.rg.ru/2010/10/22/laboratornaya-praktika-dok.html (accessed 9/09/2015).  
787 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Glavnogo gosudarstvennogo vracha RF, Sanitarnye pravila SP 1.3.3118-13: 
Bezopasnost’raboty s mikroorganismami I-II grupp patogennosti (opasnosti), No.64, 28 November 2013, available 
at http://rospotrebnadzor.ru/documents/details.php?ELEMENT_ID=3552 (accessed 9/09/2015). On the regulations 
related to work involving pathogens classified as Group I-II, see also [in Russian] Metodicheskie ukazaniya MU 
1.3.1794-03: Organizatsiya raboty pri issledovaniyakh metodom PTsR materiala, infitsirovannogo 
mikroorganizmami I-II grupp patogennosti, 5 December 2003.  
788 Author’s translation from Russian into English. See [in Russian] Ugolovnyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii: po 
sostoyaniyu na 20 oktobrya 2013 goda, (Novosibirsk: Normatika, 2013).  
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modes of punishment including a fine up to 300 000 roubles or 
imprisonment of up to 5 years. 
 
b. Biosecurity 
 
Along with the USA and the UK, Russia (then the Soviet Union) is a co-
depository of the 1975 BTWC. Having inherited the Soviet Union’s 
membership in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, Russia withdrew its reservations 
in 2001. Russia signed and ratified the CWC in 1993 and 1997, respectively. 
In accordance with the provisions made by the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540, Russia has been submitting regular national reports on the 
progress of the implementation of measures and policies aimed at preventing 
non-state actors from acquiring WMD. The principal state agency tasked with 
coordinating and monitoring the activities related to the fulfilment of Russia’s 
international obligations domestically is the Ministry of Industry and Trade. In 
2005, a Government Committee on Biological and Chemical Security was 
established to serve as a coordinating body in the process of implementation 
of biosecurity policy. The Committee is chaired by the Minister of 
Healthcare.789 Alongside, several other arms of the government are involved 
in executing the national biosecurity policy, including the Radiation, 
Chemical, and Biological Protection (RCBP) Troops of the Ministry of 
Defence (Voiska radiatsionnoi, khimicheskoi i biologicheskoi zashtity), the 
Ministry of Emergency Situations (Ministertsvo po delam grazhdanskoi 
oborony, chrezvychainym situatsiyam i likvidatsii posledstvii stikhiinykh 
bedstvii: MChS), Ministry of Federal Services (Federal’naya sluzhba 
bezopasnosti: FSB), Federal Medical and Biological Agency (Federal’noe 
mediko-biologicheskoe agenstvo: FMBA), and the Federal Service for 
Surveillance in Consumer Rights Protection and Welfare (Federal’naya 
sluzhba po nadzoru v sfere zashtity prav potrebitelei i blagopoluchiya 
cheloveka: ROSPOTREBNADZOR). Two additional inter-agency bodies also 
play a part in promoting measures for countering biological threats, namely 
the National Antiterrorist Committee (Natsionalnyi antiteroristicheskii komitet) 
789 See [in Russian] Pravitel’stvennaya komissiya po voprosam biologicheskoi i khimicheskoi bezopasnosti, 
available at http://government.ru/department/153/about/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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and the Coordinating Scientific Council for Sanitary and Epidemiological 
Protection (Koordinatsionnyi nauchnyi sovet po sanitarno-
epidemiologicheskoi okhrane). 
 
The international prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition, and retention of biological weapons is enshrined in Russia’s 
Criminal Code. Of particular relevance are the following Articles: 
• Article 189: Illicit export of raw materials, equipment, technologies, 
scientific and technological data, and services that could facilitate the 
development of WMD, armament, and military equipment – punishable 
by modes of punishment, including imprisonment of up to 3 years; 
• Article 205, (3): Bioterrorism – punishable by modes of punishment, 
including imprisonment of 15 to 20 years, or life imprisonment; 
• Article 225, (2): Negligence in safeguarding materials that could be 
used for the development of WMD – punishable by modes of 
punishment, including financial sanctions and imprisonment of up to 7 
years; 
• Article 226, (2): Theft of WMD or any materials thereof that could 
facilitate their development – punishable by imprisonment of 5 to 10 
years; 
• Article 2261: Smuggling of poisonous, toxic, and radioactive materials, 
ammunitions, explosive devices, and materials and equipment that 
could facilitate the development of WMD, their means of delivery, or 
other type of armament – punishable by modes of punishment, 
including imprisonment of 3 to 7 years and a fine of up to 1 million 
rouble; 
• Article 355: Development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or 
retention of WMD – punishable by imprisonment of 5 to 10 years; 
• Article 356, (2): Use of WMD, prohibited under international law – 
punishable by imprisonment of 10 to 20 years. 
 
Effort has been dedicated to develop and enforce export control measures 
for preventing the proliferation, smuggling and illicit trafficking of biological 
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materials for hostile purposes. In 2004, the Federal Service Technical and 
Export Control of Russia (Federal’naya sluzhba po tekhnicheskomu i 
eksportnomu kontrolju: FSTEK) was established.790 The FSTEK is the 
federal executive authority implementing national policy, organizing 
interdepartmental coordination and interaction, and exercising special and 
control functions in the sphere of state security concerning export control, 
among other issues. Whilst not being a member of the Australia Group,791 
Russia has employed an export control list based on the Group’s 
recommendations. A revised version of the list that took into account the 
provisions of the BTWC and UNSC Resolution 1540 was approved by a 
Presidential Decree in 2007.792  Relevant mechanisms include: 
 
• Federal Act as of 18 July 1999 No.183-FZ: ‘On Export Control’ – the 
Act defines the principles of state policy and the legal basis for the 
conduct of government agencies in the sphere of export control, as 
well as the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of participants in 
foreign economic activity;793 
• Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation as of 16 April 
2001 No.294:  ‘On Approval of the Regulations of Conducting a State-
Funded Expert Examination of Foreign Economic Transactions with 
Goods, Data, Works, Services and Results of Intellectual Activity 
(Rights to Such Results) over Which Export Control Is Exercised’;794 
• Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation as of 7 June 
2001 No.447:  ‘On Approval of the Resolution for Control of Foreign 
Economic Activities Concerning Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
790 See [in Russian] Ukaz Prezidenta RF, Voprosy Federal’noi sluzhby po tekhnicheskomu i ekportnomu kontrolyu, 
No.1085, 16 August 2004, available at  http://fstec.ru/obshchaya-informatsiya/polnomochiya/98-eksportnyj-
kontrol/zakonodatelstvo/ukazy/321-ukaz-prezidenta-rossijskoj-federatsii-ot-16-avgusta-2004-g-n-1085 (accessed 
10/09/2015).   
791 See [in Russian] Biobezopasnost’: strategicheskie aspekty, (Moscow: IMEMO, 2007); ‘The Australia Group at a 
Glance: Fact Sheets and Briefs’, Arms Control Association, October 2012, available at 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/australiagroup (accessed 10/09/2015). For general information on the 
Australia Group activity, see http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html (accessed 10/09.2015).  
792  See [in Russian] Ukaz Prezidenta RF, Ob utverzhdenii Spiska mikroorganizmov, toksinov oburudovaniya i 
tekhnologii, podlezhashtikh eksportnomu kontrolyu, No.1083, 20 August 2007, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
No.4449, 24 August 2007, available at http://www.rg.ru/2007/08/24/export-spisok-dok.html (accessed 9/09/2015).  
793 See [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, Ob eksportnom kontrole, No.183-FZ, 18 July 1999, available at 
http://fstec.ru/obshchaya-informatsiya/polnomochiya/96-eksportnyj-kontrol/zakonodatelstvo/zakony/309-federalnyj-
zakon-rossijskoj-federatsii-ot-18-iyulya-1999-g-n-183-fz (accessed 9/09/2015).  
794 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, Ob utverzhdenii Pravil provedeniya gosudarstvennoi ekspertizy 
vneshekonomicheskikh sdelok s tovarami, informatsiei, rabotami, uslugami i rezul’tatami intellektual’noi deyatel’nosti 
(pravimi na nikh), v otnoshnii kotorykh ustanovlen eksportnyi kontrol’, No.294, 16 April 2001.  
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That Can Be Used in the Development of Weapons and Military 
Equipment’;795 
• Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation as of 21 
June 2001 No.477:  ‘On the System of Independent Expert 
Examination for Identification of Goods and Technologies for Export 
Control Purposes’ (to be implemented along with the preceding 
Resolution);796 
• Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation as of 29 
August 2001 No.634: ‘On Approval of the Resolution for Control of 
Foreign Economic Activities Concerning Microorganisms, Toxins, 
Facilities and Technologies’;797 
• Presidential Decree No.580, 5 May 2004: ‘On Approval of the List of 
Commodities and Dual-Use Technologies That Are Subject to Export 
Control and Can Be Used for the Development of Weapons and 
Military Equipment’;798 
• Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation as of 15 
August 2005 No.517: ‘On the Procedure of Obtaining a Permit of the 
Export Control Committee of the Russian Federation for Foreign 
Economic Transactions with Goods, Data, Works, Results of 
Intellectual Activity (Rights to Such Results) That Can Be Used by 
Foreign States or Foreign Individuals for the Purpose of Creation of 
WMD and Means of Their Delivery, Other Kinds of Weapons and 
Military Equipment, or Acquired on behalf of Organisations or 
Individuals Participating in Terrorist Activities’;799 
795 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniya ob osushestvlenii kontrolya za 
vneshneekonomicheskoi deyatel’nost’yu v otnoshenii tovarov i tekhnologii dvoinogo naznacheniya, kotorye mogut 
byt’ ispolzovany pri sozdanii vooruzhenii i voennoi tekhniki, No.477, 7 June 2007, available at 
http://base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=27487 (accessed 9/09/2015).  
796 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, O sisteme nezavisimoi indentifikatsionnoi ekspertizy tovarov i 
tekhnologii, provodimoi v tselyakh eksportnogo kontrolya, No.477, 21 June 2001.  
797 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniya ob osushestvlenii kontrolyu 
vneshnoekonomicheskoi deyatel’ nost’yu v otnoshenii mokroorganizmov, toksinov, oborudovaniya i tekhnologii, 
No.634, 29 August 2001.  
798 See [in Russian] Ukaz Prezidenta, Ob utverzhdenii Spiska tovarov i tekhnologii dvoinogo naznacheniya, kotorye 
mogut byt’ ispol’zovany pri sozdanii vooruzhenii i voennoi tekhniki i v otnoshenii kotorykh osushestvlyaetsya 
eksportnyi kontrol’, No.580, 5 May 2004, available at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/30894 (accessed 
9/09/2015).  
799 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, O poryadke polucheniya razreshniya Komissii po eksportnomu 
kontrolyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii na osushestvlenie vneshnoekonomicheskikh operatsii s tovarami, informatsiei, 
rabotami, uslugami i rezul’tatami intellektual’noi deyatel’nosti (pravimi na nikh), kotorye mogut byt’ ispol’zovany 
inostrannym gosudarstvom ili inostrannym litsom v tselyakh sozdaniya oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya i sredstv 
ego dostavki, inykh vidov vooruzheniya i voennoi tekhniki libo priobretayutsya v interesakh organizatsii ili 
fizicheskikh lits, prichastnykh k terroristicheskoi deyatel’nosti, No.517, 15 August 2005.   
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• Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation as of 15 
September 2008 No.691: ‘On Approval of the Resolution for Licensing 
Foreign Economic Transactions with Goods, Data, Works, Services 
and Results of Intellectual Activity (Rights to Such Results) over Which 
Export Control Is Exercised’.800 
 
c. Genetically Modified Organisms 
 
Russia is a State Party to the Convention on Biodiversity but has joined 
neither its Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000) pertinent to the handling, 
transfer, and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern 
biotechnology, nor its Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation 
(2010).801 As noted above, accession to the Cartagena Protocol is among the 
goals listed in the revised version of the state’s biological security policy. 
  
Work involving genetic engineering techniques in Russia is regulated by a 
Federal Act titled ‘State Regulation in the Field of Genetic Engineering 
Activities’, which was adopted in 1996 and amended in 2010.802 After joining 
the WTO, Russia has embarked on developing a detailed legal framework on 
the use of GMOs, such as crops and animals. In 2013, the Government 
approved Resolution No.839 on the ‘State Registration of Genetically 
Engineered/Modified Organisms Intended for Release into the Environment 
and Products Derived from the Use of Such Organisms or Containing Such 
Organisms’.803 Thus, any GMOs released in the environment are subject to a 
registration process, including those used for the production of raw food, feed 
and feed additives for animals, as well as breeding and growing modified 
800 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniya o litsenzirovanii 
vneshekonomicheskikh operatsii s tovarami, informatsiei, rabotami, uslugami i rezul’tatami intellektual’noi 
deyatel’nosti (pravimi na nikh), v otnoshnii kotorykh ustanovlen eksportnyi kontrol’, No.691, 15 September 2008, 
published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.4757, 24 September 2008, available at http://www.rg.ru/2008/09/24/export-
licenzirovanie-dok.html (accessed 9/09/2015).  
801 For information on the Russia’s participation in the Convention on Biological Diversity, see  https://www.cbd.int/ 
(accessed 9/09/2015).  
802 See [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, O gosudartsvennom regulirovanii v oblasti genno-inzhenernii 
deyatel’nosti (s izmeneniyami i dopolneniyami ot 12 yulya 2000, No.96-FZ), No.86-FZ, 5 July 1996, published in 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 12 July 2000, available at http://www.rg.ru/2000/07/12/gennoinzh-dok.html (accessed 
9/09/2015).  
803 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, O gosudarsvennoi registratsii genno-inzhenerno-
modifitsirovannykh organizmov, a takzhe produktsii, poluchennoi s ikh primeneniem, No.839, 23 September 2013, 
available at http://government.ru/docs/6128/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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plants, animals, and microorganisms for agricultural use in the territory of 
Russia.804 Several agencies have been tasked with the implementation and 
oversight of the new rules. GMOs used in drug development for medical 
purposes are to be registered by the Ministry of Health which also 
administers the register of all GMOs and GM products; GMOs used for 
manufacturing medical products are to be registered by 
ROSZDRAVNADZOR; GMOs used in food production and raw food 
materials are to be registered by ROSPOTREBNADZOR; and GMOs used in 
agriculture are to be registered by Rosselkhoznadzor. For a GMO or a GM 
product to be registered, they have to pass five types of assessment, namely 
molecular-genetic, medical-biological, sanitary-epidemiological, biosafety, 
and environmental. The assessment on the environmental impact of GMOs 
and GM products is carried out by the Federal Service for Surveillance on 
Natural Resources Management (Federal’naya sluzhba po nadzoru v sfere 
prirodopol’zovaniya: ROSPRIRODNADZOR). GMOs used in assessments 
and scientific research are not subject to registration, as long as they are 
handled in accordance with the established sanitary and laboratory biosafety 
rules and procedures. Products obtained through the combination, treatment, 
or processing of already registered GMOs and GM products are not subject 
to registration provided that their genetic material has not been altered. 
 
In April 2015, it was reported that the State Duma had approved at first 
reading a bill on the ban of cultivation and breeding of GM crops and animals 
within the borders of the Russian Federation.805 The bill excludes GMOs 
utilised for the purpose of conducting assessment and scientific research. 
The use of plant seeds obtained through genetic engineering techniques is 
also prohibited under the bill. It further stipulates that all imported GMOs and 
GM products are to be subject to registration and that the Government 
preserves the right to forbid the import of such products on the grounds of 
health and environmental safety. The envisaged liability for non-compliance 
with the bill takes the form of a fine of up 500 000 roubles. The new bill 
804 See Peter Roudik, Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: Russian Federation, Legal Report for the 
Library of Congress, March 2014, available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/russia.php 
(accessed 9/09/2015).  
805 See [in Russian] ‘GD prinyala v I chtenii zakonoproekt o zaprete razvedeniya GMO v Rossii’, RIA Novosti, 24 
April 2015, available at http://ria.ru/science/20150424/1060718919.html (accessed 10/09/2015).  
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stands in stark contrast with the policy line that Russia has followed so far 
and in particular, with the measures taken after the country joined the WTO. 
Whilst at the time of writing, the bill remains under consideration by the Duma 
and little information has been revealed regarding the motivations and 
rationale that underpin it, it is possible to speculate that the radical regulatory 
change could be a reaction to the sanctions enforced against Russia by the 
EU and US in light of the crisis in Eastern Ukraine. 
 
In accordance with the UN Declaration on Human Cloning adopted in 
2005,806 Russia has amended its 2002 Act on the ‘Temporary Ban of Human 
Cloning’ which introduced a five-year moratorium on activities involving 
human cloning.807 The revised legal text passed in 2010 extended the 
moratorium for an indefinite period of time until law specifying the conditions 
and criteria for the application of cloning technologies for the purposes of 
human cloning is approved.808 
 
d. Intellectual Property 
 
Russia joined the World Intellectual Property Organisation in 1970 and has 
ratified most of the treaties it administers, including the Paris Convention 
(1965), the Budapest Treaty (1981), the UPOV convention (1998), the Patent 
Law Treaty (2009), and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Copyright Treaty (2009).809  In 2012, Russia acceded to the WTO, fully 
committing itself to further strengthening its legal framework for the protection 
of intellectual property in accordance with the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement.810 
806 See United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning, A/RES/59/280, 23 March 
2005, New York, available at http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/international/UN-GADeclarationHumanCloning.pdf 
(accessed 10/09/2015).  
807 See [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, O vremennom zaprete na klonirovanie cheloveka, No.54-FZ, 20 May 
2002, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.2958, 23 May 2002, available at   
http://www.rg.ru/2002/05/20/klonirovanie-dok.html (accessed 10/09/2015).  
808 See [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, O vnesenii izmeneniya v chatstyu 1 Federal’nogo zakona ‘O vremennom 
zaprete na klonirovanie cheloveka’, No.30-FZ, 29 March 2010, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.5145, 31 
March 2010, available at http://www.rg.ru/2010/03/31/klon-dok.html (accessed 10/09/2015).  
809 For a detailed record of Russia’s participation in the WIPO-administered international agreements  on the 
protection of intellectual property, see http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=147C (accessed 
10/09/2015).  
810 See Maxim Voltchenko and Tatiana Petrova, ‘Russia: As Russia Joins the WTO, It Streamlines Official Fees and 
Is Expected to Improve IP Protection’, INTA Bulletin, vol.67:15, 1 September 2012, available at 
http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/RUSSIAAsRussiaJoinstheWTO,ItStreamlinesOfficialFeesandIsExpectedtoI
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 The existing legal base for intellectual property protection in Russia features 
several components, among which the Constitution, the Civil Code, the 
Patent Law, and subject-specific laws, such as those related to trademarks, 
copyrights, and information storage and protection.811 In 1992, shortly after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia adopted a Patent Act which 
stipulated that the ownership rights of intellectual property (IP) accrued as a 
result of government-funded activity were to be assigned to the institutions in 
which that activity was conducted. The Act further specified that IP rights 
could only be assigned to legal entities such as research institutes, industrial 
enterprises, and commercial companies. By contrast, as far as military-
oriented and dual-use R&D was concerned, all IP belonged exclusively to the 
state. Throughout the 1990s the legal framework for IP protection underwent 
significant revision in an attempt to accommodate the various conundrums 
raised by the consequences of privatisation. Thus, in 2003 the existing 
Patent Act was replaced with a new one, which set clear rules on how IP was 
to be assigned. Under the provisions of the new Act, the state can apply for a 
patent for discoveries made as part of a government contract. In all other 
cases, the organisation where the discovery has been made holds the right 
to apply for a patent. Two additional legal documents are of particular 
relevance with regard to IP protection. One is Government Resolution No 
685 of 17 November 2005, ‘On the Distribution of Rights to Results of R&D’ 
which further confirmed the IP rights of organisations for discoveries made at 
state expense.812 The other is Federal Act No 217 of 2 August 2009, which 
allows for the commercialisation of government-funded research carried out 
mproveIPProtection.aspx (accessed 10/09/2015). For information on the TRIPS Agreement, see 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm (accessed 10/09/2015).  
811 Irina Dezhina and Renaud Bellais, The Russian National System of Innovation in Transition: Defence Legacy, 
Market Orientation and Emerging Challenges, June 2004, CHEAR, Paris, France, p.5. See also [in Russian] Irina 
Dezhina, Problemy prav na intellektual’nuyu sobstvenost’, Nauchnye trudy No.56-R, (Moscow: IEPP, 2003); A. 
Bendikov i Yu. Khrustalev, ‘Intellektual’naya sobstvenost’ v Rossii: problemy ispol’zovaniya i pravovoi zashtity’, 
Menedzhment v Rossii i za rubezhom, No.3 (2001), available at 
http://www.bizeducation.ru/library/management/innov/hrustalev.htm (accessed 10/09/2015); L.Samatova, ‘Problemy 
gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniya intellektual’noi sobstvennosti v usloviyakh innovatsionnogo razvitiya ekonomiki’, 
Aktual’nye problemy ekonomiki i prava, No.3 (2011), pp.34-36;  Irina Dezhina, Gosudarstvennoe regulirovanie nauki 
v Rossii, (Moscow: Magistr, 2008). 
812 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, O poryadke rasporyazheniya pravami na nauchno-
tekhnicheskoi deyatel’nosti, No.685, 17 November 2005, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.3935, 25 Novemeber 
2005, available at http://www.rg.ru/2005/11/25/prava-dok.html (accessed 10/09/2015). See also Loren Graham, 
Lonely Ideas: Can Russia Compete?, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013).  
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in educational and research institutions with IP rights being retained by the 
institutions where the research has been performed.813 
 
Innovation Lift and Public-Private Partnerships  
 
A range of initiatives has been launched to stimulate business investment 
and encourage active participation of the private sector in Russia’s 
biotechnology. Between 2011 and 2013 an ‘innovation lift’ – a system of state 
institutions that support innovative projects at various stages of their 
development from inception to expansion and restructuring – came into 
operation.814 It comprises a broad spectrum of components including open 
joint-stock companies (OJSC) such as the ‘Russian Venture Company’815 
and Rosnano;816 foundations such as Skolkovo Foundation,817 the Fund for 
Assistance to Small Innovative Enterprises (Fond sodeistvia razvitiu malykh 
form predpriatii v nauchno-tekhnicheskoi sfere),818 the Fund for Industrial 
Development (Fond Razvitiya Promyshlenosti: FRP), formerly RFTR;819 and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as ‘Russia’s Support’ (OPORA 
Rossii)820 and the Russian Venture Capital Association (Rossiiskaya 
assotsiatsiya venchurnogo investirovaniya).821 Particularly active in the area 
813 See [in Russian] Federal’nyi zakon RF, O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiskoi 
Federatsii po voprosam sozdaniya byudzhetnymi nauchnymi i obrazovatel’nymi uchrezhdeniyami khozyaistvenykh 
obstestv v tselyakh prakticheskogo primeneniya (vnedreniya) rezul’tatov intellektual’noi deyal’nosti, No.217-FZ, 2 
August 2009, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.4966, 4 August 2009, available at  
http://www.rg.ru/2009/08/04/int-dok.html (accessed 10/09/2015). See also Loren Graham, Lonely Ideas: Can Russia 
Compete?, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013). 
814 See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 
2013, (OECD Publishing, 2014).  
815 For further information on the objectives and activities of the Russian Venture Company (Rossiiskaya 
venchurnaya kompaniya), see http://www.rusventure.ru/en/company/brief/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
816 For further information on the objectives, structure, and activities of Rosnano, see 
http://www.rusnano.com/about/structure (accessed 9/09/2015). 
817 For further information on the Skolkovo Foundation, see https://sk.ru/foundation/about/ (accessed 9/09/2015). 
For analysis of Rosnano and Skolkovo, see Loren Graham, Lonely Ideas: Can Russia Compete?, (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2013); Quirin Schiermeier, ‘High Hopes for Russia’s Nanotech Firms’, Nature, vol.461 (2009), pp.1036-
1037; Mark Rice-Oxley, ‘Inside Skolkovo, Moscow’s Self-Styled Silicon Valley’, Guardian, 12 June 2015, available at  
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/jun/12/inside-skolkovo-moscows-self-styled-silicon-valley (accessed 
11/09/2015).  
818 For information on the Fund for Assistance to Small Innovative Enterprises, see [in Russian] http://www.fasie.ru/ 
(accessed 9/09/2015).  
819 For further information on the activity of the Fund for Industrial Development, see http://www.rftr.ru/ (accessed 
9/09/2015). For analysis of the activity of Russian Foundations and Funds, see Loren Graham, Lonely Ideas: Can 
Russia Compete?, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013).  
820 For further information on the activity of OPORA Rossii, see [in Russian] http://opora.ru/about/world (accessed 
9/09/2015). See also [in Russian] Frost and Sullivan, Obzor rynka biotekhnologii v Rossii i otsenka perspektiv ego 
razvitiya, op cit. 
821 For further information on the activity of the Russian Venture Capital Association, see http://www.rvca.ru/eng/ 
(accessed 9/09/2015). See also [in Russian] Frost and Sullivan, Obzor rynka biotekhnologii v Rossii i otsenka 
perspektiv ego razvitiya, op cit. On the role of clusters in promoting science, see [in Russian] Vladimir Knyaginin, 
‘Klasternyi put’ k novoi ekonomike’, Polit.Ru, 19 November 2012, available at 
http://polit.ru/article/2012/11/19/cluster/ (accessed 10/09/2015); ‘Territorii budeshtego: kak rabotayut innovatsionnye 
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of biotechnology is the Skolkovo Biomedical Cluster which not only provides 
companies with financial support in the form of grants but also offers them 
simplified customs procedures, professional mentor support, and discussion 
space. Similarly, Rosnano MedInvest, a subsidiary of Rosnano, and the 
Russian Venture Company have turned investing in biotechnology innovation 
into one of their chief priorities. 
  
An example of the growing role of public-private partnerships as a vehicle for 
the development of an innovation-based economy is the introduction of 
Technology Platforms (Tekhnologicheskie platformy) patterned on those 
functioning in the EU. Yet unlike the EU technology platforms which tend to 
be bottom-up endeavours supported by private capital, the Russian ones are 
largely reliant upon the state as their primary source of funding. By design, 
technology platforms are communication tools directed at stimulating the 
development of novel commercially-viable technologies and products; 
attracting additional resources for R&D on the basis of a multi-stakeholder 
engagement featuring industry, science, civil society, and the state; and 
improving the normative and legal framework for the development of science, 
technology, and innovation.822 Efforts to establish technology platforms in 
Russia commenced in 2010 when the Government Commission on High 
Technology and Innovation issued ‘Order on the Formation of the List of 
Technology Platforms’ (Poryadok formirovaniya perechnya 
tekhnologicheskikh platform).823 According to this document, technology 
platforms constitute a ‘public-private partnership mechanism’ and an 
‘important instrument of state science, technology, and innovation policy’. As 
klastery v Rossii’, Russian Venture Chronicle, No.2 (2014), pp.22-31, available at 
http://www.rusventure.ru/ru/newsletter/RussianVentureChronicle_October2014.pdf (accessed 10/09/2015); Anton 
Didikin, Pravovoe regulirovanie innovatsinnoi deyatel’nosti v Rossii, op cit.   
822 See [in Russian] Irina Dezhina, Tekhnologicheskie platformy i innovatsionnye klastery: vmeste ili porozn’?, 
Nauchnye trudy No.164, (Moscow: Gaidar Institute, 2013); Irina Dezhina, ‘Technology Platforms in Russia: A 
Catalyst for Connecting Government, Science, and Business?’, Triple Helix, vol.1:6 (2014), available at 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186%2Fs40604-014-0006-x  (accessed 9/09/2015); Olga Zlyvko et al. ‘Analysis 
of the Concept of Industrial Technology Platform Development in Russia and the EU’, International Economics 
Letters, vol. 3:4 (2014), p.125-140.  
823 See [in Russian] Pravitel’stvennaya komissiya po vysokim tekhnologiyami i innovaciyam, Poryadok formirovaniya 
perechnya tekhnologicheskikh platform, Protocol No.4, 3 August 2010, available at 
http://economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/innovations/formation/doc03082010_05 (accessed 9/09/2015). See 
also [in Russian] Pravitel’stvennaya komissiya po vysokim tekhnologiyami i innovaciyam, Perechen’ 
tekhnologicheskikh platform, Protocol No.2, 21 February 2012, available at 
http://economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/innovations/formation/doc20120403_11 (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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such, they provide a number of incentives for businesses and enterprises, 
such as: 
 
• Granting access to new resources for R&D; 
• Helping define priority directions for the country's economic 
development; 
• Assisting in the development of new technology regulations and 
standardisation; 
• Optimising business planning (since member companies include both 
producers and consumers of new technologies); 
• Offering option for more effective use of resources via outsourcing; 
• Developing international cooperation.824 
 
Three technology platforms have been set up in the area of biotechnology, 
namely ‘Medicine of the Future’ (Meditsina budeshego), ‘Bioindustry and 
Bioresources – BioTech 2030’ (Bioindustriya i bioresursy – BioTekh 2030), 
and ‘Bioenergy’ (Bioenergetika). Among the nearly 400 participants in 
‘Medicine of the Future’, there are 164 manufacturing plants, 114 academic 
institutions and 75 higher professional education institutions. The platform’s 
overall strategic goal is the creation of an area of medicine of the future, 
based on a set of “breakthrough” technologies, which determine the 
prospects of emerging high-technology products and service markets, as well 
as the extensive use of advanced technologies in the medical and 
pharmaceutical industries. To this end, the platform seeks to promote 
networking and effective interaction between stakeholders in the medical and 
pharmaceutical sectors, including business, science, and the government; to 
develop long-term research, innovation, and production strategic programs in 
the field of medicine; to concentrate intellectual, financial and administrative 
efforts to develop new commercial products and services competitive both on 
the domestic and international market; to optimise the regulation of research 
and innovation activities, standardise technology regulations and procedures, 
824 Irina Dezhina, ‘Technology Platforms in Russia: A Catalyst for Connecting Government, Science, and 
Business?’, Triple Helix, vol.1:6 (2014), p.2, available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186%2Fs40604-014-
0006-x  (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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and amend customs regulations in the field of biomedicine to accelerate the 
introduction of new products onto the market; to modernise healthcare and 
education by creating conditions for the utilisation of novel products and 
services; and to identify new areas of breakthrough technologies with 
application in medicine in order to reduce mortality and morbidity, increase 
the duration and quality of life, and provide population growth of Russia.825 
The activity of the platform is jointly financed through several State and 
Federal Target Programmes, RFFI, and state corporations, such as RosNano 
and RosTechnologies.826 
 
‘Bioindustry and Bioresources – Biotech 2030’ has a total of 99 participants 
featuring 46 businesses, 25 research institutes and 26 higher education 
teaching institutions. Among its funding sources the RFFI, RNF, Russian 
Venture Company, and Innovation Centre ‘Skolkovo’. The platform’s 
overarching objective is creating a modern bioindustry amounting to at least 
3% of Russia’s GDP. To accomplish this goal, the platform works in the 
following directions: 
 
• Preparation of a concept for the development of Russia’s bioindustry 
and bioresources base; 
• Creation of new and further enhancement of already existing markets; 
• Application of biotechnology in various sectors of the economy; 
• International collaboration with similar foreign-based entities; and 
• Education improvement and staff development in the area of 
biotechnology; 
 
As far as technology development is concerned, the platform is dedicated to 
promoting the use of renewable sources of biomass to achieve sustainable 
industrial production and power supply with little negative impact on the 
825 For further information on the Platform, ‘Medicine of the Future’, see [in Russian] http://tp-medfuture.ru/aboutus/ 
(accessed 10/09/2015). For a detailed discussion of the three existing technological platforms in Russia, see Irina 
Dezhina, Tekhnologicheskie platformy i innovatsionnye klastery: vmeste ili porozn’?,op cit. See also [in Russian] 
Irina Dezhina, ‘Sostoyanie sfery nauki i innovatsii’ in S. Sinel’nikov-Murylev et al. (ed.), Rossiiskaya ekonimika v 
2011 godu: Tendentsii i perpesktivy, (Moscow: Gaidar Institute, 2012), pp.375-410. 
826 See Irina Kurzina, ‘The Role of the Technology Platform ‘Medicine of the Future’ in Biomedical Innovations 
Development’, 21 May 2014, Moscow, available at  http://tp-medfuture.ru/wp-content/uploads/kurzina_i.pdf 
(accessed 10/09/2015).  
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environment. Priority areas of activity include biotechnology means of 
recycling renewable raw materials; use of renewable biomass as a raw base 
for the chemical and heavy industry; genomic and post-genomic, gene 
engineering and cell technologies for the development of new products (e.g. 
bioreagents, biomaterials, biofuels) and bioprocesses; biotechnology means 
of developing new food products; biotechnology means of more efficient 
mining; biotechnology means of recycling and waste management in 
agriculture; and agrobiotechnology.827 
 
With a total number of 68 participants, technology platform ‘Bioenergy’ brings 
together state agencies, commercial companies, education and research 
institutions, and civil society representatives. Those include 23 businesses, 
18 research institutes, 11 universities and 16 NGOs. The principal task of the 
platform is the consolidation of Russia’s scientific, professional, business, 
and expert communities, and its institutional and resource potential for the 
effective development of bioenergy. Its priority R&D areas of activity entail 
generation of heat and electrical energy from biomass; production of biogas 
through organic waste processing; production of biofuels, such as biodiesel, 
bioalcohol, biogasoline, and biokerosin; peat bioenergy; active development 
and implementation of modern bioenergy technologies in all branches of the 
economy; ensuring sustainable development on the basis of bioeconomy and 
bioenergy; and export of Russia’s bioenergy potential in the form of pellets, 
liquid biofuel, and biomethane.828 
Life Science Budget 
 
As part of its basic research programme covering all fields of science, Russia 
is expected to spend 834 billion roubles (13 billion US dollars) over the period 
until 2020.829 Yet the government expenditure on life science research in 
827 For further information on the Platform, ‘Bioindustry and Bioresources’, see [in Russian] 
http://biotech2030.ru/platforma/o-nas/ (accessed 10/09/2015). An English summary is available at 
http://biotech2030.ru/about-us/ (accessed 10/09/2015).  
828 For further information on the Platform, ‘Bioenergy’, see [in Russian] http://www.tp-bioenergy.ru/ (accessed 
10/09/2015). An English summary is available at http://www.tp-bioenergy.ru/en/ (accessed 10/09/2015).  
829 See Quirin Schiermeier, ‘Russian Science Minister Explains Radical Restructure’, Nature, 25 January 2015, 
available at http://www.nature.com/news/russian-science-minister-explains-radical-restructure-1.16776 (accessed 
20/05/15). For an overview of the Russian science funding policy, see [in Russian] Irina Dezhina, Mekhanizmy 
gosudarstvennogo finansirovaniya nauki v Rossii, op cit; Irina Dezhina, Gosudarstvennoe regulirovanie nauki v 
Rossii, (Moscow: Magistr, 2008); Evgenii Onishchenko, ‘Byudzhet na nauku – 2015’, Troitskii variant, No.164, 7 
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Russia remains low in comparison to other industrialised states, amounting to 
about 0.04 billion dollars annually.830 Moreover, the share of funding that 
Russia allocates to medical research is also much smaller. The primary 
sources of public financial support for life science research feature the RFFI, 
RNF, the RAN, and the Foundation for Advanced Research (Fond 
perspektivnykh issledovanii: FPI). 
 
Set up in 1992, RFFI is the oldest state foundation that provides funding for 
basic research in a range of fields, including biology and medical sciences. 
Its budget has been steadily increasing over the years reaching 9245 688.1 
billion roubles in 2014.831 21 per cent of the money available in 2014 was 
spent on biology- and medicine-oriented projects, which was 6 per cent more 
than the share dedicated to physics and astronomy, and 8 per cent more 
than the share dedicated to chemistry. 
 
The RNF was established in 2013 for the purpose of supporting basic 
research and staff development in virtually all areas of science. Among the 
main priorities of the Foundation is support for young scientists and post-
doctoral researchers. The Foundation’s expected budget for the period 2014-
2016 is reported to be 47 billion roubles.832 
In December 2014 the Presidium of RAN published a ‘List of Priority Areas in 
Basic Research for 2015’.833 Life science research is covered in several 
categories, among which are: 
 
• Nanostructures (physics, chemistry, biology, basic engineering) with 
an allocated budget of 140 million roubles; 
October 2014, p.10-11, available at http://trv-science.ru/2014/10/07/byudzhet-na-nauku-2015/ (accessed 
11/09/2015).  
830 See Roger Roffey, Biotechnology in Russia: Why Is not a Success Story?, op cit. See also [in Russian] Dmitrii 
Popov, ‘Tol’ko 0.3% biotekhnologicheskikh startapov dokhodyat do rynka’, Russian Venture Chronicle, No.2 (2014), 
pp.38-39, available at http://www.rusventure.ru/ru/newsletter/RussianVentureChronicle_October2014.pdf (accessed 
10/09/2015).  
831 For an overview of the funding trends of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, see [in Russian] 
http://www.rfbr.ru/rffi/ru/funding (accessed 10/09/2015).  
832 See [in Russian] ‘Byudzhet Rossiskogo nauchnogo fonda na 3 goda sostavit 47 mrld rub’, RIA Novosti, 11 
February 2014, available at http://ria.ru/science/20140211/994340988.html (accessed 10/09/2015).  
833 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Prezidiuma RAN, Ob utverzhdenii Perechnya programm fundamental’nykh 
issledovanii RAN po prioritentnym naprevleniyam, opredelyaemym RAN na 2015 god, No.176, 23 December 2014, 
available at http://www.ras.ru/presidium/documents/directions.aspx?ID=1080b82a-a4cb-48ad-8b41-a9615921e34a 
(acessed 10/09/2015).  
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• Molecular and cell biology with an allocated budget of 170 million 
roubles; 
• Mechanisms for integrating molecular systems in physiological 
processes with an allocated budget of 20 million roubles; 
• Biodiversity in ecological systems with an allocated budget of 45 
million roubles;  
• Basic research for medical technology with an allocated budget of 200 
million roubles. 
  
The Biology Department of the Academy is further expected to receive 21 
million roubles and the two former academies – RAMN and RASKhN – have 
an allocated budget of 100 million roubles each. 
  
The FPI was founded in 2012. The federal act on the basis of which the FPI 
came into being followed a presidential decree urging the Government to 
promote and ensure the development of advanced high-risk and basic 
research, and applied research for the purposes of national security and 
state defence.834 As far as the life sciences are concerned, the Foundation 
finances projects in bionics, advanced medicine, and integrated biosystems. 
The estimated budget of FPI for 2015 and 2016 is reportedly 3.3 billion and 
3.5 billion roubles, respectively.835 
Life Science Professional Practice 
 
The Russian science system remains divided along the lines of teaching and 
research. Universities and professional higher education schools are still 
predominantly seen as teaching institutions offering theoretical grounding in 
various disciplines. At the same time, research institutes have managed to 
834 See [in Russian] Ukaz Prezidenta RF, O realizatsii planov (programm) stroitel’stva i razvitiya Vooruzhenykh Sil 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, drugikh voisk, voinskikh formirovanii i organov i modernizatsii oboronno-promyshlennogo 
kompleksa, No.603, 7 May 2012, available at  
http://fpi.gov.ru/activities/documents/ukaz_prezidenta_rf_ot_7_maya_2012_g_n_603_o_realizatsii_planov_program
m_stroitelystva_i_razvitiya_booruzhennih_sil_rossiyskoy_federatsii_drugih_voysk_voinskih_formirovaniy_i_organov
_i_modernizatsii_oboronno_promishlennogo_kompleksa (accessed 10/09/2015).  
835 See [in Russian] ‘Byudzhet Rossiskogo nauchnogo fonda na 3 goda sostavit 47 mrld rub’, op cit. On the negative 
impact of current financial crisis in Russia following the Western sanctions on the FPI’s estimated budget, see [in 
Russian] ‘Byudzhet ‘kuznitsy innovatsii’ VS Rossii iz-za krizisa sokreshten na 10%’, RIA Novosti, 8 June 2015, 
available at http://ria.ru/science/20150608/1068780073.html (accessed 10/09/2015). For analysis of the broader 
impact of the sanction on Russian science, see [in Russian] Irina Dezhina, ‘Sostoyanie nauki i innovatsii’ in B. Mau 
et al. (ed.), Rossiiskaya ekonomika v 2014 godu: Tendentsii i perspektivy, (Moscow: Gaidar Institute, 2015).  
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preserve their image of bastions of knowledge production and experimental 
work. Thus, the concept of a research university virtually ubiquitous in the 
Anglo-Saxon world remains underdeveloped in Russia, even though some 
effort has been made to bring research institutes and universities closer. A 
case in point is the collaboration between Moscow State University (MGU) 
and the science-city of Pushchino.836 In 2013 MGU launched at its newly-
established Faculty Biotechnology an integrated Master’s degree in 
Biotechnology which combines theoretical and practical aspects of life 
science research. The overall duration of the programme is 6 years, in which 
the first 3 years of study entail lecture-based instruction at MGU with the final 
Bachelor’s and both Master’s years to be practically-oriented and carried out 
at Pushchino. A similar pattern of operation is observed at Novosibirsk State 
University (NGU) situated in Akademgarodok (Academy City) near 
Novosibirsk, which maintains close ties with the scientific complex of 
Koltsovo. For instance, in October 2015 Kolstovo Innovation Centre, an 
independent non-profit entity, is organising an international conference, 
OpenBio, designed to bring together and facilitate dialogue and cooperation 
among young scientists, science students, and representatives of business 
and funding institutions.837 
 
Universities offer three types of degrees, namely Bachelor’s, Master’s, and 
Candidate of Science, which is roughly the equivalent of a PhD. Most 
Russian universities do not have life science faculties or departments as 
such but instead teach relevant courses within their schools of biology or 
medicine. Alongside, specialised universities such as First Moscow State 
Medical University (I.M. Sechenov Moscow Medical Academy), Moscow 
State Academy of Veterinary Medicine and Biotechnology, and Russian State 
Agrarian University deliver advanced professional training in life science-
related disciplines. Yet it has been reported that despite the abundance of 
836 Further information on the pragramme [in Russian] is available at http://www.msu.ru/info/struct/dep/biotech.html 
(accessed 10/09/2015). On the early reforms in higher education in Russia, see Irina Dezhina and Loren Graham, 
‘Science and Higher Education in Russia’, Science, vol.286:5443 (1999), pp. 1303-1304. For an overview of the 
tendencies in science education in Russia, see [in Russian] Irina Dezhina and Viktoriya Kiseleva, Tendentsii 
razvitiya nauchnykh shkol v sovremennoi Rossii, Nauchnye trudy No.124R, (Moscow: IEPP, 2009); Irina Dezhina 
and Aleksei Ponomarev, ‘1000 laboratorii: Novye printsipy organisatsii nauchnoi raboty v Rossii’, Voprosy 
ekonomiki, No.3 (2013), pp.70-82;    
837 Further information about the event is available at http://openbio.ru/ (accessed 10/09/2015). The page also 
contains information about the conference held in 2014.  
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courses and education programmes, the number of life science graduates 
trained to work in biotechnology laboratories remains low.838 This in turn puts 
an extra strain on industries as they have to spend additional time and 
resources on re-training their new employees. The need for a radical 
education reform and restructuring of the existing life science curricula is 
therefore evident. Moreover, there seems to be growing appreciation among 
universities that changes are all but inevitable. The introduction of the 
integrated Master’s programme by MGU could be seen as a reaction to this 
recognition. Other universities have also joined the effort to help improve 
higher life science education and develop new standards and programmes. 
The participation of four Russian universities (Russian University of Chemical 
Technology, Kazan National Research Technological University, Moscow 
State University, and Novosibirsk State University) and two research 
institutes (RAN Institute of Molecular Genetics and RAN Institute of 
Microbiology) in the EU-funded project ‘Reforming Higher Education in 
Biotechnology: Development and Improvement of Standards and Academic 
Curricula for Bachelor’s and Master’s Programmes’ is indicative in this 
regard. Since 2011 NGU has also been involved in a collaborative project 
with Heilongjiang University at Harbin, China as a result of which a Chinese-
Russian Institute has been established.839 The Institute administers joint 
Bachelor’s and Master’s programmes in six areas, including biology. Several 
universities have also been involved in the development of biosafety 
curricula, including NGU, I.M Sechenov Moscow Medical Academy, and 
Pushchino State University.840  
Research institutes focus primarily on the practical aspects of life science 
practice. Teaching is limited and generally only research degrees such as 
Candidate of Science and Doctor of Science can be pursued there. Virtually 
all laboratories conducting studies involving pathogenic microorganisms are 
hosted within research institutes and all professionals with access to such 
838 See [in Russian] Frost and Sullivan, Obzor rynka biotekhnologii v Rossii i otsenka perspektiv ego razvitiya, op cit, 
p.21.  
839 Further information on joint programme is available [in Russian] at http://fen.nsu.ru/fen.phtml?topic=ruchi 
(accessed 10/09/2015).  
840 Sergey Netesov, ‘Russian Biosafety Experience during the Last Two Decades: Lessons and Achievements’, a 
Paper presented at International Workshop, Anticipating Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High 
Containment Biological Laboratories, 11-13 July 2011, Istambul, Turkey, available at 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_065001.pdf (accessed 3/02/2016). 
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microorganisms are required to undergo appropriate laboratory biosafety 
training in accordance with the sanitary regulations.841 The number of high-
containment laboratories, BSL-3 and BSL-4, is limited.842 Only in those 
facilities is work on highly dangerous pathogens from Group I and II allowed. 
Examples of institutes housing high-containment laboratories include the 
research facilities under the Ministry of Defence, with one located in Kirov, 
one in Sergiev Posad, and one in Yekaterinburg. Two entities – the State 
Research Centre of Applied Microbiology and Biotechnology at Obolensk, 
and the State Research Centre for Virology and Biotechnology ‘VECTOR’ at 
Koltsovo, the latter hosting the only BSL-4 laboratory on the territory of 
Russia – are under the auspices of ROSPOTREBNADZOR. The AP Service 
of ROSPOTREBNADZOR supervises the high-containment facilities situated 
at the five AP Institutes at Saratov (‘Microbe’), Irkutsk, Rostov, Stavropol, and 
Volgograd, the eleven regional AP Stations – Altay, Astrakhan, Chita, 
Dagestan, Elista, Kabardino-Balkaria, Khabarovsk, North-Western, 
Primorsky, Prichernomrsky  and Tuva – and one mobile unit used during the 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa. The Ministry of Agriculture is in charge of 
three institutes with high-containment laboratories, namely the Federal 
Centre for Animal Health in Vladimir region, the National Research Institute 
of Veterinary, Virology, and Microbiology at Pokrov, and the Inter-Regional 
Veterinary Laboratory at Bryansk. 
 
All research institutes with a high-containment laboratory on their premises 
are legally required to have their staff properly trained in laboratory biosafety 
with a focus on the safety procedures for handling, storage, and transfer of 
highly pathogenic microorganisms listed in Group I and II.843 The requirement 
for ensuring appropriate training extends to research staff, as well as to 
engineering, maintenance, and cleaning personnel.844 Temporary 
engineering and technical personnel has to obtain explicit authorisation by 
841 See Evgeniy Stavskiy et al, ‘Comparative Analysis of Biosafety Guidelines of the USA, WHO, and Russia 
(Organizational and Controlling, Medical and Sanitary – Antiepidemiological Aspects), Applied Biosafety, vol.8:3 
(2003), pp.118-127; [in Russian] Ye. Kondrik et al. Analiticheskoe obosnovanie kontseptsii biologicheskoi 
bezopasnosti, (Obolensk: GNTs PM, 2003). 
842 See Tatyana Elleman, ‘Russian Federation’, op cit, p.198-199. For a detailed information on the research 
facilities within the framework of ROSPOTREBNADZOR, see N. Kalinina, Mezhdunarodnye i natsional’nye 
problemy biologicheskoi bezopasnosti i perspektivy ikh resheniya, op cit, p.264-269.  
843 Interview, 15 April 2014, Moscow, Russia.   
844 Evgeniy Stavskiy et al. ‘Comparative Analysis of Biosafety Guidelines of the USA, WHO, and Russia’, op cit, 
p.123.  
295 
 
                                                          
the institute director, in order to be allowed in the facility. Such personnel can 
only perform their duties after all routine work has ceased and the premises 
have been disinfected. They have to be accompanied by an institute 
employee at all time. Details of visits (e.g. names and personal data of 
visitors, purpose of visit) of any kind to the facility are recorded in a 
designated registry.  
 
Some institutes, including the AP Institutes, the Centre for Applied 
Microbiology at Obolensk, and ‘Vector’ are licensed to deliver accredited 
specialised training and retraining courses in this area.845 The programmes 
are practically-oriented and aim to equip professionals with the skills and 
knowledge necessary to ensure that work involving dangerous pathogens is 
carried out safely and in line with the existing rules and procedures. Case 
studies and problem-solving exercises are commonly used to enhance 
individuals’ understanding of biosafety and facilitate the application of 
theoretical knowledge into practice.846 A pre- and post-assessement system 
for evaluating trainees’ level of competence is in place. Alongside with face-
to-face instruction, e-learning courses have been developed, which allow 
trainees to gain knowledge in a ‘self-study’ mode. Built-in assessment tools 
make it possible for instructors to monitor and evaluate trainees’ performance 
and ensure quality control.847 Besides appropriate training, all researchers 
have to undergo a medical examination at the start of their contract. This 
includes appropriate vaccination against any pathogens with which they 
845 All five institutes within the Anti-Plague System (Microbe – Saratov, Rostov-upon-Don, Irkutsk, Stavropol, and 
Volgograd) offer certified training courses both at beginners’ level and as part of continuing professional 
development. The Institutes are also tasked with education resource and curricula development. See, for example, 
[in Russian] ROSPOTREBNADZOR Federal’noe kazennoe uchrezhdenie zdravookhraneniya ‘Irskutskii ordena 
Trudovogo Krasnogo Znameni nauchno-issledovatel’skii protivochumnyi institut Sibiri i Dal’nego Vostoka’, 
Organizatsii i provedenie uchebnogo protsessa po podgotovke spetsialistov v oblasti biobezopasnosti i laboratornoi 
diagnostiki vozbuditelei nekotorykh opasnykh infektsionnykh boleznei, 2012, Irkutsk. On the education and training 
activities carried out at VECTOR, see [in Russian] Mamed’yar Azaev, ‘Prepodavanie osnov biobezopasnosti: 
Obrazovatel’naya deyatel’nost’ FBUN GNTs VB “Vektor”’, paper presented at Seminar-Conference ‘Biological 
Safety Principles at Microbiology Laboratories’, 14-18 October 2013, Novosibirsk State University, Novosibirsk, 
available at http://biosafety.nsu.ru/?page_id=60 (accessed 11/09/2015).  
846  [in Russian] T. A.. Malyukova et al. ‘Sovershenstvovanie podgotovki personala v tselyakh obespecheniya 
biobezopasnosti rabot s patogennymi biologicheskimi agentami’, Problemy osobo opasnykh infektsii, vol.1:93 
(2007), p.36. On the issue of biosafety training programmes, see also [in Russian] A.V.Boiko et al. ‘Evaluation of 
Professional Qualification of the Personnel Authorised for Work with Pathogenic Biological Agents’, Problemy osobo 
opasnykh infektsii, vol.2:108 (2011), pp.12-15; G.Onishchenko et al. ‘Normirovanie kak element sistemy 
obespecheniya bezopasnosti rabot s biologicheskimi agentami I-II grupp patogennosti’, Problemy osobo opasnykh 
infektsii, vol. 2:90 (2005), pp.5-11; T.A. Malyukova et al. ‘Meditsinskie profilakticheskie meropriyatiya pri organizatsii 
provedeniya rabot s patogennymi biologicheskimi agentami I-II grupp: puti sovershenstvovaniya’, Problemy osobo 
opasnykh infektsii, vol.4:88 (2004), pp.9-12.  
847 Ibid.  
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intend to work.848 Employees who exhibit vaccination intolerance, or other 
side effects are allowed to conduct research only with a special institutional 
order. All members of staff are subject to daily medical surveillance and 
temperature measurement. They are further required to pass an annual 
medical check-up, including a mental health and drug test. A designated 
biosafety officer is in charge of monitoring compliance with these 
requirements. The biosafety officer has to keep a record of anyone who 
requests access to the laboratory and/or the pathogens collection. A two-
person rule is in operation in all high-containment facilities. Work patterns are 
also monitored. For instance, if a member of staff is absent, they have to 
notify their line manager within two hours of their regular start office hours.849 
Failure to call into work or report an absence more than two hours after the 
official start time triggers an investigation by the line manager who is obliged 
to establish why the employee is not at their workplace.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, biosafety has a long-standing tradition in Russia, 
with its origins dating back to the late imperial period when the anti-plague 
laboratory at Fort Alexander I was established. Besides being actively 
engaged in the study of bacterial diseases and development of therapeutics, 
the laboratory also focused on training and capacity building in bacteriology 
and plague diagnostics. The expertise developed at Fort Alexander I was 
later transferred to Saratov where it largely laid the foundations for the 
establishment of the sanitary-epidemiological surveillance system of the 
Soviet Union. The backbone of the nationwide surveillance infrastructure was 
the AP system.  
 
Human resource development and training were deemed areas of paramount 
importance, something evident in the emergence of specialised courses 
taught on the premises of the ‘Microbe’ Institute at Saratov as early as 
1923.850 By the late 1940s completing a training course in biosafety had 
become a formal requirement for being allowed to work with pathogens. By 
848 Evgeniy Stavskiy et al. ‘Comparative Analysis of Biosafety Guidelines of the USA, WHO, and Russia’, op cit, 
p.123.  
849 Ibid  
850 T. A.. Malyukova et al. ‘Sovershenstvovanie podgotovki personala v tselyakh obespecheniya biobezopasnosti 
rabot s patogennymi biologicheskimi agentami’,op cit, p.33.  
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the 1960s the sanitary regulations were further tightened, whereby work 
involving OOI could be carried only qualified individuals who had passed 
extensive prior biosafety training and had at least three years of practical 
experience in virology laboratories. Specialists working with OOI were further 
required to spend a set period in quarantine – that is, not to conduct any 
research – before they could undertake any travel if the latter entailed them 
being away from their place of residence for more than 24 hours.851 All 
trained personnel were obliged to undergo a re-certification procedure every 
five years to demonstrate their biosafety competency – the rule is still in force 
in present-day Russia. Yet it is worth noting that despite the effort and time 
dedicated to the preparation of research personnel, laboratory accidents 
involving OOI still occurred, an aspect that highlights the challenge of 
eradicating the scope for human error, or technical failure.852 
In terms of scope, biosafety training courses developed during the Soviet 
time were quite extensive, covering a vast array of aspects of professional 
activity. Since most of research practice was subject to state regulation, 
developing relevant habits and practices was not just a matter of professional 
responsibility but a legal requirement. The use of PPE is a case in point. 
Unlike in the USA where biosafety cabinets were introduced as early as the 
late 1940s, in the USSR most of laboratory research was carried out at the 
bench. Under those circumstances, even one tiny drop on the bench was 
considered an accident.853 Ensuring that staff were properly protected 
against potential biosafety risks therefore required high level awareness both 
of laboratory practices and PPE. To further reinforce the importance of PPE, 
the Sanitary Regulations contained (and still do in their present-day iteration) 
clear instructions on how the anti-plague suit (protivochumnyi kostjum) was 
to be worn and taken off. There are four types of anti-plague suit; each type 
is designed for a specific activity. The composition of a Type 1 suit, which is 
851 Interview, Novosibirsk, 7 April 2014. 
852 See S. Ya. Gaidamovich, ‘Human Laboratory Acquired Arbo-, Arena-, and Hantavirus Infections’, Journal of the 
American Biological Safety Asociation vol.5:1 (2000), pp.5-11; [in Russian] Nina Ruzanova, ‘Virus kak na ladoni’, 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.3514, 30 June 2004, available at http://www.rg.ru/2004/06/30/ebola.html (accessed 
3/02/2016).  
853 Ibid. 
298 
 
                                                          
required for work with OOI is described below, alongside with the official 
instructions on how the suit is to be put on and taken off.854  
How to wear a Type 1 anti-plague suit? 
 (i) The anti-plagie suit has to be put on in the designated for this 
purpose area in the following sequence: 
(ii) A hood/head scarf. Put on the hood/head scarf so that it covers the 
forehead to the level of the eyebrows, the whole of the neck reaching 
underneath the chin, and most of the cheeks. Tie the laces at the back 
of the neck.  
(iii) An anti-plague robe (gown). Put on the robe, so that the 
hood/head scarf remains inside it. Tie the collar and belt elastic laces 
in a bow that is visible in the front of the robe on the left-hand side; 
only after that tie the elastic laces of the sleeves.  
(iv) A respirator. Place the respirator on the face, so that its upper end 
is aligned with the lower edge of the eyes, and its lower end reaches 
underneath the chin.  
(v) Glasses. Before putting the glasses on, rub the lenses with a 
special pencil or dry soap, in order to prevent fogging.  
(vi) Gloves. Check the gloves for defects before use.  
(vii) Towel. Fix the towel on the right-hand side of the robe belt. 
(vii) Boots. Put on the boots before entering the zone where 
pathogens are to be handled (‘infectious zone’). Wear a pair of 
waterproof shoe covers underneath the boots.  
 
How to take off a Type 1 anti-plague suit? 
(i) The anti-plague suit has to be taken off in the designated for this 
purpose area in slow manner and in the sequence described below. 
Each time you take off an element of the suit, dip your hands in a 
disinfecting solution without removing the gloves. 
(ii) Upon exiting the ‘infectious zone’, dip your feet without taking off 
the boots in disinfecting solution. Rub each boot from top to bottom for 
about 1-2 minutes with a tissue, or swab soaked in disinfecting 
solution. Only afterwards proceed with taking off the suit.  
854 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Glavnogo gosudarstvennogo vracha RF, Sanitarnye pravila SP 1.3.3118-13: 
Bezopasnost’raboty s mikroorganismami I-II grupp patogennosti (opasnosti), op cit.. 
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(iii) First, remove the towel and place it in a tank with disinfencting 
solution or in an autoclave.  
(iv) Take off the glasses using both hands by pulling it away from the 
face forwards, then upwards and finally backwards behind the head. 
Dip the glasses in, or rub them twice with ethyl alcohol (70 per cent). 
(v) Take off the respirator by pulling it away from the face, ensuring 
that its outer side does not touch the face. Place it in a container for 
decontamination.  
(vi) Undo the robe collar and belt laces, and lowering the upper edge 
of the gloves, undo the robe sleeve laces. Take off the robe by folding 
it inside out, and place it in a container for decontamination.  
(vii) Take off the hood/ headscarf folding its ends at the back of the 
head in one hand and place it in a container for decontamination.  
(viii) Take off the boots and waterproof shoe covers. 
(ix) Take off the gloves. Check for defects only after dipping them in 
disinfecting solution.  
(x) Treat your hands throuroughly with ethyl alcohol (70 per cent) and 
wash them with soap.  
 
One researcher asserts: ‘As a young scientist, I had to practise putting on my 
anti-plague suit multiple times – until I did it in the correct sequence, that is, 
as specified in the regulations’.855 Another one is more critical in their 
assessment: ‘We were indeed well trained but it would have been more 
useful, had it been explained to us why we had to follow that precise 
sequence [when putting on and taking off the suit]. We were taught to follow 
instructions but we were not encouraged to think about, let alone, question 
them. And it would have been easier to remember the sequence in the first 
place if we had known the logic behind it!’856 
 
Along with the USA, Russia is in possession of a collection of Variola strains, 
the virus that causes smallpox. When the WHO officially eradicated the virus 
in 1983, the US and Russia (then the Soviet Union) were allowed to retain 
855 Interview, 15 April 2014, Moscow. 
856 Interview, 28 May 2015, Odessa.  
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their collections and continue research work to help ensure preparedness in 
case of a reoccurrence of the disease.857 Thus, the Centre for Disease 
Control in Atlanta, Georgia in the USA and ‘VECTOR’ are the only two official 
repositories of the virus. All experimental work involving Variola strains is 
strictly overseen by the WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research 
which comprises members from all WHO regions. The Committee is assisted 
by a group of scientific experts from such areas as public health, fundamental 
applied research and regulatory agencies. ‘VECTOR’’s collection comprises 
120 strains with a total of 696 registered stored units. Among the WHO-
approved project recently undertaken at the centre was an investigation of 
the susceptibility of mice to the Russian Variola virus. The study is aimed at 
developing animal models to test the efficacy of therapeutic and preventive 
products against smallpox. 
  
Biosecurity, unlike biosafety is not yet fully integrated in the formal instruction 
of Russian life scientists. ‘VECTOR’’s biosafety training programme contains 
some elements pertitent to biosecurity and the State Centre for Applied 
Microbiology at Obolensk has posted the BTWC in the ‘Legal Documents’ 
section of its official website. Likewise, the syllabus of one of the professional 
training courses, that is delivered at the ‘Microbe’ institute at Saratov features 
the following topic: ‘The Threat of Bioterrorism: Counter-Terrorism and 
General Overview of the Biological Agents Most Likely to be Used for the 
Purposes of Bioterrorist Attacks’.858 As part of international collaboration 
within the framework of the ISTC (prior to Russia’s withdrawal from the 
agreement noted in Chapter 7), a number of educational and awareness-
raising tools and resources have been devoped, such as ‘English-Russian 
Harmonized Dictionary of Biological Safety and Security (Anglo-russkii 
garmonizirovannyi slovar’ po biologicheskoi bezopasnosti i okhrane).859 
857For information on the WHO smallpox research and preparedness, see 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/research/en/ (accessed 10/09/2015). The issue of retaining strains of the 
Variola virus is a contentious one. See, for example, James Gallagher, ‘Should the US and Russia Destroy Their 
Smallpox Stocks?’, BBC News, 16 May 2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-13360794 (accessed 
10/09/2015).  
858 T. A.. Malyukova et al. ‘Sovershenstvovanie podgotovki personala v tselyakh obespecheniya biobezopasnosti 
rabot s patogennymi biologicheskimi agentami’,op cit, p.36.  
859 Sergey Netesov et al.  English-Russian Harmonized Dictionary of Biological Safety and Security, (Moscow: MDV, 
2010).  
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 At university level, however, very little effort has been made to introduce 
seminars and courses on the biosecurity aspects of modern biotechnology. 
With the exception of Novosibirsk State University, Moscow State University, 
and Siberian Federal University (Krasnoyarsk) where university students are 
exposed to those issues as part of the bioethics curricula, biosecurity has 
hardly been embedded in the training of prospective life scientists.  By 
contrast, over the past few decades, bioethics as related to the medical and 
clinical practice has been institutionalised.860 As early as 1992, a Russian 
National Bioethics Committee was set up under the auspices of RAN. The 
main aim of the Committee is the protection of the fundamental human rights 
and human dignity in the conditions of scientific and technological progress in 
the area of biology and medicine.861 In 2007, a Federal Ethics Committee 
was established within the remit of ROSZDRAVNADZOR. The Committee is 
tasked with conducting ethics assessment of the materials used in clinical 
trials for testing new drugs and pharmaceuticals. Another national bioethics 
committee – the Russian Bioethics Committee (Rossiiskii komitet po bioetike: 
RKB) – was also created in that same year. RKB is under the auspices of the 
Federal Commission on UNESCO, which made the decision for its 
establishment. RKB’s activities entail assessment of the legal, social, and 
ethical issues arising from scientific research and technology directed at 
humans; consultation and expert advice on the preparation of bills and legal 
acts in the field of bioethics; and analysis of the tendencies in the evolution of 
bioethical norms.862 At local level, all laboratories conducting work involving 
860 See Daniel Callahan, ‘Bioethics as a Discipline’, Hastings Centre Studies, vol.1:1 (1973), pp.66-73. Relevant 
international agreements on bioethics include Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine, 4 April 1997, Oviedo, Spain, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/164.htm (accessed 11/09/2015); UNESCO, Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 11 November 1997, Paris, France, available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13177&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 
11/09/2005); UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 19 October 2005, Paris, France, 
available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
(accessed 11/09/2005). Relevant international bodies tasked with dealing with bioethics issues include the 
International Bioethics Committee founded in 1993 and the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee founded in 
1998, both under the auspices of UNESCO. For further information, see http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-
human-sciences/themes/bioethics/international-bioethics-committee/ (accessed 11/09/2015). For a overview of the 
development of bioethics as a discipline in Russia, see [in Russian] Yurii Lopukhin, ‘O bioetike: Bioetika v Rossii’, op 
cit; G.L. Mikirtichan et al, ‘Rossisskaya Federatsiya’, op cit. 
861 See [in Russian] Yurii Khrustalev, Bioetika: Filosofiya sokhraneniya zhizni i sberezheniya zdorov’ya, (Moscow: 
GEOTAR, 2012), p.366.  
862 For further information on the goals, compositition and activity of the Russian Bioethics Committee, see [in 
Rusian] http://www.bioethics.ru/rus/bioee/ (accessed 10/09/2015).  
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the use of animals are required to have a bioethics committee.863 The 
committee is responsible for reviewing project proposals and, where 
possible, for making recommendations for applying alternative methods for 
avoiding unnecessary animal suffering. 
  
Whilst some effort has been made to promote closer ties between 
universities and business, as evident in Government Resolution No 218 of 9 
April 2010, ‘On the Measures for State Support for Fostering Cooperation 
between Higher Education Institutions and Organisations Working on High-
Technology Production Projects’, by and large, in the area of biotechnology 
those remain underdeveloped.864 A notable exception in this regard is the 
involvement of research institutes in vaccine production.865 Cholera and 
rabies vaccine is produced in the Anti-Plague Institute ‘Microbe’ at Saratov; 
plague vaccine is manufactured at the Anti-Plague Institute at Stavropol; and 
hepatitis A and measles vaccine are produced at ‘VECTOR’. The Saint 
Petersburg Research Institute for Vaccine and Sera specialises in flu and 
herpetic vaccine production and the Chumakov Institute of Poliomyelitis and 
Viral Encephalitis in Moscow – in vaccine production against rabies, tick-
borne encephalitis, yellow fever, and oral poliovirus. The Federal Centre for 
Animal Health and the National Russian Institute of Veterinary Virology and 
Microbiology manufacture a wide range of vaccines against zoonotic 
diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), avian flu, anthrax, 
Newcastle disease, and sheep pox. Plague vaccine, anthrax vaccine, and 
smallpox vaccine are produced at Kirov, Yekaterinburg, and Sergiev Posad, 
respectively. 
  
Soviet Inertia Revisited 
 
As the discussion in the preceding sections illustrates, biotechnology is 
deemed a key state priority in Russia and a fundamental ingredient of 
863 See, for example, the goals and activities of the Bioethics Committee established by Moscow State University 
available [in Russian] at http://www.msu.ru/bioetika/ (accessed 10/09/2015).  
864 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, O merakh gosudarstvennoi podderzhki razvitiya kooperatsii 
rossiiskikh vysshikh uchebnyi zavedenii i organizatsii, realizuyushtikh kompleksnye proekty po sozdaniyu 
vysokotekhnologichnogo proizvodstv’, No.218, 9 April 2010, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No.5160, 16 April 
2010, available at  http://www.rg.ru/2010/04/16/pravila-dok.html (accessed 10/09/2015).  
865 Tatyana Elleman, ‘Russian Federation’, op cit, p.199-200.  
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promoting economic and technological modernisation. The sheer number of 
policy instruments devised to stir innovation and facilitate knowledge-transfer 
and product-development in the life sciences and related disciplines is a clear 
indicator of the government’s commitment to the goal of embedding cutting-
edge biotechnology advances in such critical sectors as medicine, drug 
development, agriculture, and energy supply. Given the shared recognition 
within the Russian leadership of the need for replacing the existing economic 
model largely dependent on the extraction and export of natural resources, 
including gas and oil, with one based on the assimilation of novel 
technologies, this trend is likely to persist and potentially even intensify. 
  
Yet the ongoing expansion of biotechnology in Russia does not take place in 
a vacuum but in a complex socio-political and economic context conditioned 
culturally and historically. Just as the globalising dynamics that have shaped 
the life sciences over the past few decades continue to permeate and 
influence the country’s reality, local contingencies, power relations and 
competing agendas have a bearing on the trajectory of biotechnology 
advancement. Stiff global competition for economic growth, 
commercialisation, and quick implementation of biotechnology advances 
exacerbates realist fears, skews political calculations, and accelerates the 
drive for gaining scientific and technological advantage. Those dynamics are 
certainly not exclusively limited to the context of Russia; on the contrary, 
hardly any state finds itself insulated from such pressures. However, it is 
argued that the case of Russia is special, not least because of the legacy of a 
prolonged autocratic rule and the shadow of the biological weapons 
programme. When assessing the development of the Soviet Union, the 
historical and cultural context is difficult to overstate. The October Revolution 
and resultant rise of the Bolsheviks to power effectively set the scene for an 
experiment in state engineering on an unprecedented scale. Prior to 1917, 
Russia was largely an agrarian state which had parted with feudalism about 
half a century earlier. Industry was underdeveloped and the country’s 
experience with capitalism was limited and bordering on non-existent. Its 
territory spread across two continents encompassing a multitude of peoples, 
ethnic groups, languages, and cultures. Some thirty years later, the Soviet 
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Union would emerge as one of the world’s two superpowers and a possessor 
of the epitome of the most advanced technology at the time: the A-bomb. In 
national memory the horrors of the Stalinist purges, arbitrary arrests, and 
state-level harassment still tend to be juxtaposed with the victory in the Great 
Patriotic War. For its part, science and the life sciences in particular 
developed against the backdrop of the need for a rapid socio-economic post-
war recovery and national defence enhancement. The synergy between 
these dynamics coupled with the attributes of a state apparatus which 
emphasised total control, submission, and ideological compliance gave rise 
to a system of knowledge production that was largely infused with and 
reflected the Soviet mentality of the day. 
 
Even though the USSR ceased to exist more than two decades ago, its 
legacy still casts a shadow over the governance of the life sciences in 
Russia. Whilst science has officially demobilised, the culture that has 
sustained its development during the Soviet regime persists. State 
involvement, top-down regulation, secrecy and limited options for public 
deliberation on science policy raise questions regarding the extent to which 
the attempts to modernise the life science establishment and foster an ethos 
compatible with the changing biotechnology landscape have met with 
success. It suffices to mention that despite the enormous effort invested in 
promoting biotechnology research very little attention is given to the study of 
possible risks and related ethical, legal, and social concerns. Likewise, the 
level of engagement of both practising and prospective life scientists with the 
broader implications of their work remains low. Adapting the existing 
governance mechanisms in the realm of the life sciences to the changing 
innovation landscape requires a normative change that at this stage is hardly 
evident either in the established state-led approaches, or the life science 
professional culture. Against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving biotechnology 
sector and growing consolidation of multifaceted dynamics with complex 
interactions, fostering the type of professional ethos necessary to ensure the 
sustainable development of the life sciences in Russia remains a challenging 
task.  
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Conclusion and Research Implications 
 
This research has sought to examine to what extent and by what means it is 
possible for Russia to reconcile its on-going expansion in biotechnology with 
the institutional and normative inertia arising from its Soviet past. The 
development of the life sciences in the USSR has in many respects been 
conditioned by the prevalent political and ideological ethos and economic and 
military contingencies, which have moulded a particular professional culture 
with its own attributes, relations of power and mentality. An inherent quality of 
cultures is stability, which makes them both robust and resilient. They are 
stable but not static, for ‘stability is a special case of change and not the 
natural order of things’.866 For a culture change to be effective and 
sustainable therefore it is essential that the existing set of relations should 
adapt to the new reality and broader socio-political and economic context. 
 
The governance of biotechnology in the ‘new’ Russia post-1991 is a vivid 
illustration of missed opportunities. The collapse of the Soviet Union offered 
prospects for building a liberal democratic order based on values such as 
individuality, freedom of expression, and private initiative – all long neglected 
and downplayed under the Communist Party. For once the future appeared 
brighter than ever, pregnant with hopes and expectations for a smooth 
transition to a freer, more open and in a way fairer society. As the outlook for 
a long-waited change for the better gradually became dimmer and dimmer 
throughout the 1990s, so did the retrograde forces for re-establishing old 
habits and past patterns of organisation and order gather momentum, 
becoming stronger and stronger. On the brink of the new millennium, Russia 
emerged as a ‘sovereign democracy’ whereby underneath the delicate 
surface of what ostensibly was pictured as a reformed state with democratic 
institutions and a market economy, the Soviet heritage remained virtually 
intact, continuing to inform everyday policy and practice.867  
866 A. W. DePorte, Europe between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance, (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1986), p.xv. 
867 The concept of ‘sovereign democracy’was first introduced in 2006 by the then Deputy Head of the Presidential 
Administration of the Russian Federation, Vladislav Surkov. See Richard Sakwa, ‘Putin’s Leadership: Character and 
Consequences’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol.60:6 (2008), pp.879-897; Andrei Okara, ‘Sovereign Democracy: A New 
Russian Idea or a PR Project’, Russia in Global Affairs, vol.5: 3 (2007), pp.8-20; Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘Sovereignty 
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If during the 1990s Russian science was in crisis struggling for survival, over 
the past decade and a half it has enjoyed a fresh revival and vigorous 
expansion. The area of biotechnology is a case in point. As illustrated in the 
preceding chapter, the sheer number and wide scope of high-level initiatives, 
programmes, and mechanisms highlighting the powerful drivers behind the 
growing expansion of the life sciences is indicative of Russia’s firm 
commitment to enhancing its scientific prowess and deriving the maximum 
benefit attainable from the advent of new technologies. Given the explicit 
emphasis on the need for fostering sustainable domestic production to 
overcome the dependency on foreign imports in light of the international 
sanctions introduced amidst the Ukrainian crisis, the trend toward increasing 
consolidation of biotechnology development is likely to persist and further 
intensify. Yet a worrying aspect of the current trajectory of life science 
progress in Russia is the fact that the initiatives designed to facilitate the 
growth of biotechnology are barely matched with relevant measures for 
addressing the potential legal, social, ethical, and security concerns arising 
therefrom. Continuing state control over science, secrecy and lack of 
transparency breed distrust at international level. Equally, the absence of a 
life science ethos keenly aware and responsive to the challenges posed by 
the rapid proliferation of knowledge and technologies with multiple adaptive 
uses precludes the development and implementation of adequate 
governance mechanisms to ensure that biotechnology advances are utilised 
solely for peaceful, prophylactic and protective purposes. Until those 
conundrums are adressed, Russia’s burgeoning biotechnology sector is likely 
to be viewed with suspicion and considered problematic in relation to its 
commitment to biological security and disarmament. 
 
One aspect that merits attention is the active participation of Russia in the 
current Intersessional Programme of the BTWC 2012 – 2015. At the BTWC 
Meeting of Experts held in August 2014 Russia put forward a document titled 
‘Strengthening the B[T]WC through a Legally-Binding Instrument 
and Democracy  in Contemporary Russia: A Modern Subject Faces the Post-Modern World’, Journal of International 
Relations and Development, vol.11 (2008), pp.152-180; [in Russian] Vladimir Putin, ‘Demokratiya i kachestvo 
gosudarstva’, Kommersant, 6 February 2012, available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1866753 (accessed 
28/09/2015).  
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(Protocol)’.868 The proposal called for using the 1994 B[T]WC Special 
Conference negotiating mandate to develop a ‘supplementary and additional 
Protocol’ which would add ‘value for States Parties by setting up enabling 
mechanisms of co-operation, assistance and protection and national 
implementation thereby strengthening the Convention and improving its 
implementation’. Among the key thematic areas of the Protocol was 
investigation of alleged use of biological weapons; investigation of suspicious 
disease outbreaks; promotion of international cooperation for peaceful 
purposes; assistance and protection against biological weapons; confidence 
building measures; national implementation; and monitoring of developments 
in science and technology relevant to the Convention. For the purposes of 
the administration and fulfilment of those and other related tasks, the 
proposal envisioned the establishment of an implementing agency – the 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW) – modelled 
on the OPCW and comprising a Technical Secretariat, Executive Council and 
Conference of the States Parties. The proposal was once again discussed at 
the BTWC Meeting of Experts in August 2015 with a view of preparing a 
substantive document to be tabled in preparation for the Eight Review 
Conference of the BTWC to be held in the end of 2016.869 At that meeting, 
Russia also tabled a Working Paper jointly drafted with Belarus on measures 
for improving the structure of the intersessional process to make it more 
effective. Further, voicing concerns about the potential for misuse of dual-use 
research, Russia has suggested the creation of an ‘ad-hoc expert working 
group to elaborate the criteria for referring the most sensitive research to the 
B[T]WC scope.’ 
 
If genuine, Russia’s efforts to advocate for strengthening the BTWC 
constitute a positive signal of political will and commitment to the goal of 
ensuring that the life sciences are not subject to hostile misuse. Grounds for 
868 See Russian Federation, Strengthening the BWC Through a Legally Binding Instrument (Protocol), 5 August 
2014, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland. Available at 
http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/f837b6e7a401a21cc1257a150050cb2a?OpenDocument
&ExpandSection=9#_Section9 (accessed 5/9/2015).  
869 See Russian Federation, Proposal by the Russian Federation for Inclusion in the Report of the Eighth Review 
Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, 11 August 2015, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Available at 
http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/46cac219b57f8b49c1257db20030bce8?OpenDocument
&ExpandSection=11#_Section11 (5/9/2015). 
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scepticism stem from at least two sources though. One is the formal 
explanation submitted by the Russian Federation with regard to the 2014 
Report of the Meeting of the States Parties to the BTWC. According to the 
explanation, ‘the Russian Federation considers paragraphs 19 through 59 
[the substantive paragraphs]… as having no approved status, and therefore, 
no commitments may arise therein.’870 Another is the rhetoric employed by 
the Russian delegation during the 2015 BTWC Meeting of Experts when 
accusations of dubious activities bordering noncompliance with the 
Convention were levelled against fellow States Parties.871 
 
In 2015 the BTWC is celebrating its 40th Anniversary since its entry into force. 
The Convention is the first international agreement to outlaw a whole class of 
WMD codifying the norm that the use of biological and/or toxin weapons 
‘would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind’. Back in 1972 when the 
Convention was negotiated and opened for signature, the USSR was one of 
its three depository states. Russia therefore has a moral duty to act as a 
bulwark against the hostile misuse of the life sciences. So far, however, the 
country still has not fully lived up to this expectation. Whilst the formal legal 
architecture is in place domestically, more action is required to overcome the 
persisting institutional, infrastructural, and normative legacies inherited from 
the Soviet era and thus give a tangible expression to the vocal commitment 
to fostering a culture of biosecurity, both domestically and internationally. 
  
This research has sought to uncover and analyse the existing culture of life 
science practice in present-day Russia. To this end, it has drawn upon the 
wide literature on the history of science in Imperial and, later, Soviet Russia 
looking both into the scope of scientific and technological advancement and 
the governance mechanisms for utilising scientific knowledge for social, 
political, economic, and military purposes. It has further reviewed the 
academic scholarship and official documents and reports on the history of the 
870 Statement by the Russian Federation under the Standing Agenda Item,  ‘Review of Developments in Science 
and Technology Relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention’, 2 December 2014, Palais des Nations, 
Geneva, Switzerland.  
871 See Statement of the Russian Federation under the Standing Agenda Item, ‘Strengthening National 
Implementation’, 13 August 2015, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland. Available at 
http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/46cac219b57f8b49c1257db20030bce8?OpenDocument
&ExpandSection=9#_Section9 (accessed 5/09/2015).  
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Soviet biological weapons programme. The historical account has been then 
combined with an extensive analysis of the initiatives, measures and policies 
implemented in the area of biotechnology after the collapse of the USSR 
underpinned by primary research data obtained over the span of many hours 
of interaction with life scientists and government officials from Russia and the 
Former Soviet Union states, as well as by critical engagement with the limited 
literature on science governance in Russia after 1991. Thus, the research 
offers important insights into the multifaceted dynamics that have shaped and 
continue to shape the life science enterprise in Russia identifying both the 
strengths and shortcomings of the existing governance mechanisms in 
accommodating the whole gamut of ethical, security, social, and legal 
challenges arising from the rapid advancement of twenty-first century 
biotechnology. In particular, by drawing attention to the persistence of 
institutional and normative Soviet inertia, it highlights the limits of formal 
regulatory approaches to the development of a professional culture that could 
adequately accommodate the advent of novel multiple-use technologies. 
 
The research consolidates several bodies of literature and primary research 
findings and, as such, provides a valuable starting point for further studies 
designed to examine the governance of biotechnology in Russia. One area 
that merits investigation is the role of scientist engagement in promoting a 
culture of biosecurity in the life sciences. According to the preamble of 
UNESCO’s Constitution: ‘since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the 
minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed’.872 Good 
laboratory biosafety practice has a long-standing tradition in Russia dating 
back to the late imperial period. Education and training programmes in this 
area are in place and there are powerful professional norms re-enforcing 
compliance with the relevant laws and regulations. It may be useful therefore 
to examine the extent to which engaging life scientists with the dual-use 
problematic and the broader social, ethical, and legal implications of 
biotechnology could impact on their practices and contribute to the 
development of a professional ethos, based on a shared understanding of 
872 UNESCO Constitution, 16 November 1945, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 7/02/16).  
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the essential role of biosecurity in preventing the hostile misuse of the life 
sciences.  
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Appendix 1 
 
List of State Policy Documents and Programmes with Relevance to 
Biotechnology in Russia 
 
Presidential Decree No.899 
 
In 2011 the then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed Decree No.899 
‘On the Approval of Priority Directions for the Development of Science and 
Technology in the Russian Federation and the List of Critical 
Technologies’.873 The document defined eight priority areas on which the 
state agencies were to focus in order to promote the goal of modernising the 
economy and enhancing its competitiveness. The life sciences were listed 
under number 4. Among the twenty-seven critical technologies that merit 
specific attention and that should be vigorously pursued as stipulated in the 
second part of the document were biocatalytic, biosynthetic and biosensor 
technologies; biomedical and veterinary technologies; genomic, proteomic, 
and post-genomic technologies; cell technologies; NBIC technologies;874 
bioengineering; and technologies for reducing the loss of life of socially 
significant disease. 
 
State Coordination Programme for the Development of Biotechnology in the 
Russian Federation until 2020 (BIO 2020) 
 
In 2005 the Ovchinnikov Society of Russian Biotechnologists published a 
National Programme for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian 
Federation, 2006 – 2015.875 The Programme was developed in consultation 
with a wide range of stakeholders, including the State Duma, relevant 
873 See [in Russian] Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Ob utverzhdenii prioritetnykh napravlenii razvitiya nauki, 
tekhnologii i tekhniki v Rossiiskoi Federatsii i perechnya kriticheskikh tekhnologii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No.899, 7 
July 2011, Moscow.  
874 Derived from the convergence of Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology, and Cognitive 
Science. 
875 See [in Russian] Obshestvo biotekhnologov Rossii im. Yu.A. Ovchinnikov, Natsional’naya programma ‘Razvitie 
biotekhnologii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 2006-2015’, 27 October 2015, available at 
http://www.biorosinfo.ru/strategija-razvitija-biotekhnologicheskojj-otrasli-promyshlennosti-v-rossijjskojj-federatsii-do-
2020-g-strategija-bio-2020/ (accessed 9/09/2015). See also [in Russian] Obshestvo biotekhnologov Rossii im. Yu.A. 
Ovchinnikov, Strategiya razvitiya biotekhnologii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2020 (Strategiya Bio2020), 23 December 
2010, Moscow.   
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ministries, the three big Science Academies at the time – RAN, RAMN, and 
RASKhN, research institutes, and private sector, and its draft was endorsed 
by the Expert Council on Biotechnology Industry of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Industry, Engineering and Knowledge-Based Technology. By 
design, it constituted an unprecedented undertaking aimed at raising 
awareness of the enormous potential, economic viability, and various 
benefits of biotechnology, highlighting the need for fostering public-private 
partnerships to ensure the long-term strategic advancement of the life 
sciences. Even though the programme was not ultimately implemented, it 
was an important first step toward the goal of consolidating the efforts to 
support biotechnology nation-wide. 
  
In many respects, the 2005 National Programme has served as a basis for 
the development of another important document - the State Coordination 
Programme for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation 
until 2020 – which was adopted in April 2012. The State Coordination 
Programme has institutionalised the government’s commitment to promoting 
biotechnology drawing upon the proposals made in its draft predecessor.876 
Among the objectives set in its ambitious agenda are: 
• Raising the volume of consumption of biotechnology products 8.3 
times; 
• Raising the volume of production of biotechnology products 33 times;  
• Reducing the import of consumer biotechnology products by half; 
• Increasing the share of biotechnology exports more than 25 times; 
• Raising the level of biotechnology production to 1% of the GDP by 
2020 and to at least 3% by 2030. 
 
In order to fulfil the aforementioned objectives, the Programme has 
envisaged a package of diverse measures. Those include: 
876 See State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation until 2020, No. 
VP-P8-2322, 24 April 2012, Moscow, English version available at 
http://owwz.de/fileadmin/Biotechnologie/Information_Biotech/BIO2020_Programme_full.pdf (accessed 9/09/2015). 
[in Russian] Kompleksnaya programma razvitiya biotekhnologii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2020, No. VP-
P8-3222, 24 April 2012, Moscow, available at http://innovation.gov.ru/page/584 (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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• Incentive pricing (e.g. state procurements, setting new standards and 
technical regulations, financial support for industries); 
• Enhancing the competitiveness of biotechnology enterprises (e.g. 
grants and interest-free loans to support R&D programmes at small 
and medium businesses; export promotion; development of innovation 
infrastructure); 
• Improving education (e.g. creation of new educational standards and 
programmes); 
• Development of science (e.g. increasing state funding, development of 
strategic research programmes); 
• Development of a pilot production base;  
• Promoting business-science-education cooperation;  
• Support for biotechnology in the provinces; 
• International collaboration. 
  
The Programme is divided into two stages. During Stage 1 (2011-2015) the 
Programme has focused on the development of domestic demand and export 
of biotechnology products. In Stage 2 (2016-2020), it seeks to create the 
institutional conditions required for carrying out a ‘deep’ modernisation of the 
technological base of the relevant sectors of industry to enable the 
embedment of biotechnology methods in production. The principal 
coordinator of the Programme is the Ministry of Economic Development 
(Ministerstvo ekonomicheskogo razvitiya: MINEKONOMRAZVITIYA). 
Additional nine arms of the government are tasked to work alongside on its 
implementation. The Programme’s overall budget is 1.2 trillion roubles, with 
367 billion roubles allocated for bioenergy, 210 billion for industrial 
biotechnology, 200 billion for agricultural biotechnology, 150 billion for 
biomedicine, 106 billion for biopharmacy, 70 billion for marine biotechnology, 
45 billion for forestry biotechnology, and 30 billion for environmental 
biotechnology.877 
 
877 See [in Russian] Frost and Sullivan, Obzor rynka biotekhnologii v Rossii i otsenka perspektiv ego razvitiya, 
October 2014, Moscow, p.12. Full text of the report is available at http://ww2.frost.com/news/press-
releases/biotehnologii-zadayut-vektor-innovacionnogo-razvitiya-ekonomiki-rossii/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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Blueprint for the Development of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering 
 
In 2013 the then Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed Governmental 
Order No.1247-r approving the Plan (Blueprint) for the Development of 
Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering. That was yet another state 
document which recognised the need for addressing the unsatisfactory 
performance of Russia’s biotechnology on the international scene and 
tackling its heavy dependence on foreign imports: 
 
More than 80 percent of the biotechnology products 
used in Russia are imported and the volume of 
consumption is extremely low as compared to that 
in both developed and developing countries. 
Imported products feature 100 percent of the amino 
acids for the agricultural sector (lysine), up to 80 
percent of the feed enzyme preparations, 100 
percent of the enzymes for household chemicals, 
more than 50 percent of veterinary antibiotics, 100 
percent of lactic acid, and 50 to 100 percent of the 
biological food ingredients.878 
 
The Blueprint is conceptually linked to the State Coordination Programme 
outlined above and aims to facilitate the fulfilment of its core objectives set 
out for Stage 1. In particular, the Plan seeks to develop domestic demand 
and export of biotechnological products; to establish a technological and 
manufacturing basis for the organisation of new industry sub-branches which 
in the long-term could replace a significant part of the products currently 
manufactured by means of chemical synthesis with ones obtained through 
biological synthesis; and to establish a technological and pilot production 
base for the development of the biofuel industry. To this end, the Plan draws 
a list of indicators with clear targets to be met between 2012 and 2015, and 
then 2015 and 2018. For example, according to the Plan, the volume of 
consumption of biotechnology production in 2012 amounted to 128 billion 
roubles with the projected figures for 2015 and 2018 being 180 and 300 
878 See [in Russian] Razporyazhenie Pravitel’stva RF, Plan meropriyatii (“dorozhnaya karta”) ‘Razvitie biotekhnologii 
i gennoi inzhenerii’, No.1247-r, 18 July 2013, Moscow, available at http://government.ru/docs/3257/ (accessed 
9/09/2015). For an unofficial English version,  see Executive Order of the Government of the Russian Federation, 
Action Plan (“Roadmap”) ‘Development of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, No.1247-r, 18 July 2013, 
available at: 
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Russian%20Government%20Roadmap%20for%20Devel
opment%20of%20Biotechnology_Moscow_Russian%20Federation_9-20-2013.pdf (accessed 9/09/2015). 
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billion roubles, respectively. Moreover, the Plan defines two packages of 
measures to be implemented. The first one, framework measures, is directed 
at such areas as promoting R&D; improving the education and qualification of 
scientific, engineering, technical, and management staff; improving the 
regulation of biotechnology; and creating coordination mechanisms. The 
second one, sector-specific measures, encompasses the policies to be 
developed with regard to the various fields of biotechnology. 
  
Basic Principles of the State Policy in the Area of Healthy Nutrition Until 2020 
 
In 2012 the Russian Government issued Resolution No.1873-r approving the 
‘Basic Principles of the State Policy in the Area of Healthy Nutrition Until 
2020’.879 Among its key objectives and tasks the Policy listed ‘development 
and implementation of innovation technologies, including biotechnology and 
nanotechnology in agriculture and food production.’ In addition, the 
mechanisms through which the policy is to be executed feature investment in 
the promotion of basic research in the field of biotechnology and 
nanotechnology for the purpose of obtaining new food sources and methods 
for medical and biological analysis of their quality and safety. 
 
State Programmes, Sub-Programmes, and Federal Targeted Programmes 
 
The State Programme ‘Science and Technology Development’ adopted in 
2012 set out the framework for the development of science and technology in 
Russia until 2020. Its implementing-agency-in-chief is MINOBRANAUKI 
which is to be assisted by MINEKONOMRAZVITIYA. The main objectives of 
the Programme are as follows: 
 
• Creation of a competitive and cost-effective research and 
development sector and ensuring its leading role in the Russian 
economy’s technological modernisation processes; 
• Advancement of fundamental research; 
879 See [in Russian] Razporyazhenie Pravitel’stva RF, Osnovy gosudarstnnoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v oblasti 
zdorovogo pitaniya naseleniya na period 2020, No.1873-r, 25 October 2010, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
No.5328, 3 November 2010, http://www.rg.ru/2010/11/03/pravila-dok.html (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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• Fostering larger than planned science and technological potential in 
high-priority areas of science and technology development; 
• Ensuring the institutional development of the R&D sector and 
improving its structure, management, and financing system; 
• Integration of scientific research with education; 
• Establishment of modern equipment and production assets in the R&D 
sector; 
• Integration of the Russian R&D sector into the system of international 
science and technological cooperation.880 
 
The implementation of the Programme is estimated to cost 1,603 trillion 
roubles. Among the main instruments of the Programme is the Federal 
Targeted Programme, ‘Research and Development in Priority Areas of 
Development of the Russian Scientific and Technological Complex for 2014-
2020’ drafted in 2013.881 The Targeted Programme is tasked with creating 
scientific and technological groundwork orientated primarily toward inter-
industry needs and a single infrastructure to support the R&D sector. To this 
end, it employs various implementation tools with regard to scientific and 
technological projects, including both state contracts and grant agreements in 
the form of subsidies for legal entities carrying out research projects.882 The 
cost of the Targeted Programme for 2014-2020 is 239.03 billion roubles, of 
which 202.24 billion constitute a contribution from the federal budget and the 
remaining 36.79 billion roubles are to be derived from extra-budgetary 
sources. 
 
In 2012 the Russian Government approved a State Programme titled 
‘Agricultural Development and Regulation of Agricultural Products, 
880 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, Ob utverzhdenii gosudarstvennoi programmy Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii ‘Razvitiya nauki i tekhnologii’ na 2013-2020 goda, No.301, 15 April 2014, available at http://xn--
80abucjiibhv9a.xn--
p1ai/%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D1%8B/4125 (accessed 
9/09/2015). For the progress of the implementation of the Programme, see 
http://government.ru/programs/211/events/ (accessed 9/09/2015). For an English summary, see 
http://government.ru/en/docs/3346/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
881 Here is an illustration of how State Programmes and Targeted Programmes are linked together. In this case, the 
State Programme serves as a framework within which the Targeted Programme is utilised for the attainment of 
particular goals and directing resources.  
882 [in Russian] Federal’naya tselevaya programma, Issledovaniya i razrabotki po prioritetnym napravleniyam 
razvitiya nauchno-tekhnologicheskogo kompleksa Rossii na 2014-2020, 21 May 2013, http://fcpir.ru/ (accessed 
9/09/2015). An English summary is available at http://government.ru/en/docs/2129/ (accessed 12 May 2015).  
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Commodities, and Food Markets, 2013-2020’ to be implemented by the 
Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerstvo sel’skogo khozyaistva).883 Other 
participants in the Programme include the Ministry of Culture (Ministerstvo 
kul’tury), Federal Road Agency (Federal’noe dorozhnoe agenstvo), and 
Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Federal’naya 
sluzhba po veterinarnomu i fitosanitarnomu nadzoru: 
ROSSELKHOZNADZOR). Among the strategic goals of the Programme is 
guaranteeing food security; enhancing the competitiveness of domestic 
products both in and outside Russia; and fostering efficient and environment-
friendly production models. To accomplish those goals, the Programme 
seeks to complete the following tasks: 
• Creating incentives for the production of the main types of agricultural 
and food products; 
• Implementing anti-epizootic measures with regard to quarantine and 
especially dangerous animal diseases; 
• Supporting the development of agricultural and food market 
infrastructure; 
• Making agriculture more cost-effective to ensure its sustainable 
development; 
• Promoting biotechnology; and 
• Encouraging innovation in the agricultural industry. 
 
The State Programme comprises six sub-programmes and four targeted 
programmes. Particularly pertinent to the promotion of biotechnology is the 
sub-programme entitled, ‘Technical and Technological Modernisation, 
Innovative Development’. Its chief objectives are enhancing the efficiency 
and competitiveness of agricultural production through technical and 
technological modernisation; fostering favourable economic conditions to 
support innovative development and attract investment; and bringing 
Russia’s agricultural industry to leading positions in the area of agricultural 
biotechnology. The tasks required for the accomplishment of those goals 
883 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, O Gosudarstvennoi programme razvitiya sel’skogo khozyaistva 
i regulirovaniya rynkov sel’skokhozyaistvennoi produktsii, syr’ya i prodovol’stviya na 2013-2020 gody, No.717, 14 
July 2012, Moscow, available at http://government.ru/docs/16239/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  An English summary is 
available at http://government.ru/en/docs/3360/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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include the creation of appropriate institutional environment for the large-
scale development and utilisation of innovation and adequate infrastructure 
for promoting agricultural biotechnology. Of the overall State Programme 
budget amounting to 2.126 trillion roubles, 31.6 billion roubles are to be 
dedicated to the completion of the sub-programme. 
  
The State Programme entitled ‘Development of Pharmaceutical and Medical 
Industry, 2013-2020’ was launched in April 2014. Its principal coordinator is 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Ministerstvo promyshlennosti i torgovli) 
with other Programme participants featuring MINOBRANAUKI, Federal 
Service for Surveillance in Healthcare (Federal’naya sluzhba ponadzoru v 
sfere zdravookhraneniya: ROSZDRAVNADZOR), MINZDRAV, and Moscow 
State University. The overall objective of the programme is the formation of a 
world-class innovation-based pharmaceutical and medical industry in Russia. 
The main tasks to be completed to this end include: 
 
• Enhancing the technological and manufacturing potential of the 
pharmaceutical and medical industry; 
• Enhancing the innovative potential of the pharmaceutical and 
medical industry; and 
• Improving the production of innovative medicines and medical 
products.884 
 
Among the expected outcomes of the Programme is a seven-fold increase of 
the share of high-technological and knowledge-based products by 2020 in 
the overall volume of pharmaceutical and medical production as compared to 
2011; an increase of up to 50 per cent of the share of domestically 
manufactured consumer medicines; and an increase in the export of 
pharmaceuticals and medical products to a level of at least 105 billion 
roubles. The Programme budget is 99.4 billion roubles. Three Sub-
884 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, Ob utverzdenii gosudarstvennoi programmy Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii ‘Razvitie farmatsevticheskoi i meditsinskoi promyshlennosti’ na 2012-2020, No.305, 15 April 2014, 
Moscow, available at http://government.ru/media/files/FixAD0zpgrA.pdf (accessed 9/09/2015). An English summary 
of the Programme is available at http://government.ru/en/docs/3370/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
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Programmes and one Targeted Programme are to be implemented within the 
framework of the State Programme. Those are: 
  
• Sub-Programme 1, Development of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing;  
• Sub-Programme 2, Development of Medical Product Manufacturing;  
• Sub-Programme 3, Improvement of the State Regulations Pertaining 
to the Circulation of Pharmaceutical Drugs and Medical Products; and  
• Targeted Programme, Development of Pharmaceutical and Medical 
Industry in the Russian Federation until 2020 and beyond.885 
  
The activities to be conducted as part of the Targeted Programme are 
divided in seven categories as follows: 
 
1. Development of the scientific and technical potential of the 
pharmaceutical industry; 
2. Development of the innovation potential of the pharmaceutical 
industry;  
3. Development of the scientific and technical potential of the medical 
industry; 
4. Development of the innovation potential of the medical industry; 
5. Staff development and enhancement of the information infrastructure 
of the pharmaceutical and medical industry; 
6. Investments to provide for the technological modernisation and the 
adoption of an innovation-based model of development in the 
pharmaceutical and medical industry; 
7. Programme management. 
 
As part of the Government State Programme, ‘Development of Industry and 
Increasing Competitiveness, 2012-2020’,886 a sub-programme titled 
885 See in [Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, O Federal’noi tselevoi programme ‘Razvitie farmatsevticheskoi I 
meditsinskoi promyshlennosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2020 goda i dal’neisuyu perspektivu’, No.91, 17 
February 2011, Moscow, available at http://fcpfarma.ru/catalog.aspx?CatalogId=744 (accessed 9/09/2015). For an 
overview of the Targeted Programme in English, see 
http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu/erawatch/opencms/information/country_pages/ru/supportmeasure/support_0017 
(accessed 9/09/2015).  
886 See [in Russian] Razporyazhenie Pravitel’stva RF, Gosudarstvennya programma Rossiiskoi Federatsii ‘Razvitie 
promyshlenosti i povyshenie ee konkurentosposobnosti’, No.1535-r, 29 August 2013, available at 
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‘Industrial Biotechnology’ is to be implemented.887 The agency tasked with 
the implementation of the sub-programme is the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade. The overall objective of the sub-programme is creating and 
developing modern industrial biotechnology sector competitive both on 
domestic and international markets. Among the tasks to be fulfilled to this 
end are the creation of an up-to-date legal, normative, technical, 
informational, and organisational base for the development of industrial 
biotechnology; formation and execution of comprehensive innovative projects 
in the area of industrial biotechnology; development of industrial 
biotechnology production export; and creation of technological base for 
industrial biotechnology. The sub-programme runs between 2014 and 2020 
and its budget for the first three years of implementation (2014-2016) is 1.50 
billion roubles. 
 
Principles of the State Policy in the Area of Ensuring Chemical and Biological 
Security of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2025 and beyond 
 
Several key documents have identified biosecurity as a priority area that 
requires concerted action.888 The ‘National Security Strategy of the Russian 
Federation until 2020’ published in 2009 lists ‘illicit activity in the field of 
biology’ as one of the strategic challenges to ensure the state’s national 
security.889 The proliferation of ‘nuclear, chemical, and biological technology’ 
and ‘the development of [WMD] and their means of delivery’ are also 
considered military threats. ‘Principles of the State Policy in the Area of 
Ensuring Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for the 
Period up to 2025 and beyond’ issued in 2013 is a comprehensive document 
setting out Russia’s biosecurity policy. Among the potential biological threats 
specified in the ‘Principles’ is the spread of naturally occurring diseases 
resulting from the risk of the emergence of new and the re-emergence of 
http://government.ru/docs/11912/ (accessed 9/09/2015). For a reference to the State Programme in English, see 
http://government.ru/en/docs/3341/ (accessed 9/09/2015).  
887 The full text of [in Russian] Podprogrammy No.18: Promyshlennye biotekhnologii is available at 
http://base.garant.ru/70643464/#block_18000 (accessed 9/09/2015). Author’s translation.  
888 See [in Russian] Eduard Yezhov, Gosudarstvennaya nauchno-tekhnicheskaya politika: osnova teknologicheskoi 
bezopasnosti, (Moscow: MAI, 1999); Aleksandra Simonova, Protivodeistvie bioterrorizmu: mezhdunarodno-pravovoi 
aspect, (Moscow: Librokom, 2010); V. Sergiev and N. Filatov, Infektsionnye bolezni na rubezhe vekov: osoznanie 
biologicheskoi ugrozy, (Moscow: Nauka, 2006).    
889 [in Russian] ‘Strategia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda’, op cit. Author’s 
translation.  
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already eradicated infectious diseases, and the growth of anti-microbial 
resistance; the accidental release of pathogens due to a failure in a 
laboratory containment system; and the deliberate release of pathogens 
featuring sabotage, illicit application of dual-use technologies, and 
bioterrorism. The main objectives of the policy are as follows: 
 
• Improvement of measures aimed at ensuring the implementation of 
Russia’s commitments under international treaties;   
• Participation in the development and application of the Russian-
Kazakhstan-Belarus Customs Union Technical Regulations which lay 
down safety requirements for products created with the use of 
biotechnologies;  
• Improvement of the regulation on trans-border transfer of GMOs; 
• Russia’s accession to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; and 
• Elaboration of measures aimed at preventing the threat of use of 
biological weapons against the Russian Federation.890 
 
The current ‘Principles’ aim to build upon Russia’s earlier efforts to develop 
an effective nation-wide biosecurity system, as illustrated in the ‘Principles of 
the State Policy in the Area of Ensuring Chemical and Biological Security of 
the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2010 and beyond’ which 
appeared in 2003. The primary instrument for the implementation of the 2003 
‘Principles’ has been the Federal Targeted Programme, ‘National System for 
Chemical and Biological Security in the Russian Federation, 2009-2014’, the 
goals of which have been the development of a methodology for threat 
assessment; modernisation of hazardous chemical biological facilities; 
research aimed at biological security; emergency response, and public and 
military protection; and curricula and staff development.891 4.09 billion 
890 See Russian Federation, Statement by the Russian Delegation at the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of 
States Parties, 9 December 2013, BWC/MSP/2013, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, available at 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C2B97F73E1976622C1257C3C0068D2F0/$file/Russian+Fe
deration.pdf (accessed 9/09/2015).  
891 See [in Russian] Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF, O Federal’noi tselevoi programme ‘Natsional’naya Sistema 
khimicheskoi i biologicheskoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii (2009-2014)’, No.791, 27 October 2008, available 
at http://base.garant.ru/2166728/ (accessed 9/09/2015). Full text of the Programme in Russian is available at 
http://fcp.economy.gov.ru/cgi-bin/cis/fcp.cgi/Fcp/Passport/View/2010/255/ (accessed 9/09/2015). The English 
translation of the Programme Title has been taken from Tatyana Elleman, ‘Russian Federation’, op cit, p.195. For a 
detailed overview of the programme, see [in Russian] Nikolai Makhutov et al. Bezopasnost’ Rossii: Pravovye, 
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Roubles have been spent on the Programme, including 2.85 billion on facility 
modernisation and 1.3 billion on research. The Federal Targeted Programme 
for the revised ‘Principles’, which will cover the period 2015-2020, is currently 
being developed. 
  
RAN Basic Research Programme, 2013-2020 
 
In 2012 the Government approved RAN’s Programme of Basic Research for 
the period 2013-2020.892 Among the key considerations underpinning the 
Programme is the need for the development of a modern system for the 
organisation of basic research on the basis of academic science; the need for 
effective utilisation of the potential of basic research as a strategic asset for 
the development of the society and state in general; and the need for 
ensuring the contribution of science to economic development, technological 
advancement, and national security. As the Programme was issued prior to 
the 2013 reform of the Academy, each of the three Academies pertinent to 
the life sciences – RAN, RAMN, and RASKhN – have been allocated a 
budget. For 2015, the estimated budget of RAN, RAMN, and RASKhN is 
57185.82 million roubles, 5078.62 million roubles, and 7665.2 million roubles, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie i nauchno-tekhnicheskie aspekti: biologicheskaya bezopasnost’, (Moscow: Znanie, 
2009), particularly Chapter 12 and Appendix 2.  
892 See [in Russian] Razporyazhenie Pravitel’stva, Programma fundamental’nykh nauchnykn issledovanii 
gosudarstvennykh akademii nauk na 2013-2020 gody’, No.2237-r, 3 December 2012, Moscow, available at 
http://www.ras.ru/scientificactivity/2013-2020plan.aspx (accessed 9/09/2015).   
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